TAB 1

Canada Federal Statutes Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act Interpretation

Most Recently Cited in: Montreal, Maine & Atlanique Canada Cie c. Richter Groupe Conseil inc., 2015 CarswellQue 6384 | (C.S. Qué., Jul 13, 2015)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 2

s 2.

Currency

2(1)Definitions
 In this Act,

"aircraft objects" [Repealed 2012, c. 31, s. 419.]

"bargaining agent" means any trade union that has entered into a collective agreement on behalf of the employees of a company; ("agent négociateur")

"bond" includes a debenture, debenture stock or other evidences of indebtedness; ("obligation")

"cash-flow statement", in respect of a company, means the statement referred to in paragraph 10(2)(a) indicating the company's projected cash flow; ("état de l'évolution de l'encaisse")

"claim" means any indebtedness, liability or obligation of any kind that would be a claim provable within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; ("réclamation")

"collective agreement", in relation to a debtor company, means a collective agreement within the meaning of the jurisdiction governing collective bargaining between the debtor company and a bargaining agent; ("convention collective")

"**company**" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province, any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies; ("compagnie")

"court" means

- (a) in Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, the Supreme Court,
- (a.1) in Ontario, the Superior Court of Justice,
- (b) in Quebec, the Superior Court,
- (c) in New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Queen's Bench, and
- (c.1) in Newfoundland and Labrador, the Trial Division of the Supreme Court, and
- (d) in Yukon and the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and in Nunavut, the Nunavut Court of Justice;

("tribunal")

"debtor company" means any company that

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent,

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts,

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a bankruptcy order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the Winding-up and Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent;

("compagnie débitrice")

"director" means, in the case of a company other than an income trust, a person occupying the position of director by whatever name called and, in the case of an income trust, a person occupying the position of trustee by whatever named called; ("administrateur")

"eligible financial contract" means an agreement of a prescribed kind; ("contrat financier admissible")

"equity claim" means a claim that is in respect of an equity interest, including a claim for, among others,

- (a) a dividend or similar payment,
- (b) a return of capital,
- (c) a redemption or retraction obligation,

(d) a monetary loss resulting from the ownership, purchase or sale of an equity interest or from the rescission, or, in Quebec, the annulment, of a purchase or sale of an equity interest, or

(e) contribution or indemnity in respect of a claim referred to in any of paragraphs (a) to (d);

("réclamation relative à des capitaux propres")

"equity interest" means

(a) in the case of a company other than an income trust, a share in the company — or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a share in the company — other than one that is derived from a convertible debt, and

(b) in the case of an income trust, a unit in the income trust — or a warrant or option or another right to acquire a unit in the income trust — other than one that is derived from a convertible debt;

("intérêt relatif à des capitaux propres")

"financial collateral" means any of the following that is subject to an interest, or in the Province of Quebec a right, that secures payment or performance of an obligation in respect of an eligible financial contract or that is subject to a title transfer credit support agreement:

(a) cash or cash equivalents, including negotiable instruments and demand deposits,

(b) securities, a securities account, a securities entitlement or a right to acquire securities, or

(c) a futures agreement or a futures account;

("garantie financière")

"income trust" means a trust that has assets in Canada if

(a) its units are listed on a prescribed stock exchange on the day on which proceedings commence under this Act, or

(b) the majority of its units are held by a trust whose units are listed on a prescribed stock exchange on the day on which proceedings commence under this Act;

("fiducie de revenu")

"initial application" means the first application made under this Act in respect of a company; ("demande initiale")

"monitor", in respect of a company, means the person appointed under section 11.7 to monitor the business and financial affairs of the company; ("contrôleur")

"net termination value" means the net amount obtained after netting or setting off or compensating the mutual obligations between the parties to an eligible financial contract in accordance with its provisions; ("valeurs nettes dues à la date de résiliation")

"prescribed" means prescribed by regulation; ("Version anglaise seulement")

"secured creditor" means a holder of a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, all or any property of a debtor company as security for indebtedness of the debtor company, or a holder of any bond of a debtor company secured by a mortgage, hypothec, pledge, charge, lien or privilege on or against, or any assignment, cession or transfer of, or a trust in respect of, all or any property of the debtor company, whether the holder or beneficiary is resident or domiciled within or outside Canada, and a trustee under any trust deed or other instrument securing any of those bonds shall be deemed to be a secured creditor for all purposes of this Act except for the purpose of voting at a creditors' meeting in respect of any of those bonds; ("créancier garanti")

"shareholder" includes a member of a company — and, in the case of an income trust, a holder of a unit in an income trust — to which this Act applies; ("actionnaire")

"Superintendent of Bankruptcy" means the Superintendent of Bankruptcy appointed under subsection 5(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act; ("surintendant des faillites")

"Superintendent of Financial Institutions" means the Superintendent of Financial Institutions appointed under subsection 5(1) of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Act; ("surintendant des institutions financières")

"title transfer credit support agreement" means an agreement under which a debtor company has provided title to property for the purpose of securing the payment or performance of an obligation of the debtor company in respect of an eligible financial contract; ("accord de transfert de titres pour obtention de crédit")

"unsecured creditor" means any creditor of a company who is not a secured creditor, whether resident or domiciled within or outside Canada, and a trustee for the holders of any unsecured bonds issue under a trust deed or other instrument running in favour of the trustee shall be deemed to be an unsecured creditor for all purposes of this Act except for the purpose of voting at a creditors' meeting in respect of any of those bonds. ("creancier chirographaire")

2(2)Meaning of "related" and "dealing at arm's length"

For the purpose of this Act, section 4 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* applies for the purpose of determining whether a person is related to or dealing at arm's length with a debtor company.

Amendment History


R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (2nd Supp.), s. 10 (Sched., item 3); 1990, c. 17, s. 4; 1992, c. 27, s. 90(1)(f); 1993, c. 28, s. 78 (Sched. III, item 20) [Repealed 1999, c. 3, s. 12 (Sched., item 4).]; 1993, c. 34, s. 52; 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d); 1997, c. 12, s. 120; 1998, c. 30, s. 14(c); 1999, c. 3, s. 22; 1999, c. 28, s. 154; 2001, c. 9, s. 575; 2002, c. 7, s. 133; 2004, c. 25, s. 193; 2005, c. 3, s. 15; 2005, c. 47, s. 124 [Amended 2007, c. 36, s. 105.]; 2007, c. 29, s. 104; 2007, c. 36, ss. 61(1), (2), (4); 2012, c. 31, s. 419; 2015, c. 3, s. 37

Currency

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Canada Federal Statutes Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act Interpretation

Most Recently Cited in: Hush Homes Inc., Re , 2015 ONSC 370, 2015 CarswellOnt 558, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 67, 248 A.C.W.S. (3d) 754 | (Ont. S.C.J., Jan 19, 2015)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 3

s 3.

Currency

3.

3(1)Application

This Act applies in respect of a debtor company or affiliated debtor companies if the total of claims against the debtor company or affiliated debtor companies, determined in accordance with section 20, is more than \$5,000,000 or any other amount that is prescribed.

3(2)Affiliated companies

For the purposes of this Act,

(a) companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each of them is controlled by the same person; and

(b) two companies affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

3(3)Company controlled

For the purposes of this Act, a company is controlled by a person or by two or more companies if

(a) securities of the company to which are attached more than fifty per cent of the votes that may be cast to elect directors of the company are held, other than by way of security only, by or for the benefit of that person or by or for the benefit of those companies; and

(b) the votes attached to those securities are sufficient, if exercised, to elect a majority of the directors of the company.

3(4)Subsidiary

For the purposes of this Act, a company is a subsidiary of another company if

- (a) it is controlled by
 - (i) that other company,
 - (ii) that other company and one ore more companies each of which is controlled by that other company, or
 - (iii) two or more companies each of which is controlled by that other company; or
- (b) it is a subsidiary of a company that is a subsidiary of that other company.

Amendment History

1997, c. 12, s. 121; 2005, c. 47, s. 125



Most Recently Cited in: Target Canada Co., Re , 2016 ONSC 316, 2016 CarswellOnt 589 | (Ont. S.C.J., Jan 15, 2016)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11

s 11. General power of court

Currency

11.General power of court

Despite anything in the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* or the *Winding-up and Restructuring Act*, if an application is made under this Act in respect of a debtor company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, subject to the restrictions set out in this Act, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit, make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

Amendment History

1992, c. 27, s. 90; 1996, c. 6, s. 167(1)(d); 1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128


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Most Recently Cited in: Pretty Estates Ltd., Re, 2016 BCSC 19, 2016 CarswellBC 24 | (B.C. S.C., Jan 7, 2016)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.2

s 11.2

Currency

11.2

11.2(1)Interim financing

On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

11.2(2)Priority — secured creditors

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

11.2(3)Priority — other orders

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

11.2(4)Factors to be considered

In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,


- (a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;
- (b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;
- (c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;
- (d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;
- (e) the nature and value of the company's property;
- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

Amendment History

1997, c. 12, s. 124; 2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 65

Currency

Federal English Statutes reflect amendments current to January 27, 2016



Most Recently Cited in: Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Re , 2015 ONSC 7371, 2015 CarswellOnt 19150 | (Ont. S.C.J., Nov 27, 2015)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.51

s 11.51

Currency

11.51

11.51(1)Security or charge relating to director's indemnification

On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

11.51(2)Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

11.51(3)Restriction — indemnification insurance

The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

11.51(4)Negligence, misconduct or fault

The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

Amendment History


2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 66

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Most Recently Cited in: Victorian Order of Nurses for Canada, Re , 2015 ONSC 7371, 2015 CarswellOnt 19150 | (Ont. S.C.J., Nov 27, 2015)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.52

s 11.52

Currency

11.52

11.52(1)Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2)Priority

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Amendment History


2005, c. 47, s. 128; 2007, c. 36, s. 66

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Canada Federal Statutes Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act Part IV — Cross-Border Insolvencies [Heading added 2005, c. 47, s. 131.] Miscellaneous Provisions [Heading added 2005, c. 47, s. 131.]

Most Recently Cited in: Cline Mining Corp., Re , 2014 ONSC 6998, 2014 CarswellOnt 18943, 22 C.B.R. (6th) 278, 251 A.C.W.S. (3d) 381 | (Ont. S.C.J., Dec 3, 2014)

R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 56

s 56. Authorization to act as representative of proceeding under this Act

Currency

56.Authorization to act as representative of proceeding under this Act The court may authorize any person or body to act as a representative in respect of any proceeding under this Act for the purpose of having them recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.

Amendment History

2005, c. 47, s. 131

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TAB 2

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

1995 CarswellOnt 36 Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Re plan of compromise or arrangement of all CADILLAC FAIRVIEW INC. and other companies set out in Sched. "A" attached hereto

CADILLAC FAIRVIEW INC. and all those companies set out in Sched. "A" (applicants)*

Farley J.

Heard: February 3, 1995 Judgment: February 5, 1995 Docket: Doc. B348/94

Counsel: W.R. Passi and J.R. Sproat, for Cadillac Fairview U.S. Inc. and other Cadillac Fairview interests. W.A. Kelly, Q.C., J.C. Orr and Helen A. Daly, for JMB/CF Advisors — CFCL, JMB/CF Advisors — CFUS, and other JMB interests.

David R. Byers, for mortgage lenders groups plus Prudential Life and Aetna Life but not contacted by Bank of America.

Kathryn L. Krueger, for subrogated debt committee.

Charles F. Scott, for syndicated lenders.

Kevin Aalto, for Swiss Bank Corporation.

Steve J. Weisz, for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

T.M. Dolan, for Toronto Dominion Bank and Toronto Dominion (Texas), Inc.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises --- Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Application of Act

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Ex parte application — Telephone service of notice of application being sufficient in ex parte application — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Ex parte application — Instant trust deeds not improper in connection with CCAA application — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

A company applied for a declaration that it was a company to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") applied. The application was supported by instant trust deeds.

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re, 1995 CarswellOnt 36

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

A bank had exercised its right of set-off by applying certain funds held on deposit by the company against a large debt. That set-off eliminated all but \$200,000 U.S. held in the company's bank account.

An opposing creditor questioned the validity of the instant trust deeds and of telephone service under the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

The bank should justify its actions with respect to the set-off; otherwise, the CCAA order would be granted on a nunc pro tunc basis against the bank.

An instant trust deed is not improper in connection with a CCAA application. Telephone service was more than sufficient in the circumstances: a CCAA application is an ex parte matter.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) --- referred to

Macdonald v. Georgian Bay Lumber Co. (1878), 2 S.C.R. 364 - referred to

Marine Trust Co. v. Weinig, 16 C.B.R. 304, [1935] O.W.N. 150, [1935] 3 D.L.R. 282 (S.C.) - referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — followed

P.R.O. Holdings Ltd., Re (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 145 N.B.R. (2d) 7, 372 A.P.R. 7 (C.A.) - referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ---

s. 2 "company"

Application for declaration that applicant company was company to which Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act applied.

Farley J.:

1 This was the second application by the applicant Cadillac Fairview U.S. Inc. ("CFUS") for (i) a declaration that CFUS was a company to which the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") applies and (ii) an amendment to my order of December 23, 1994 ("CCAA Order") to add CFUS as an applicant in that proceeding. The CFUS application in this respect has had a meander. The first application for the same relief was set down for Thursday, January 26, 1995 but adjourned at the request of JMB/CF Advisors — CFUS and the related JMB entities (collectively "JMB") to allow cross-examination on

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re, 1995 CarswellOnt 36

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

the materials. It was then scheduled to resume on Wednesday, February 1st. However, with new material being filed, I found on my preliminary review that there was an irregularity on the face of the material with respect to the debentures ("March 1994 Debentures"). The matter was then adjourned to Friday, February 3rd at 2:00 p.m. for the purpose of allowing CFUS to file supplementary material to explain or correct the application as well as allowing a consideration of notifying all affected material creditors. At 4:40 p.m. that day I read my endorsement giving the reasons why I had dismissed the first application since CFUS had "explained" as opposed to "corrected" (corrected in the sense of a fresh issue of debentures pursuant to a trust deed) since there were still on the face of the materials irregularities regarding the certification of the trustee and the payment of monies to CFUS in return for the issuance of the March 1994 Debentures in March 1994. The application was dismissed without prejudice to CFUS re-applying with a fresh application based on a transaction and facts which would get it through the eye of the needle threshold requirements of CCAA for thereafter consideration by me of the appropriateness of extending the protection of the CCAA request to CFUS to allow it breathing space to reorganize.

2 *Immediately* upon my advising of the dismissal of the first application, Mr. Passi advised that CFUS would be making a second application based upon a fresh situation and inquired whether he could return within an hour. As the matter has been outstanding for some time and should be dealt with on an effective basis without being strung out which would try everyone's patience and as I had another hearing coming back for an hour's work, I had no problem with acceding to his request which was made in the presence of counsel for the interested participants.

Mr. Passi and (all - as far as I can determine) the other counsel returned within an hour and a few minutes. Mr. Passi had 3 a fresh application which included the details of a second debenture issue ("February 1995 Debentures"). The material showed that a new trust deed was entered into between CFUS and 1059724 Ontario Inc. ("Trustee") on February 2nd, 1995, there was a new direction to the Trustee from CFUS to certify and deliver two debentures for \$50 each to Cadillac Fairview Corporation Limited ("CFCL"), that two debentures were so issued to CFCL and that CFCL had paid \$50 each for same to CFUS, which funds were deposited in CFUS' Toronto bank account on that same day. These funds raised by the issuance of the February 1995 Debentures joined the monies in the Toronto accounts of CFUS namely some \$200,000 and the proceeds from the March 1994 Debentures received in January 1995. Mr. Kelly raised the question of whether the authorization resolution of the directors of CFUS dated as of January 24, 1995 was being relied on for the February 1995 Debentures, especially regarding the approval of a new trust deed. Mr. Passi has now provided today with an affidavit of Graeme Eadie, President and a director of CFUS sworn yesterday confirming that there was a fresh directors' resolution to this effect executed as of February 2nd, 1995. Mr. Eadie's affidavit also provided me with another resolution dated as of February 4th, 1995 which renumbers the February 1995 Debentures as numbers 2-1 and 2-2 (as I had pointed out on Friday that both debentures in the material were numbered the same - i.e. "2" although it was apparent from the differences in the handwriting that there were two different original debentures in fact). I note that all the resolutions referred to are resolutions in writing which I presume explains the nature of the "as of" dating.

4 Mr. Kelly's concern about the approval of the fresh trust deed was the only point raised at the hearing on the second application, as it appears that everyone was content to allow their same first application arguments stand for the second application.

5 It is, of course, important for CFUS to make a proper application for consideration by the court, otherwise it would open itself up to attack at a later stage. In this regard I think it helpful to recall the words of Doherty J.A. in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) at p. 313 [emphasis added]:

In holding that "instant" trust deeds can satisfy the requirements of s. 3 of the Act, I should not be taken as concluding that debentures or bonds which are truly shams, in that they do not reflect a transaction which actually occurred and do not create a real debt owed by the company, will suffice. Clearly, they will not. I do not, however, equate the two. One is a tactical device used to gain the potential advantages of the Act. The other is a fraud.

I note the observations of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in *Re P.R.O. Holdings Ltd.* (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (N.B. C.A.) at p. 4 after citing the above quote from *Elan*:

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

There was no evidence that the deeds here were a sham in that sense. Instead, they were instant trust deeds, a device that has received, albeit sometimes reluctantly, almost universal judicial approval.

It went on to say at p. 5:

Section 3 of the Act is clear. From that, we can only conclude that Parliament wanted an objective and easily understood standard. The introduction of a judicial subjective standard could quickly lead to the uneven application of the Act.

I am of the view that CFUS is a "company" within that definition as set out in s. 2 CCAA in that it is an "incorporated company having assets ... in Canada, wherever incorporated ...". Clearly CFUS has the U.S. and Canadian dollar bank accounts in Toronto in which it has deposited over \$200,000 U.S. In the same way that Doherty J.A. was not concerned about tactical devices being used so long as they reflect a transaction which actually occurred, I have no difficulty in accepting assets which are reflective of assets being in Canada. I do not see that it matters that the assets are of any particular percentage or importance to the applicant overall. I recall that instant debt was recognized in some aspects of the Olympia & York proceedings by Blair J. I similarly have no problems with accepting the concept of instant assets. I see no reason to determine if CFUS is actually carrying on business in Canada.

7 CFUS indicates that it is admittedly insolvent on the basis that it has not been able to meet its liabilities generally as they become due. While Mr. Kelly may be right that CFCL has not demanded payment of its \$73 million advance to CFUS, it was responded that there was no sense in doing so as CFCL would know that CFUS could not meet the demand. That also may be true but it would not seem that absent such advances CFUS could claim insolvency as a result of this inter-company debt which is presently being accommodated. However CFUS' cash to meet any debts or demands is perilously limited — namely (after taking into account \$5.5 million of the \$7 million available cash for project level working capital purposes) \$1.5 million. The project loan on Cal Plaza 2A is guaranteed by CFUS, CFCL and Cadillac Fairview Inc. ("CFI"); \$3.5 million is in default and Citicorp Real Estate Inc. has made demand against CFUS aside from suing CFCL and CFI. The project loan on Pomerado Business Park of \$60 million is in default; demand was made on the CFUS and CFCL guarantees last September. Toronto Dominion (Texas) Inc. sued CFUS. Settlement discussions have taken place but the liability of CFUS in this regard would be in the tens of millions of dollars. Given the nature of its assets (investments in companies which are holding or developing real estate projects, some of which are less than 50% interest) which leads to a certain illiquidity, I have no difficulty in accepting CFUS' admission of insolvency. This is a corporation under severe financial pressure — even aside from JMB's lawsuit against it for advisory services which JMB is ardently pressing.

There is another element to this to which I was alerted after the hearing on Friday night. It appears that Swiss Bank 8 Corporation ("SBC") at 4:11 p.m. on Friday forwarded a letter to CFUS c/o the Chicago JMB offices notifying CFUS that SBC had exercised its right of set-off by applying \$1,317,743.94 held by CFUS on deposit with SBC against the obligations by CFUS to SBC (which I understand to have been a \$9 million debt). This would appear to eliminate all but the approximately \$200.000 U.S. held in the Toronto bank account if this set-off were allowed to stand. It seems to me that SBC should justify its actions in this regard or otherwise it would seem at first analysis that any CCAA order to issue in this respect should be given on a nunc pro tunc basis against SBC: see my views at p. 309 (para.8) and p. 310 (para.15) of Re Inducon Development Corp. (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.); see also Re Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at pp. 31-32. I note in this respect that John MacDonald, Senior Vice President, Treasurer and another director of CFUS (swearing a February 4th, 1995 affidavit) states that he discussed the CCAA process on February 1st, 1995 with Mark B. Cohen, one of the SBC senders of the notice of set-off. SBC was represented at the Friday hearings by Mr. Aalto and advised the court that SBC was not fundamentally opposed to the application but it wished to have some protection in the way as requested by Messrs. Dolan and Byers. He went on to point out that the schedule of debt (ex. "O") was in error as to SBC since SBC's loan was secured versus (as indicated) unsecured. It is as well puzzling in the circumstances why SBC would notify CFUS in Chicago since it took JMB almost two hours to relay the fax back (this is not intended as a criticism of JMB since it would be unreasonable to assume that everyone can act "instantaneously" in every instance). Perhaps the formal notice went to CFUS in Chicago because that was the formal address given for notice; however I would have thought it a reasonable courtesy to have advised Mr. MacDonald in Toronto at the same time, given his discussions two days earlier with Mr. Cohen.

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re, 1995 CarswellOnt 36

1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 53 A.C.W.S. (3d) 536

9 I note as well that it is contemplated that the restructuring arising out of these CCAA proceedings if CFUS is added would involve a compromise of the debt pursuant to the trust deeds.

10 It would also appear that the affairs of CFUS are intertwined with that of CFI and CFCL, for example including the CFCL \$73 million advance, the joint guarantees and in some instances reguarantees and the fact that the affairs of the Cadillac Fairview group including CFUS are managed and accounted for on a consolidated basis. It now appears that the consensual restructuring of CFUS previously hoped for is no longer feasible and it would be desirable to have CFUS as a participant in the existing CCAA proceedings by including it as an applicant in the CCAA Order. This of course does not mean that CFUS' assets and liabilities are merely to be added into a pot and treated as a homogeneous part of the whole. That will be a matter of careful consideration and balancing. The restructurings contemplated may be assisted by further advances from the parent companies (CFI and CFCL).

11 JMB was the only participant in the hearing which opposed the CFUS application, the rest were either unopposed or generally supportive.

12 Mr. Kelly submits that telephone service is not sufficient under CCAA. However he overlooks that technically a CCAA application is an ex parte matter: see *Inducon* at p. 310. Thus in my view telephone notice is more than sufficient in the circumstances — on the practicalities of the situation. Further I am satisfied that CFUS has given reasonable notice to all of its material affected creditors; Bank of America was the only one not to make its views known but it had a reasonable opportunity to do so.

13 Mr. Kelly then raised some bankruptcy cases: *Macdonald v. Georgian Bay Lumber Co.* (1878), 2 S.C.R. 364 and *Marine Trust Co. v. Weinig*, [1935] O.W.N. 150 (S.C.) as standing for the proposition that I should not grant the relief requested under CCAA. However what he appears to have overlooked is that in a bankruptcy there is a question of vesting of assets in the trustee in bankruptcy. This then gets into a debate about moveables and immoveables. The nub of this question gets down to the aspect of a trustee in bankruptcy being vested with moveables but not foreign immoveables under Canadian bankruptcy law. However this is not a bankruptcy situation; it is an application under CCAA where there is no such vesting question but rather CFUS will continue to hold all assets directly which it did before the application. The key feature to a CCAA application is the stay protection afforded, all with a view towards accommodating the anticipated restructuring which then must be accepted by the requisite majorities (and then by the court) as being fair and reasonable. I do not find Mr. Kelly's cases as relevant to this type of proceeding. See also my views in *Lehndorff*, supra.

I am therefore of the view that it would be appropriate to issue the declaration and to add CFUS as a participant to my CCAA Order. If Mr. Kelly (or others) wish to challenge the supplementary material they may do so by utilizing the comeback clause. If a consensual arrangement is not worked out with SBC, then I would entertain a further motion concerning the timing of the effect of CFUS being so added. I would be of the view that the actual form of order would be quite simple; I would note that the draft I was provided with today asked for additional relief which was not in the motion. This should be the subject, if desired, of a further motion (assuming a lack of consent by affected parties).

Application allowed.

Footnotes

Schedule "A" was not provided by the court.

End of Document

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TAB 3

2004 BCSC 745 British Columbia Supreme Court

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re

2004 CarswellBC 1249, 2004 BCSC 745, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1153, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650, 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210, 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

And In the Matter of the Yukon Business Corporations Act, R.S.Y. 1986, c. 15

And In the Matter of Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Un Limited and Brightstar Limited (Petitioner)

Pitfield J.

Heard: April 26, 2004 Judgment: June 4, 2004

Docket: Vancouver L021991

Counsel: Scott A. Turner, David E. Gruber for Petitioners Gordon D. Phillips for Respondents, UBS Capital Americas II, LLC and Canven V (Barbados) Limited Douglas B. Hyndman for York Capital Management LP Alan B. Brown for Credit Suisse First Boston Heather M. Ferris for Monitor, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Debtor company applied to add two subsidiaries as petitioners in proceeding under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Two subsidiaries were incorporated in Bermuda — Immediately prior to application to add, each subsidiary had deposited US \$100 in Canadian bank account — Application was granted — Debtor company and its two subsidiaries subsequently obtained approval of majority of creditors for consolidated plan of arrangement under Act — By that time balance in each subsidiary's Canadian bank account was US \$45.15 — Debtor company and subsidiaries brought application for court approval of plan — Application granted — Plan was sufficiently fair and reasonable — Fair and reasonable plan is meant to be equitable arrangement in nature of compromise — Plan satisfied majority of creditors on whole — Objecting creditor did not discharge heavy burden on it as party seeking to oppose court approval of plan — Objecting creditor became involved as lender to debtor company knowing that capital would be directed to capitalization of subsidiaries — No suggestion was made that operating relationship among debtor company and subsidiaries was inappropriate — Objecting creditor must have been aware that consolidated plan would deprive it of right to recover on guarantees — Objecting creditor's argument that subsidiary had no real connection to Canada was back door attempt to oppose permission granted to debtor and subsidiaries to submit consolidated proposal to creditors.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249

2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1153, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650...

Debtor company applied to add two subsidiaries as petitioners in proceeding under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Two subsidiaries were incorporated in Bermuda — Immediately prior to application to add, each subsidiary had deposited US \$100 in Canadian bank account — Application was granted — Debtor company and its two subsidiaries subsequently obtained approval of majority of creditors for consolidated plan of arrangement under Act — By that time balance in each subsidiary's Canadian bank account was US \$45.15 — Debtor company and subsidiaries brought application for court approval of plan — Objecting creditor took position that bank accounts created by subsidiaries were not assets sufficient to bring subsidiaries within definition of "company" under s. 2 of Act — Application granted — Subsidiaries qualified as companies under Act — Court must not engage in qualitative or quantitative analysis of company's Canadian assets in order to decide whether company qualifies as "having assets in Canada" in accordance with definition in s. 2 of Act — Certainty is required with respect to availability of Act — Importing element of discretion into question of eligibility to use Act would diminish effectiveness of Act — Courts have acknowledged efficacy of "instant assets" — If de minimis standard is thought to be appropriate in determining whether company has assets in Canada and is therefore entitled to protection of Act, it is for Parliament to amend the Act accordingly.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pitfield J*.:

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29, 1995 CarswellOnt 36 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) - referred to

Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139, 1993 CarswellOnt 228 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) - referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1989), (sub nom. Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada) 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, (sub nom. Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada) 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, (sub nom. Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada) [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 1989 CarswellBC 334 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

P.R.O. Holdings Ltd., Re (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 145 N.B.R. (2d) 7, 372 A.P.R. 7, 1994 CarswellNB 10 (N.B. C.A.) — referred to

Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re (1991), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 1, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 651, 60 B.C.L.R. (2d) 311, 1991 CarswellBC 502 (B.C. S.C.) — referred to

Sammi Atlas Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOut 1145, 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered

s. 2 "company" — considered

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1153, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650...

APPLICATION by debtor companies for order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act approving plan of arrangement.

Pitfield J.:

1 Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Un Limited and Brightstar Limited apply for an order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-25 sanctioning a consolidated Plan of Arrangement approved by creditors in the manner contemplated by the *Act*.

2 If approved, the Plan would permit distribution of cash on hand in the approximate amount of US \$658,000 to the petitioners' creditors on a rateable basis in the calculation of which the claims of creditors owed more than \$100,000 would be capped at \$100,000. Creditors with claims in excess of \$100,000 would receive shares in a corporation to be incorporated for the purpose of acquiring Global's interest in Bestel, S.A., a Mexican company that operates a telecommunications network located primarily in Mexico. Share entitlement would be determined on a rateable basis by reference to the gross amount of each creditor's claim.

3 The Plan has been approved by the requisite majority of creditors. However, York Capital Management LP, York Offshore Investors Unit Trust and York Investment Limited oppose the application to sanction on the grounds that Brightstar and Un Limited are not debtor companies for *CCAA* purposes and cannot be included in the Plan; Brightstar and Un Limited should not have been added as petitioners in the proceeding and the order purporting to do so was a nullity; and the Plan is not fair and reasonable.

4 The relevant background is the following. Global is a Yukon corporation. It raised substantial amounts of capital by issuing shares and various debt instruments. The capital so acquired was used, in part, to capitalize Un Limited as a wholly owned subsidiary. In turn, Un Limited capitalized Brightstar. Both Un Limited and Brightstar are Bermuda corporations. Global also capitalized GST Mextel, Inc., a Delaware corporation, as a wholly owned subsidiary. Following capitalization by Global, Brightstar acquired a 49% interest in New World Network Holdings Ltd., and GST Mextel acquired a 49% interest in Bestel.

5 Global borrowed US \$4 million from York pursuant to a series of loan agreements dated June 29, 2001. That sum compares to debts in excess of US \$40 million owed to other debenture holders. By January 2002, Global was in default under the York loan agreements. York agreed to extend the loan repayment date to June 30, 2002, in consideration for, among other things, loan guarantees from Brightstar and Un Limited.

6 On June 28, 2002, Global was granted a stay of proceedings under the *Act* in order to allow it to construct a plan of Arrangement or Compromise for presentation to its creditors. On August 15, 2003, Global applied to add its subsidiary, Un Limited, and that company's subsidiary, Brightstar, as petitioners in the proceeding. The application to add clearly identified the fact that Brightstar and Un Limited had provided guarantees in relation to some of Global's debts. York appeared at the hearing of the application but took no position in relation to it.

7 On August 28, 2003, the court granted an order approving the sale of Brightstar's 49% equity interest in New World Network Holdings Ltd. on condition that the sale price of approximately US \$658,000 be remitted to, and held by, the Monitor in trust for the benefit of the petitioners' creditors. York Capital appeared on that application but took no position.

8 On February 18, 2004, the court granted a procedural order authorizing the petitioners to seek creditor approval of the consolidated Plan of Arrangement in respect of which sanction is now sought. Counsel for York appeared on that application but took no position.

9 On March 23, 2004, the Plan was approved by 83% of creditors in number and 86% of creditors in dollar value. The percentages exceeded the minimum required by the *Act*. This application to sanction followed as a result.

10 At the hearing of this application, York claimed that it had recently learned that Brightstar and Un Limited had opened Canadian bank accounts with nominal deposits of US \$100 immediately prior to applying to be added as petitioners. It claimed to have been informed that the accounts were closed immediately after the granting of the order adding them as petitioners. These statements of fact, not verified by affidavit at the time of the hearing, were not disputed by the petitioners. York relied Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249

2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1153, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650...

on this information to support its claim that Brightstar and Un Limited, as Bermuda corporations, were not companies that could not benefit from a *CCAA* proposal because the bank accounts with nominal amount on deposit did not satisfy the *CCAA* requirement that the companies have assets in Canada before availing themselves of the protection afforded by the *Act*.

Following the hearing, I directed the petitioners to file affidavit evidence explaining the origin, operation, and current status of the bank accounts. The affidavits indicate that each of Un Limited and Brightstar opened an account with HSBC in Vancouver on July 24, 2003. The amount of US \$100 was deposited to each account. The monitor deposes as follows in relation to the origin of the funds:

The funds that were deposited to the Brightstar and Un Limited accounts were provided to Brightstar and Un Limited by Global Light. This was consistent with the dealings between Global Light, Un Limited and Brightstar throughout their existence. Whenever Brightstar or Un Limited required funds in the past, those funds were always provided by Global Light.

12 The affidavit evidence establishes that the accounts have remained open. No additional deposits have been made. The only debits to the accounts have been the bank's monthly minimum balance service charges. At March 31, 2004, the balance in each account was US \$45.15.

13 I invited the parties to make additional submissions having regard for the additional evidence. None were forthcoming.

14 York does not challenge the efficacy of the transactions resulting in the creation of the accounts but says the "instant" Canadian bank accounts created shortly before the application to add Brightstar and Un Limited as petitioners do not qualify as assets sufficient to bring Brightstar within the definition of "company" as defined in s. 2 of the *Act*. In the alternative, York says that the Plan is unfair because Brightstar has no real connection to Canada and consolidation produces an inappropriate result by permitting creditors of a Canadian company to enjoy benefits that should accrue solely to York under the guarantees granted to it by Brightstar.

15 The petitioners submit that the Plan is fair and reasonable. They say that York failed to object to the procedural order that permitted the presentation of a consolidated plan to creditors and did not appeal the order or apply to have it set aside as a nullity.

16 In my opinion, York's claim that Brightstar does not qualify as a company for purposes of the *Act* must fail. Section 2 of the *Act* defines "company" as follows:

..."company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporation by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, except banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies;...

17 The substance of York's claim is that the court must engage in a qualitative or quantitative analysis of the Canadian assets in order to decide whether a company that is not incorporated in Canada and is not doing business in Canada otherwise qualifies as one "having assets ... in Canada". In my opinion, the court must not engage in that kind of analysis. Certainty is required in so far as the availability of the *Act* is concerned. In my opinion, importing an element of discretion into the question of eligibility would diminish the effectiveness of the *Act* as a means of assisting in the evolution of plans of arrangement acceptable to companies and their creditors. It is for that reason, I suggest, that courts concerned with the application of the *Act* have acknowledged the efficacy of "instant assets": see, for example, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.); *Cadillac Fairview Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Philip's Manufacturing Ltd., Re* (1991), 9 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (B.C. S.C.); and *P.R.O. Holdings Ltd., Re* (1994), 24 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (N.B. C.A.). If a *de minimis* standard is thought to be appropriate in determining whether a company has assets in Canada, it is for parliament to amend the *Act* accordingly.

18 I conclude that Brightstar qualified as a company at the time it applied to be added as a petitioner. It qualified as a company at the time of the application for the procedural order and at the time of the application to sanction the plan. It would

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not have qualified without opening the bank account. It would have ceased to qualify if the account balance had been reduced to nil, or if the bank account had been closed. The qualitative and quantitative analyses urged by York are only relevant in the assessment of the suitability of a consolidated plan of arrangement in any particular circumstances. In that regard, York expressed no opposition to a consolidated plan of arrangement when it was first proposed by the petitioners at the time of applying for the procedural order.

19 In considering whether to sanction the Plan, the court must have regard for three well-established principles, as set out in *Northland Properties Ltd., Re* (1989), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195 (B.C. C.A.), at 201:

1. There must be strict compliance with all statutory requirements;

2. All material filed and procedures carried out must be examined to determine if anything has been done which is not authorized by the *CCCA*;

3. The plan must be fair and reasonable.

20 Brightstar qualifies as a company under the *CCAA* and has complied with the technical requirements. That which has been done to date is authorized by the *Act*. The only issue is whether the consolidated Plan is fair and reasonable.

21 York says the Plan is not fair and reasonable because Brightstar has no real connection to this jurisdiction other than a hastily opened bank account of an insignificant amount. This objection amounts to a back door attempt to oppose the permission granted to the petitioners to submit a consolidated proposal to creditors.

22 York must have been aware that the consolidated Plan would deprive it of the right to seek to recover on its guarantees. It did not attempt to suggest in its submissions that the operating relationship among Global, Un Limited and Brightstar was such that consolidation was inappropriate. Indeed, York became involved as a lender to Global, as did other lenders, knowing that Global's capital would be directed to the capitalization of subsidiaries. York did not oppose the application to consolidate at the hearing of the application regarding the procedural order. It did not appeal that order. In the circumstances, York cannot now be heard to complain about adverse effects flowing from the consolidated Plan.

Is the Plan otherwise fair and reasonable? In addressing that question the court must not insist on perfection with respect to fairness and reasonableness. Rather, a fair and reasonable plan is meant to be an equitable arrangement in the nature of a compromise: *Sammi Atlas Inc., Re* (1998), 3 C.B.R. (4th) 171 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at 173. Each of the creditors will not necessarily be treated equally, but the Plan must satisfy the majority of creditors on the whole. This Plan has that effect. All creditors became involved with Global and its subsidiaries knowing they were dealing with Global as the parent. While one may query whether the guarantee in favour of York is valid given that it was granted when the group was seemingly insolvent, there is nothing in the evidence tendered by York that would suggest it accommodated the Global group in a manner that should result in it being potentially the sole beneficiary of the sale proceeds of a subsidiary's interest in a distant investment. The majority has voted in favour of the Plan. There is a heavy burden on parties seeking to oppose sanctioning: *Central Guaranty Trustco Ltd., Re* (1993), 21 C.B.R. (3d) 139 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). York has not discharged that burden.

In my view, the Plan is sufficiently fair and reasonable in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the application for an order sanctioning the Plan dated February 18, 2004 is granted.

Application granted.

Footnotes

* An amended replacement copy of the judgment was issued by the court on June 28, 2004.

Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re, 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249 2004 BCSC 745, 2004 CarswellBC 1249, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1153, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 650...

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TAB 4

Most Negative Treatment: Recently added (treatment not yet designated) Most Recent Recently added (treatment not yet designated): PT Holdco, Inc., Re | 2016 ONSC 495, 2016 CarswellOnt 1447 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Jan 21, 2016)

> 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

> > Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284, 129 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1065, 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT WITH RESPECT TO STELCO INC. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A"

APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

Farley J.

Heard: March 5, 2004 Judgment: March 22, 2004 Docket: 04-CL-5306

Counsel: Michael E. Barrack, James D. Gage, Geoff R. Hall for Applicants David Jacobs, Michael McCreary for Locals, 1005, 5328, 8782 of the United Steel Workers of America Ken Rosenberg, Lily Harmer, Rob Centa for United Steelworkers of America Bob Thornton, Kyla Mahar for Ernst & Young Inc., Monitor of the Applicants Kevin J. Zych for Informal Committee of Stelco Bondholders David R. Byers for CIT Kevin McElcheran for GE Murray Gold, Andrew Hatnay for Retired Salaried Beneficiaries Lewis Gottheil for CAW Canada and its Local 523 Virginie Gauthier for Fleet H. Whiteley for CIBC Gail Rubenstein for FSCO Kenneth D. Kraft for EDS Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Application of Act

Steel company S Inc. applied for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") on January 29, 2004 — Union locals moved to rescind initial order and dismiss initial application of S Inc. and its subsidiaries on ground S Inc. was not "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of CCAA because S Inc. was not insolvent — Motion dismissed — Given

Stelco Inc., Re, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284...

time and steps involved in reorganization, condition of insolvency perforce required expanded meaning under CCAA — Union affiant stated that S Inc. will run out of funding by November 2004 — Given that November was ten months away from date of filing, S Inc. had liquidity problem — S Inc. realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access to further outside funding — S Inc. had negative equity of \$647 million — On balance of probabilities, S Inc. was insolvent and therefore was "debtor company" as at date of filing and entitled to apply for CCAA protection.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Farley J.:

A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re (1993), [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) - considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) - considered

Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd. (1996), [1997] 1 W.W.R. 209, 140 D.L.R. (4th) 33, 148 Sask. R. 135, 134 W.A.C. 135, 6 C.P.C. (4th) 90, 1996 CarswellSask 581 (Sask. C.A.) — considered

Barsi v. Farcas (1923), [1924] 1 W.W.R. 707, 2 C.B.R. 299, 18 Sask. L.R. 158, [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154, 1923 CarswellSask 227 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex (2002), 2002 SCC 42, 2002 CarswellBC 851, 2002 CarswellBC 852, 100 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 1, 212 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 287 N.R. 248, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 289, 166 B.C.A.C. 1, 271 W.A.C. 1, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 189, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) — considered

Challmie, Re (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 1976 CarswellBC 63 (B.C. S.C.) -- considered

Clarkson v. Sterling (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) - considered

Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re (1986), 69 B.C.L.R. 273, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156, 1986 CarswellBC 481 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Cumberland Trading Inc., Re (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225, 1994 CarswellOnt 255 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) -- considered

Davidson v. Douglas (1868), 15 Gr. 347, 1868 CarswellOnt 167 (Ont. Ch.) - considered

Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of) (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133, 1991 CarswellOnt 168 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp. (1999), 1999 CarswellOnt 2213, 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) -- considered

Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74, 1950 CarswellOnt 101 (Ont. S.C.) - considered

Gardner v. Newton (1916), 10 W.W.R. 51, 26 Man. R. 251, 29 D.L.R. 276, 1916 CarswellMan 83 (Man. K.B.) - considered

Inducon Development Corp., Re (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306, 1991 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - considered

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Kenwood Hills Development Inc., Re (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44, 1995 CarswellOnt 38 (Ont. Bktcy.) - considered

King Petroleum Ltd., Re (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76, 1978 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.) -- considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) -- considered

Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd. (1989), 92 N.S.R. (2d) 283, 75 C.B.R. (N.S.) 317, 45 B.L.R. 14, 237 A.P.R. 283, 1989 CarswellNS 27 (N.S. T.D.) — considered

Montreal Trust Co. of Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd. (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14, (sub nom. Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)) 101 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 73, (sub nom. Timber Lodge Ltd. v. Montreal Trust Co. of Canada (No. 1)) 321 A.P.R. 73, 1992 CarswellPEI 13 (P.E.I. C.A.) — referred to

MTM Electric Co., Re (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29, 1982 CarswellOnt 170 (Ont. Bktcy.) --- considered

New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 93, 1993 CarswellOnt 173 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1990 CarswellOnt 139 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2001), 2001 CarswellOnt 2954, 16 B.L.R. (3d) 74, 28 C.B.R. (4th) 294 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp. (2003), 2003 CarswellOut 5210, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 313, (sub nom. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Bankrupt) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp.) 180 O.A.C. 158 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 64, 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747, 42 O.A.C. 321, (sub nom. Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. v. Digital Recording Corp.) 1 O.R. (3d) 131, 1990 CarswellOnt 143 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Pacific Mobile Corp., Re (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209, 1979 CarswellQue 76 (C.S. Que.) - referred to

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609, 49 C.P.R. (3d) 456, 64 O.A.C. 274, 15 O.R. (3d) 730, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 109, 1993 CarswellOnt 149 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc. (1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix, 10 B.L.R. (2d) 244 (note), 104 D.L.R. (4th) vii, 68 O.A.C. 21 (note), 164 N.R. 78 (note), 16 O.R. (3d) xvi (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Proulx (2000), [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 2000 SCC 5, 2000 CarswellMan 32, 2000 CarswellMan 33, 140 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 249 N.R. 201, 49 M.V.R. (3d) 163, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, 212 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621, 1991 CarswellOnt 220 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered Stelco Inc., Re, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211

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Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co. (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7, 21 C.B.R. (3d) 25, 1993 CarswellOnt 219 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

TDM Software Systems Inc., Re (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92, 1986 CarswellOnt 203 (Ont. S.C.) - referred to

Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157, 1986 CarswellBC 499 (B.C. S.C.) - referred to

Webb v. Stenton (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) - referred to

633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72, 73 O.R. (2d) 774, 1990 CarswellOnt 181 (Ont. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-3 Generally — referred to

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3 Generally — referred to

- s. 2(1) "insolvent person" referred to
- s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (a) considered
- s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (b) considered
- s. 2(1) "insolvent person" (c) -- considered
- s. 43(7) referred to
- s. 121(1) referred to
- s. 121(2) referred to
- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to
 - s. 2 "debtor company" referred to
 - s. 2 "debtor company" (a) -- considered
 - s. 2 "debtor company" (b) considered
 - s. 2 "debtor company" (c) considered
 - s. 2 "debtor company" (d) considered
 - s. 12 referred to
 - s. 12(1) "claim" referred to

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Winding-up and Restructuring Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. W-11 Generally — referred to

Words and phrases considered:

debtor company

It seems to me that the [*Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36] test of insolvency . . . which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the [*Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3] definition of [s. 2(1)] (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring.

MOTION by union that steel company was not "debtor company" as defined in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Farley J.:

1 As argued this motion by Locals 1005, 5328 and 8782 United Steel Workers of America (collectively "Union") to rescind the initial order and dismiss the application of Stelco Inc. ("Stelco") and various of its subsidiaries (collectively "Sub Applicants") for access to the protection and process of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") was that this access should be denied on the basis that Stelco was not a "debtor company" as defined in s. 2 of the CCAA because it was not insolvent.

2 Allow me to observe that there was a great deal of debate in the materials and submissions as to the reason(s) that Stelco found itself in with respect to what Michael Locker (indicating he was "an expert in the area of corporate restructuring and a leading steel industry analyst") swore to at paragraph 12 of his affidavit was the "current crisis":

12. Contending with weak operating results and resulting tight cash flow, management has deliberately chosen not to fund its employee benefits. By contrast, Dofasco and certain other steel companies have consistently funded both their employee benefit obligations as well as debt service. If Stelco's management had chosen to fund pension obligations, presumably with borrowed money, *the current crisis* and related restructuring plans would focus on debt restructuring as opposed to the reduction of employee benefits and related liabilities. [Emphasis added.]

For the purpose of determining whether Stelco is insolvent and therefore could be considered to be a debtor company, it 3 matters not what the cause or who caused the financial difficulty that Stelco is in as admitted by Locker on behalf of the Union. The management of a corporation could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the corporation could be in the grip of ruthless, hard hearted and hard nosed outside financiers; the corporation could be the innocent victim of uncaring policy of a level of government; the employees (unionized or non-unionized) could be completely incompetent, inadvertently or advertently; the relationship of labour and management could be absolutely poisonous; the corporation could be the victim of unforeseen events affecting its viability such a as a fire destroying an essential area of its plant and equipment or of rampaging dumping. One or more or all of these factors (without being exhaustive), whether or not of varying degree and whether or not in combination of some may well have been the cause of a corporation's difficulty. The point here is that Stelco's difficulty exists; the only question is whether Stelco is insolvent within the meaning of that in the "debtor company" definition of the CCAA. However, I would point out, as I did in closing, that no matter how this motion turns out, Stelco does have a problem which has to be addressed - addressed within the CCAA process if Stelco is insolvent or addressed outside that process if Stelco is determined not to be insolvent. The status quo will lead to ruination of Stelco (and its Sub Applicants) and as a result will very badly affect its stakeholder, including pensioners, employees (unionized and non-unionized), management, creditors, suppliers, customers, local and other governments and the local communities. In such situations, time is a precious commodity; it cannot be wasted; no matter how much some would like to take time outs, the clock cannot be stopped. The watchwords of the Commercial List are equally applicable in such circumstances. They are communication, cooperation and common sense.

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I appreciate that these cases frequently invoke emotions running high and wild; that is understandable on a human basis but it is the considered, rational approach which will solve the problem.

4 The time to determine whether a corporation is insolvent for the purpose of it being a "debtor company" and thus able to make an application to proceed under the CCAA is the date of filing, in this case January 29, 2004.

5 The Monitor did not file a report as to this question of insolvency as it properly advised that it wished to take a neutral role. I understand however, that it did provide some assistance in the preparation of Exhibit C to Hap Steven's affidavit.

6 If I determine in this motion that Stelco is not insolvent, then the initial order would be set aside. See *Montreal Trust Co.* of *Canada v. Timber Lodge Ltd.* (1992), 15 C.B.R. (3d) 14 (P.E.I. C.A.). The onus is on Stelco as I indicated in my January 29, 2004 endorsement.

7 S. 2 of the CCAA defines "debtor company" as:

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ["BIA"] or deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound-up under the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act because the company is insolvent.

8 Counsel for the Existing Stelco Lenders and the DIP Lenders posited that Stelco would be able to qualify under (b) in light of the fact that as of January 29, 2004 whether or not it was entitled to receive the CCAA protection under (a) as being insolvent, it had ceased to pay its pre-filing debts. I would merely observe as I did at the time of the hearing that I do not find this argument attractive in the least. The most that could be said for that is that such game playing would be ill advised and in my view would not be rewarded by the exercise of judicial discretion to allow such an applicant the benefit of a CCAA stay and other advantages of the procedure for if it were capriciously done where there is not reasonable need, then such ought not to be granted. However, I would point out that if a corporation did capriciously do so, then one might well expect a creditor-initiated application so as to take control of the process (including likely the ouster of management including directors who authorized such unnecessary stoppage); in such a case, while the corporation would not likely be successful in a corporation application, it is likely that a creditor application would find favour of judicial discretion.

9 This judicial discretion would be exercised in the same way generally as is the case where s. 43(7) of the BIA comes into play whereby a bankruptcy receiving order which otherwise meets the test may be refused. See *Kenwood Hills Development Inc.*, *Re* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 44 (Ont. Bktcy.) where at p. 45 I observed:

The discretion must be exercised judicially based on credible evidence; it should be used according to common sense and justice and in a manner which does not result in an injustice: See *Re Churchill Forest Industries (Manitoba) Ltd.* (1971), 16 C.B.R. (NS) 158 (Man. Q.B.).

10 Anderson J. in *MTM Electric Co., Re* (1982), 42 C.B.R. (N.S.) 29 (Ont. Bktcy.) at p. 30 declined to grant a bankruptcy receiving order for the eminently good sense reason that it would be counterproductive: "Having regard for the value of the enterprise and having regard to the evidence before me, I think it far from clear that a receiving order would confer a benefit on anyone." This common sense approach to the judicial exercise of discretion may be contrasted by the rather more puzzling approach in *TDM Software Systems Inc., Re* (1986), 60 C.B.R. (N.S.) 92 (Ont. S.C.).

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The Union, supported by the International United Steel Workers of America ("International"), indicated that if certain of 11 the obligations of Stelco were taken into account in the determination of insolvency, then a very good number of large Canadian corporations would be able to make an application under the CCAA. I am of the view that this concern can be addressed as follows. The test of insolvency is to be determined on its own merits, not on the basis that an otherwise technically insolvent corporation should not be allowed to apply. However, if a technically insolvent corporation were to apply and there was no material advantage to the corporation and its stakeholders (in other words, a pressing need to restructure), then one would expect that the court's discretion would be judicially exercised against granting CCAA protection and ancillary relief. In the case of Stelco, it is recognized, as discussed above, that it is in crisis and in need of restructuring - which restructuring, if it is insolvent, would be best accomplished within a CCAA proceeding. Further, I am of the view that the track record of CCAA proceedings in this country demonstrates a healthy respect for the fundamental concerns of interested parties and stakeholders. I have consistently observed that much more can be achieved by negotiations outside the courtroom where there is a reasonable exchange of information, views and the exploration of possible solutions and negotiations held on a without prejudice basis than likely can be achieved by resorting to the legal combative atmosphere of the courtroom. A mutual problem requires a mutual solution. The basic interest of the CCAA is to rehabilitate insolvent corporations for the benefit of all stakeholders. To do this, the cause(s) of the insolvency must be fixed on a long term viable basis so that the corporation may be turned around. It is not achieved by positional bargaining in a tug of war between two parties, each trying for a larger slice of a defined size pie; it may be achieved by taking steps involving shorter term equitable sacrifices and implementing sensible approaches to improve productivity to ensure that the pie grows sufficiently for the long term to accommodate the reasonable needs of the parties.

12 It appears that it is a given that the Sub Applicants are in fact insolvent. The question then is whether Stelco is insolvent.

13 There was a question as to whether Stelco should be restricted to the material in its application as presented to the Court on January 29, 2004. I would observe that CCAA proceedings are not in the nature of the traditional adversarial lawsuit usually found in our courtrooms. It seems to me that it would be doing a disservice to the interest of the CCAA to artificially keep the Court in the dark on such a question. Presumably an otherwise deserving "debtor company" would not be allowed access to a continuing CCAA proceeding that it would be entitled to merely because some potential evidence were excluded for traditional adversarial technical reasons. I would point out that in such a case, there would be no prohibition against such a corporation reapplying (with the additional material) subsequently. In such a case, what would be the advantage for anyone of a "pause" before being able to proceed under the rehabilitative process under the CCAA. On a practical basis, I would note that all too often corporations will wait too long before applying, at least this was a significant problem in the early 1990s. In *Inducon Development Corp.*, *Re* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.), I observed:

Secondly, CCAA is designed to be remedial; it is not, however, designed to be preventative. CCAA should not be the *last* gasp of a dying company; it should be implemented, if it is to be implemented, at a stage prior to the death throe.

14 It seems to me that the phrase "death throe" could be reasonably replaced with "death spiral". In *Cumberland Trading Inc., Re* (1994), 23 C.B.R. (3d) 225 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), I went on to expand on this at p. 228:

I would also observe that all too frequently debtors wait until virtually the last moment, the last moment, or in some cases, beyond the last moment before even beginning to think about reorganizational (and the attendant support that any successful reorganization requires from the creditors). I noted the lamentable tendency of debtors to deal with these situations as "last gasp" desperation moves in *Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 308 (Ont. Gen. Div.). To deal with matters on this basis minimizes the chances of success, even if "success" may have been available with earlier spade work.

15 I have not been able to find in the CCAA reported cases any instance where there has been an objection to a corporation availing itself of the facilities of the CCAA on the basis of whether the corporation was insolvent. Indeed, as indicated above, the major concern here has been that an applicant leaves it so late that the timetable of necessary steps may get impossibly compressed. That is not to say that there have not been objections by parties opposing the application on various other grounds. Prior to the 1992 amendments, there had to be debentures (plural) issued pursuant to a trust deed; I recall that in *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.), the initial application was

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rejected in the morning because there had only been one debenture issued but another one was issued prior to the return to court that afternoon. This case stands for the general proposition that the CCAA should be given a large and liberal interpretation. I should note that there was in *Enterprise Capital Management Inc. v. Semi-Tech Corp.* (1999), 10 C.B.R. (4th) 133 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) a determination that in a creditor application, the corporation was found not to be insolvent, but see below as to BIA test (c) my views as to the correctness of this decision.

16 In Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) I observed at p. 32:

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors.

17 In Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), the court stated to the same effect:

The second submission is that the plan is contrary to the purposes of the CCAA. Courts have recognized that the purpose of the CCAA is to enable compromises to be made for the common benefit of the creditors and the company and to keep the company alive and out of the hands of liquidators.

18 Encompassed in this is the concept of saving employment if a restructuring will result in a viable enterprise. See *Diemaster Tool Inc. v. Skvortsoff (Trustee of)* (1991), 3 C.B.R. (3d) 133 (Ont. Gen. Div.). This concept has been a continuing thread in CCAA cases in this jurisdiction stretching back for at least the past 15 years, if not before.

I would also note that the jurisprudence and practical application of the bankruptcy and insolvency regime in place in 19 Canada has been constantly evolving. The early jails of what became Canada were populated to the extent of almost half their capacity by bankrupts. Rehabilitation and a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor came afterwards. Most recently, the Bankruptcy Act was revised to the BIA in 1992 to better facilitate the rehabilitative aspect of making a proposal to creditors. At the same time, the CCAA was amended to eliminate the threshold criterion of there having to be debentures issued under a trust deed (this concept was embodied in the CCAA upon its enactment in 1933 with a view that it would only be large companies with public issues of debt securities which could apply). The size restriction was continued as there was now a threshold criterion of at least \$5 million of claims against the applicant. While this restriction may appear discriminatory, it does have the practical advantage of taking into account that the costs (administrative costs including professional fees to the applicant, and indeed to the other parties who retain professionals) is a significant amount, even when viewed from the perspective of \$5 million. These costs would be prohibitive in a smaller situation. Parliament was mindful of the time horizons involved in proposals under BIA where the maximum length of a proceeding including a stay is six months (including all possible extensions) whereas under CCAA, the length is in the discretion of the court judicially exercised in accordance with the facts and the circumstances of the case. Certainly sooner is better than later. However, it is fair to observe that virtually all CCAA cases which proceed go on for over six months and those with complexity frequently exceed a year.

20 Restructurings are not now limited in practical terms to corporations merely compromising their debts with their creditors in a balance sheet exercise. Rather there has been quite an emphasis recently on operational restructuring as well so that the emerging company will have the benefit of a long term viable fix, all for the benefit of stakeholders. See *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 314 where Borins J. states:

The proposed plan exemplifies the policy and objectives of the Act as it proposes a regime for the court-supervised reorganization for the Applicant company intended to avoid the devastating social and economic effects of a creditor-initiated termination of its ongoing business operations and enabling the company to carry on its business in a manner in which it is intended to cause the least possible harm to the company, its creditors, its employees and former employees and the communities in which its carries on and carried on its business operations.

The CCAA does not define "insolvent" or "insolvency". Houlden & Morawetz, *The 2004 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (Toronto, Carswell; 2003) at p. 1107 (N5) states:

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In interpreting "debtor company", reference must be had to the definition of "insolvent person" in s. 2(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act,

To be able to use the Act, a company must be bankrupt or insolvent: *Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (*Canada*), 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] S.C.R. 659, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75. The company must, in its application, admit its insolvency.

It appears to have become fairly common practice for applicants and others when reference is made to insolvency in the context of the CCAA to refer to the definition of "insolvent person" in the BIA. That definition is as follows:

s. 2(1) ...

"insolvent person" means a person who is not bankrupt and who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada, and whose liability to creditors provable as claims under this Act amount to one thousand dollars, and

(a) who is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due,

(b) who has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due, or

(c) the aggregate of whose property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or, if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

23 Stelco acknowledges that it does not meet the test of (b); however, it does assert that it meets the test of both (a) and (c). In addition, however, Stelco also indicates that since the CCAA does not have a reference over to the BIA in relation to the (a) definition of "debtor company" as being a company that is "(a) bankrupt or insolvent", then this term of "insolvent" should be given the meaning that the overall context of the CCAA requires. See the modern rule of statutory interpretation which directs the court to take a contextual and purposive approach to the language of the provision at issue as illustrated by *Bell ExpressVu Ltd. Partnership v. Rex*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 (S.C.C.) at p. 580:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

I note in particular that the (b), (c) and (d) aspects of the definition of "debtor company" all refer to other statutes, 24 including the BIA; (a) does not. S. 12 of the CCAA defines "claims" with reference over to the BIA (and otherwise refers to the BIA and the Winding-Up and Restructuring Act). It seems to me that there is merit in considering that the test for insolvency under the CCAA may differ somewhat from that under the BIA, so as to meet the special circumstances of the CCAA and those corporations which would apply under it. In that respect, I am mindful of the above discussion regarding the time that is usually and necessarily (in the circumstances) taken in a CCAA reorganization restructuring which is engaged in coming up with a plan of compromise and arrangement. The BIA definition would appear to have been historically focussed on the question of bankruptcy - and not reorganization of a corporation under a proposal since before 1992, secured creditors could not be forced to compromise their claims, so that in practice there were no reorganizations under the former Bankruptcy Act unless all secured creditors voluntarily agreed to have their secured claims compromised. The BIA definition then was essentially useful for being a pre-condition to the "end" situation of a bankruptcy petition or voluntary receiving order where the upshot would be a realization on the bankrupt's assets (not likely involving the business carried on - and certainly not by the bankrupt). Insolvency under the BIA is also important as to the Paulian action events (eg., fraudulent preferences, settlements) as to the conduct of the debtor prior to the bankruptcy; similarly as to the question of provincial preference legislation. Reorganization under a plan or proposal, on the contrary, is with a general objective of the applicant continuing to exist, albeit that the CCAA may also be used to have an orderly disposition of the assets and undertaking in whole or in part.

It seems to me that given the time and steps involved in a reorganization, and the condition of insolvency perforce requires an expanded meaning under the CCAA. Query whether the definition under the BIA is now sufficient in that light for

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the allowance of sufficient time to carry through with a realistically viable proposal within the maximum of six months allowed under the BIA? I think it sufficient to note that there would not be much sense in providing for a rehabilitation program of restructuring/reorganization under either statute if the entry test was that the applicant could not apply until a rather late stage of its financial difficulties with the rather automatic result that in situations of complexity of any material degree, the applicant would not have the financial resources sufficient to carry through to hopefully a successful end. This would indeed be contrary to the renewed emphasis of Parliament on "rescues" as exhibited by the 1992 and 1997 amendments to the CCAA and the BIA.

Allow me now to examine whether Stelco has been successful in meeting the onus of demonstrating with credible evidence on a common sense basis that it is insolvent within the meaning required by the CCAA in regard to the interpretation of "debtor company" in the context and within the purpose of that legislation. To a similar effect, see *PWA Corp. v. Gemini Group Automated Distribution Systems Inc.* (1993), 103 D.L.R. (4th) 609 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed [(1993), 49 C.P.R. (3d) ix (S.C.C.)] wherein it was determined that the trial judge was correct in holding that a party was not insolvent and that the statutory definition of insolvency pursuant to the BIA definition was irrelevant to determine that issue, since the agreement in question effectively provided its own definition by implication. It seems to me that the CCAA test of insolvency advocated by Stelco and which I have determined is a proper interpretation is that the BIA definition of (a), (b) or (c) of insolvent person is acceptable with the caveat that as to (a), a financially troubled corporation is insolvent if it is reasonably expected to run out of liquidity within reasonable proximity of time as compared with the time reasonably required to implement a restructuring. That is, there should be a reasonable cushion, which cushion may be adjusted and indeed become in effect an encroachment depending upon reasonable access to DIP between financing. In the present case, Stelco accepts the view of the Union's affiant, Michael Mackey of Deloitte and Touche that it will otherwise run out of funding by November 2004.

On that basis, allow me to determine whether Stelco is insolvent on the basis of (i) what I would refer to as the CCAA test as described immediately above, (ii) BIA test (a) or (iii) BIA test (c). In doing so, I will have to take into account the fact that Stephen, albeit a very experienced and skilled person in the field of restructurings under the CCAA, unfortunately did not appreciate that the material which was given to him in Exhibit E to his affidavit was modified by the caveats in the source material that in effect indicated that based on appraisals, the fair value of the real assets acquired was in excess of the purchase price for two of the U.S. comparators. Therefore the evidence as to these comparators is significantly weakened. In addition at Q. 175-177 in his cross examination, Stephen acknowledged that it was reasonable to assume that a purchaser would "take over some liabilities, some pension liabilities and OPEB liabilities, for workers who remain with the plant." The extent of that assumption was not explored; however, I do note that there was acknowledgement on the part of the Union that such an assumption would also have a reciprocal negative effect on the purchase price.

The BIA tests are disjunctive so that anyone meeting any of these tests is determined to be insolvent: see *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc., Re* (1990), 75 D.L.R. (4th) 747 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 756; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 161. Thus, if I determine that Stelco is insolvent on *any one* of these tests, then it would be a "debtor company" entitled to apply for protection under the CCAA.

In my view, the Union's position that Stelco is not insolvent under BIA (a) because it has not entirely used up its cash and cash facilities (including its credit line), that is, it is not yet as of January 29, 2004 run out of liquidity conflates inappropriately the (a) test with the (b) test. The Union's view would render the (a) test necessarily as being redundant. See *R. v. Proulx*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.) at p. 85 for the principle that no legislative provision ought to be interpreted in a manner which would "render it mere surplusage." Indeed the plain meaning of the phrase "unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due" requires a construction of test (a) which permits the court to take a purposive assessment of a debtor's ability to meet his future obligations. See *King Petroleum Ltd., Re* (1978), 29 C.B.R. (N.S.) 76 (Ont. S.C.) where Steele J. stated at p. 80:

With respect to cl. (a), it was argued that at the time the disputed payments were made the company was able to meet its obligations as they generally became due because no major debts were in fact due at that time. This was premised on the fact that the moneys owed to Imperial Oil were not due until 10 days after the receipt of the statements and that the statements had not then been received. I am of the opinion that this is not a proper interpretation of cl. (a). *Clause (a) speaks in the present and future tenses and not in the past.* I am of the opinion that the company was an "insolvent person" within the meaning of cl. (a) because by the very payment-out of the money in question it placed itself in a position that

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it was unable to meet its obligations as they would generally become due. In other words, it had placed itself in a position that it would not be able to pay the obligations that it knew it had incurred and which it knew would become due in the immediate future. [Emphasis added.]

30 *King Petroleum Ltd.* was a case involving the question in a bankruptcy scenario of whether there was a fraudulent preference during a period when the corporation was insolvent. Under those circumstances, the "immediate future" does not have the same expansive meaning that one would attribute to a time period in a restructuring forward looking situation.

31 Stephen at paragraphs 40-49 addressed the restructuring question in general and its applicability to the Stelco situation. At paragraph 41, he outlined the significant stages as follows:

The process of restructuring under the CCAA entails a number of different stages, the most significant of which are as follows:

- (a) identification of the debtor's stakeholders and their interests;
- (b) arranging for a process of meaningful communication;
- (c) dealing with immediate relationship issues arising from a CCAA filing;
- (d) sharing information about the issues giving rise to the debtor's need to restructure;
- (e) developing restructuring alternatives; and
- (f) building a consensus around a plan of restructuring.

32 I note that January 29, 2004 is just 9-10 months away from November 2004. I accept as correct his conclusion based on his experience (and this is in accord with my own objective experience in large and complicated CCAA proceedings) that Stelco would have the liquidity problem within the time horizon indicated. In that regard, I also think it fair to observe that Stelco realistically cannot expect any increase in its credit line with its lenders or access further outside funding. To bridge the gap it must rely upon the stay to give it the uplift as to prefiling liabilities (which the Union misinterpreted as a general turnaround in its cash position without taking into account this uplift). As well, the Union was of the view that recent price increases would relieve Stelco's liquidity problems; however, the answers to undertaking in this respect indicated:

With respect to the Business Plan, the average spot market sales price per ton was \$514, and the average contract business sales price per ton was \$599. The Forecast reflects an average spot market sales price per ton of \$575, and average contract business sales price per ton of \$611. The average spot price used in the forecast considers further announced price increases, recognizing, among other things, the timing and the extent such increases are expected to become effective. The benefit of the increase in sales prices from the Business Plan is essentially offset by the substantial increase in production costs, and in particular in raw material costs, primarily scrap and coke, as well as higher working capital levels and a higher loan balance outstanding on the CIT credit facility as of January 2004.

I accept that this is generally a cancel out or wash in all material respects.

I note that \$145 million of cash resources had been used from January 1, 2003 to the date of filing. Use of the credit facility of \$350 million had increased from \$241 million on November 30, 2003 to \$293 million on the date of filing. There must be a reasonable reserve of liquidity to take into account day to day, week to week or month to month variances and also provide for unforeseen circumstances such as the breakdown of a piece of vital equipment which would significantly affect production until remedied. Trade credit had been contracting as a result of appreciation by suppliers of Stelco's financial difficulties. The DIP financing of \$75 million is only available if Stelco is under CCAA protection. I also note that a shut down as a result of running out of liquidity would be complicated in the case of Stelco and that even if conditions turned around more than reasonably expected, start-up costs would be heavy and quite importantly, there would be a significant erosion of the customer base (reference should be had to the Slater Hamilton plant in this regard). One does not liquidate assets which one would not sell

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in the ordinary course of business to thereby artificially salvage some liquidity for the purpose of the test: see *Pacific Mobile Corp., Re* (1979), 32 C.B.R. (N.S.) 209 (C.S. Que.) at p. 220. As a rough test, I note that Stelco (albeit on a consolidated basis with all subsidiaries) running significantly behind plan in 2003 from its budget of a profit of \$80 million now to a projected loss of \$192 million and cash has gone from a positive \$209 million to a negative \$114 million.

34 Locker made the observation at paragraph 8 of his affidavit that:

8. Stelco has performed poorly for the past few years primarily due to an inadequate business strategy, poor utilization of assets, inefficient operations and generally weak management leadership and decision-making. This point is best supported by the fact that Stelco's local competitor, Dofasco, has generated outstanding results in the same period.

Table 1 to his affidavit would demonstrate that Dofasco has had superior profitability and cashflow performance than its "neighbour" Stelco. He went on to observe at paragraphs 36-37:

36. Stelco can achieve significant cost reductions through means other than cutting wages, pensions and benefits for employees and retirees. Stelco could bring its cost levels down to those of restructured U.S. mills, with the potential for lowering them below those of many U.S. mills.

37. Stelco could achieve substantial savings through productivity improvements within the mechanisms of the current collective agreements. More importantly, a major portion of this cost reduction could be achieved through constructive negotiations with the USWA in an out-of-court restructuring that does not require intervention of the courts through the vehicle of CCAA protection.

I accept his constructive comments that there is room for cost reductions and that there are substantial savings to be achieved through productivity improvements. However, I do not see anything detrimental to these discussions and negotiations by having them conducted within the umbrella of a CCAA proceeding. See my comments above regarding the CCAA in practice.

But I would observe and I am mystified by Locker's observations at paragraph 12 (quoted above), that Stelco should have borrowed to fund pension obligations to avoid its current financial crisis. This presumes that the borrowed funds would not constitute an obligation to be paid back as to principal and interest, but rather that it would assume the character of a costfree "gift".

I note that Mackey, without the "laundry list" he indicates at paragraph 17 of his second affidavit, is unable to determine at paragraph 19 (for himself) whether Stelco was insolvent. Mackey was unable to avail himself of all available information in light of the Union's refusal to enter into a confidentiality agreement. He does not closely adhere to the BIA tests as they are defined. In the face of positive evidence about an applicant's financial position by an experienced person with expertise, it is not sufficient to displace this evidence by filing evidence which goes no further than raising questions: see *Anvil Range Mining Corp., supra* at p. 162.

The Union referred me to one of my decisions *Standard Trustco Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Standard Trust Co.* (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 7 (Ont. Gen. Div.) where I stated as to the MacGirr affidavit:

The Trustee's cause of action is premised on MacGirr's opinion that STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 and therefore the STC common shares and promissory note received by Trustco in return for the Injection had no value at the time the Injection was made. Further, MacGirr ascribed no value to the opportunity which the Injection gave to Trustco to restore STC and salvage its thought to be existing \$74 million investment. In stating his opinion MacGirr defined solvency as:

- (a) the ability to meet liabilities as they fall due; and
- (b) that assets exceed liabilities.

On cross-examination MacGirr testified that in his opinion on either test STC was insolvent as at August 3, 1990 since as to (a) STC was experiencing then a negative cash flow and as to (b) the STC financial statements incorrectly reflected

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values. As far as (a) is concerned, I would comment that while I concur with MacGirr that at some time in the long run a company that is experiencing a negative cash flow will eventually not be able to meet liabilities as they fall due but that is not the test (which is a "present exercise"). On that current basis STC was meeting its liabilities on a timely basis.

As will be seen from that expanded quote, MacGirr gave his own definitions of insolvency which are not the same as the s. 2 BIA tests (a), (b) and (c) but only a very loose paraphrase of (a) and (c) and an omission of (b). Nor was I referred to the *King Petroleum Ltd.* or *Proulx* cases *supra*. Further, it is obvious from the context that "*sometime in the long run*... *eventually*" is not a finite time in the foreseeable future.

I have not given any benefit to the \$313 - \$363 million of improvements referred to in the affidavit of William Vaughan at paragraph 115 as those appear to be capital expenditures which will have to be accommodated within a plan of arrangement or after emergence.

It seems to me that if the BIA (a) test is restrictively dealt with (as per my question to Union counsel as to how far in the future should one look on a prospective basis being answered "24 hours") then Stelco would not be insolvent under that test. However, I am of the view that that would be unduly restrictive and a proper contextual and purposive interpretation to be given when it is being used for a restructuring purpose even under BIA would be to see whether there is a reasonably foreseeable (at the time of filing) expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis which will result in the applicant running out of "cash" to pay its debts as they generally become due in the future without the benefit of the say and ancillary protection and procedure by court authorization pursuant to an order. I think this is the more appropriate interpretation of BIA (a) test in the context of a reorganization or "rescue" as opposed to a threshold to bankruptcy consideration or a fraudulent preferences proceeding. On that basis, I would find Stelco insolvent from the date of filing. Even if one were not to give the latter interpretation to the BIA (a) test, clearly for the above reasons and analysis, if one looks at the meaning of "insolvent" within the context of a CCAA reorganization or rescue solely, then of necessity, the time horizon must be such that the liquidity crisis would occur in the sense of running out of "cash" but for the grant of the CCAA order. On that basis Stelco is certainly insolvent given its limited cash resources unused, its need for a cushion, its rate of cash burn recently experienced and anticipated.

What about the BIA (c) test which may be roughly referred to as an assets compared with obligations test. See New Quebec Raglan Mines Ltd. v. Blok-Andersen, [1993] O.J. No. 727 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) as to fair value and fair market valuation. The Union observed that there was no intention by Stelco to wind itself up or proceed with a sale of some or all of its assets and undertaking and therefore some of the liabilities which Stelco and Stephen took into account would not crystallize. However, as I discussed at the time of the hearing, the (c) test is what one might reasonably call or describe as an "artificial" or notional/hypothetical test. It presumes certain things which are in fact not necessarily contemplated to take place or to be involved. In that respect, I appreciate that it may be difficult to get one's mind around that concept and down the right avenue of that (c) test. See my views at trial in Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (Trustee of) v. Olympia & York Realty Corp., [2001] O.J. No. 3394 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paragraphs 13, 21 and 33; affirmed [2003] O.J. No. 5242 (Ont. C.A.). At paragraph 33, I observed in closing:

33... They (and their expert witnesses) all had to contend with dealing with rambling and complicated facts and, in Section 100 BIA, a section which is difficult to administer when fmv [fair market value] in a notational or hypothetical market involves ignoring what would often be regarded as self evidence truths but at the same time appreciating that this notational or hypothetical market requires that the objects being sold have to have realistic true to life attributes recognized.

42 The Court of Appeal stated at paragraphs 24-25 as follows:

24. Nor are the appellants correct to argue that the trial judge also assumed an imprudent vendor in arriving at his conclusion about the fair market value of the OYSF note would have to know that in order to realize value from the note any purchaser would immediately put OYSF and thus OYDL itself into bankruptcy to pre-empt a subsequent triggering event in favour of EIB. While this was so, and the trial judge clearly understood it, the error in this submission is that it seeks to inject into the analysis factors subjected to the circumstances of OYDL as vendor and

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not intrinsic to the value of the OYSF note. The calculation of fair market value does not permit this but rather must assume an unconstrained vendor.

25. The Applicants further argue that the trial judge eroded in determining the fair market value of the OYSF note by reference to a transaction which was entirely speculative because it was never considered by OYDL nor would have it been since it would have resulted in OYDL's own bankruptcy. I disagree. The transaction hypothesized by the trial judge was one between a notational, willing, prudent and informed vendor and purchaser based on factors relevant to the OYSF note itself rather than the particular circumstances of OYDL as the seller of the note. This is an entirely appropriate way to determine the fair market value of the OYSF note.

Test (c) deems a person to be insolvent if "the aggregate of [its] property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or of disposed at a fairly conducted sale under legal process would not be sufficient to enable payment of all [its] obligations, due and accruing due." The origins of this legislative test appear to be the decision of Spragge V-C in *Davidson v. Douglas* (1868), 15 Gr. 347 (Ont. Ch.) at p. 351 where he stated with respect to the solvency or insolvency of a debtor, the proper course is:

to see and examine whether all his property, real and personal, be sufficient if presently realized for the payment of his debts, and in this view we must estimate his land, as well as his chattel property, not at what his neighbours or others may consider to be its value, but at what it would bring in the market at a forced sale, or a sale where the seller cannot await his opportunities, but must sell.

44 In *Clarkson v. Sterling* (1887), 14 O.R. 460 (Ont. C.P.) at p. 463, Rose J. indicted that the sale must be fair and reasonable, but that the determination of fairness and reasonableness would depend on the facts of each case.

The Union essentially relied on garnishment cases. Because of the provisions relating as to which debts may or may not be garnished, these authorities are of somewhat limited value when dealing with the test (c) question. However I would refer to one of the Union's cases *Bank of Montreal v. I.M. Krisp Foods Ltd.*, [1996] S.J. No. 655 (Sask. C.A.) where it is stated at paragraph 11:

11. Few phrases have been as problematic to define as "debt due or accruing due". The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary,

3rd ed. defines "accruing" as "arising in due course", but an examination of English and Canadian authority reveals that not all debts "arising in due course" are permitted to be garnisheed. (See Professor Dunlop's extensive research for his British Columbia Law Reform Commission's Report on Attachment of Debts Act, 1978 at 17 to 29 and is text Creditor-Debtor Law in Canada, 2nd ed. at 374 to 385.)

In *Barsi v. Farcas* (1923), [1924] 1 D.L.R. 1154 (Sask. C.A.), Lamont J.A. was cited for his statement at p. 522 of *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.B.D. 518 (Eng. C.A.) that: "an accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

47 Saunders J. noted in 633746 Ontario Inc. (Trustee of) v. Salvati (1990), 79 C.B.R. (N.S.) 72 (Ont. S.C.) at p. 81 that a sale out of the ordinary course of business would have an adverse effect on that actually realized.

48 There was no suggestion by any of the parties that any of the assets and undertaking would have any enhanced value from that shown on the financial statements prepared according to GAAP.

49 In King Petroleum Ltd., supra at p. 81 Steele J. observed:

To consider the question of insolvency under cl. (c) I must look to the aggregate property of the company and come to a conclusion as to whether or not it would be sufficient to enable payment of all obligations due and accruing due. There are two tests to be applied: First, its fair value and, secondly, its value if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process. The balance sheet is a starting point, but the evidence relating to the fair value of the assets and what they might realize if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process must be reviewed in interpreting it. In this case,

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I find no difficulty in accepting the obligations shown as liabilities because they are known. I have more difficulty with respect to the assets.

50 To my view the preferable interpretation to be given to "sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due" is to be determined in the context of this test as a whole. What is being put up to satisfy those obligations is the debtor's assets and undertaking *in total*; in other words, the debtor in essence is taken as having sold everything. There would be no residual assets and undertaking to pay off any obligations which would not be encompassed by the phrase "all of his obligations, due and accruing due". Surely, there cannot be "orphan" obligations which are left hanging unsatisfied. It seems to me that the intention of "due and accruing due" was to cover off all obligations of whatever nature or kind and leave nothing in limbo.

51 S. 121(1) and (2) of the BIA, which are incorporated by reference in s. 12 of the CCAA, provide in respect to provable claims:

S. 121(1) All debts and liabilities, present or future, to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt or to which bankrupt may become subject before the bankrupt's discharge by reason of any obligation incurred before the day on which the bankrupt becomes bankrupt shall be deemed to be claims provable in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The determination whether a contingent or unliquidated claim is a provable claim and the valuation of such claim shall be made in accordance with s. 135.

52 Houlden and Morawetz 2004 Annotated supra at p. 537 (G28(3)) indicates:

The word "liability" is a very broad one. It includes all obligations to which the bankrupt is subject on the day on which he becomes bankrupt except for contingent and unliquidated claims which are dealt with in s. 121(2).

However contingent and unliquidated claims would be encompassed by the term "obligations".

In Gardner v. Newton (1916), 29 D.L.R. 276 (Man. K.B.), Mathers C.J.K.B. observed at p. 281 that "contingent claim, 53 that is, a claim which may or may not ripen into a debt, according as some future event does or does not happen." See A Debtor (No. 64 of 1992), Re, [1993] 1 W.L.R. 264 (Eng. Ch. Div.) at p. 268 for the definition of a "liquidated sum" which is an amount which can be readily ascertained and hence by corollary an "unliquidated claim" would be one which is not easily ascertained, but will have to be valued. In Gagnier, Re (1950), 30 C.B.R. 74 (Ont. S.C.), there appears to be a conflation of not only the (a) test with the (c) test, but also the invocation of the judicial discretion not to grant the receiving order pursuant to a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that "[the judge was] unable to find the debtor is bankrupt". The debtor was able to survive the (a) test as he had the practice (accepted by all his suppliers) of providing them with post dated cheques. The (c) test was not a problem since the judge found that his assets should be valued at considerably more than his obligations. However, this case does illustrate that the application of the tests present some difficulties. These difficulties are magnified when one is dealing with something more significantly complex and a great deal larger than a haberdashery store - in the case before us, a giant corporation in which, amongst other things, is engaged in a very competitive history including competition from foreign sources which have recently restructured into more cost efficient structures, having shed certain of their obligations. As well, that is without taking into account that a sale would entail significant transaction costs. Even of greater significance would be the severance and termination payments to employees not continued by the new purchaser. Lastly, it was recognized by everyone at the hearing that Stelco's plants, especially the Hamilton-Hilton works, have extremely high environmental liabilities lurking in the woodwork. Stephen observed that these obligations would be substantial, although not quantified.

It is true that there are no appraisals of the plant and equipment nor of the assets and undertaking of Stelco. Given the circumstances of this case and the complexities of the market, one may realistically question whether or not the appraisals would be all that helpful or accurate.

I would further observe that in the notional or hypothetical exercise of a sale, then all the obligations which would be triggered by such sale would have to be taken into account.

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All liabilities, contingent or unliquidated would have to be taken into account. See *King Petroleum Ltd., supra* p. 81; *Salvati, supra* pp. 80-1; *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of) v. Provisioners Maritimes Ltd.* (1989), 45 B.L.R. 14 (N.S. T.D.) at p. 29; *Challmie, Re* (1976), 22 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78 (B.C. S.C.), at pp. 81-2. In *Challmie* the debtor ought to have known that his guarantee was very much exposed given the perilous state of his company whose liabilities he had guaranteed. It is interesting to note what was stated in *Maybank Foods Inc. (Trustee of)*, even if it is rather patently obvious. Tidman J. said in respect of the branch of the company at p. 29:

Mr. MacAdam argues also that the \$4.8 million employees' severance obligation was not a liability on January 20, 1986. The *Bankruptcy Act* includes as obligations both those due and accruing due. Although the employees' severance obligation was not due and payable on January 20, 1986 it was an obligation "accruing due". The Toronto facility had experienced severe financial difficulties for some time; in fact, it was the major, if not the sole cause, of Maybank's financial difficulties. I believe it is reasonable to conclude that a reasonably astute perspective buyer of the company has a going concern would have considered that obligation on January 20, 1986 and that it would have substantially reduced the price offered by that perspective buyer. Therefore that obligation must be considered as an obligation of the company on January 20, 1986.

57 With the greatest of respect for my colleague, I disagree with the conclusion of Ground J. in *Enterprise Capital* Management Inc., supra as to the approach to be taken to "due and accruing due" when he observed at pp. 139-140:

It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the principle amount of the Notes constitutes an obligation "due or accruing due" as of the date of this application.

There is a paucity of helpful authority on the meaning of "accruing due" for purposes of a definition of insolvency. Historically, in 1933, in *P. Lyall & Sons Construction Co. v. Baker*, [1933] O.R. 286 (Ont. C.A.), the Ontario Court of Appeal, in determining a question of set-off under the *Dominion Winding-Up Act* had to determine whether the amount claimed as set-off was a debt due or accruing due to the company in liquidation for purposes of that Act. Marsten J. at pp. 292-293 quoted from Moss J.A. in *Mail Printing Co. v. Clarkson* (1898), 25 O.R. 1 (Ont. C.A.) at p. 8:

A debt is defined to be a sum of money which is certainly, and at all event, payable without regard to the fact whether it be payable now or at a future time. And an accruing debt is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation: Per Lindley L.J. in *Webb v. Stenton* (1883), 11 Q.D.D. at p. 529.

Whatever relevance such definition may have had for purposes of dealing with claims by and against companies in liquidation under the old winding-up legislation, it is apparent to me that it should not be applied to definitions of insolvency. To include every debt payable at some future date in "accruing due" for the purposes of insolvency tests would render numerous corporations, with long term debt due over a period of years in the future and anticipated to be paid out of future income, "insolvent" for the purposes of the BIA and therefore the CCAA. For the same reason, I do not accept the statement quoted in the Enterprise factum from the decision of the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in *Centennial Textiles Inc., Re*, 220 B.R. 165 (U.S.N.Y.D.C. 1998) that "if the present saleable value of assets are less than the amount required to pay existing debt as they mature, the debtor is insolvent". In my view, the obligations, which are to be measured against the fair valuation of a company's property as being obligations due and accruing due, must be limited to obligations currently payable or properly chargeable to the accounting period during which the test is being applied as, for example, a sinking fund payment due within the current year. Black's Law Dictionary defines "accrued liability" as "an obligation or debt which is properly chargeable in a given accounting period, but which is not yet paid or payable". The principal amount of the Notes is neither due nor accruing due in this sense.

58 There appears to be some confusion in this analysis as to "debts" and "obligations", the latter being much broader than debts. Please see above as to my views concerning the floodgates argument under the BIA and CCAA being addressed by judicially exercised discretion even if "otherwise warranted" applications were made. I pause to note that an insolvency test under general corporate litigation need not be and likely is not identical, or indeed similar to that under these insolvency statutes. As well, it is curious to note that the cut off date is the end of the current fiscal period which could have radically different

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results if there were a calendar fiscal year and the application was variously made in the first week of January, mid-summer or the last day of December. Lastly, see above and below as to my views concerning the proper interpretation of this question of "accruing due".

It seems to me that the phrase "accruing due" has been interpreted by the courts as broadly identifying obligations that will "become due". See *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd.* below at pp. 163-4 - at least at some point in the future. Again, I would refer to my conclusion above that *every obligation* of the corporation in the hypothetical or notional sale must be treated as "accruing due" to avoid orphan obligations. In that context, it matters not that a wind-up pension liability may be discharged over 15 years; in a test (c) situation, it is crystallized on the date of the test. See *Optical Recording Laboratories Inc. supra* at pp. 756-7; *Viteway Natural Foods Ltd., Re* (1986), 63 C.B.R. (N.S.) 157 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 164-63-4; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd., Re* (1986), 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 156 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 163. In *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.*, Spencer J. at pp. 162-3 stated:

In my opinion, a futures broker is not in that special position. The third definition of "insolvency" may apply to a futures trader at any time even though he has open long positions in the market. Even though Consolidated's long positions were not required to be closed on 10th December, the chance that they might show a profit by March 1981 or even on the following day and thus wipe out Consolidated's cash deficit cannot save it from a condition of insolvency on that day. The circumstances fit precisely within the third definition; if all Consolidated's assets had been sold on that day at a fair value, the proceeds would not have covered its obligations due and accruing due, including its obligations to pay in March 1981 for its long positions in rapeseed. The market prices from day to day establish a fair valuation....

The contract to buy grain at a fixed price at a future time imposes a present obligation upon a trader taking a long position in the futures market to take delivery in exchange for payment at that future time. It is true that in the practice of the market, that obligation is nearly always washed out by buying an offsetting short contract, but until that is done the obligation stands. The trader does not know who will eventually be on the opposite side of his transaction if it is not offset but all transactions are treated as if the clearing house is on the other side. It is a present obligation due at a future time. It is therefore an obligation accruing due within the meaning of the third definition of "insolvency".

The possibility of an expectancy of future profits or a change in the market is not sufficient; *Consolidated Seed Exports Ltd.* at p. 162 emphasizes that the test is to be done on that day, the day of filing in the case of an application for reorganization.

I see no objection to using Exhibit C to Stephen's affidavit as an aid to review the balance sheet approach to test (c). While Stephen may not have known who prepared Exhibit C, he addressed each of its components in the text of his affidavit and as such he could have mechanically prepared the exhibit himself. He was comfortable with and agreed with each of its components. Stelco's factum at paragraphs 70-1 submits as follows:

70. In Exhibit C to his Affidavit, Mr. Stephen addresses a variety of adjustments to the Shareholder's Equity of Stelco necessary to reflect the values of assets and liabilities as would be required to determine whether Stelco met the test of insolvency under Clause C. In cross examination of both Mr. Vaughan and Mr. Stephen only one of these adjustments was challenged - the "Possible Reductions in Capital Assets."

71. The basis of the challenge was that the comparative sales analysis was flawed. In the submission of Stelco, none of these challenges has any merit. Even if the entire adjustment relating to the value in capital assets is ignored, the remaining adjustments leave Stelco with assets worth over \$600 million less than the value of its obligations due and accruing due. This fundamental fact is not challenged.

62 Stelco went on at paragraphs 74-5 of its factum to submit:

74. The values relied upon by Mr. Stephen if anything, understate the extent of Stelco's insolvency. As Mr. Stephen has stated, and no one has challenged by affidavit evidence or on cross examination, in a fairly conducted sale under legal process, the value of Stelco's working capital and other assets would be further impaired by: (i) increased environmental liabilities not reflected on the financial statements, (ii) increased pension deficiencies that would be

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284...

generated on a wind up of the pension plans, (iii) severance and termination claims and (iv) substantial liquidation costs that would be incurred in connection with such a sale.

75. No one on behalf of the USWA has presented any evidence that the capital assets of Stelco are in excess of book value on a stand alone basis. Certainly no one has suggested that these assets would be in excess of book value if the related environmental legacy costs and collective agreements could not be separated from the assets.

63 Before turning to that exercise, I would also observe that test (c) is also disjunctive. There is an insolvency condition if the total obligation of the debtor exceed either (i) a fair valuation of its assets or (ii) the proceeds of a sale fairly conducted under legal process of its assets.

As discussed above and confirmed by Stephen, if there were a sale under legal process, then it would be unlikely, especially in this circumstance that values would be enhanced; in all probability they would be depressed from book value. Stephen took the balance sheet GAAP calculated figure of equity at November 30, 2003 as \$804.2 million. From that, he deducted the loss for December 2003 - January 2004 of \$17 million to arrive at an equity position of \$787.2 million as at the date of filing.

From that, he deducted, reasonably in my view, those "booked" assets that would have no value in a test (c) sale namely: (a) \$294 million of future income tax recourse which would need taxable income in the future to realize; (b) \$57 million for a write-off of the Platemill which is presently hot idled (while Locker observed that it would not be prohibitive in cost to restart production, I note that neither Stephen nor Vaughn were cross examined as to the decision not to do so); and (c) the captialized deferred debt issue expense of \$3.2 million which is being written off over time and therefore, truly is a "nothing". This totals \$354.2 million so that the excess of value over liabilities before reflecting obligations not included in the financials directly, but which are, substantiated as to category in the notes would be \$433 million.

On a windup basis, there would be a pension deficiency of \$1252 million; however, Stephen conservatively in my view looked at the Mercer actuary calculations on the basis of a going concern finding deficiency of \$656 million. If the \$1252 million windup figure had been taken, then the picture would have been even bleaker than it is as Stephen has calculated it for test (c) purposes. In addition, there are deferred pension costs of \$198.7 million which under GAAP accounting calculations is allowed so as to defer recognition of past bad investment experience, but this has no realizable value. Then there is the question of Employee Future Benefits. These have been calculated as at December 31, 2003 by the Mercer actuary as \$909.3 million but only \$684 million has been accrued and booked on the financial statements so that there has to be an increased provision of \$225.3 million. These off balance sheet adjustments total \$1080 million.

Taking that last adjustment into account would result in a *negative* equity of (\$433 million minus \$1080 million) or *negative* \$647 million. On that basis without taking into account possible reductions in capital assets as dealt with in the somewhat flawed Exhibit E nor environmental and other costs discussed above, Stelco is insolvent according to the test (c). With respect to Exhibit E, I have not relied on it in any way, but it is entirely likely that a properly calculated Exhibit E would provide comparators (also being sold in the U.S. under legal process in a fairly conducted process) which tend to require a further downward adjustment. Based on test (c), Stelco is significantly, not marginally, under water.

In reaching my conclusion as to the negative equity (and I find that Stephen approached that exercise fairly and constructively), please note my comments above regarding the possible assumption of pension obligations by the purchaser being offset by a reduction of the purchase price. The 35% adjustment advocated as to pension and employee benefits in this regard is speculation by the Union. Secondly, the Union emphasized cash flow as being important in evaluation, but it must be remembered that Stelco has been negative cash flow for some time which would make that analysis unreliable and to the detriment of the Union's position. The Union treated the \$773 million estimated contribution to the shortfall in the pension deficiency by the Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund as eliminating that as a Stelco obligation. That is not the case however as that Fund would be subrogated to the claims of the employees in that respect with a result that Stelco would remain liable for that \$773 million. Lastly, the Union indicated that there should be a \$155 million adjustment as to the negative equity in Sub Applicants when calculating Stelco's equity. While Stephen at Q. 181-2 acknowledged that there was no adjustment for

2004 CarswellOnt 1211, [2004] O.J. No. 1257, [2004] O.T.C. 284...

that, I agree with him that there ought not to be since Stelco was being examined (and the calculations were based) on an unconsolidated basis, not on a consolidated basis.

In the end result, I have concluded on the balance of probabilities that Stelco is insolvent and therefore it is a "debtor company" as at the date of filing and entitled to apply for the CCAA initial order. My conclusion is that (i) BIA test (c) strongly shows Stelco is insolvent; (ii) BIA test (a) demonstrates, to a less certain but sufficient basis, an insolvency and (iii) the "new" CCAA test again strongly supports the conclusion of insolvency. I am further of the opinion that I properly exercised my discretion in granting Stelco and the Sub Applicants the initial order on January 29, 2004 and I would confirm that as of the present date with effect on the date of filing. The Union's motion is therefore dismissed.


I appreciate that all the employees (union and non-union alike) and the Union and the International have a justifiable pride in their work and their workplace - and a human concern about what the future holds for them. The pensioners are in the same position. Their respective positions can only be improved by engaging in discussion, an exchange of views and information reasonably advanced and conscientiously listened to and digested, leading to mutual problem solving, ideas and negotiations. Negative attitudes can only lead to the detriment to all stakeholders. Unfortunately there has been some finger pointing on various sides; that should be put behind everyone so that participants in this process can concentrate on the future and not inappropriately dwell on the past. I understand that there have been some discussions and interchange over the past two weeks since the hearing and that is a positive start.

Motion dismissed.

APPENDIX

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2004 CarswellOnt 2936 Ontario Court of Appeal

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 2936, [2004] O.J. No. 1903

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended

In the Matter of a Proposed Plan of Compromise or Arrangement with Respect to Stelco Inc. and the other Applicants Listed on Schedule "A" Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, As Amended

Doherty J.A., Laskin J.A., Moldaver J.A.

Judgment: May 5, 2004 Docket: CA M31129

Counsel: David P. Jacobs, for Moving Party Michael E. Barrack, for Responding Party

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.


Headnote Bankruptcy and insolvency

Per Curiam:

Leave to appeal refused. Costs to the respondents Stelco in the amount by \$2,000 and to the "primary lender" in the amount of \$1000.

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2004 CarswellOnt 5200 Supreme Court of Canada

Stelco Inc., Re

2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, 338 N.R. 196 (note)

Local Union No. 1005 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 5328 United Steelworkers of America, Local Union No. 8782 United Steelworkers of America v. Stelco Inc., CHT Steel Company Inc., Stelpipe Ltd., Stelwire Ltd., and Welland Pipe Ltd. (collectively "STELCO"), CIT Business Credit Canada Inc., GE Commercial Finance, Fleet Capital Canada (collectively the "Senior Lenders")

Binnie J., Charron J., McLachlin C.J.C.

Judgment: December 9, 2004 Docket: 30447

Proceedings: Leave to appeal refused, 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.); Leave to appeal refused, 48 C.B.R.: (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List])

Counsel: None given

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote Bankruptcy and insolvency

Per Curiam:

1 The application for leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, Number M31129, dated May 5, 2004, is dismissed with costs.

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TAB 5

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: Bauscher-Grant Farms Inc. v. Lake Diefenbaker Potato Corp. | 1998 CarswellSask 335, 167 Sask. R. 14, [1998] S.J. No. 344, 80 A.C.W.S. (3d) 62, [1998] 8 W.W.R. 751 | (Sask. Q.B., May 11, 1998)

> 1993 CarswellOnt 183 Ontario Court of Justice (General Division — Commercial List)

> > Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275

Re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36; Re Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C-43; Re plan of compromise in respect of LEHNDORFF GENERAL PARTNER LTD. (in its own capacity and in its capacity as general partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA), LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) and LEHNDORFF PROPERTIES (CANADA) II) and in respect of certain of their nominees LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA) LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS LTD., LEHNDORFF CANADIAN HOLDINGS II LTD., BAYTEMP PROPERTIES LIMITED and 102 BLOOR STREET WEST LIMITED and in respect of THG LEHNDORFF VERMÖGENSVERWALTUNG GmbH (in its capacity as limited partner of LEHNDORFF UNITED PROPERTIES (CANADA))

Farley J.

Heard: December 24, 1992 Judgment: January 6, 1993 Docket: Doc. B366/92

Counsel: Alfred Apps, Robert Harrison and Melissa J. Kennedy, for applicants. L. Crozier, for Royal Bank of Canada. R.C. Heintzman, for Bank of Montreal. J. Hodgson, Susan Lundy and James Hilton, for Canada Trustco Mortgage Corporation. Jay Schwartz, for Citibank Canada. Stephen Golick, for Peat Marwick Thorne^{*} Inc., proposed monitor.

John Teolis, for Fuji Bank Canada.

Robert Thorton, for certain of the advisory boards.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Stay of proceedings — Stay being granted even where it would affect non-applicants that were not companies within meaning of Act — Business operations of applicants and non-applicants being so intertwined as to make stay appropriate.

The applicant companies were involved in property development and management and sought the protection of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA") in order that they could present a plan of compromise. They also sought a stay of all proceedings against the individual company applicants either in their own capacities or because of their interest in a larger group of companies. Each of the applicant companies was insolvent and had outstanding debentures issued under trust deeds. They proposed a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of the debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors deemed appropriate in the circumstances.

A question arose as to whether the court had the power to grant a stay of proceedings against non-applicants that were not companies and, therefore, not within the express provisions of the CCAA.

Held:

The application was allowed.

It was appropriate, given the significant financial intertwining of the applicant companies, that a consolidated plan be approved. Further, each of the applicant companies had a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating even though each was currently unable to meet all of its expenses. This was precisely the sort of situation in which all of the creditors would likely benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it was appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings.

The inherent power of the court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Clearly, the court had the jurisdiction to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants that were companies fitting the criteria in the CCAA. However, the stay requested also involved limited partnerships where (1) the applicant companies acted on behalf of the limited partnerships, or (2) the stay would be effective against any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertakings of the limited partnerships in which they held a direct interest. The business operations of the applicant companies that would affect their business without affecting the undivided interest of the limited partnerships in the business. As a result, it was just and reasonable to supplement s. 11 and grant the stay.

While the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim, as well as the interest of any other person, anyone wishing to start or continue proceedings against the applicant companies could use the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain the stay. In such a motion, the onus would be on the applicant companies to show that it was appropriate in the circumstances to continue the stay.

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Cases considered:

Amirault Fish Co., Re, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) - referred to

Associated Investors of Canada Ltd., Re, 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237, Alta. L.R. (2d) 259, [1988] 2 W.W.R. 211, 38 B.L.R. 148, (sub nom. *Re First Investors Corp.*) 46 D.L.R. (4th) 669 (Q.B.), reversed (1988), 71 C.B.R. 71, 60 Alta. L.R. (2d) 242, 89 A.R. 344 (C.A.) — referred to

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd. (1992), 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

Canada Systems Group (EST) v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co. (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.) [affirmed (1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 135, 33 C.P.C. 210, 145 D.L.R. (3d) 266 (C.A.)] — referred to

Empire-Universal Films Ltd. v. Rank, [1947] O.R. 775 [H.C.] - referred to

Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, 28 C.B.R. 124, [1947] Que. K.B. 348 (C.A.) - referred to

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Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd. (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136 (C.A.) — referred to

Inducon Development Corp. Re (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.B. Ltd. (1992), 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290 (Q.B.) - considered

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Langley's Ltd., Re, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.) - referred to

McCordic v. Bosanquet (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) - referred to

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 576 (Q.B.) — *referred to*

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 1 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd., Re (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) - referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282, 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (C.A.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.), affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (note), 55 B.C.L.R. (2d) xxxiii (note), 135 N.R. 317 (note) — referred to

Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 — referred to

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R. (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137, 104 D.L.R. (3d) 274 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) — referred to

Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312, 86 D.L.R. (4th) 621 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Slavik, Re (1992), 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.) - considered

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1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

s. 8 s. 9 s. 11 s. 12(1) s. 13 s. 15(2) s. 24 Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c.P-2 --- Pt. 2 s. 75 **Rules considered:**

r. 8.01

r. 8.02

Application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act to file consolidated plan of compromise and for stay of proceedings.

Farley J.:

1 These are my written reasons relating to the relief granted the applicants on December 24, 1992 pursuant to their application under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 ("CCAA") and the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 ("CJA"). The relief sought was as follows:

(a) short service of the notice of application;

(b) a declaration that the applicants were companies to which the CCAA applies;

(c) authorization for the applicants to file a consolidated plan of compromise;

(d) authorization for the applicants to call meetings of their secured and unsecured creditors to approve the consolidated plan of compromise;

(e) a stay of all proceedings taken or that might be taken either in respect of the applicants in their own capacity or on account of their interest in Lehndorff United Properties (Canada) ("LUPC"), Lehndorff Properties (Canada) ("LPC") and Lehndorff Properties (Canada) II ("LPC II") and collectively (the "Limited Partnerships") whether as limited partner, as general partner or as registered titleholder to certain of their assets as bare trustee and nominee; and

(f) certain other ancillary relief.

2 The applicants are a number of companies within the larger Lehndorff group ("Group") which operates in Canada and elsewhere. The group appears to have suffered in the same way that a number of other property developers and managers which have also sought protection under the CCAA in recent years. The applicants are insolvent; they each have outstanding debentures

1993 CarswellOnt 183, [1993] O.J. No. 14, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 847...

issues under trust deeds; and they propose a plan of compromise among themselves and the holders of these debentures as well as those others of their secured and unsecured creditors as they deemed appropriate in the circumstances. Each applicant except THG Lehndorff Vermögensverwaltung GmbH ("GmbH") is an Ontario corporation. GmbH is a company incorporated under the laws of Germany. Each of the applicants has assets or does business in Canada. Therefore each is a "company" within the definition of s. 2 of the CCAA. The applicant Lehndorff General Partner Ltd. ("General Partner Company") is the sole general partner of the Limited Partnerships. The General Partner Company has sole control over the property and businesses of the Limited Partnerships. All major decisions concerning the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are made by management operating out of the Lehndorff Toronto Office. The applicants aside from the General Partner Company have as their sole purpose the holding of title to properties as bare trustee or nominee on behalf of the Limited Partnerships. LUPC is a limited partnership registered under the Limited Partnership Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.16 ("Ontario LPA"). LPC and LPC II are limited partnerships registered under Part 2 of the Partnership Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. P-2 ("Alberta PA") and each is registered in Ontario as an extra provincial limited partnership. LUPC has over 2,000 beneficial limited partners, LPC over 500 and LPC II over 250, most of whom are residents of Germany. As at March 31, 1992 LUPC had outstanding indebtedness of approximately \$370 million, LPC \$45 million and LPC II \$7 million. Not all of the members of the Group are making an application under the CCAA. Taken together the Group's indebtedness as to Canadian matters (including that of the applicants) was approximately \$543 million. In the summer of 1992 various creditors (Canada Trustco Mortgage Company, Bank of Montreal, Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Tokyo Canada) made demands for repayment of their loans. On November 6, 1992 Funtanua Investments Limited, a minor secured lendor also made a demand. An interim standstill agreement was worked out following a meeting of July 7, 1992. In conjunction with Peat Marwick Thorne Inc. which has been acting as an informal monitor to date and Fasken Campbell Godfrey the applicants have held multiple meetings with their senior secured creditors over the past half year and worked on a restructuring plan. The business affairs of the applicants (and the Limited Partnerships) are significantly intertwined as there are multiple instances of intercorporate debt, cross-default provisions and guarantees and they operated a centralized cash management system.

3 This process has now evolved to a point where management has developed a consolidated restructuring plan which plan addresses the following issues:

- (a) The compromise of existing conventional, term and operating indebtedness, both secured and unsecured.
- (b) The restructuring of existing project financing commitments.
- (c) New financing, by way of equity or subordinated debt.
- (d) Elimination or reduction of certain overhead.
- (e) Viability of existing businesses of entities in the Lehndorff Group.
- (f) Restructuring of income flows from the limited partnerships.
- (g) Disposition of further real property assets aside from those disposed of earlier in the process.
- (h) Consolidation of entities in the Group; and
- (i) Rationalization of the existing debt and security structure in the continuing entities in the Group.

Formal meetings of the beneficial limited partners of the Limited Partnerships are scheduled for January 20 and 21, 1993 in Germany and an information circular has been prepared and at the time of hearing was being translated into German. This application was brought on for hearing at this time for two general reasons: (a) it had now ripened to the stage of proceeding with what had been distilled out of the strategic and consultative meetings; and (b) there were creditors other than senior secured lenders who were in a position to enforce their rights against assets of some of the applicants (and Limited Partnerships) which if such enforcement did take place would result in an undermining of the overall plan. Notice of this hearing was given to various creditors: Barclays Bank of Canada, Barclays Bank PLC, Bank of Montreal, Citibank Canada, Canada Trustco Mortgage

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Corporation, Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Tokyo Canada, Funtauna Investments Limited, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Fuji Bank Canada and First City Trust Company. In this respect the applicants have recognized that although the initial application under the CCAA may be made on an ex parte basis (s. 11 of the CCAA; *Re Langley's Ltd.*, [1938] O.R. 123, [1938] 3 D.L.R. 230 (C.A.); *Re Keppoch Development Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 95 (N.S. T.D.). The court will be concerned when major creditors have not been alerted even in the most minimal fashion (*Re Inducon Development Corp.* (1992), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 306 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 310). The application was either supported or not opposed.

4 "Instant" debentures are now well recognized and respected by the courts: see *Re United Maritime Fishermen Co-operative* (1988), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 44 (N.B. Q.B.), at pp. 55-56, varied on reconsideration (1988), 68 C.B.R. (N.S.) 170 (N.B. Q.B.), reversed on different grounds (1988), 69 C.B.R. (N.S.) 161 (N.B. C.A.), at pp. 165-166; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 248 (B.C. S.C.) at pp. 250-251; *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Elan Corp. v. Comiskey*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289, 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (C.A.) per Doherty J.A., dissenting on another point, at pp. 306-310 (O.R.); *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of)* (sub nom. *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Gammon*) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 321 (Gen. Div.) at p. 327. The applicants would appear to me to have met the technical hurdle of s. 3 and as defined s. 2) of the CCAA in that they are debtor companies since they are insolvent, they have outstanding an issue of debentures under a trust deed and the compromise or arrangement that is proposed includes that compromise between the applicants and the holders of those trust deed debentures. I am also satisfied that because of the significant intertwining of the applicants it would be appropriate to have a consolidated plan. I would also understand that this court (Ontario Court of Justice (General Division)) is the appropriate court to hear this application since all the applicants except GmbH have their head office or their chief place of business in Ontario and GmbH, although it does not have a place of business within Canada, does have assets located within Ontario.

The CCAA is intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative 5 to bankruptcy and, as such, is remedial legislation entitled to a liberal interpretation. It seems to me that the purpose of the statute is to enable insolvent companies to carry on business in the ordinary course or otherwise deal with their assets so as to enable plan of compromise or arrangement to be prepared, filed and considered by their creditors and the court. In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors. See the preamble to and sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 11 of the CCAA; Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, [1934] S.C.R. 659 at p. 661, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 219-220; Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd. (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361 (Q.B.), at pp. 12-13 (C.B.R.); Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp. (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (B.C. C.A.), at pp. 310-311, affirming (1990), 2 C.B.R. (3d) 291, 47 B.C.L.R. (2d) 193 (S.C.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. dismissed (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 164 (S.C.C.) .; Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of), supra, at p. 307 (O.R.); Fine's Flowers v. Fine's Flowers (Creditors of) (1992), 7 O.R. (3d) 193 (Gen. Div.), at p. 199 and "Reorganizations Under The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act", Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 592.

The CCAA is intended to provide a structured environment for the negotiation of compromises between a debtor company and its creditors for the benefit of both. Where a debtor company realistically plans to continue operating or to otherwise deal with its assets but it requires the protection of the court in order to do so and it is otherwise too early for the court to determine whether the debtor company will succeed, relief should be granted under the CCAA. see *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey* (*Trustee of*), supra at pp. 297 and 316; *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252 and *Ultracare Management Inc. v. Zevenberger (Trustee of*), supra, at p. 328 and p. 330. It has been held that the intention of the CCAA is to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among the creditors during the period required to develop a plan and obtain approval of creditors. Such manoeuvres could give an aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who are less aggressive and would undermine the company's financial position making it even less likely that the plan will succeed: see *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at p. 220 (W.W.R.). The possibility that one or more creditors may be prejudiced should not affect the court's exercise of its authority to grant a stay of proceedings under the CCAA because this affect is offset by the benefit to all creditors and to the company of facilitating a reorganization. The court's primary concerns under the CCAA

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must be for the debtor and *all* of the creditors: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 108-110; *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84 (C.A.), at pp. 315-318 (C.B.R.) and *Re Stephanie's Fashions Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 251-252.

One of the purposes of the CCAA is to facilitate ongoing operations of a business where its assets have a greater value as part of an integrated system than individually. The CCAA facilitates reorganization of a company where the alternative, sale of the property piecemeal, is likely to yield far less satisfaction to the creditors. Unlike the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, before the amendments effective November 30, 1992 to transform it into the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* ("BIA"), it is possible under the CCAA to bind secured creditors it has been generally speculated that the CCAA will be resorted to by companies that are generally larger and have a more complicated capital structure and that those companies which make an application under the BIA will be generally smaller and have a less complicated structure. Reorganization may include partial liquidation where it is intended as part of the process of a return to long term viability and profitability. See *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318 and *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.* (1987), 67 C.B.R. (N.S.) 237 (Alta. Q.B.) at pp. 245, reversed on other grounds at (1988), 71 C.B.R. (N.S.) 71 (Alta. C.A.). It appears to me that the purpose of the CCAA is also to protect the interests of creditors and to enable an orderly distribution of the debtor company's affairs. This may involve a winding-up or liquidation of a company or simply a substantial downsizing of its business operations, provided the same is proposed in the best interests of the creditors generally. See *Re Associated Investors of Canada Ltd.*, supra, at p. 318; *Re Amirault Fish Co.*, 32 C.B.R. 186, [1951] 4 D.L.R. 203 (N.S. T.D.) at pp. 187-188 (C.B.R.).

8 It strikes me that each of the applicants in this case has a realistic possibility of being able to continue operating, although each is currently unable to meet all of its expenses albeit on a reduced scale. This is precisely the sort of circumstance in which all of the creditors are likely to benefit from the application of the CCAA and in which it is appropriate to grant an order staying proceedings so as to allow the applicant to finalize preparation of and file a plan of compromise and arrangement.

9 Let me now review the aspect of the stay of proceedings. Section 11 of the CCAA provides as follows:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

10 The power to grant a stay of proceeding should be construed broadly in order to permit the CCAA to accomplish its legislative purpose and in particular to enable continuance of the company seeking CCAA protection. The power to grant a stay therefore extends to a stay which affected the position not only of the company's secured and unsecured creditors, but also all non-creditors and other parties who could potentially jeopardize the success of the plan and thereby the continuance of the company. See *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.*, supra, at pp. 12-17 (C.B.R.) and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 296-298 (B.C. S.C.) and pp. 312-314 (B.C. C.A.) and *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank*, supra, at pp. 219 ff. Further the court has the power to order a stay that is effective in respect of the rights arising in favour of secured creditors under all forms of commercial security: see *Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.*, supra, at p. 320 where Gibbs J.A. for the court stated:

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

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11 The power to grant a stay may also extend to preventing persons seeking to terminate or cancel executory contracts, including, without limitation agreements with the applying companies for the supply of goods or services, from doing so: see *Gaz Métropolitain v. Wynden Canada Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) at pp. 290-291 and *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 311-312 (B.C. C.A.). The stay may also extend to prevent a mortgagee from proceeding with foreclosure proceedings (see *Re Northland Properties Ltd.* (1988), 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 141 (B.C. S.C.) or to prevent landlords from terminating leases, or otherwise enforcing their rights thereunder (see *Feifer v. Frame Manufacturing Corp.* (1947), 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A. Que.)). Amounts owing to landlords in respect of arrears of rent or unpaid rent for the unexpired portion of lease terms are properly dealt with in a plan of compromise or arrangement: see *Sklar-Peppler Furniture Corp. v. Bank of Nova Scotia* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 312 (Ont. Gen. Div.) especially at p. 318. The jurisdiction of the court to make orders under the CCAA in the interest of protecting the debtor company so as to enable it to prepare and file a plan is effective notwithstanding the terms of any contract or instrument to which the debtor company is a party. Section 8 of the CCAA provides:

8. This Act extends and does not limit the provisions of any instrument now or hereafter existing that governs the rights of creditors or any class of them and has full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in that instrument.

The power to grant a stay may also extend to prevent persons from exercising any right of set off in respect of the amounts owed by such a person to the debtor company, irrespective of whether the debtor company has commenced any action in respect of which the defense of set off might be formally asserted: see *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.*, supra, at pp. 312-314 (B.C.C.A.).

12 It was submitted by the applicants that the power to grant a stay of proceedings may also extend to a stay of proceedings against non-applicants who are not companies and accordingly do not come within the express provisions of the CCAA. In support thereof they cited a CCAA order which was granted staying proceedings against individuals who guaranteed the obligations of a debtor-applicant which was a qualifying company under the terms of the CCAA: see *Re Slavik*, unreported, [1992] B.C.J. No. 341 [now reported at 12 C.B.R. (3d) 157 (B.C. S.C.)]. However in the *Slavik* situation the individual guarantors were officers and shareholders of two companies which had sought and obtained CCAA protection. Vickers J. in that case indicated that the facts of that case included the following unexplained and unamplified fact [at p. 159]:

5. The order provided further that all creditors of Norvik Timber Inc. be enjoined from making demand for payment upon that firm or upon any guarantor of an obligation of the firm until further order of the court.

The CCAA reorganization plan involved an assignment of the claims of the creditors to "Newco" in exchange for cash and shares. However the basis of the stay order originally granted was not set forth in this decision.

13 It appears to me that Dickson J. in *International Donut Corp. v. 050863 N.D. Ltd.*, unreported, [1992] N.B.J. No. 339 (N.B. Q.B.) [now reported at 127 N.B.R. (2d) 290, 319 A.P.R. 290] was focusing only on the stay arrangements of the CCAA when concerning a limited partnership situation he indicated [at p. 295 N.B.R.]:

In August 1991 the limited partnership, through its general partner the plaintiff, applied to the Court under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*, R.S.C., c. C-36 for an order delaying the assertion of claims by creditors until an opportunity could be gained to work out with the numerous and sizable creditors a compromise of their claims. An order was obtained but it in due course expired without success having been achieved in arranging with creditors a compromise. That effort may have been wasted, because it seems questionable that the federal Act could have any application to a limited partnership in circumstances such as these . (Emphasis added.)

I am not persuaded that the words of s. 11 which are quite specific as relating as to a *company* can be enlarged to encompass something other than that. However it appears to me that Blair J. was clearly in the right channel in his analysis in *Campeau v. Olympia & York Developments Ltd.* unreported, [1992] O.J. No. 1946 [now reported at 14 C.B.R. (3d) 303 (Ont. Gen. Div.)] at pp. 4-7 [at pp. 308-310 C.B.R.].

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The Power to Stay

The court has always had an inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings whenever it is just and convenient to do so, in order to control its process or prevent an abuse of that process: see *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60, 137 D.L.R. (3d) 287 (Ont. H.C.), and cases referred to therein. In the civil context, this general power is also embodied in the very broad terms of s. 106 of the *Courts of Justice Act*, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, which provides as follows:

106. A court, on its own initiative or on motion by any person, whether or not a party, may stay any proceeding in the court on such terms as are considered just.

Recently, Mr. Justice O'Connell has observed that this discre tionary power is "highly dependent on the facts of each particular case": *Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim* (unreported) [(June 25, 1992), Doc. 24127/88 (Ont. Gen. Div.)], [1992] O.J. No. 1330.

Apart from this inherent and general jurisdiction to stay proceedings, there are many instances where the court is specifically granted the power to stay in a particular context, by virtue of statute or under the *Rules of Civil Procedure*. The authority to prevent multiplicity of proceedings in the same court, under r. 6.01(1), is an example of the latter. The power to stay judicial and extra-judicial proceedings under s. 11 of the C.C.A.A., is an example of the former. Section 11 of the C.C.A.A. provides as follows.

The Power to Stay in the Context of C.C.A.A. Proceedings

By its formal title the C.C.A.A. is known as "An Act to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors". To ensure the effective nature of such a "facilitative" process it is essential that the debtor company be afforded a respite from the litigious and other rights being exercised by creditors, while it attempts to carry on as a going concern and to negotiate an acceptable corporate restructuring arrangement with such creditors.

In this respect it has been observed that the C.C.A.A. is "to be used as a practical and effective way of restructuring corporate indebtedness.": see the case comment following the report of *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd.* (1988), 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 1, 63 Alta. L.R. (2d) 361, 92 A.R. 81 (Q.B.), and the approval of that remark as "a perceptive observation about the attitude of the courts" by Gibbs J.A. in *Quintette Coal Ltd. v. Nippon Steel Corp.* (1990), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 105 (C.A.) at p. 113 [B.C.L.R.].

Gibbs J.A. continued with this comment:

To the extent that a general principle can be extracted from the few cases directly on point, and the others in which there is persuasive obiter, it would appear to be that the courts have concluded that under s. 11 there is a discretionary power to restrain judicial or extra-judicial conduct against the debtor company the effect of which is, or would be, seriously to impair the ability of the debtor company to continue in business during the compromise or arrangement negotiating period.

(emphasis added)

I agree with those sentiments and would simply add that, in my view, the restraining power extends as well to conduct which could seriously impair the debtor's ability to focus and concentrate its efforts on the business purpose of negotiating the compromise or arrangement. [In this respect, see also *Sairex GmbH v. Prudential Steel Ltd.* (1991), 8 C.B.R. (3d) 62 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at p. 77.]

I must have regard to these foregoing factors while I consider, as well, the general principles which have historically governed the court's exercise of its power to stay proceedings. These principles were reviewed by Mr. Justice Montgomery in *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allendale Mutual Insurance*, supra (a "Mississauga Derailment" case), at pp. 65-66

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[C.P.C.]. The balance of convenience must weigh significantly in favour of granting the stay, as a party's right to have access to the courts must not be lightly interfered with. The court must be satisfied that a continuance of the proceeding would serve as an injustice to the party seeking the stay, in the sense that it would be oppressive or vexatious or an abuse of the process of the court in some other way. The stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff.

It is quite clear from *Empire-Universal Films Limited v. Rank*, [1947] O.R. 775 (H.C.) that McRuer C.J.H.C. considered that *The Judicature Act* [R.S.O. 1937, c. 100] then [and now the CJA] merely confirmed a statutory right that previously had been considered inherent in the jurisdiction of the court with respect to its authority to grant a stay of proceedings. See also *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 (H.C.) and *Canada Systems Group (EST) Ltd. v. Allen-Dale Mutual Insurance Co.* (1982), 29 C.P.C. 60 (H.C.) at pp. 65-66.

15 Montgomery J. in Canada Systems, supra, at pp. 65-66 indicated:

Goodman J. (as he then was) in *McCordic v. Bosanquet* (1974), 5 O.R. (2d) 53 in granting a stay reviewed the authorities and concluded that the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to grant a stay of proceedings may be made whenever it is just and reasonable to do so. "This court has ample jurisdiction to grant a stay whenever it is just and reasonable to do so." (Per Lord Denning M.R. in *Edmeades v. Thames Board Mills Ltd.*, [1969] 2 Q.B. 67 at 71, [1969] 2 All E.R. 127 (C.A.). Lord Denning's decision in *Edmeades* was approved by Lord Justice Davies in *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach* (*Executor of Estate of George William Willis*), [1972] 1 All E.R. 430, (sub nom. *Lane v. Willis; Lane v. Beach*) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 326 (C.A.).

In Weight Watchers Int. Inc. v. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. (1972), 25 D.L.R. (3d) 419, 5 C.P.R. (2d) 122, appeal allowed by consent without costs (sub nom. Weight Watchers of Ont. Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Inc. Inc.) 42 D.L.R. (3d) 320n, 10 C.P.R. (2d) 96n (Fed. C.A.), Mr. Justice Heald on an application for stay said at p. 426 [25 D.L.R.]:

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The principles which must govern in these matters are clearly stated in the case of *Empire Universal Films Ltd. et al. v. Rank et al.*, [1947] O.R. 775 at p. 779, as follows [quoting *St. Pierre et al. v. South American Stores (Gath & Chaves), Ltd. et al.*, [1936] 1 K.B. 382 at p. 398]:

(1.) A mere balance of convenience is not a sufficient ground for depriving a plaintiff of the advantages of prosecuting his action in an English Court if it is otherwise properly brought. The right of access to the King's Court must not be lightly refused. (2.) In order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the Court that the continuance of the action would work an injustice because it would be oppressive or vexatious to him or would be an abuse of the process of the Court in some other way; and (b) the stay must not cause an injustice to the plaintiff. On both the burden of proof is on the defendant.

16 Thus it appears to me that the inherent power of this court to grant stays can be used to supplement s. 11 of the CCAA when it is just and reasonable to do so. Is it appropriate to do so in the circumstances? Clearly there is jurisdiction under s. 11 of the CCAA to grant a stay in respect of any of the applicants which are all companies which fit the criteria of the CCAA. However the stay requested also involved the limited partnerships to some degree either (i) with respect to the applicants acting on behalf of the Limited Partnerships or (ii) the stays being effective vis-à-vis any proceedings taken by any party against the property assets and undertaking of the Limited Partnerships in respect of which they hold a direct interest (collectively the "Property") as set out in the terms of the stay provisions of the order paragraphs 4 through 18 inclusive attached as an appendix to these reasons. [Appendix omitted.] I believe that an analysis of the operations of a limited partnership in this context would be beneficial to an understanding of how there is a close inter-relationship to the applicants involved in this CCAA proceedings and how the Limited Partnerships and their Property are an integral part of the operations previously conducted and the proposed restructuring.

17 A limited partnership is a creation of statute, consisting of one or more general partners and one or more limited partners. The limited partnership is an investment vehicle for passive investment by limited partners. It in essence combines the

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flow through concept of tax depreciation or credits available to "ordinary" partners under general partnership law with limited liability available to shareholders under corporate law. See Ontario LPA sections 2(2) and 3(1) and Lyle R. Hepbum, Limited Partnerships, (Toronto: De Boo, 1991), at p. 1-2 and p. 1-12. I would note here that the limited partnership provisions of the Alberta PA are roughly equivalent to those found in the Ontario LPA with the interesting side aspect that the Alberta legislation in s. 75 does allow for judgment against a limited partner to be charged against the limited partner's interest in the limited partnership. A general partner has all the rights and powers and is subject to all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership. In particular a general partner is fully liable to each creditor of the business of the limited partnership. The general partner has sole control over the property and business of the limited partnership: see Ontario LPA ss. 8 and 13. Limited partners have no liability to the creditors of the limited partnership's business; the limited partners' financial exposure is limited to their contribution. The limited partners do not have any "independent" ownership rights in the property of the limited partnership. The entitlement of the limited partners is limited to their contribution plus any profits thereon, after satisfaction of claims of the creditors. See Ontario LPA sections 9, 11, 12(1), 13, 15(2) and 24. The process of debtor and creditor relationships associated with the limited partnership's business are between the general partner and the creditors of the business. In the event of the creditors collecting on debt and enforcing security, the creditors can only look to the assets of the limited partnership together with the assets of the general partner including the general partner's interest in the limited partnership. This relationship is recognized under the Bankruptcy Act (now the BIA) sections 85 and 142.

18 A general partner is responsible to defend proceedings against the limited partnership in the firm name, so in procedural law and in practical effect, a proceeding against a limited partnership is a proceeding against the general partner. See Ontario *Rules of Civil Procedure*, O. Reg. 560/84, Rules 8.01 and 8.02.

19 It appears that the preponderance of case law supports the contention that contention that a partnership including a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. See *Lindley on Partnership*, 15th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1984), at pp. 33-35; *Seven Mile Dam Contractors v. R.* (1979), 13 B.C.L.R. 137 (S.C.), affirmed (1980), 25 B.C.L.R. 183 (C.A.) and "Extra-Provincial Liability of the Limited Partner", Brad A. Milne, (1985) 23 Alta. L. Rev. 345, at pp. 350-351. Milne in that article made the following observations:

The preponderance of case law therefore supports the contention that a limited partnership is not a separate legal entity. It appears, nevertheless, that the distinction made in *Re Thorne* between partnerships and trade unions could not be applied to limited partnerships which, like trade unions, must rely on statute for their validity. The mere fact that limited partnerships owe their existence to the statutory provision is probably not sufficient to endow the limited partnership with the attribute of legal personality as suggested in *Ruzicks* unless it appeared that the Legislature clearly intended that the limited partnership should have a separate legal existence. A review of the various provincial statutes does not reveal any procedural advantages, rights or powers that are fundamentally different from those advantages enjoyed by ordinary partnerships. The legislation does not contain any provision resembling section 15 of the *Canada Business Corporation Act* [S.C. 1974-75, c. 33, as am.] which expressly states that a corporation has the capacity, both in and outside of Canada, of a natural person. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to create a new category of legal entity.

It appears to me that the operations of a limited partnership in the ordinary course are that the limited partners take a completely passive role (they must or they will otherwise lose their limited liability protection which would have been their sole reason for choosing a limited partnership vehicle as opposed to an "ordinary" partnership vehicle). For a lively discussion of the question of "control" in a limited partnership as contrasted with shareholders in a corporation, see R. Flannigan, "The Control Test of Investor Liability in Limited Partnerships" (1983) 21 Alta. L. Rev. 303; E. Apps, "Limited Partnerships and the 'Control' Prohibition: Assessing the Liability of Limited Partners" (1991) 70 Can. Bar Rev. 611; R. Flannigan, "Limited Partner Liability: A Response" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 552. The limited partners leave the running of the business to the general partner and in that respect the care, custody and the maintenance of the property, assets and undertaking of the limited partnership roperty, assets and undertaking is an undivided interest which cannot be segregated for the purpose of legal process. It seems to me that there must be afforded a protection of the whole since the applicants' individual interest therein cannot be segregated without in effect dissolving the partnership arrangement. The limited partners have two courses of action to take if they are

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dissatisfied with the general partner or the operation of the limited partnership as carried on by the general partner — the limited partners can vote to (a) remove the general partner and replace it with another or (b) dissolve the limited partnership. However Flannigan strongly argues that an unfettered right to remove the general partner would attach general liability for the limited partners (and especially as to the question of continued enjoyment of favourable tax deductions) so that it is prudent to provide this as a conditional right: *Control Test*, (1992), supra, at pp. 524-525. Since the applicants are being afforded the protection of a stay of proceedings in respect to allowing them time to advance a reorganization plan and complete it if the plan finds favour, there should be a stay of proceedings (vis-à-vis any action which the limited partners may wish to take as to replacement or dissolution) through the period of allowing the limited partners to vote on the reorganization plan itself.

It seems to me that using the inherent jurisdiction of this court to supplement the statutory stay provisions of s. 11 of the CCAA would be appropriate in the circumstances; it would be just and reasonable to do so. The business operations of the applicants are so intertwined with the limited partnerships that it would be impossible for relief as to a stay to be granted to the applicants which would affect their business without at the same time extending that stay to the undivided interests of the limited partners in such. It also appears that the applicants are well on their way to presenting a reorganization plan for consideration and a vote; this is scheduled to happen within the month so there would not appear to be any significant time inconvenience to any person interested in pursuing proceedings. While it is true that the provisions of the CCAA allow for a cramdown of a creditor's claim (as well as an interest of any other person), those who wish to be able to initiate or continue proceedings against the applicants may utilize the comeback clause in the order to persuade the court that it would not be just and reasonable to maintain that particular stay. It seems to me that in such a comeback motion the onus would be upon the applicants to show that in the circumstances it was appropriate to continue the stay.

22 The order is therefore granted as to the relief requested including the proposed stay provisions.

Application allowed.

Footnotes

* As amended by the court.

End of Document

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TAB 6

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank, 1984 CarswellAlta 259 1984 CarswellAlta 259, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, [1984] A.W.L.D. 609, [1984] A.W.L.D. 611...

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: Woodward's Ltd., Re | 1993 CarswellBC 530, 37 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1040, 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236, 79 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 363, [1993] B.C.J. No. 42 | (B.C. S.C., Jan 11, 1993)

1984 CarswellAlta 259 Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank

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MERIDIAN DEVELOPMENTS INC. v. TORONTO DOMINION BANK; MERIDIAN DVELOPMENTS INC. v. NU-WEST GROUP LTD.

Wachowich J.

Judgment: May 11, 1984 Docket: Edmonton Nos. 8401-10190, 8301-09096

Counsel: A.Z. Breitman and J.G. Shea, for Meridian Dev. Ltd. J.L. MacPherson, Q.C., and K.J. Martens, for Toronto Dominion Bank. P.M. Owen, Q.C., and C. Bodner, for Nu-West Group Ltd.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote Banking and Banks --- Letters of credit

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Proposals — Procedure under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Company posting letter of credit to secure payment of judgment — Court subsequently restraining further steps in any proceeding against company — "Proceeding" not limited to one involving court or court official — Payment of letter of credit being "proceeding", but not "proceeding against company" because company having no property in letter of credit — Letter being independent contract between bank and person negotiating draft.

The defendant N. Ltd. guaranteed payments due from its subsidiary to the plaintiff under an agreement for sale. When N. Ltd. failed to comply with the terms of the guarantee, the plaintiff obtained default judgment against it and commenced execution proceedings. N. Ltd. then applied for a declaration providing that the land must be sold before execution could be made against it. The application was dismissed, but execution was stayed pending the outcome of an appeal from the dismissal. The stay was granted on the condition that N. Ltd. post an irrevocable letter of credit in favour of the plaintiff in the amount of the balance owing under the guarantee. Subsequently, N. Ltd. obtained an order pursuant to the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act which restrained "further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against ... [N. Ltd.] until July 31, 1984". After N. Ltd. lost the appeal respecting execution, the plaintiff presented the letter of credit to the

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respondent bank for payment. The bank refused to honour the letter and the plaintiff applied for advice and directions concerning their right to present the letter of credit for payment.

Held:

Letter of credit to be honoured by bank.

The restraining order was made in accordance with the general object of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. It was intended to prevent manoeuvers for positioning among the creditors since these manoeuvers would give the aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of less aggressive creditors and would further undermine the financial position of the company, making it less likely that the eventual arrangement would succeed. The order was designed to catch all creditors. Therefore the plaintiff could only succeed in its application by establishing that payment of the letter of credit was not a proceeding against N. Ld. To narrow the interpretation of "proceeding" to one which necessarily involves either a court or court official is too restrictive; there are situations where this interpretation could defeat the Act's purpose. Moreover, payment of the letter of credit in this case was contingent on the decision of the Court of Appeal; therefore a court was involved. However, the money to be paid was not the property of N. Ltd.; accordingly, payment of the letter of credit could not be termed a proceeding against N. Ltd. Security in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit is not the property of the party arranging the letter of credit. That party has contracted with his bank to require the bank to pay out a specific amount of money to a third party on the occurrence of certain events. In return, he has promised to repay the bank for the funds so expended. The customer of the bank never has "ownership" of any funds represented by the letter of credit. An irrevocable letter of credit is an independent contract between the bank and the person cashing the draft and the bank is bound to honour it. Thus, the respondent bank was obliged to honour its contract with the plaintiff.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Artistic Colour Printing Co., Re (1880), 14 Ch. D. 502 - considered

Aspen Planners Ltd. v. Commerce Masonry & Forming Ltd. (1979), 7 B.L.R. 102 (Ont. H.C.) - considered

A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que., [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75 - applied

Can. Credit Men's Trust Assoc. v. Edmonton, 5 C.B.R. 589, 21 Alta. L.R. 160, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 747, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 525 (C.A.) — considered

East Girard Savings Assn. v. Citizens Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Bagtown (1979), 593 F. (2d) 598 (U.S.C.A.) — applied

Gray v. Wentworth Canning Co., 58 Man. R. 459, 31 C.B.R. 182, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 1285 (K.B.) -- considered

Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd., Re, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 326 (B.C.S.C.) - referred to

Keyworth, Re; Ex parte Banner (1874), 9 Ch. App. 379 (L.J.) - referred to

Lee v. Armstrong, 13 Alta. L.R. 160, [1917] 3 W.W.R. 889, 37 D.L.R. 738 (C.A.) - considered

Owen (Edward) Enrg. Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank Int. Ltd., [1978] 1 All E.R. 976, [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 166 (C.A.) - considered

Page v. First Nat. Bank of Maryland, U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Columbia, 30th March 1982 (not yet reported) - applied

Perkins Beach Lead Mining Co., Re (1877), 7 Ch. D. 371 - considered

Regina Steam Laundry Ltd. v. Sask. Govt. Ins. Office, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 96, 15 D.L.R. (3d) 121 (Sask. C.A.) — referred to

Wynden Can. Inc. v. Gaz Metro. Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (Que. S.C. - applied

Statutes considered:

Alberta Business Corporations Act, 1981 (Alta.), c. B-15.

Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict.), c. 89, s. 85.

Companies' Creditors Arrangment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-25, s. 11.

Law of Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-8, ss. 40(2), (3).

Authorities considered:

Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979), "proceeding".

3 Hals. (4th) 100, 102, paras. 132, 133.

Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 2nd ed. (1969), vol. 4, p. 182, "proceedings".

Words and phrases considered:

proceeding

Application for advice and directions concerning obligation of bank to honour letter of credit.

Wachowich J.:

1 The applicant Meridian Developments Inc. (hereinafter called "Meridian") is an Alberta corporation which has recently been continued under the Alberta Business Corporations Act, 1981 (Alta.), c. B-15. Previously it was known as Meridian Developments Ltd. and it was in that name that Meridian sold land by agreement for sale to 233995 Alberta Ltd. on 16th March 1981. Nu-West Group Ltd. (hereinafter called "Nu-West") is the beneficial owner of all of the shares of 233995 Alberta Ltd. and on 16th March 1981 executed under seal an unconditional guarantee in favour of Meridian Developments Ltd. whereby Nu-West unconditionally guaranteed to Meridian the amounts due from 233995 Alberta Ltd. at the times and in the manner set forth in the agreement for sale.

2 It was a term of the guarantee that if default occurred under the agreement, Nu-West would forthwith on demand pay all of the purchase moneys owed.

3 By cl. 5 of this guarantee it was agreed that Meridian would not be bound to exhaust other resources or to act on other securities before proceeding against Nu-West.

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4 On 15th March 1983, 233995 Alberta Ltd. defaulted on the agreement for sale. On 18th March 1983 demand was made to Nu-West as was required under the terms of the guarantee.

5 Nu-West failed to pay the amount owing on demand and, thereafter, Meridian issued a statement of claim on 31st March 1983. Nu-West did not defend this action and, as a result, Meridian obtained default judgment on 3rd May 1983 in the amount of \$928,989.33 plus costs. A writ of execution was duly filed on 11th May 1983 and Meridian instructed the sheriff to seize sufficient assets of Nu-West to satisfy the judgment. Seizure of a number of pieces of furniture and office machines was effected on 16th May 1983.

6 Nu-West then made application by notice of motion for a declaration that Meridian was not at liberty to make execution against Nu-West until it had sold the land in question because of the provisions of s. 40(2) and (3) of the Law of Property Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. L-8. This application was dismissed by order of Kirby J. on 24th May 1983. Part of the debt was then paid but execution on the balance of \$463,329.33 was stayed pending Nu-West's appeal of Kirby J.'s order. The stay of execution granted was subject to the following conditions:

1. That Nu-West post an irrevocable letter of credit issued by the Toronto-Dominion Bank in favour of Meridian Developments Ltd. in the amount of the unpaid balance of \$463,239.33 with interest at $11^{-1}/_{2}$ per cent per annum calculated thereon from 4th May 1983 to the date of payment.

8 2. That Meridian's solicitors were to hold the letter on the trust conditions imposed in correspondence from solicitors for the defendant to the solicitors for the plaintiff dated 6th June 1983.

9 3. That the defendant would promptly prosecute the appeal of the order.

10 The appeal was subsequently launched on 20th June 1983 and heard on 12th October 1983. The appeal was dismissed with written reasons on 29th March 1984 [31 Alta. L.R. (2d) 1, [1984] 4 W.W.R. 97 (C.A.)].

11 The irrevocable letter of credit was held in trust by solicitors for Meridian throughout the period between Kirby J.'s first order and the dismissal of the appeal. During this period several new orders were made by consent each of which had the effect of continuing the terms and conditions of the original order. The amount of the letter of credit was increased during this period in order to account for the interest on the principal which accrued during the period. The order that was in effect when the decision of the Court of Appeal was released was made by Hetherington J. on 30th January 1984.

12 The letter of credit would have probably been honoured on presentation after 29th March were it not for the ex parte order obtained from myself by Nu-West under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-25, as amended. This order was made as a result of Nu-West's insolvency and provided, inter alia, in cl. 2 that:

further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the Petitioner be restrained until July 31, 1984

and in clause 3 that:

until July 31, 1984 no suit, action, or other proceeding be proceeded with or commenced against the Petitioner, except with leave of this Court.

As a result of the bank's knowledge of this order, it has not honoured the letter of credit and has, instead, brought interpleader proceedings.

13 Meridian has brought action against the bank alleging breach of contract in their failure to honour the letter of credit.

14 Application for advice and directions was also made by Meridian to entitle them to present the letter of credit for payment and to determine that my order of 21st March 1984 does not enjoin and restrain Meridian from presenting the letter of credit or the bank from honouring it.

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15 From this the following issues come before me in this application:

16 1. Is payment of the letter of credit a "proceeding" within the meaning of cl. 2 or 3 of the 21st March order?

17 2. If so, is it a proceeding "against the Petitioner" [Nu-West] so as to be restrained by cl. 2 or 3 of that order?

18 3. If it is found to be a "proceeding", should the court in any case give leave to Meridian in the circumstances to obtain payment of the letter of credit?

19 These are difficult issues to resolve as counsel agree that the law in the area is unclear and the cases cannot all be reconciled. Further, there are good policy arguments to be made for both sides.

In order to resolve the issues raised in this application I must consider the scope and intent of my 21st March ex parte order under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. This Act, though little used, is one of a number of federal statutes dealing with insolvency. In common with the various other statutes, it envisages the protection of creditors and the orderly administration of the debtor's affairs or assets: *Wynden Can. Inc. v. Gaz Metro Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.). In the words of Duff C.J.C. who spoke for the court in *A.G. Can. v. A.G. Que.*, [1934] S.C.R. 659, 16 C.B.R. 1 at 2, [1934] 4 D.L.R. 75:

... the aim of the Act is to deal with the existing condition of insolvency in itself to enable arrangements to be made in view of the insolvent condition of the company under judicial authority which, otherwise, might not be valid prior to the initiation of proceedings in bankruptcy. *Ex facie* it would appear that such a scheme in principle does not radically depart from the normal character of bankruptcy legislation.

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allows a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors.

22 This aim is facilitated by s. 11 of the Act which enables the court to:

... restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company upon such terms as the court sees fit, and the court may also make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

It was pursuant to this section that on 21st March I granted the order that restrained "further proceedings in any action, suit, or proceeding" against Nu-West and enjoined creditors and others from proceeding with or commencing any "suit, action, or proceeding".

23 This order is in accord with the general aim of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act. The intention was to prevent any manoeuvres for positioning among creditors during the interim period which would give the aggressive creditor an advantage to the prejudice of others who were less aggressive and would further undermine the financial position of the company making it less likely that the eventual arrangement would succeed.

The order was obviously intended to cast a wide net and catch all creditors. Therefore Meridian can only succeed if it can establish that the payment of the letter of credit is not a "proceeding" against Nu-West as contemplated by the order.

As both counsel have frankly admitted, there are no cases directly on point. One of the few cases which does deal with the meaning of the word "proceeding" in the Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act is *Gray v. Wentworth Canning Co.*, 58 Man. R. 459, 31 C.B.R. 182, [1950] 2 W.W.R. 1285, a decision of the Manitoba Court of King's Bench. In that case Kelly J. determined that the relevant statute section gave the court complete discretion to determine the kinds of proceedings it would restrain. Although because of the wording in the particular order there at issue, Kelly J. determined that it was meant to catch only proceedings, suits, or actions which had not yet been instituted, it is clear from his judgment that he sees the section as allowing orders of much wider range. He points out, in fact, that it is because the draftsman of the order did not see fit to follow

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the exact words of what was then s. 10 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, 1932-33 (Can.), c. 36, that the order as given must be seen as restraining only those proceedings commenced after the order was given.

A similar provision to s. 11 may be found in the English Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict.), c. 89, s. 85, which allowed a court at any time after the presentation of a winding-up petition to:

... restrain further Proceedings in any Action, Suit, or Proceeding against the Company, upon such Terms as the Court sees fit; the Court may also make an order that no Suit, Action or other Proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the Company except with the Leave of the Court and subject to such Terms as the Court imposes.

27 Several cases which have interpreted this provision are useful in determining the scope of the term "proceeding". Jessel M.R. in *Re Artistic Colour Printing Co.* (1880), 14 Ch. D. 502, determined that an order made under this section could restrain the sheriff from selling goods already in his possession after seizure on the judgment of a judgment creditor. At p. 505 he concluded: "The word 'proceeding' in both sections of course includes execution under a judgment in an action." *Re Perkins Beach Lead Mining Co.* (1877), 7 Ch. D. 371, is to the same effect.

28 Counsel for Meridian admits that "proceeding" may have a very general meaning but submits that we must confine ourselves here to proceedings which necessarily involve a court or a court official. There is certainly authority for this proposition. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. (1979), defines the term in the following manner:

Proceeding. In a general sense, the form and manner of conducting juridical business before a court or judicial officer. Regular and orderly progress in form of law, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of judgment. Term also refers to administrative proceedings before agencies, tribunals, bureaus, or the like.

An act which is done by the authority or direction of the court, agency, or tribunal, express or implied; an act necessary to be done in order to obtain a given end; a prescribed mode of action for carrying into effect a legal right. All the steps or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an action. *Statter v. U.S.* (1933), 66 F. (2d) 819 (Alaska C.C.A.). The word may be used synonymously with "action" or "suit" to describe the entire course of an action at law or suit in equity from the issuance of the writ or filing of the complaint until the entry of a final judgment, or may be used to describe any act done by authority of a court of law and every step required to be taken in any cause by either party. The proceedings of a suit embrace all matters that occur in its progress judicially.

Term "proceeding" may refer not only to a complete remedy but also to a mere procedural step that is part of a larger action or special proceeding. *Rooney v. Vermont Invt. Corp.* (1973), 10 Cal. (3d) 351, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 515 P. (2d) 297 (Cal. S.C.). A "proceeding" includes action and special proceedings before judicial tribunals as well as proceedings pending before quasi-judicial officers and boards. *State ex rel. Johnson v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 810, Wabasha County* (1961), 260 Minn. 237, 109 N.W. (2d) 596 (Minn. S.C.).

Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 2nd ed. (1969), vol. 4, p. 182, similarly restricts the definition to actions before a court or other judicial body:

Proceedings

The term "proceeding" is frequently used to note a step in an action, and obviously it has that meaning in such phrases as "proceeding in any cause or matter". When used alone, however, it is in certain statutes to be construed as synonymous with, or including "action" (1 Hals. (3rd) 4-5, paras. 5, 6).

"By s. 89 of the Judicature Act of 1873 (36 & 37 Vict.), c. 66 [repealed; see now Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, (15 & 16 Geo. 5), c. 49, s. 202] ... it is said that every inferior court 'shall, as regards all causes of action within its jurisdiction for the time being, have power to grant and shall grant in any proceeding before such Court, such relief, redress, or remedy' in as full and ample a manner as might and ought to be done in the like case by the High Court of Justice ... It can do so 'in any proceeding'. Now what is the meaning there of 'in any proceeding'? ... Now, although

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if s. 89 stood by itself, there might be some difficulty in determining what is the meaning of the word 'proceeding', yet it seems to me to be clear what is its meaning in s. 90 [repealed; see now Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, s. 203], and that 'proceeding' in that section is a general word meant to cover every step in an action, and is equivalent to the word 'action'." *Pryor v. City Offices Co.* (1883), 10 Q.B.D. 504 (C.A.), *per* Brett, M.R., at pp. 507, 508.

"Anything that precedes the final judgment or order is, in my opinion, a 'proceeding' in the action." *Blake v. Summersby*, [1889] W.M. 39, *per* Kay, J. at p. 39.

Although this last mentioned definition indicated *Blake v. Summersby* restricts the proceedings to steps in an action preceding judgment, there is ample authority, cited by both counsel, to indicate that the term must be taken to include execution steps taken after judgment. As I indicated earlier, counsel for Meridian would restrict "execution proceedings" to those involving a court or court official. Those cases cited by Nu-West which indicate that an order restraining proceedings restrains a sheriff from conducting a sale following seizure, I am satisfied are in accord with this view inasmuch as the sheriff is an officer of the court. Further, counsel for Meridian cites *Can. Credit Men's Trust Assn. v. Edmonton*, 5 C.B.R. 589, 21 Alta. L.R. 160, [1925] 1 W.W.R. 747, [1925] 2 D.L.R. 525, where the Alberta Appellate Division found that a distress was not a "process against property" within the meaning of s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1919 (Can.), c. 36. He also cites another Alberta Appellate Division decision, that of *Lee v. Armstrong*, 13 Alta. L.R. 160, [1917] 3 W.W.R. 889, 37 D.L.R. 738, where the court found that the noting on the title by the registrar of a writ of execution was not a "proceeding" within the meaning of the phrase "no proceedings shall be had or taken in respect of any execution already issued on any personal judgment ... until sale of the land mortgaged" as found in the Land Titles Act, 1906 (Alta.), c. 24, s. 62(2) [am. 1917, c. 3, s. 40(2)].

31 Meridian argues further on the basis of the ejusdem generis rule that the interpretation of "other proceeding" in s. 11 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act is limited to proceedings which would fall within the genus indicated by the words "suit" and "action". This, too, indicates that the term as used in the Act ought to be restricted to proceedings which necessarily involve either a court or court official.

32 These arguments are persuasive. Nonetheless, I am mindful of the wide scope of action which Parliament intended for this section of the Act. To narrow the interpretation of "proceeding" could lessen the ability of a court to restrain a creditor from acting to prejudice an eventual arrangement in the interim when other creditors are being consulted. As I indicated earlier, it is necessary to give this section a wide interpretation in order to ensure its effectiveness. I hesitate therefore to restrict the term "proceedings" to those necessarily involving a court or court official because there are situations in which to do so would allow non-judicial proceedings to go against the creditor which would effectively prejudice other creditors and make effective arrangement impossible. The restriction could thus defeat the purpose of the Act. I must consider, for instance, the fact that it may still be possible to make distress without requiring a sheriff or his bailiff, as for example, on a chattel mortgage. It might well be necessary to find that such a distress constitutes a "proceeding" in terms of s. 11 in some future situations. As a result, in the absence of a clear indication from Parliament of an intention to restrict "proceedings" to "proceedings which involve either a court or court official", I cannot find that the term should be so restricted. Had Parliament intended to so restrict the term, it would have been easy to qualify it by saying for instance "proceedings before a court or tribunal".

33 Nor is there anything within the provisions of the order given on 21st March to indicate any intention to so limit the meaning of the word. I conclude, therefore, that payment of a letter of credit drawn on the account of an insolvent company could well come within the meaning of the word "proceeding" in the order.

34 Here, we are dealing with a payment which remains contingent at the date of the order. It awaited the judgment of the Court of Appeal on 21st March and thus, did involve a court or court official. Even if, therefore, I were to accept that payment of a letter of credit is not a proceeding under the Act, it seems clear that a payment which awaits a decision of the court is a proceeding as contemplated by the Act.

35 It must be noted, however, that by the terms of the 21st March 1984 order it is only "further proceedings in any action, suit, or proceeding against the Petitioner" that are restrained. Unless the payment of the letter of credit is a "proceeding against

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the Petitioner" (Nu-West) it was not restrained by this order. I agree with counsel for Meridian that the payment of the letter of credit cannot be termed a proceeding against Nu-West unless the money to be paid is Nu-West's property.

The ownership of the funds represented by the letter of credit is dependent upon the judicial nature of the commercial instrument in question. The nature of a letter of credit has been extensively considered. 3 Hals. (4th) states at p. 100, para. 132 that letters of credit:

... create binding contract to accept or pay bills on the specified conditions, enforceable against the banker by any person to whom the letter has been shown by the grantee, and who has acted on the faith of it.

In para. 133 at p. 102 the authors continue:

The contract thus created between the seller and the banker is separate from, although ancillary to, the original contract between the buyer and the seller, by reason of the banker's undertaking to the seller, which is absolute.

The nature of a letter of credit has been explored in both English and Canadian cases. In *Aspen Planners Ltd. v. Commerce Masonry & Forming Ltd.* (1979), 7 B.L.R. 102 at 107 (Ont. H.C.) Henry J. quotes with approval from the English Court of Appeal [who are quoting from *Malas (Hamzch) v. Sons & British Imex Indust.*, [1958] 2 Q.B. 127, [1958] 1 All E.R. 262 at 263, [1958] 2 W.L.R. 100, [1957] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 549 (C.A.)] in *Edward Owen Enrg. Ltd. v. Barclay's Bank Int.*, [1978] 1 All E.R. 976 at 981, [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 166 (C.A.):

" '... it seems to be plain that the opening of a confirmed letter of credit constitutes a bargain between the banker and the vendor of the goods, which imposes on the banker an absolute obligation to pay, irrespective of any dispute which there may be between the parties on the question whether the goods are up to the contract or not. An elaborate commercial system has been built up on the footing that bankers' confirmed credits are of that character, and, in my judgment it would be wrong for this court in the present case to interfere with that established practice.' "

38 *Aspen Planners Ltd.*, supra, deals with a situation in which the plaintiffs arranged irrevocable letters of credit to a contractor to ensure payment of a building contract. They later alleged that the contractor had defaulted on the contract and sought to obtain an injunction restraining payment under the letter of credit. The Ontario court refused, citing the irrevocable nature of the bank's obligation to pay the contractor.

39 This case, as do the English cases cited by counsel, exemplifies the more traditional use of the letter to guarantee payment in commercial transactions where goods and services are bought and sold.

40 Here, however, a more novel use has been made of the letter of credit as a security device and to determine whether this use affects the nature of the document we must turn to the American cases where the use of letters of credit, particularly in the way one was used here, is much more prevalent.

41 The nature of a letter of credit was explored in numerous cases relied upon by counsel for Meridian. *East Girard Savings* Assn. v. Citizens Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Bagtown (1979), 593 F. (2d) 598, a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sets out the nature of the letter of credit at p. 601:

... a letter of credit typically involves three separate contracts. First, the issuing bank enters into a contract with its customer to issue the letter of credit. Second, there is a contract between the issuing bank and the party receiving the letter of credit. Third, the customer who procured the letter of credit signs a contract with the person receiving it, usually involving the sale of goods or the provision of some service. *Barclays Bank D.C.O. v. Mercantile Nat. Bank* (1973), 481 F. (2d) 1224, 1239 n.21, cert. dismissed 414 U.S. 1139, 94 S.Ct. 888, 39 L.Ed. (2d) 96; Verkuil, "Bank Solvency and Guaranty Letters of Credit," 25 Stan. L. Rev. 716 at 719.

In recent years, letters of credit have been used for a variety of commercial transactions, Harfield, *The Increasing Domestic Use of the Letter* (1972), 4 U.C.C.L.J. 251. The guaranty letter of credit is one of these recent innovations. The guaranty letter of credit is designed to ensure that one or more parties to a contract will perform their duties under it. In a typical

1984 CarswellAlta 259, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, [1984] A.W.L.D. 609, [1984] A.W.L.D. 611...

guaranty situation, the future owner of a building requires that the building contractor give him a completion bond providing for the payment of a certain sum of money if the building is not completed on schedule.

At p. 602 the court continues:

Regardless of which form of letter of credit is used, upon compliance with the conditions contained in the letter, the recipient is entitled to full payment. This entitlement is independent of collateral obligations which may exist under the other underlying contracts. *Pringle-Assoc. Mtge. Corp. v. Southern Nat. Bank of Hattiesburg, Miss.*, 571F. (2d) 871 (Miss. C.A.); *Barclays Bank*, supra, at 1238-39; Vernons Texas Codes, Annotated, 2 Tex. Bus. & Com. Code (1968), p. 534, s. 5.114(a).

At p. 603 the court concludes:

If the letter of credit is to retain its utility as a commercial instrument, the rights and duties of the issuer, the beneficiary, and the procurer must remain clear. Parties to commercial transactions must be able to rely on the fact that as soon as the conditions contained in a particular letter are satisfied, payment is due.

This case, and others cited by counsel for Meridian, clearly indicate that the nature of a letter of credit has not been changed by its use in a greater variety of commercial transactions, notably as a guarantee. It exists as an independent contract between the bank and the person cashing or negotiating the draft and, if it is irrevocable, the bank is bound to honour it.

Because of the independent contractual nature of a letter of credit, the analogy which Nu-West attempts to make between money held in court following seizure and a letter of credit cannot be maintained. Money paid into court may well remain the property of the defendants as the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal determined in *Regina Steam Laundry Ltd. v. Sask. Govt. Ins. Office*, [1971] 1 W.W.R. 96, 15 D.L.R. (3d) 121, although I note that there is also authority to the contrary: *Re Keyworth; Ex parte Banner* (1874), 9 Ch. App. 379 (L.S.); *Re Hansard Spruce Mills Ltd.*, [1954] 1 D.L.R. 326 (B.C.S.C.). Security in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit is not the property of the party arranging the letter of credit. Indeed, I would go so far as to say that it has never been his money. He has contracted with his bank to require the bank to pay out a specific amount of money to a third party on the occurrence of certain events. In return he has promised to repay the bank for the funds so expended. The customer of the bank has, in my view, never had "ownership" of any funds represented by the letter of credit. He can lay claim only to the debt that has been thereby created.

Thus, it is my view that even if the payment out of a letter of credit could be termed a "proceeding", as this term is used in s. 11 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, it cannot be termed "a proceeding against the Petitioner" so as to be caught by the order of 21st March.

45 I am fortified in my view by a recent unreported American case cited by Meridian which seems right on point. The case is *Page v. First Nat. Bank of Maryland*, U.S. Dist. Ct., Dist. of Columbia, 30th March 1982 (not yet reported).

The facts are very similar to those found here. Westinghouse Credit Corporation ("W.C.C.") was the beneficiary of a letter of credit drawn on the First National Bank of Maryland ("bank"). The bank was enjoined from payment out on this letter after Page and Associates, a limited partnership and Virginia Page ("Page") its sole general partner, filed voluntary petitions in bankruptcy. W.C.C. was a substantial creditor of Page, holding among its forms of security the letter of credit issued on the bank. W.C.C. presented its letter of credit for payment four days after the petition was filed. Page sought an injunction the next day which was granted on the ground that to pay the letter would be a transfer in violation of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C., s. 362(3) or (4). These subsections provide:

[A] petition [under Title 11] operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of ...

(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate;

(4) any act to create, perfect or enforce any lien against property of the estate.

1984 CarswellAlta 259, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, [1984] A.W.L.D. 609, [1984] A.W.L.D. 611...

W.C.C. appealed the decision to grant the injunction and this appeal was allowed. The court found that cashing the letter of credit was not the type of act contemplated by the provisions of the statute since neither the letter of credit nor its proceeds are the "property of the estate" under the Bankruptcy Code.

47 At p. 4 of the decision the court stated:

In issuing the letter of credit the bank entered into an independent contractual obligation to pay W.C.C. out of its own assets. Although cashing the letter will immediately give rise to a claim by the bank against the debtors pursuant to the latter's indemnification obligations, that claim will not divest the debtors of any property since any attempt to enforce that claim would be subject to an automatic stay pursuant to 11 U.S.C., para. 362(4).

In my view the Toronto-Dominion Bank is in the same position. It is obliged to honour its contract with Meridian even though the cashing of the letter of credit will increase Nu-West's debt to the bank and even though the bank has no method of enforcing its claim against Nu-West because of the 21st March order.

49 It makes no difference that the letter of credit was held in trust by Meridian's solicitors and that the condition precedent for presentation had not been met on 21st March. If the moneys secured were not Nu-West property on 21st March, the order did not affect them. The letter of credit became negotiable when the condition precedent was fulfilled on 29th March with the rendering of the Court of Appeal's decision in Meridian's favour. The bank should be directed to honour it on presentation on the terms and conditions specified in the letter and it is so ordered.

Directions given.

Ead of Document

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TAB 7

1999 CarswellOnt 625, [1999] O.J. No. 709, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: 8440522 Canada Inc., Re | 2013 ONSC 6167, 2013 CarswellOnt 13921, 233 A.C.W.S. (3d) 286, 8 C.B.R. (6th) 86 | (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List], Oct 4, 2013)

1999 CarswellOnt 625 Ontario Court of Justice, General Division [Commercial List]

Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re

1999 CarswellOnt 625, [1999] O.J. No. 709, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 314, 96 O.T.C. 272

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

In the Matter of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O., 1990, C. C-43, as amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Royal Oak Mines Inc., and others

Blair J.

Judgment: March 10, 1999 Docket: 99-CL-003278

Counsel: David E. Baird, Q.C., and Mario J. Forte, for Applicants. Peter H. Griffin, for Trilon Financial Corporation and Northgate Exploration Limited. Ronald N. Robertson, Q.C., for Unofficial Senior Subordinated Noteholders' Committee. Sean Dunphy, for Bankers Trust and Macquarrie Limited. Hilary Clarke, for Bank of Nova Scotia.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangements Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — Miscellaneous issues

Debtor company applied for initial order pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Relief sought included debtor-in-possession financing super-priority, stay of proceedings, and permission to conduct certain operations and take certain restructuring steps — Relief sought also included power to borrow and charge property, to impose charge as liability protection in favour of directors, to not pay creditors, permission to file plan of arrangement, appointment of monitor and inclusion of general terms, including come back clauses — Debtor was supported by two senior secured lenders and by unofficial creditors' committee of senior secured subordinated noteholders — Group of hedge lenders opposed scope and extent of relief as being broad and overreaching — Other creditors received short notice or no notice of application — Application granted — Initial order approved but in more limited scope than requested — Relief sought extended beyond bounds of procedural fairness — Language of order not to read like trust indenture but to be clear, simple and readily understandable — Initial order to contain declaration that applicant had standing to apply, authorization to file plan of compromise, appointment of monitor and its duties and to contain comeback clause — Initial order to put in place stay provisions and operating, financing and restructuring terms reasonably necessary for continued operation of debtor during brief but realistic sorting-out period on urgent basis — Proliferation of advisory committees and extension of broad

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protection to directors are better left for orders other than initial order — Comeback clauses not to be used to provide answer to overreaching initial orders — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11(3), (4).

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Blair J*.:

Bank of America Canada v. Willann Investments Ltd. (February 6, 1991), Doc. B22/91 (Ont. Gen. Div.) -- referred to

Canadian Asbestos Services Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, 16 C.B.R. (3d) 114, [1992] G.S.T.C. 15, 11 O.R. (3d) 353, 93 D.T.C. 5001, 5 C.L.R. (2d) 54, [1993] 1 C.T.C. 48, 5 T.C.T. 4328 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Canadian Asbestos Services Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal, 13 O.R. (3d) 291, 10 C.L.R. (2d) 204, [1993] G.S.T.C. 23, 1 G.T.C. 6169 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — referred to

Dylex Ltd., Re (January 23, 1995), Doc. B-4/95 (Ont. Gen. Div.) - referred to

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 1 O.R. (3d) 289, (sub nom. Elan Corp. v. Comiskey) 41 O.A.C. 282 (Ont. C.A.) — referred to

Quintette Coal Ltd., Re (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146, 68 B.C.L.R. (2d) 219 (B.C. S.C.) - referred to

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered

- s. 3(1) referred to
- s. 11 [rep. & sub. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] -- considered
- s. 11(3) [rep. & sub. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11(3)(a)-11(3)(c) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
- s. 11(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered

APPLICATION by debtor company for initial order pursuant to s. 11 of Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Blair J.:

1 These reasons are an expanded version of an endorsement made at the time of the granting of an Initial Order in favour of the Applicants under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended, on February 15, 1999. At the time, I indicated that I would release additional reasons with respect to certain of the issues raised on the Initial Application at a later date. In doing so, I propose to incorporate significant portions of the earlier handwritten endorsement.

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2 Royal Oak Mines Inc. ("Royal Oak"), and a series of related corporations, applied for the protection of the Court afforded by the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (the "CCAA") while they endeavour to negotiate a restructuring of their debt with their creditors. Royal Oak is a publicly traded mining company of considerable import in the mining industry. It currently operates four gold and copper mines (two in the Timmins area of Ontario, one in Yellowknife in the North West Territories, and one (the Kemess mine) in the interior of British Columbia). The Company employs approximately 960 people (about 300 in Ontario, 280 in the North West Territories, 348 in British Columbia, 27 at its corporate headquarters in Seattle, and 5 in the Province of Newfoundland).

3 Royal Oak is supported in this CCAA Application by Trilon Financial Corporation and Northgate Exploration Limited, the senior secured lenders who are owed approximately \$180 million, and by the unofficial creditors' committee of the Senior Secured Subordinated Noteholders who are owed about \$264 million. A group of three other lenders, known in the jargon of the industry as the "Hedge Lenders", and who have advanced approximately \$50 million to Royal Oak, stands between the former two groups, in terms of priority. The three Hedge Lenders — Bankers Trust, Macquarrie Limited of Australia, and Bank of Nova Scotia — did not strenuously oppose the granting of an Initial CCAA Order in principle; however, they questioned the scope and extent of some of the relief sought, arguing that it was unnecessarily broad and "overreaching", particularly where they had only been given short notice of the Application and where some creditors had been given none.

4 There are construction lien claimants in the Province of British Columbia, they point out, who have lien claims against the Kemess Mine totalling about \$18 million, and whose claims are admittedly prior to those of *any* other secured creditor in relation to that asset. Yet the lien claimants were not given notice of these proceedings. In addition, Export Development Corporation has a claim for about \$19.5 million and had not been given notice.

5 Falling world prices for gold and copper, environmental concerns with their attendant costs, and construction and startup costs relating to the Kemess Mine in particular, have led to Royal Oak's current financial crunch. It is insolvent. I was quite satisfied on the evidence in Ms. Witte's affidavit, and on the other materials filed, that the Applicants met the statutory requirements for the granting of an Initial Order under section 11 of the CCAA, and that it was appropriate and just in the circumstances for the Court to grant the protection sought on an Initial Order basis, while the Applicants attempt to restructure their affairs and to elicit the approval and support of their creditors to such a restructuring. Accordingly, an Initial Order was granted on February 15, 1999. There have been certain adjustments and variations made to that Order since then.

6 In view of some of the important concerns raised by Mr. Dunphy and Ms. Clarke on behalf of the Hedge Lenders about the details and reach of the Order sought, however, I indicated that the Court was not prepared to approve it in its entirely at this stage. The Initial Order as granted was therefore somewhat more limited in scope than that requested. Somewhat more expanded reasons than those set out in the handwritten endorsement made at the time were to follow. These are those reasons.

Initial CCAA Orders

Section 11 of the CCAA is the provision of the Act embodying the broad and flexible statutory power invested in the court to "grant its protection" to an applicant by imposing a stay of proceedings against the applicant company, subject to terms, while the company attempts to negotiate a restructuring of its debt with its creditors. It is well established that the provisions of the Act are remedial in nature, and that they should be given a broad and liberal interpretation in order to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors, and to keep companies in business where that end can reasonably be achieved: see, *Nova Metal Products Inc. v. Comiskey (Trustee of)* (1990), 1 C.B.R. (3d) 101 (Ont. C.A.), per Doherty J.A.; *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), at p. 31; "*Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*", Stanley E. Edwards, (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587 at p. 593 referred to with approval by Thackray J. in *Quintette Coal Ltd., Re* (1992), 13 C.B.R. (3d) 146 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 173.

8 In the utilization of the CCAA for this broad purpose a practice has developed whereby the application is "pre-packaged" to a significant extent before relief is sought from the Court. That is, the debtor company seeks to obtain the consent and support of its major creditors to a CCAA process, and to its major terms and conditions, before the application is launched. This has

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been my experience in the course of supervising more than a few such proceedings. The practice is a healthy and effective one in my view, and is to be commended and encouraged. Nonetheless, it has led in some ways to the problem which is the subject of these reasons.

9 The problem centers around the growing complexity of the Initial Orders sought under s. 11(3) of the Act, and the increasing tendency to attempt to incorporate into such orders provisions to meet every eventuality that might conceivably arise during the course of the CCAA process. Included in this latter category is the matter of debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing, calling — as it frequently does — for a "super priority" position over all other secured lending then in place.

10 Initial Orders under the CCAA are almost invariably sought on short notice to many of the creditors and, not infrequently, without any notice to others. I note as well that the Court is also asked in most cases to respond on short notice and with little advance opportunity to examine the materials filed in support of the application. This is because the materials, for very practical reasons, are not usually ready for filing until just before the filing is made. I make these observations not to be critical in any way, but simply to point out the realities of the context in which the application for the Initial Order is usually determined.

11 This case falls into both the "short notice" and "no notice" categories. The Hedge Lenders, at least, received only very short notice of the Application on February 15th. Neither the Kemess Lien Claimants in British Columbia nor Export Development Corporation were given any notice. Yet the Court was asked to grant super priority funding, which would rank ahead of even the Lien Claimants (who have admitted priority over everyone), without their knowledge or consent, and which would rank ahead of the Hedge Lenders who had not yet had a reasonable opportunity to consider their position or (given an American holiday) for their counsel to obtain meaningful instructions. The Initial Order which was originally sought in the proceeding consisted of 58 paragraphs of highly complex and sophisticated language. It was 28 pages in length. In addition, it had an 11 page Term Sheet annexed as a Schedule to it. It dealt with,

- (a) the stay of proceedings (7 paragraphs, $4^{-1}/_2$; pages);
- (b) permitted operations by the Applicants during the CCAA period (4 paragraphs, $3^{-1}/_2$; pages);
- (c) restructuring steps permitted (8 paragraphs, 3 pages);
- (d) the power to borrow and the charging of property (15 paragraphs, 5 pages);
- (e) a charge to be imposed as a liability protection in favour of directors (2 elaborate paragraphs, spanning 4 pages);
- (f) non-payment of creditors (one paragraph, 1/3 page);
- (g) permission to file a plan of arrangement (2 paragraphs, $\frac{1}{3}$ pages);
- (h) appointment and duties of the Monitor (9 paragraphs, 5 pages); and,
- (i) general terms, including the "come back" clauses (6 paragraphs, $1^{-1}/_2$; pages).

12 What is at issue here is not the principle of the Court granting relief of the foregoing nature in CCAA proceedings. That principle is well enough imbedded in the broad jurisdiction referred to earlier in these reasons. In particular, it is not the tenet of DIP financing itself, or super priority financing, which were being questioned. There is sufficient authority for present purposes to justify the granting of such relief in principle: see, *Canadian Asbestos Services Ltd. v. Bank of Montreal* (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 353 (Ont. Gen. Div.), (Chadwick J.) at pp. 359-361, supplemental reasons and leave to appeal granted (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 291 (Ont. Gen. Div.); *Bank of America Canada v. Willann Investments Ltd.* (February 6, 1991), Doc. B22/91 (Ont. Gen. Div.), (Austin J); *Dylex Ltd., Re* (January 23, 1995), Doc. B-4/95 (Ont. Gen. Div.), (Houlden J.A.). It was the granting of such relief on the broad terms sought here, and the wisdom of that growing practice — without the benefit of interested

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persons having the opportunity to review such terms and, if so advised, to comment favourably or neutrally or unfavourably, on them — which was called into question.

13 There is justification in the call for caution, in my view. The scope and the parameters of the relief to be granted at the Initial Order stage — in conjunction with the dynamics of no notice, short notice, and the initial statutory stay period provided for in subsection 11(3) of the Act — require some consideration.

14 I have alluded to the highly complex and sophisticated nature of the Initial Order which was originally sought in this proceeding. The statutory source from which this emanation grew, however, is relatively simple and straightforward. Subsection 11(3) of the CCAA — which is the foundation of the Court's "protective" jurisdiction — states:

11(3) A court may, on an initial application in respect of a company, make an order on such terms as it may impose, effective for such period as the court deems necessary not exceeding thirty days,

(a) staying, until otherwise ordered by the court, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under an Act referred to in subsection (1);

(b) restraining, until otherwise ordered by the court, further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company; and

(c) prohibiting, until otherwise ordered by the court, the commencement of or proceeding with any other action, suit or proceeding against the company.

15 Conceptually, then, the applicant is provided with the protections of a stay, a restraining order and a prohibition order for a period "not exceeding 30 days" in order to give it time to muster support for and justify the relief granted in the Initial Order, all interested persons by then having received reasonable notice and having had a reasonable opportunity to consider their respective positions. The difficulties created by *ex parte* and short notice proceedings are thereby attenuated.

16 Subsection 11(4) of the Act provides for the making of additional orders in the CCAA process. The Court is granted identical powers to those set out in paragraphs (a) through (c) of subsection 11(3), except that there is no limit on the time period during which a subsection 11(4) order may remain in effect. The only other difference between the two subsections is that in respect of an Initial order under subsection 11(3) the onus on the applicant is to show that it is appropriate in the circumstances for the order to issue, whereas in respect of an order under subsection 11(4) there is an additional requirement to show that the applicant "has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence" in the CCAA process.

17 The Initial Order sought in this case was not unlike those sought -- and, indeed, those which have been granted -- in numerous other CCAA applications. While the relief granted is always a matter for the exercise of judicial discretion, based upon the statutory and inherent jurisdiction of the Court, it seems to me that considerable relief now sought at the Initial Order stage extends beyond what can appropriately be accommodated within the bounds of procedural fairness. It was at least partially for that reason that I declined to grant the Initial Order relief sought at the outset of this proceeding.

18 Upon reflection, it seems to me that the following considerations might usefully be kept in mind by those preparing for an Initial Order application, and by the Court in granting such an order.

19 First, recognition must be given to the reality that CCAA applications for the most part involve substantial corporations with large indebtedness and often complex debtor-creditor structures. Indeed, the threshold for applying for relief under the

CCAA is a debt burden of at least 5 million^1 . Thus, I do not mean to suggest by anything said in these reasons that either the process itself or the corporate/commercial/financial issues which must be addressed and resolved, are simple or easily articulated. Therein lies a challenge, however.

20 CCAA orders will of necessity involve a certain complexity. Nevertheless, at least a nod in the direction of plainer language would be helpful to those having to review the draft on short notice, or to react to the order in quick fashion after it has

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been made on no notice. It would also be helpful to the Court, which — as I have noted — is not infrequently asked to give its approval and grant the order with very little advance opportunity for review or consideration. The language of orders should be clear and as simple and readily understandable to creditors and others affected by them as possible in the circumstances. They should not read like trust indentures. These comments are relevant to all orders, but to Initial CCAA Orders in particular.

21 The Initial Order will, of course, contain the necessary declaration that the applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies, the authorization to file a plan of compromise and arrangement, the appointment of the monitor and its duties, and such things as the "comeback" clause. In other respects, however, what the Initial Order should seek to accomplish, in my view, is to put in place the necessary stay provisions and such further operating, financing and restructuring terms as are reasonably necessary for the continued operation of the debtor company during a brief but realistic period of time, on an urgency basis. During such a period, the ongoing operations of the company will be assured, while at the same time the major affected stakeholders are able to consider their respective positions and prepare to respond.

Having sought only the reasonably essential minimum relief required for purposes of the Initial Order, the applicant then has the discretion as to when to ask for more extensive relief. It may well be helpful, though, if the nature of the more extensive relief to be sought is signalled in the Initial application, so that interested and affected persons will know what is in the offing in that regard.

Subsection 11(3) of the Act does not stipulate that the Initial Order shall be granted for a period of 30 days. It provides that the Court in its discretion may grant an order for a period *not exceeding* 30 days. Each case must be approached on the basis of its own circumstances, and an agreement in advance on the part of all affected secured creditors, at least, may create an entirely different situation. In the absence of such agreement, though, the preferable practice on applications under subsection 11(3) is to keep the Initial Order as simple and straightforward as possible, and the relief sought confined to what is essential for the continued operations of the company during a brief "sorting-out" period of the type referred to above. Further issues can then be addressed, and subsequent orders made, if appropriate, under the rubric of the subsection 11(4) jurisdiction.

It follows from what I have said that, in my opinion, extraordinary relief such as DIP financing with super priority status should be kept, in Initial Orders, to what is reasonably necessary to meet the debtor company's urgent needs over the sortingout period. Such measures involve what may be a significant re-ordering of priorities from those in place before the application is made, not in the sense of altering the existing priorities as between the various secured creditors but in the sense of placing encumbrances ahead of those presently in existence. Such changes should not be imported lightly, if at all, into the creditors mix; and affected parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to think about their potential impact, and to consider such things as whether or not the CCAA approach to the insolvency is the appropriate one in the circumstances — as opposed, for instance, to a receivership or bankruptcy — and whether or not, or to what extent, they are prepared to have their positions affected by DIP or super priority financing. As Mr. Dunphy noted, in the context of this case, the object should be to "keep the lights [of the company] on" and enable it to keep up with appropriate preventative maintenance measures, but the Initial Order itself should approach that objective in a judicious and cautious matter.

For similar reasons, things like the proliferation of advisory committees and the attendant professional costs accompanying them, and the extension of broad protection to directors, are better left for orders other than the Initial order.

26 I conclude these observations with a word about the "comeback clause". The Initial Order as granted in this case contained the usual provision which is known by that description. It states:

THIS COURT ORDERS that, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order, the Applicants may apply at any time to this Court to seek any further relief, and any interested Person may apply to this Court to vary or rescind this Order or seek other relief on seven days' notice to the Applicants, the Monitor, the CCAA Lender and to any other Person likely to be affected by the Order sought or on such other notice, if any, as this Court may order. (emphasis added)

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27 The Initial Order also contained the usual clause permitting the Applicants or the Monitor to apply for directions in relation to the discharge of the Monitor's powers and duties or in relation to the proper execution of the Initial Order. This right is not afforded to others.

The comeback provisions are available to sort out issues as they arise during the course of the restructuring. However, they do not provide an answer to overreaching Initial Orders, in my view. There is an inherent disadvantage to a person having to rely on those provisions. By the time such a motion is brought the CCAA process has often taken on a momentum of its own, and even if no formal "onus" is placed on the affected person in such a position, there may well be a practical one if the relief sought goes against the established momentum. On major security issues, in particular, which arise at the Initial Order stage, the occasions where a creditor is required to rely upon the comeback clause should be minimized.

29 These reasons are intended to compliment and to elaborate upon those set out in the brief endorsement made at the time the Initial Order was granted on February 15, 1999, in favour of the Royal Oak Applicants, but in a form more limited than that sought.

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 CCAA, subsection 3(1).

End of Document

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TAB 8

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd., 1990 CarswellBC 394 1990 CarswellBC 394, [1990] B.C.W.L.D. 2518, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384...

Most Negative Treatment: Not followed

Most Recent Not followed: Norm's Hauling Ltd., Re | 1991 CarswellSask 38, 6 C.B.R. (3d) 16, 91 Sask. R. 210, [1991] 3 W.W.R. 23, [1991] S.J. No. 53, 25 A.C.W.S. (3d) 57 | (Sask. Q.B., Jan 28, 1991)

1990 CarswellBC 394 British Columbia Court of Appeal

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd.

1990 CarswellBC 394, [1990] B.C.W.L.D. 2518, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 136, 23 A.C.W.S. (3d) 976, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311, 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84

RE CHEF READY FOODS LTD. et al.; CHEF READY FOODS LTD. v. HONGKONG BANK OF CANADA

Carrothers, Cumming and Gibbs JJ.A.

Heard: October 12, 1990 Judgment: October 29, 1990 Docket: Doc. Vancouver CA12944

Counsel: *D.I. Knowles* and *H.M. Ferris*, for appellant bank. *R.H. Sahrmann* and *L.D. Goldberg*, for respondent debtor.

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Banking and Banks --- Loans and discounts --- Loans under s. 178 of Bank Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, formerly s.88, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1)

Banking and Banks --- Loans and discounts — Loans under s. 178 of Bank Act (R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1, formerly s. 88, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1)

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application of Act

Corporations --- Arrangements and compromises — Under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Effect of arrangement — Stay of proceedings

Corporations — Arrangements and compromises — Where conflict between Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act and rights of holder of s. 178 Bank Act security, the broad scope of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act is to prevail — Appeal dismissed — Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, s. 11.

The bank held a s. 178 *Bank Act* security on the debtor's accounts receivables. The bank demanded payment of the debt. When the debtor failed to pay, the bank appointed an agent under the general assignment of book debts with instructions to the agent to realize upon the accounts. The debtor filed a petition for relief under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement*

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Act. An order was granted pursuant to s. 11 of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act staying realization upon, or other dealings with, any security on the undertaking, property and assets of the debtor. The bank appealed and sought that the stay order be varied to exclude the s. 178 security.

Held:

The appeal was dismissed.

The purpose of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* was to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company was able to continue in business. The statute did not exempt any creditors of a debtor company from its provisions. The *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* did not detract from the title held by the bank, it merely postponed the exercise of the right to seize and sell. Nor did the *Bank Act* exclude the operation of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.

In contrast to ss. 178 and 179 of the *Bank Act*, which focussed on the competing rights and duties of the borrower and the lender, the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* served the interests of a broad constituency of investors, creditors and employees. To grant a bank holding a s. 178 *Bank Act* security immunity from the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* would render the protection afforded that constituency illusory and frustrate the public policy objectives of the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*. Realization by the bank on its security would destroy the company as a going concern.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered:

Bank of Montreal v. Hall, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, [1990] 2 W.W.R. 193, 46 B.L.R. 161, 9 P.P.S.A.C. 177, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 361, 104 N.R. 110, 82 Sask. R. 120 — considered

Feifer and Frame Manufacturing Corp., Re, [1947] Quc. K.B. 348, 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A.) - referred to

Flintoff v. Royal Bank, [1964] S.C.R. 631, 7 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 49 W.W.R. 301, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 141 - referred to

Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.) — referred to

Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v. Oakwood Petroleums Ltd., 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 139 (Q.B.) — referred to

Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122 (C.A.) — referred to

Wynden Canada Inc. v. Gaz Métropolitain Inc. (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.) [affirmed 45 C.B.R. (N.S.) 11 (Que. C.A.)] – referred to

Statutes considered:

Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1 —

s. 178, as am. R.S.C. 1985 (3rd Supp.), c. 25, s. 26

Hongkong Bank of Canada v. Chef Ready Foods Ltd., 1990 CarswellBC 394 1990 CarswellBC 394, [1990] B.C.W.L.D. 2518, [1990] B.C.J. No. 2384...

s. 179

Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 11.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, S.C. 1932-33, c. 36.

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 —

s. 8

s. 11

Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59.

Limitation of Civil Rights Act, The, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16 —

ss. 19-36

Winding-up Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 213.

Words and phrases considered:

creditor — as used in the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, includes a bank holding a security under s. 178 of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1.

security — as used in the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, includes a security under s. 178 of the Bank Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1.

Appeal from order of Maczko J. dated August 30, 1990, granting stay pursuant to s. 11 of *Companies' Creditors Arrangement* Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 [reported 4 C.B.R. (3d) 307].

The judgment of the Court was delivered by Gibbs J.A.:

1 The sole issue on this appeal is whether a stay order made by a chambers Judge under s. 11 of the *Companies' Creditors* Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, is a bar to realization by the Hongkong Bank of Canada (the "bank") on security granted to it under s. 178 of the *Bank Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-1.

2 The facts relevant to resolution of the issue are not in dispute. The respondent Chef Ready Foods Ltd. ("Chef Ready") is in the business of manufacturing and wholesaling fresh and frozen pizza products. The appellant bank provided credit and other banking services to Chef Ready. As part of the security for its indebtedness Chef Ready executed the appropriate documentation and filed the appropriate notices under s. 178 of the *Bank Act*. Accordingly, the bank holds what is commonly referred to as "section 178 security."

3 Chef Ready encountered financial difficulties. On August 22, 1990, following upon some fruitless negotiations, the bank, through its solicitors, demanded payment from Chef Ready. The debt then stood at \$365,318.69 with interest accruing thereafter at \$150.43 per day. Chef Ready did not pay.

On August 27, 1990, the bank commenced proceedings upon debenture security which it held and upon guarantees by the principals of Chef Ready. Also on August 27, 1990, the bank appointed an agent under a general assignment of book debts which it held, with instructions to the agent to realize upon the accounts. In the meantime, on August 23, 1990, so as to qualify under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* (the "C.C.A.A."), Chef Ready had granted a trust deed to a trustee and issued an unsecured \$50 bond. On August 28, 1990, the day after the bank commenced its debenture and guarantee proceedings, Chef

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Ready filed a petition seeking various forms of relief under the C.C.A.A. On the same day Chef Ready filed an application, ex parte, as they were entitled to do under the C.C.A.A., for an order to be issued that day granting the relief claimed in the petition.

5 The application was heard in chambers in the afternoon of August 28, 1990 and the following day. The bank learned "on the grapevine" of the application and appeared on the hearing and was given standing to make submissions. It also filed affidavit evidence which appears to have been taken into account by the chambers Judge. The affidavit evidence had appended to it, inter alia, the s. 178 security documentation. On August 30, 1990, the chambers Judge granted the order and delivered oral reasons at the end of which he said:

I therefore conclude that the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* is an overriding statute which gives the court power to stay all proceedings including the right of the bank to collect the accounts receivable.

6 The reasons refer specifically to the accounts receivable because the bank was then poised ready to take possession of those accounts and collect the amounts owing. Its right to do so arose under the general assignment of book debts and under cl. 4 of the s. 178 security instrument:

4. If the Customer shall sell the property or any part thereof, the proceeds of any such sale, including cash, bills, notes, evidence of title, and securities, and the indebtedness of any purchaser in connection with such sales shall be the property of the Bank to be forthwith paid or transferred to the Bank, and until so paid or transferred to be held by the Customer on behalf of and in trust for the Bank. Execution by the Customer and acceptance by the Bank of an assignment of book debts shall be deemed to be in furtherance of this declaration and not an acknowledgement by the Bank of any right or title on the part of the Customer to such book debts.

7 The formal order made by the chambers Judge contains a paragraph which stays realization upon or otherwise dealing with any securing on "the undertaking, property and assets" of Chef Ready:

THIS COURT FURTHER ORDERS THAT all proceedings taken or that might be taken by any of the Petitioners' creditors or any other person, firm or corporation under the *Bankruptcy Act* (Canada) or the *Winding-up Act* (Canada) shall be stayed until further Order of this Court upon 2 days notice to the Petitioners and that further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding commenced by any person, firm or corporation against any of the Petitioners be stayed until the further Order of this Court upon 2 days notice to the Petitioners, suit or other proceeding may be proceeded with or commenced against any of the Petitioners by any person, firm or corporation except with leave of this Court upon 2 days notice to such terms as this Court may impose and that *the right of any person, firm or corporation to realize upon or otherwise deal with any property, right or security held by that person, firm or corporation on the undertaking, property and assets of the Petitioners be and the same is postponed.*

[Emphasis added.]

8 The jurisdiction in the Court to make such a stay order is found in s. 11 of the C.C.A.A.:

11. Notwithstanding anything in the *Bankruptcy Act* or the *Winding-up Act*, whenever an application has been made under this Act in respect of any company, the court, on the application of any person interested in the matter, may, on notice to any other person or without notice as it may see fit,

(a) make an order staying, until such time as the court may prescribe or until any further order, all proceedings taken or that might be taken in respect of the company under the *Bankruptcy Act* and the *Winding-up Act* or either of them;

(b) restrain further proceedings in any action, suit or proceeding against the company on such terms as the court sees fit; and

(c) make an order that no suit, action or other proceeding shall be proceeded with or commenced against the company except with the leave of the court and subject to such terms as the court imposes.

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9 The question of whether a step, not involving any court or litigation process, taken to realize upon the accounts receivable is a "suit, action or other proceeding ... against the company" is not before the Court on this appeal. The bank does not put its case forward on that footing. Its contention is more general in nature. It is that s. 178 security is beyond the reach of the C.C.A.A.; put another way, that whatever the scope of the C.C.A.A., it does not go so far as to impede or qualify, or give jurisdiction to make orders which will impede or qualify, the rights of realization of a holder of s. 178 security. Consistent with that position, by way of relief on the appeal the bank asks only that the stay order be varied to free up the s. 178 security:

(Nature of Order Sought)

An order that the appeal of the Appellant be allowed and an order be made the Order of the Judge in the Court below be set aside insofar as it restrains the Appellant from exercising its rights under its section 178 security ...

10 The purpose of the C.C.A.A. is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to the end that the company is able to continue in business. It is available to any company incorporated in Canada with assets or business activities in Canada that is not a bank, a railway company, a telegraph company, an insurance company, a trust company, or a loan company. When a company has recourse to the C.C.A.A., the Court is called upon to play a kind of supervisory role to preserve the status quo and to move the process along to the point where a compromise or arrangement is approved or it is evident that the attempt is doomed to failure. Obviously time is critical. Equally obviously, if the attempt at compromise or arrangement is to have any prospect of success, there must be a means of holding the creditors at bay, hence the powers vested in the Court under s. 11.

11 There is nothing in the C.C.A.A. which exempts any creditors of a debtor company from its provisions. The allencompassing scope of the Act qua creditors is even underscored by s. 8, which negates any contracting out provisions in a security instrument. And Chef Ready emphasizes the obvious, that if it had been intended that s. 178 security or the holders of s. 178 security be exempt from the C.C.A.A. it would have been a simple matter to say so. But that does not dispose of the issue. There is the *Bank Act* to consider.

12 There is nothing in the Loans and Security division of the *Bank Act* either, where s. 178 is found, which specifically excludes direct or indirect impact by the C.C.A.A. Nonetheless, the bank's position, in essence, is that there is a notional cordon sanitaire around s. 178 and other sections associated with it such that neither the C.C.A.A. nor orders made under it can penetrate. In support of its position, the bank relies heavily upon the recent unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in *Bank of Montreal v. Hall*, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 121, [1990] 2 W.W.R. 193, 46 B.L.R. 161, 9 P.P.S.A.C. 177, 65 D.L.R. (4th) 361, 104 N.R. 110, 82 Sask. R. 120, and to a lesser degree upon an earlier unanimous Supreme Court of Canada judgment in *Flintoft v. Royal Bank*, [1964] S.C.R. 631, 7 C.B.R. (N.S.) 78, 49 W.W.R. 301, 47 D.L.R. (2d) 141.

13 The principal issue in *Hall* was whether ss. 19 to 36 of the Saskatchewan *Limitation of Civil Rights Act*, R.S.S. 1978, c. L-16 applied to a security taken under ss. 178 and 179 of the *Bank Act*. The Court held that it was beyond the competence of the Saskatchewan Legislature "to superadd conditions governing realization over and above those found within the confines of the *Bank Act*" (p. 154 [S.C.R.]). In the course of arriving at its decision, the Court considered the property interest acquired by a bank under s. 178 security, the legislative history leading up to the present ss. 178 and 179, the purposes intended to be achieved by the legislation, and the rights of a bank holding s. 178 security. All of those considerations have application to the issue here, and the judgment merits reading in full to appreciate the relevance of all of its parts. However, a few extracts will serve to illustrate the bank's reliance:

14 Page 134:

... a bank taking security under section 178 effectively acquires legal title to the borrower's interest in the present and afteracquired property assigned to it by the borrower ...

15 Pages 139-140:

... the Parliament of Canada has enacted these sections not so much for the benefit of banks as for the benefit of manufacturers.

....

These sections of the *Bank Act* have become an integral part of bank lending activities and are a means of providing support in many fields of endeavour to an extent which otherwise would not be practical from the standpoint of prudent banking ...

16 Page 143:

... The bank obtains and may assert its right to the goods and their proceeds against the world, except as only Parliament itself may reduce or modify these rights.

17 Pages 143-144:

the rights, duties and obligations of creditor and debtor are to be determined solely by reference to the Bank Act.

18 Page 152:

The essence of that regime [ss. 178 and 179], it hardly needs repeating, is to assign to the bank, on the taking out of the security, right and title to the goods in question, and to confer, on default of the debtor, an *immediate* right to seize and sell those goods.

19 Page 154:

[I]t was Parliament's manifest legislative purpose that the sole realization scheme applicable to the s. 178 security interest be that contained in the *Bank Act* itself.

20 Page 155:

Parliament, under its power to regulate banking, has enacted a complete code that at once defines and provides for the realization of a security interest.

It is the insular theme which runs through these propositions that the bank seizes upon to support its claim for immunity. But, it must be asked, in what respect does the preservation of the status quo qua creditors under the C.C.A.A. for a temporary period infringe upon the rights of the bank under ss. 178 and 179? It does not detract from the bank's title; it does not distort the mechanics of realization of the security in the sense of the steps to be taken; it does not prevent immediate crystallization of *the right* to seize and sell; it does not breach the "complete code." All that it does is postpone the exercise of the right to seize and sell. And here the bank had already allowed at least 5 days to expire between the accrual of the right and the taking of a step to exercise. It follows from this analysis that there is no apparent bar in the *Bank Act* to the application of the C.C.A.A. to s. 178 security and the bank's rights in respect of it.

Having regard to the broad public policy objectives of the C.C.A.A., there is good reason why s. 178 security should not be excluded from its provisions. The C.C.A.A. was enacted by Parliament in 1933 when the nation and the world were in the grip of an economic depression. When a company became insolvent, liquidation followed because that was the consequence of the only insolvency legislation which then existed — the *Bankruptcy Act*, R.S.C. 1927, c. 11, and the *Winding-up Act*, R.S.C. 1927, c. 213. Almost inevitably, liquidation destroyed the shareholders' investment, yielded little by way of recovery to the creditors, and exacerbated the social evil of devastating levels of unemployment. The government of the day sought, through the C.C.A.A., to create a regime whereby the principals of the company and the creditors could be brought together under the supervision of the court to attempt a reorganization or compromise or arrangement under which the company could continue in business. These excerpts from an article by Stanley E. Edwards (1947) 25 Can. Bar Rev. 587, entitled "Reorganizations Under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act," explain very well the historic and continuing purposes of the Act (p. 592): It is important in applying the C.C.A.A. to keep in mind its purpose and several fundamental principles which may serve to accomplish that purpose. Its object, as one Ontario judge has stated in a number of cases, is to keep a company going despite insolvency. Hon. C.H. Cahan when he introduced the bill into the House of Commons indicated that it was designed to permit a corporation, through reorganization, to continue its business, and thereby to prevent its organization being disrupted and its goodwill lost. It may be that the main value of the assets of a company is derived from their being fitted together into one system and that individually they are worth little. The trade connections associated with the system and held by the manage ment may also be valuable. In the case of a large company it is probable that no buyer can be found who would be able and willing to buy the enterprise as a whole and pay its going concern value. The alternative to reorganization then is often a sale of the property piecemeal for an amount which would yield little satisfaction to the creditors and none at all to the shareholders.

23 Page 590:

There are a number of conditions and tendencies in this country which underline the importance of this statute. There has been over the last few years a rapid and continuous growth of industry, primarily manufacturing. The tendency here, as in other expanding private enterprise countries, is for the average size of corporations to increase faster than the number of them, and for much of the new wealth to be concentrated in the hands of existing companies or their successors. The results of permitting dissolutions of companies without giving the parties an adequate opportunity to reorganize them would therefore likely be more serious in the future than they have been in the past.

Because of the country's relatively small population, however, Canadian industry is and will probably continue to be very much dependent on world markets and consequently vulnerable to world depressions. If there should be such a depression it will become particularly important that an adequate reorganization procedure should be in existence, so that the Canadian economy will not be permanently injured by discontinuance of its industries, so that whatever going concern value the insolvent companies have will not be lost through dismemberment and sale of their assets, so that their employees will not be thrown out of work, and so that large numbers of investors will not be deprived of their claims and their opportunity to share in the fruits of the future activities of the corporations. While we hope that the dismal prospect will not materialize, it is nevertheless a possibility which must be recognized. But whether it does or not, the growing importance of large companies in Canada will make it important that adequate provision be made for reorganization of insolvent corporations.

It is apparent from these excerpts and from the wording of the statute that, in contrast with ss. 178 and 179 of the *Bank Act*, which are preoccupied with the competing rights and duties of the borrower and the lender, the C.C.A.A. serves the interests of a broad con stituency of investors, creditors and employees. If a bank's rights in respect of s. 178 security are accorded a unique status which renders those rights immune from the provisions of the C.C.A.A., the protection afforded that constituency for any company which has granted s. 178 security will be largely illusory. It will be illusory because almost inevitably the realization by the bank on its security will destroy the company as a going concern. Here, for example, if the bank signifies and collects the accounts receivable, Chef Ready will be deprived of working capital. Collapse and liquidation must necessarily follow. The lesson will be that where s. 178 security is present a single creditor can frustrate the public policy objectives of the C.C.A.A.; and those for whom the C.C.A.A. may be irrelevant dependent upon the whim of the s. 178 security holder. Given the economic circumstances which prevailed when the C.C.A.A. was enacted, it is difficult to imagine that the legislators of the day intended that result to follow.

In the exercise of their functions under the C.C.A.A. Canadian courts have shown themselves partial to a standard of liberal construction which will further the policy objectives. See such cases as *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto-Dominion Bank; Meridian Developments Inc. v. Nu-West Ltd.*, 52 C.B.R. (N.S.) 109, [1984] 5 W.W.R. 215, 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 150, 53 A.R. 39 (Q.B.); *Northland Properties Ltd. v. Excelsior Life Insurance Co. of Canada*, 73 C.B.R. (N.S.) 195, 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 122, [1989] 3 W.W.R. 363 (C.A.); *Re Feifer and Frame Manufacturing Corp.*, [1947] Que. K.B. 348, 28 C.B.R. 124 (C.A.); *Wynden Canada Inc. v. Gaz Métropolitain Inc.* (1982), 44 C.B.R. (N.S.) 285 (C.S. Que.); and *Norcen Energy Resources Ltd. v.*

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Oakwood Petroleums Ltd., 72 C.B.R. (N.S.) 20, [1989] 2 W.W.R. 566, 64 Alta. L.R. (2d) 149 (Q.B.). The trend demonstrated by these cases is entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the C.C.A.A.

The trend which emerges from this sampling will be given effect here by holding that where the word "security" occurs in the C.C.A.A., it includes s. 178 security and, where the word creditor occurs, it includes a bank holding s. 178 security. To the extent that there may be conflict between the two statutes, therefore, the broad scope of the C.C.A.A. prevails.

27 For these reasons the disposition by the chambers Judge of the application made by Chef Ready will be upheld. It follows that the appeal is dismissed.

Appeal dismissed.

End of Document

TAB 9

2010 ONSC 222 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re

2010 CarswellOnt 212, 2010 ONSC 222, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684, 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36, AS AMENDED AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST PUBLISHING INC./PUBLICATIONS CANWEST INC., CANWEST BOOKS INC. AND CANWEST (CANADA) INC.

Pepall J.

Judgment: January 18, 2010 Docket: CV-10-8533-00CL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Alex Cobb, Duncan Ault for Applicant, LP Entities Mario Forte for Special Committee of the Board of Directors Andrew Kent, Hilary Clarke for Administrative Agent of the Senior Secured Lenders' Syndicate Peter Griffin for Management Directors Robin B. Schwill, Natalie Renner for Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Miscellaneous

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have been unable to continue operating business.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act - Arrangements - Approval by creditors

CMI, entity of C Corp., obtained protection from creditors in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("CCAA") proceedings in October 2009 — CPI, newspaper entities related to C, sought similar protection — CPI brought application for order pursuant to CCAA and for stay of proceedings and other benefits of order to be extended to CPI — Application granted — CPI was clearly insolvent — Community served by CPI was huge — Granting of order premised on anticipated going concern sale of newspaper business, which would serve interests of CPI and stakeholders and also community at large — Order requested would provide stability and enable CPI to pursue restructuring and preserve enterprise value for stakeholders — Without benefit of stay, CPI would have been required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would have

2010 ONSC 222, 2010 CarswellOnt 212, [2010] O.J. No. 188, 184 A.C.W.S. (3d) 684...

been unable to continue operating business — In circumstances, it was appropriate to allow CPI to file and present plan only to secured creditors.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Pepall J.:

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2002), 2002 CarswellOnt 2254, 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.) - considered

Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re (2003), 310 N.R. 200 (note), 2003 CarswellOnt 730, 2003 CarswellOnt 731, 180 O.A.C. 399 (note) (S.C.C.) — referred to

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4699, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 54, 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Philip Services Corp., Re (1999), 13 C.B.R. (4th) 159, 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

Statutes considered:

- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to
 - s. 4 considered
 - s. 5 considered
 - s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.2(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.2(4) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered

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s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - considered

s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] --- considered

s. 11.7(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered

APPLICATION by entity of company already protected under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act for similar protection.

Pepall J.:

Reasons for Decision

Introduction

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global") is a leading Canadian media company with interests in (i) newspaper publishing and digital media; and (ii) free-to-air television stations and subscription based specialty television channels. Canwest Global, the entities in its Canadian television business (excluding CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries) and the National Post Company (which prior to October 30, 2009 owned and published the National Post) (collectively, the "CMI Entities"), obtained protection from their creditors in a *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*¹ ("CCAA") proceeding on October 6, 2009.² Now, the Canwest Global Canadian newspaper entities with the exception of National Post Inc. seek similar protection. Specifically, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. ("CPI"), Canwest Books Inc. ("CBI"), and Canwest (Canada) Inc. ("CCI") apply for an order pursuant to the CCAA. They also seek to have the stay of proceedings and the other benefits of the order extend to Canwest Limited Partnership/Canwest Société en Commandite (the "Limited Partnership"). The Applicants and the Limited Partnership are referred to as the "LP Entities" throughout these reasons. The term "Canwest" will be used to refer to the Canwest enterprise as a whole. It includes the LP Entities and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries which are not applicants in this proceeding.

2 All appearing on this application supported the relief requested with the exception of the Ad Hoc Committee of 9.25% Senior Subordinated Noteholders. That Committee represents certain unsecured creditors whom I will discuss more fully later.

3 I granted the order requested with reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

I start with three observations. Firstly, Canwest Global, through its ownership interests in the LP Entities, is the largest publisher of daily English language newspapers in Canada. The LP Entities own and operate 12 daily newspapers across Canada. These newspapers are part of the Canadian heritage and landscape. The oldest, The Gazette, was established in Montreal in 1778. The others are the Vancouver Sun, The Province, the Ottawa Citizen, the Edmonton Journal, the Calgary Herald, The Windsor Star, the Times Colonist, The Star Phoenix, the Leader-Post, the Nanaimo Daily News and the Alberni Valley Times. These newspapers have an estimated average weekly readership that exceeds 4 million. The LP Entities also publish 23 nondaily newspapers and own and operate a number of digital media and online operations. The community served by the LP Entities is huge. In addition, based on August 31, 2009 figures, the LP Entities employ approximately 5,300 employees in Canada with approximately 1,300 of those employees working in Ontario. The granting of the order requested is premised on an anticipated going concern sale of the newspaper business of the LP Entities. This serves not just the interests of the LP Entities and their stakeholders but the Canadian community at large.

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5 Secondly, the order requested may contain some shortcomings; it may not be perfect. That said, insolvency proceedings typically involve what is feasible, not what is flawless.

6 Lastly, although the builders of this insolvent business are no doubt unhappy with its fate, gratitude is not misplaced by acknowledging their role in its construction.

Background Facts

(i) Financial Difficulties

7 The LP Entities generate the majority of their revenues through the sale of advertising. In the fiscal year ended August 31, 2009, approximately 72% of the LP Entities' consolidated revenue derived from advertising. The LP Entities have been seriously affected by the economic downturn in Canada and their consolidated advertising revenues declined substantially in the latter half of 2008 and in 2009. In addition, they experienced increases in certain of their operating costs.

8 On May 29, 2009 the Limited Partnership failed, for the first time, to make certain interest and principal reduction payments and related interest and cross currency swap payments totaling approximately \$10 million in respect of its senior secured credit facilities. On the same day, the Limited Partnership announced that, as of May 31, 2009, it would be in breach of certain financial covenants set out in the credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007 between its predecessor, Canwest Media Works Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent, a syndicate of secured lenders ("the LP Secured Lenders"), and the predecessors of CCI, CPI and CBI as guarantors. The Limited Partnership also failed to make principal, interest and fee payments due pursuant to this credit agreement on June 21, June 22, July 21, July 22 and August 21, 2009.

9 The May 29, 2009, defaults under the senior secured credit facilities triggered defaults in respect of related foreign currency and interest rate swaps. The swap counterparties (the "Hedging Secured Creditors") demanded payment of \$68.9 million. These unpaid amounts rank pari passu with amounts owing under the LP Secured Lenders' credit facilities.

10 On or around August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership and certain of the LP Secured Lenders entered into a forbearance agreement in order to allow the LP Entities and the LP Secured Lenders the opportunity to negotiate a pre-packaged restructuring or reorganization of the affairs of the LP Entities. On November 9, 2009, the forbearance agreement expired and since then, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to demand payment of approximately \$953.4 million, the amount outstanding as at August 31, 2009. Nonetheless, they continued negotiations with the LP Entities. The culmination of this process is that the LP Entities are now seeking a stay of proceedings under the CCAA in order to provide them with the necessary "breathing space" to restructure and reorganize their businesses and to preserve their enterprise value for the ultimate benefit of their broader stakeholder community.

The Limited Partnership released its annual consolidated financial statements for the twelve months ended August 31, 2009 and 2008 on November 26, 2009. As at August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated assets with a net book value of approximately \$644.9 million. This included consolidated current assets of \$182.7 million and consolidated non-current assets of approximately \$462.2 million. As at that date, the Limited Partnership had total consolidated liabilities of approximately \$1.719 billion (increased from \$1.656 billion as at August 31, 2008). These liabilities consisted of consolidated current liabilities of \$107 million.

12 The Limited Partnership had been experiencing deteriorating financial results over the past year. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership's consolidated revenues decreased by \$181.7 million or 15% to \$1.021 billion as compared to \$1.203 billion for the year ended August 31, 2008. For the year ended August 31, 2009, the Limited Partnership reported a consolidated net loss of \$66 million compared to consolidated net earnings of \$143.5 million for fiscal 2008.

(ii) Indebtedness under the Credit Facilities

13 The indebtedness under the credit facilities of the LP Entities consists of the following.

(a) The LP senior secured credit facilities are the subject matter of the July 10, 2007 credit agreement already mentioned. They are guaranteed by CCI, CPI and CBI. The security held by the LP Secured Lenders has been reviewed by the solicitors for the proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. and considered to be valid and enforceable.³ As at August 31, 2009, the amounts owing by the LP Entities totaled \$953.4 million exclusive of interest.⁴

(b) The Limited Partnership is a party to the aforementioned foreign currency and interest rate swaps with the Hedging Secured Creditors. Defaults under the LP senior secured credit facilities have triggered defaults in respect of these swap arrangements. Demand for repayment of amounts totaling \$68.9 million (exclusive of unpaid interest) has been made. These obligations are secured.

(c) Pursuant to a senior subordinated credit agreement dated as of July 10, 2007, between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of Nova Scotia as administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders, and others, certain subordinated lenders agreed to provide the Limited Partnership with access to a term credit facility of up to \$75 million. CCI, CPI, and CBI are guarantors. This facility is unsecured, guaranteed on an unsecured basis and currently fully drawn. On June 20, 2009, the Limited Partnership failed to make an interest payment resulting in an event of default under the credit agreement. In addition, the defaults under the senior secured credit facilities resulted in a default under this facility. The senior subordinated lenders are in a position to take steps to demand payment.

(d) Pursuant to a note indenture between the Limited Partnership, The Bank of New York Trust Company of Canada as trustee, and others, the Limited Partnership issued 9.5% per annum senior subordinated unsecured notes due 2015 in the aggregate principal amount of US \$400 million. CPI and CBI are guarantors. The notes are unsecured and guaranteed on an unsecured basis. The noteholders are in a position to take steps to demand immediate payment of all amounts outstanding under the notes as a result of events of default.

14 The LP Entities use a centralized cash management system at the Bank of Nova Scotia which they propose to continue. Obligations owed pursuant to the existing cash management arrangements are secured (the "Cash Management Creditor").

(iii) LP Entities' Response to Financial Difficulties

15 The LP Entities took a number of steps to address their circumstances with a view to improving cash flow and strengthening their balance sheet. Nonetheless, they began to experience significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and other trade creditors. The LP Entities' debt totals approximately \$1.45 billion and they do not have the liquidity required to make payment in respect of this indebtedness. They are clearly insolvent.

16 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of directors (the "Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives. The Special Committee has appointed Thomas Strike, the President, Corporate Development & Strategy Implementation, as Recapitalization Officer and has retained Gary Colter of CRS Inc. as Restructuring Advisor for the LP Entities (the "CRA"). The President of CPI, Dennis Skulsky, will report directly to the Special Committee.

17 Given their problems, throughout the summer and fall of 2009, the LP Entities have participated in difficult and complex negotiations with their lenders and other stakeholders to obtain forbearance and to work towards a consensual restructuring or recapitalization.

18 An ad hoc committee of the holders of the senior subordinated unsecured notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee") was formed in July, 2009 and retained Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg as counsel. Among other things, the Limited Partnership agreed to pay the Committee's legal fees up to a maximum of \$250,000. Representatives of the Limited Partnership and their advisors have had ongoing discussions with representatives of the Ad Hoc Committee and their counsel was granted access to certain confidential information following execution of a confidentiality agreement. The Ad Hoc Committee has also engaged a financial advisor who has been granted access to the LP Entities' virtual data room which contains confidential information regarding the business

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and affairs of the LP Entities. There is no evidence of any satisfactory proposal having been made by the noteholders. They have been in a position to demand payment since August, 2009, but they have not done so.

19 In the meantime and in order to permit the businesses of the LP Entities to continue to operate as going concerns and in an effort to preserve the greatest number of jobs and maximize value for the stakeholders of the LP Entities, the LP Entities have been engaged in negotiations with the LP Senior Lenders, the result of which is this CCAA application.

(iv) The Support Agreement, the Secured Creditors' Plan and the Solicitation Process

20 Since August 31, 2009, the LP Entities and the LP administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders have worked together to negotiate terms for a consensual, prearranged restructuring, recapitalization or reorganization of the business and affairs of the LP Entities as a going concern. This is referred to by the parties as the Support Transaction.

As part of this Support Transaction, the LP Entities are seeking approval of a Support Agreement entered into by them and the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders. 48% of the LP Secured Lenders, the Hedging Secured Creditors, and the Cash Management Creditor (the "Secured Creditors") are party to the Support Agreement.

22 Three interrelated elements are contemplated by the Support Agreement and the Support Transaction: the credit acquisition, the Secured Creditors' plan (the "Plan"), and the sale and investor solicitation process which the parties refer to as SISP.

The Support Agreement contains various milestones with which the LP Entities are to comply and, subject to a successful 23 bid arising from the solicitation process (an important caveat in my view), commits them to support a credit acquisition. The credit acquisition involves an acquisition by an entity capitalized by the Secured Creditors and described as AcquireCo. AcquireCo. would acquire substantially all of the assets of the LP Entities (including the shares in National Post Inc.) and assume certain of the liabilities of the LP Entities. It is contemplated that AcquireCo. would offer employment to all or substantially all of the employees of the LP Entities and would assume all of the LP Entities' existing pension plans and existing post-retirement and post-employment benefit plans subject to a right by AcquireCo., acting commercially reasonably and after consultation with the operational management of the LP Entities, to exclude certain specified liabilities. The credit acquisition would be the subject matter of a Plan to be voted on by the Secured Creditors on or before January 31, 2010. There would only be one class. The Plan would only compromise the LP Entities' secured claims and would not affect or compromise any other claims against any of the LP Entities ("unaffected claims"). No holders of the unaffected claims would be entitled to vote on or receive any distributions of their claims. The Secured Creditors would exchange their outstanding secured claims against the LP Entities under the LP credit agreement and the swap obligations respectively for their pro rata shares of the debt and equity to be issued by AcquireCo. All of the LP Entities' obligations under the LP secured claims calculated as of the date of closing less \$25 million would be deemed to be satisfied following the closing of the Acquisition Agreement. LP secured claims in the amount of \$25 million would continue to be held by AcquireCo. and constitute an outstanding unsecured claim against the LP Entities.

The Support Agreement contemplates that the Financial Advisor, namely RBC Dominion Securities Inc., under the supervision of the Monitor, will conduct the solicitation process. Completion of the credit acquisition process is subject to a successful bid arising from the solicitation process. In general terms, the objective of the solicitation process is to obtain a better offer (with some limitations described below) than that reflected in the credit acquisition. If none is obtained in that process, the LP Entities intend for the credit acquisition to proceed assuming approval of the Plan. Court sanction would also be required.

In more detailed terms, Phase I of the solicitation process is expected to last approximately 7 weeks and qualified interested parties may submit non-binding proposals to the Financial Advisor on or before February 26, 2010. Thereafter, the Monitor will assess the proposals to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining a Superior Offer. This is in essence a cash offer that is equal to or higher than that represented by the credit acquisition. If there is such a prospect, the Monitor will recommend that the process continue into Phase II. If there is no such prospect, the Monitor will then determine whether there is a Superior Alternative Offer, that is, an offer that is not a Superior Offer but which might nonetheless receive approval from the Secured Creditors. If so, to proceed into Phase II, the Superior Alternative Offer must be supported by Secured Creditors

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holding more than at least 33.3% of the secured claims. If it is not so supported, the process would be terminated and the LP Entities would then apply for court sanction of the Plan.

26 Phase II is expected to last approximately 7 weeks as well. This period allows for due diligence and the submission of final binding proposals. The Monitor will then conduct an assessment akin to the Phase 1 process with somewhat similar attendant outcomes if there are no Superior Offers and no acceptable Alternative Superior Offers. If there were a Superior Offer or an acceptable Alternative Superior Offer, an agreement would be negotiated and the requisite approvals sought.

27 The solicitation process is designed to allow the LP Entities to test the market. One concern is that a Superior Offer that benefits the secured lenders might operate to preclude a Superior Alternative Offer that could provide a better result for the unsecured creditors. That said, the LP Entities are of the view that the solicitation process and the support transaction present the best opportunity for the businesses of the LP Entities to continue as going concerns, thereby preserving jobs as well as the economic and social benefits of their continued operation. At this stage, the alternative is a bankruptcy or liquidation which would result in significant detriment not only to the creditors and employees of the LP Entities but to the broader community that benefits from the continued operation of the LP Entities' business. I also take some comfort from the position of the Monitor which is best captured in an excerpt from its preliminary Report:

The terms of the Support Agreement and SISP were the subject of lengthy and intense arm's length negotiations between the LP Entities and the LP Administrative Agent. The Proposed Monitor supports approval of the process contemplated therein and of the approval of those documents, but without in any way fettering the various powers and discretions of the Monitor.

It goes without saying that the Monitor, being a court appointed officer, may apply to the court for advice and directions and also owes reporting obligations to the court.

As to the objection of the Ad Hoc Committee, I make the following observations. Firstly, they represent unsecured subordinated debt. They have been in a position to take action since August, 2009. Furthermore, the LP Entities have provided up to \$250,000 for them to retain legal counsel. Meanwhile, the LP Secured Lenders have been in a position to enforce their rights through a non-consensual court proceeding and have advised the LP Entities of their abilities in that regard in the event that the LP Entities did not move forward as contemplated by the Support Agreement. With the Support Agreement and the solicitation process, there is an enhanced likelihood of the continuation of going concern operations, the preservation of jobs and the maximization of value for stakeholders of the LP Entities. It seemed to me that in the face of these facts and given that the Support Agreement expired on January 8, 2010, adjourning the proceeding was not merited in the circumstances. The Committee did receive very short notice. Without being taken as encouraging or discouraging the use of the comeback clause in the order, I disagree with the submission of counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee to the effect that it is very difficult if not impossible to stop a process relying on that provision. That provision in the order is a meaningful one as is clear from the decision in *Muscletech Research & Development Inc., Re*⁵. On a come back motion, although the positions of parties who have relied bona fide on an Initial Order should not be prejudiced, the onus is on the applicants for an Initial Order to satisfy the court that the existing terms should be upheld.

Proposed Monitor

30 The Applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor. It currently serves as the Monitor in the CMI Entities' CCAA proceeding. It is desirable for FTI to act; it is qualified to act; and it has consented to act. It has not served in any of the incompatible capacities described in section 11.7(2) of the CCAA. The proposed Monitor has an enhanced role that is reflected in the order and which is acceptable.

Proposed Order

31 As mentioned, I granted the order requested. It is clear that the LP Entities need protection under the CCAA. The order requested will provide stability and enable the LP Entities to pursue their restructuring and preserve enterprise value for their

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stakeholders. Without the benefit of a stay, the LP Entities would be required to pay approximately \$1.45 billion and would be unable to continue operating their businesses.

(a) Threshold Issues

32 The chief place of business of the Applicants is Ontario. They qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. They are affiliated companies with total claims against them that far exceed \$5 million. Demand for payment of the swap indebtedness has been made and the Applicants are in default under all of the other facilities outlined in these reasons. They do not have sufficient liquidity to satisfy their obligations. They are clearly insolvent.

(b) Limited Partnership

The Applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and the other relief requested to the Limited Partnership. The CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or a limited partnership but courts have exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the protections of an Initial CCAA Order to partnerships when it was just and convenient to do so. The relief has been held to be appropriate where the operations of the partnership are so intertwined with those of the debtor companies that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted: *Canwest Global Communications Corp.*, in $\frac{6}{2}$ where the left of the lef

Re^{6} and Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re^{7} .

In this case, the Limited Partnership is the administrative backbone of the LP Entities and is integral to and intertwined with the Applicants' ongoing operations. It owns all shared information technology assets; it provides hosting services for all Canwest properties; it holds all software licences used by the LP Entities; it is party to many of the shared services agreements involving other Canwest entities; and employs approximately 390 full-time equivalent employees who work in Canwest's shared services area. The Applicants state that failure to extend the stay to the Limited Partnership would have a profoundly negative impact on the value of the Applicants, the Limited Partnership and the Canwest Global enterprise as a whole. In addition, exposing the assets of the Limited Partnership to the demands of creditors would make it impossible for the LP Entities to successfully restructure. I am persuaded that under these circumstances it is just and convenient to grant the request.

(c) Filing of the Secured Creditors' Plan

35 The LP Entities propose to present the Plan only to the Secured Creditors. Claims of unsecured creditors will not be addressed.

36 The CCAA seems to contemplate a single creditor-class plan. Sections 4 and 5 state:

s.4 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its unsecured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, it the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

s.5 Where a compromise or an arrangement is proposed between a debtor company and its secured creditors or any class of them, the court may, on the application in a summary way of the company or of any such creditor or of the trustee in bankruptcy or liquidator of the company, order a meeting of the creditors or class of creditors and, if the court so determines, of the shareholders of the company, to be summoned in such manner as the court directs.

Case law has interpreted these provisions as authorizing a single creditor-class plan. For instance, Blair J. (as he then was) stated in *Philip Services Corp.*, Re^8 : "There is no doubt that a debtor is at liberty, under the terms of sections 4 and 5 of the CCAA, to make a proposal to secured creditors or to unsecured creditors or to both groups."⁹ Similarly, in *Anvil Range Mining Corp.*, Re^{10} , the Court of Appeal stated: "It may also be noted that s. 5 of the CCAA contemplates a plan which is a compromise between a debtor company and its secured creditors and that by the terms of s. 6 of the Act, applied to the facts of this case, the plan is binding only on the secured creditors and the company and not on the unsecured creditors."¹¹

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Based on the foregoing, it is clear that a debtor has the statutory authority to present a plan to a single class of creditors. In *Anvil Range Mining Corp., Re*, the issue was raised in the context of the plan's sanction by the court and a consideration of whether the plan was fair and reasonable as it eliminated the opportunity for unsecured creditors to realize anything. The basis of the argument was that the motions judge had erred in not requiring a more complete and in depth valuation of the company's assets relative to the claims of the secured creditors.

In this case, I am not being asked to sanction the Plan at this stage. Furthermore, the Monitor will supervise a vigorous and lengthy solicitation process to thoroughly canvass the market for alternative transactions. The solicitation should provide a good indication of market value. In addition, as counsel for the LP Entities observed, the noteholders and the LP Entities never had any forbearance agreement. The noteholders have been in a position to take action since last summer but chose not to do so. One would expect some action on their part if they themselves believed that they "were in the money". While the process is not perfect, it is subject to the supervision of the court and the Monitor is obliged to report on its results to the court.

40 In my view it is appropriate in the circumstances to authorize the LP Entities to file and present a Plan only to the Secured Creditors.

(D) DIP Financing

41 The Applicants seek approval of a DIP facility in the amount of \$25 million which would be secured by a charge over all of the assets of the LP Entities and rank ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge, and ahead of all other existing security interests except validly perfected purchase money security interests and certain specific statutory encumbrances.

42 Section 11.2 of the CCAA provides the statutory jurisdiction to grant a DIP charge. In *Canwest Global Communications* $Corp., Re^{12}$, I addressed this provision. Firstly, an applicant should address the requirements contained in section 11.2 (1) and then address the enumerated factors found in section 11.2(4) of the CCAA. As that list is not exhaustive, it may be appropriate to consider other factors as well.

43 Applying these principles to this case and dealing firstly with section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, notice either has been given to secured creditors likely to be affected by the security or charge or alternatively they are not affected by the DIP charge. While funds are not anticipated to be immediately necessary, the cash flow statements project a good likelihood that the LP Entities will require the additional liquidity afforded by the \$25 million. The ability to borrow funds that are secured by a charge will help retain the confidence of the LP Entities' trade creditors, employees and suppliers. It is expected that the DIP facility will permit the LP Entities to conduct the solicitation process and consummate a recapitalization transaction of a sale of all or some of its assets. The charge does not secure any amounts that were owing prior to the filing. As such, there has been compliance with the provisions of section 11.2 (1).

Turning then to a consideration of the factors found in section 11.2(4) of the Act, the LP Entities are expected to be subject to these CCAA proceedings until July 31, 2010. Their business and financial affairs will be amply managed during the proceedings. This is a consensual filing which is reflective of the confidence of the major creditors in the current management configuration. All of these factors favour the granting of the charge. The DIP loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement and would ensure the necessary stability during the CCAA process. I have already touched upon the issue of value. That said, in relative terms, the quantum of the DIP financing is not large and there is no readily apparent material prejudice to any creditor arising from the granting of the charge and approval of the financing. I also note that it is endorsed by the proposed Monitor in its report.

45 Other factors to consider in assessing whether to approve a DIP charge include the reasonableness of the financing terms and more particularly the associated fees. Ideally there should be some evidence on this issue. Prior to entering into the forbearance agreement, the LP Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a DIP facility. In this case, some but not all of the Secured Creditors are participating in the financing of the DIP loan. Therefore, only some would benefit from the DIP while others could bear the burden of it. While they may have opted not to participate in the DIP financing for

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various reasons, the concurrence of the non participating Secured Creditors is some market indicator of the appropriateness of the terms of the DIP financing.

Lastly, I note that the DIP lenders have indicated that they would not provide a DIP facility if the charge was not approved. In all of these circumstances, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and grant the DIP charge.

(e) Critical Suppliers

47 The LP Entities ask that they be authorized but not required to pay pre-filing amounts owing in arrears to certain suppliers if the supplier is critical to the business and ongoing operations of the LP Entities or the potential future benefit of the payments is considerable and of value to the LP Entities as a whole. Such payments could only be made with the consent of the proposed Monitor. At present, it is contemplated that such suppliers would consist of certain newspaper suppliers, newspaper distributors, logistic suppliers and the Amex Bank of Canada. The LP Entities do not seek a charge to secure payments to any of its critical suppliers.

48 Section 11.4 of the CCAA addresses critical suppliers. It states:

11.4(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods and services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares the person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied upon the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Mr. Byers, who is counsel for the Monitor, submits that the court has always had discretion to authorize the payment of critical suppliers and that section 11.4 is not intended to address that issue. Rather, it is intended to respond to a post-filing situation where a debtor company wishes to compel a supplier to supply. In those circumstances, the court may declare a person to be a critical supplier and require the person to supply. If the court chooses to compel a person to supply, it must authorize a charge as security for the supplier. Mr. Barnes, who is counsel for the LP Entities, submits that section 11.4 is not so limited. Section 11.4 (1) gives the court general jurisdiction to declare a supplier to be a "critical supplier" where the supplier provides goods or services that are essential to the ongoing business of the debtor company. The permissive as opposed to mandatory language of section 11.4 (2) supports this interpretation.

Section 11.4 is not very clear. As a matter of principle, one would expect the purpose of section 11.4 to be twofold: (i) to codify the authority to permit suppliers who are critical to the continued operation of the company to be paid and (ii) to require the granting of a charge in circumstances where the court is compelling a person to supply. If no charge is proposed to be granted, there is no need to give notice to the secured creditors. I am not certain that the distinction between Mr. Byers and Mr. Barnes' interpretation is of any real significance for the purposes of this case. Either section 11.4(1) does not oust the court's inherent jurisdiction to make provision for the payment of critical suppliers where no charge is requested or it provides authority to the court to declare persons to be critical suppliers. Section 11.4(1) requires the person to be a supplier of goods and services that are critical to the companies' operation but does not impose any additional conditions or limitations.

51 The LP Entities do not seek a charge but ask that they be authorized but not required to make payments for the pre-filing provision of goods and services to certain third parties who are critical and integral to their businesses. This includes newsprint

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and ink suppliers. The LP Entities are dependent upon a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint and ink and they have insufficient inventory on hand to meet their needs. It also includes newspaper distributors who are required to distribute the newspapers of the LP Entities; American Express whose corporate card programme and accounts are used by LP Entities employees for business related expenses; and royalty fees accrued and owing to content providers for the subscription-based online service provided by FPinfomart.ca, one of the businesses of the LP Entities. The LP Entities believe that it would be damaging to both their ongoing operations and their ability to restructure if they are unable to pay their critical suppliers. I am satisfied that the LP Entities may treat these parties and those described in Mr. Strike's affidavit as critical suppliers but none will be paid without the consent of the Monitor.

(f) Administration Charge and Financial Advisor Charge

52 The Applicants also seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure the fees of the Monitor, its counsel, the LP Entities' counsel, the Special Committee's financial advisor and counsel to the Special Committee, the CRA and counsel to the CRA. These are professionals whose services are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities' business. This charge is to rank in priority to all other security interests in the LP Entities' assets, with the exception of purchase money security interests and specific statutory encumbrances as provided for in the proposed order. ¹³ The LP Entities also request a \$10 million charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, RBC Dominion Securities Inc. The Financial Advisor is providing investment banking services to the LP Entities and is essential to the solicitation process. This charge would rank in third place, subsequent to the administration charge and the DIP charge.

53 In the past, an administration charge was granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the court. Section 11.52 of the amended CCAA now provides statutory jurisdiction to grant an administration charge. Section 11.52 states:

On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the debtor company is subject to a security or charge - in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

I am satisfied that the issue of notice has been appropriately addressed by the LP Entities. As to whether the amounts are appropriate and whether the charges should extend to the proposed beneficiaries, the section does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in its assessment. It seems to me that factors that might be considered would include:

- (a) the size and complexity of the businesses being restructured;
- (b) the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- (c) whether there is an unwarranted duplication of roles;
- (d) whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- (e) the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- (f) the position of the Monitor.

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This is not an exhaustive list and no doubt other relevant factors will be developed in the jurisprudence.

There is no question that the restructuring of the LP Entities is large and highly complex and it is reasonable to expect extensive involvement by professional advisors. Each of the professionals whose fees are to be secured has played a critical role in the LP Entities restructuring activities to date and each will continue to be integral to the solicitation and restructuring process. Furthermore, there is no unwarranted duplication of roles. As to quantum of both proposed charges, I accept the Applicants' submissions that the business of the LP Entities and the tasks associated with their restructuring are of a magnitude and complexity that justify the amounts. I also take some comfort from the fact that the administrative agent for the LP Secured Lenders has agreed to them. In addition, the Monitor supports the charges requested. The quantum of the administration charge appears to be fair and reasonable. As to the quantum of the charge in favour of the Financial Advisor, it is more unusual as it involves an incentive payment but I note that the Monitor conducted its own due diligence and, as mentioned, is supportive of the request. The quantum reflects an appropriate incentive to secure a desirable alternative offer. Based on all of these factors, I concluded that the two charges should be approved.

(g) Directors and Officers

56 The Applicants also seek a directors and officers charge ("D & O charge") in the amount of \$35 million as security for their indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed upon the Applicants' directors and officers. The D & O charge will rank after the Financial Advisor charge and will rank pari passu with the MIP charge discussed subsequently. Section 11.51 of the

CCAA addresses a D & O charge. I have already discussed section 11.51 in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹⁴ as it related to the request by the CMI Entities for a D & O charge. Firstly, the charge is essential to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. The continued participation of the experienced Boards of Directors, management and employees of the LP Entities is critical to the restructuring. Retaining the current officers and directors will also avoid destabilization. Furthermore, a CCAA restructuring creates new risks and potential liabilities for the directors and officers. The amount of the charge appears to be appropriate in light of the obligations and liabilities that may be incurred by the directors and officers. The charge will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in a worse case scenario. While Canwest Global maintains D & O liability insurance, it has only been extended to February 28, 2009 and further extensions are unavailable. As of the date of the Initial Order, Canwest Global had been unable to obtain additional or replacement insurance coverage.

57 Understandably in my view, the directors have indicated that due to the potential for significant personal liability, they cannot continue their service and involvement in the restructuring absent a D & O charge. The charge also provides assurances to the employees of the LP Entities that obligations for accrued wages and termination and severance pay will be satisfied. All secured creditors have either been given notice or are unaffected by the D & O charge. Lastly, the Monitor supports the charge and I was satisfied that the charge should be granted as requested.

(h) Management Incentive Plan and Special Arrangements

The LP Entities have made amendments to employment agreements with 2 key employees and have developed certain Management Incentive Plans for 24 participants (collectively the "MIPs"). They seek a charge in the amount of \$3 million to secure these obligations. It would be subsequent to the D & O charge.

59 The CCAA is silent on charges in support of Key Employee Retention Plans ("KERPs") but they have been approved in numerous CCAA proceedings. Most recently, in *Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re*¹⁵, I approved the KERP requested on the basis of the factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc., Re*¹⁶ and given that the Monitor had carefully reviewed the charge and was supportive of the request as were the Board of Directors, the Special Committee of the Board of Directors, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the Adhoc Committee of Noteholders.

60 The MIPs in this case are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the LP Entities through a successful restructuring. The participants are critical to the successful restructuring of the LP Entities. They are experienced executives and have played critical roles in the Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Re, 2010 ONSC 222, 2010...

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restructuring initiatives to date. They are integral to the continued operation of the business during the restructuring and the successful completion of a plan of restructuring, reorganization, compromise or arrangement.

In addition, it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities in the absence of a charge securing their payments. The departure of senior management would distract from and undermine the restructuring process that is underway and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for these employees. The MIPs provide appropriate incentives for the participants to remain in their current positions and ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in the reorganization process.

In this case, the MIPs and the MIP charge have been approved in form and substance by the Board of Directors and the Special Committee of Canwest Global. The proposed Monitor has also expressed its support for the MIPs and the MIP charge in its pre-filing report. In my view, the charge should be granted as requested.

(i) Confidential Information

63 The LP Entities request that the court seal the confidential supplement which contains individually identifiable information and compensation information including sensitive salary information about the individuals who are covered by the MIPs. It also contains an unredacted copy of the Financial Advisor's agreement. I have discretion pursuant to Section 137(2) of the *Courts* of Justice Act¹⁷ to order that any document filed in a civil proceeding be treated as confidential, sealed and not form part of the public record. That said, public access in an important tenet of our system of justice.

The threshold test for sealing orders is found in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of *Sierra Club of Canada v*. *Canada (Minister of Finance)*¹⁸. In that case, Iacobucci J. stated that an order should only be granted when: (i) it is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and (ii) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

In Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re¹⁹ I applied the Sierra Club test and approved a similar request by the 65 Applicants for the sealing of a confidential supplement containing unredacted copies of KERPs for the employees of the CMI Entities. Here, with respect to the first branch of the Sierra Club test, the confidential supplement contains unredacted copies of the MIPs. Protecting the disclosure of sensitive personal and compensation information of this nature, the disclosure of which would cause harm to both the LP Entities and the MIP participants, is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The information would be of obvious strategic advantage to competitors. Moreover, there are legitimate personal privacy concerns in issue. The MIP participants have a reasonable expectation that their names and their salary information will be kept confidential. With respect to the second branch of the Sierra Club test, keeping the information confidential will not have any deleterious effects. As in the Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re case, the aggregate amount of the MIP charge has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. The salutary effects of sealing the confidential supplement outweigh any conceivable deleterious effects. In the normal course, outside of the context of a CCAA proceeding, confidential personal and salary information would be kept confidential by an employer and would not find its way into the public domain. With respect to the unredacted Financial Advisor agreement, it contains commercially sensitive information the disclosure of which could be harmful to the solicitation process and the salutary effects of sealing it outweigh any deleterious effects. The confidential supplements should be sealed and not form part of the public record at least at this stage of the proceedings.

Conclusion

66 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to grant the order requested.

Application granted.

Footnotes

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- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended.
- 2 On October 30, 2009, substantially all of the assets and business of the National Post Company were transferred to the company now known as National Post Inc.
- 3 Subject to certain assumptions and qualifications.
- 4 Although not formally in evidence before the court, counsel for the LP Secured Lenders advised the court that currently \$382,889,000 in principal in Canadian dollars is outstanding along with \$458,042,000 in principal in American dollars.
- 5 2006 CarswellOnt 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 6 2009 CarswellOnt 6184 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 29.
- 7 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 8 1999 CarswellOnt 4673 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 9 Ibid at para, 16.
- 10 (2002), 34 C.B.R. (4th) 157 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (March 6,2003) [2003 CarswellOnt 730 (S.C.C.)].
- 11 Ibid at para. 34.
- 12 Supra, note 7 at paras. 31-35.
- 13 This exception also applies to the other charges granted.
- 14 Supra note 7 at paras. 44-48.
- 15 Supra note 7.
- 16 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 17 R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, as amended.
- 18 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).
- 19 Supra, note 7 at para. 52.

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TAB 10

2009 CarswellOnt 6184 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Canwest Global Communications Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, C-36. AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PROPOSED PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CANWEST GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS CORP. AND THE OTHER APPLICANTS LISTED ON SCHEDULE "A"

Pepall J.

Judgment: October 13, 2009 Docket: CV-09-8241-OOCL

Counsel: Lyndon Barnes, Edward Sellers, Jeremy Dacks for Applicants Alan Merskey for Special Committee of the Board of Directors David Byers, Maria Konyukhova for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. Benjamin Zarnett, Robert Chadwick for Ad Hoc Committee of Noteholders Edmond Lamek for Asper Family Peter H. Griffin, Peter J. Osborne for Management Directors, Royal Bank of Canada Hilary Clarke for Bank of Nova Scotia Steve Weisz for CIT Business Credit Canada Inc.

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Arrangements -- Miscellaneous

Debtor companies experienced financial problems due to deteriorating economic environment in Canada — Debtor companies took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets — Economic conditions did not improve nor did financial circumstances of debtor companies — They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees — Application was brought for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Proposed monitor was appointed — Companies qualified as debtor companies under Act — Debtor companies were in default of their obligations — Required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under s. 11(2) were filed — Stay of proceedings was granted to create stability and allow debtor companies to pursue their restructuring — Partnerships in application carried on operations that were integral and closely interrelated to business of debtor companies — It was just and convenient to grant relief requested with respect to partnerships — Debtor-in-possession financing was approved — Administration charge was granted — Directors' and officers' charge was granted — Key employee retention plans were approved — Extension of time for calling of annual general meeting was granted.

2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Pepall J*.:

Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re (1995), 1995 CarswellOnt 36, 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187, 2006 ABQB 153, 2006 CarswellAlta 446 (Alta. Q.B.) --- referred to

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Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) — followed

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Statutes considered:

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Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Chapter 15 — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally --- referred to

s. 106(6) — referred to

s. 133(1) — referred to

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- s. 133(1)(b) referred to
- s. 133(3) referred to
- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — considered
 - s. 2 "debtor company" --- referred to
 - s. 11 -- considered
 - s. 11(2) referred to
 - s. 11.2 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.2(1) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] referred to
 - s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
 - s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] referred to
 - s. 11.4(3) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] considered
 - s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] considered
 - s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] --- considered
 - s. 23 --- considered
- Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43 s. 137(2) — considered

Rules considered:

Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194 R. 38.09 — referred to

APPLICATION for relief pursuant to Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Pepall J.:

1 Canwest Global Communications Corp. ("Canwest Global"), its principal operating subsidiary, Canwest Media Inc. ("CMI"), and the other applicants listed on Schedule "A" of the Notice of Application apply for relief pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*.¹ The applicants also seek to have the stay of proceedings and other provisions extend to the following partnerships: Canwest Television Limited Partnership ("CTLP"), Fox Sports World Canada Partnership and The National Post Company/La Publication National Post ("The National Post Company"). The businesses operated by the applicants and the aforementioned partnerships include (i) Canwest's free-to-air television broadcast business (ie. the Global Television Network stations); (ii) certain subscription-based specialty television channels that are wholly owned and operated by CTLP; and (iii) the National Post.

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2 The Canwest Global enterprise as a whole includes the applicants, the partnerships and Canwest Global's other subsidiaries that are not applicants. The term Canwest will be used to refer to the entire enterprise. The term CMI Entities will be used to refer to the applicants and the three aforementioned partnerships. The following entities are not applicants nor is a stay sought in respect of any of them: the entities in Canwest's newspaper publishing and digital media business in Canada (other than the National Post Company) namely the Canwest Limited Partnership, Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc., Canwest Books Inc., and Canwest (Canada) Inc.; the Canadian subscription based specialty television channels acquired from Alliance Atlantis Communications Inc. in August, 2007 which are held jointly with Goldman Sachs Capital Partners and operated by CW Investments Co. and its subsidiaries; and subscription-based specialty television channels which are not wholly owned by CTLP.

3 No one appearing opposed the relief requested.

Backround Facts

4 Canwest is a leading Canadian media company with interests in twelve free-to-air television stations comprising the Global Television Network, subscription-based specialty television channels and newspaper publishing and digital media operations.

5 As of October 1, 2009, Canwest employed the full time equivalent of approximately 7,400 employees around the world. Of that number, the full time equivalent of approximately 1,700 are employed by the CMI Entities, the vast majority of whom work in Canada and 850 of whom work in Ontario.

6 Canwest Global owns 100% of CMI. CMI has direct or indirect ownership interests in all of the other CMI Entities. Ontario is the chief place of business of the CMI Entities.

7 Canwest Global is a public company continued under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*². It has authorized capital consisting of an unlimited number of preference shares, multiple voting shares, subordinate voting shares, and non-voting shares. It is a "constrained-share company" which means that at least 66 2/3% of its voting shares must be beneficially owned by Canadians. The Asper family built the Canwest enterprise and family members hold various classes of shares. In April and May, 2009, corporate decision making was consolidated and streamlined.

8 The CMI Entities generate the majority of their revenue from the sale of advertising (approximately 77% on a consolidated basis). Fuelled by a deteriorating economic environment in Canada and elsewhere, in 2008 and 2009, they experienced a decline in their advertising revenues. This caused problems with cash flow and circumstances were exacerbated by their high fixed operating costs. In response to these conditions, the CMI Entities took steps to improve cash flow and to strengthen their balance sheets. They commenced workforce reductions and cost saving measures, sold certain interests and assets, and engaged in discussions with the CRTC and the Federal government on issues of concern.

9 Economic conditions did not improve nor did the financial circumstances of the CMI Entities. They experienced significant tightening of credit from critical suppliers and trade creditors, a further reduction of advertising commitments, demands for reduced credit terms by newsprint and printing suppliers, and restrictions on or cancellation of credit cards for certain employees.

In February, 2009, CMI breached certain of the financial covenants in its secured credit facility. It subsequently received waivers of the borrowing conditions on six occasions. On March 15, 2009, it failed to make an interest payment of US\$30.4 million due on 8% senior subordinated notes. CMI entered into negotiations with an ad hoc committee of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders holding approximately 72% of the notes (the "Ad Hoc Committee"). An agreement was reached wherein CMI and its subsidiary CTLP agreed to issue US\$105 million in 12% secured notes to members of the Ad Hoc Committee. At the same time, CMI entered into an agreement with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT") in which CIT agreed to provide a senior secured revolving asset based loan facility of up to \$75 million. CMI used the funds generated for operations and to repay amounts owing on the senior credit facility with a syndicate of lenders of which the Bank of Nova Scotia was the administrative agent. These funds were also used to settle related swap obligations.

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11 Canwest Global reports its financial results on a consolidated basis. As at May 31, 2009, it had total consolidated assets with a net book value of \$4.855 billion and total consolidated liabilities of \$5.846 billion. The subsidiaries of Canwest Global that are not applicants or partnerships in this proceeding had short and long term debt totalling \$2.742 billion as at May 31, 2009 and the CMI Entities had indebtedness of approximately \$954 million. For the 9 months ended May 31, 2009, Canwest Global's consolidated revenues decreased by \$272 million or 11% compared to the same period in 2008. In addition, operating income before amortization decreased by \$253 million or 47%. It reported a consolidated net loss of \$1.578 billion compared to \$22 million for the same period in 2008. CMI reported that revenues for the Canadian television operations decreased by \$8 million or 4% in the third quarter of 2009 and operating profit was \$21 million compared to \$39 million in the same period in 2008.

12 The board of directors of Canwest Global struck a special committee of the board ("the Special Committee") with a mandate to explore and consider strategic alternatives in order to maximize value. That committee appointed Thomas Strike, who is the President, Corporate Development and Strategy Implementation of Canwest Global, as Recapitalization Officer and retained Hap Stephen, who is the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., as a Restructuring Advisor ("CRA").

13 On September 15, 2009, CMI failed to pay US\$30.4 million in interest payments due on the 8% senior subordinated notes.

On September 22, 2009, the board of directors of Canwest Global authorized the sale of all of the shares of Ten Network Holdings Limited (Australia) ("Ten Holdings") held by its subsidiary, Canwest Mediaworks Ireland Holdings ("CMIH"). Prior to the sale, the CMI Entities had consolidated indebtedness totalling US\$939.9 million pursuant to three facilities. CMI had issued 8% unsecured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$761,054,211. They were guaranteed by all of the CMI Entities except Canwest Global, and 30109, LLC. CMI had also issued 12% secured notes in an aggregate principal amount of US\$94 million. They were guaranteed by the CMI Entities. Amongst others, Canwest's subsidiary, CMIH, was a guarantor of both of these facilities. The 12% notes were secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP and the guarantors. In addition, pursuant to a credit agreement dated May 22, 2009 and subsequently amended, CMI has a senior secured revolving asset-based loan facility in the maximum amount of \$75 million with CIT Business Credit Canada Inc. ("CIT"). Prior to the sale, the debt amounted to \$23.4 million not including certain letters of credit. The facility is guaranteed by CTLP, CMIH and others and secured by first ranking charges against all of the property of CMI, CTLP, CMIH and other guarantors. Significant terms of the credit agreement are described in paragraph 37 of the proposed Monitor's report. Upon a CCAA filing by CMI and commencement of proceedings under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, the CIT facility converts into a DIP financing arrangement and increases to a maximum of \$100 million.

15 Consents from a majority of the 8% senior subordinated noteholders were necessary to allow the sale of the Ten Holdings shares. A Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement was entered into by CMI, CMIH, certain consenting noteholders and others wherein CMIH was allowed to lend the proceeds of sale to CMI.

16 The sale of CMIH's interest in Ten Holdings was settled on October 1, 2009. Gross proceeds of approximately \$634 million were realized. The proceeds were applied to fund general liquidity and operating costs of CMI, pay all amounts owing under the 12% secured notes and all amounts outstanding under the CIT facility except for certain letters of credit in an aggregate face amount of \$10.7 million. In addition, a portion of the proceeds was used to reduce the amount outstanding with respect to the 8% senior subordinated notes leaving an outstanding indebtedness thereunder of US\$393.25 million.

17 In consideration for the loan provided by CMIH to CMI, CMI issued a secured intercompany note in favour of CMIH in the principal amount of \$187.3 million and an unsecured promissory note in the principal amount of \$430.6 million. The secured note is subordinated to the CIT facility and is secured by a first ranking charge on the property of CMI and the guarantors. The payment of all amounts owing under the unsecured promissory note are subordinated and postponed in favour of amounts owing under the CIT facility. Canwest Global, CTLP and others have guaranteed the notes. It is contemplated that the debt that is the subject matter of the unsecured note will be compromised.

18 Without the funds advanced under the intercompany notes, the CMI Entities would be unable to meet their liabilities as they come due. The consent of the noteholders to the use of the Ten Holdings proceeds was predicated on the CMI Entities

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making this application for an Initial Order under the CCAA. Failure to do so and to take certain other steps constitute an event of default under the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement, the CIT facility and other agreements. The CMI Entities have insufficient funds to satisfy their obligations including those under the intercompany notes and the 8% senior subordinated notes.

19 The stay of proceedings under the CCAA is sought so as to allow the CMI Entities to proceed to develop a plan of arrangement or compromise to implement a consensual "pre-packaged" recapitalization transaction. The CMI Entities and the Ad Hoc Committee of noteholders have agreed on the terms of a going concern recapitalization transaction which is intended to form the basis of the plan. The terms are reflected in a support agreement and term sheet. The recapitalization transaction contemplates amongst other things, a significant reduction of debt and a debt for equity restructuring. The applicants anticipate that a substantial number of the businesses operated by the CMI Entities will continue as going concerns thereby preserving enterprise value for stakeholders and maintaining employment for as many as possible. As mentioned, certain steps designed to implement the recapitalization transaction have already been taken prior to the commencement of these proceedings.

20 CMI has agreed to maintain not more than \$2.5 million as cash collateral in a deposit account with the Bank of Nova Scotia to secure cash management obligations owed to BNS. BNS holds first ranking security against those funds and no court ordered charge attaches to the funds in the account.

The CMI Entities maintain eleven defined benefit pension plans and four defined contribution pension plans. There is an aggregate solvency deficiency of \$13.3 million as at the last valuation date and a wind up deficiency of \$32.8 million. There are twelve television collective agreements eleven of which are negotiated with the Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada. The Canadian Union of Public Employees negotiated the twelfth television collective agreement. It expires on December 31, 2010. The other collective agreements are in expired status. None of the approximately 250 employees of the National Post Company are unionized. The CMI Entities propose to honour their payroll obligations to their employees, including all pre-filing wages and employee benefits outstanding as at the date of the commencement of the CCAA proceedings and payments in connection with their pension obligations.

Proposed Monitor

22 The applicants propose that FTI Consulting Canada Inc. serve as the Monitor in these proceedings. It is clearly qualified to act and has provided the Court with its consent to act. Neither FTI nor any of its representatives have served in any of the capacities prohibited by section of the amendments to the CCAA.

Proposed Order

I have reviewed in some detail the history that preceded this application. It culminated in the presentation of the within application and proposed order. Having reviewed the materials and heard submissions, I was satisfied that the relief requested should be granted.

This case involves a consideration of the amendments to the CCAA that were proclaimed in force on September 18, 2009. While these were long awaited, in many instances they reflect practices and principles that have been adopted by insolvency practitioners and developed in the jurisprudence and academic writings on the subject of the CCAA. In no way do the amendments change or detract from the underlying purpose of the CCAA, namely to provide debtor companies with the opportunity to extract themselves from financial difficulties notwithstanding insolvency and to reorganize their affairs for the benefit of stakeholders. In my view, the amendments should be interpreted and applied with that objective in mind.

(a) Threshhold Issues

Firstly, the applicants qualify as debtor companies under the CCAA. Their chief place of business is in Ontario. The applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims against them exceeding \$5 million. The CMI Entities are in default of their obligations. CMI does not have the necessary liquidity to make an interest payment in the amount of US\$30.4 million that was due on September 15, 2009 and none of the other CMI Entities who are all guarantors are able to make such a payment

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either. The assets of the CMI Entities are insufficient to discharge all of the liabilities. The CMI Entities are unable to satisfy their debts as they come due and they are insolvent. They are insolvent both under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*³ definition and under the more expansive definition of insolvency used in *Stelco Inc., Re*⁴. Absent these CCAA proceedings, the applicants would lack liquidity and would be unable to continue as going concerns. The CMI Entities have acknowledged their insolvency in the affidavit filed in support of the application.

Secondly, the required statement of projected cash-flow and other financial documents required under section 11(2) of the CCAA have been filed.

(b) Stay of Proceedings

27 Under section 11 of the CCAA, the Court has broad jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings and to give a debtor company a chance to develop a plan of compromise or arrangement. In my view, given the facts outlined, a stay is necessary to create stability and to allow the CMI Entities to pursue their restructuring.

(b) Partnerships and Foreign Subsidiaries

28 The applicants seek to extend the stay of proceedings and other relief to the aforementioned partnerships. The partnerships are intertwined with the applicants' ongoing operations. They own the National Post daily newspaper and Canadian free-to-air television assets and certain of its specialty television channels and some other television assets. These businesses constitute a significant portion of the overall enterprise value of the CMI Entities. The partnerships are also guarantors of the 8% senior subordinated notes.

While the CCAA definition of a company does not include a partnership or limited partnership, courts have repeatedly exercised their inherent jurisdiction to extend the scope of CCAA proceedings to encompass them. See for example *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.*, Re^5 ; *Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc.*, Re^6 ; and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd.*, Re^7 . In this case, the partnerships carry on operations that are integral and closely interrelated to the business of the applicants. The operations and obligations of the partnerships are so intertwined with those of the applicants that irreparable harm would ensue if the requested stay were not granted. In my view, it is just and convenient to grant the relief requested with respect to the partnerships.

30 Certain applicants are foreign subsidiaries of CMI. Each is a guarantor under the 8% senior subordinated notes, the CIT credit agreement (and therefore the DIP facility), the intercompany notes and is party to the support agreement and the Use of Cash Collateral and Consent Agreement. If the stay of proceedings was not extended to these entities, creditors could seek to enforce their guarantees. I am persuaded that the foreign subsidiary applicants as that term is defined in the affidavit filed are debtor companies within the meaning of section 2 of the CCAA and that I have jurisdiction and ought to grant the order requested as it relates to them. In this regard, I note that they are insolvent and each holds assets in Ontario in that they each maintain funds on deposit at the Bank of Nova Scotia in Toronto. See in this regard *Cadillac Fairview Inc., Re*⁸ and *Global Light Telecommunications Inc., Re*⁹

(C) DIP Financing

31 Turning to the DIP financing, the premise underlying approval of DIP financing is that it is a benefit to all stakeholders as it allows the debtors to protect going-concern value while they attempt to devise a plan acceptable to creditors. While in the past, courts relied on inherent jurisdiction to approve the terms of a DIP financing charge, the September 18, 2009 amendments to the CCAA now expressly provide jurisdiction to grant a DIP financing charge. Section 11.2 of the Act states:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

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(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over any security or charge arising from a previous order made under subsection (1) only with the consent of the person in whose favour the previous order was made.

(4) In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

- (f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and
- (g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

In light of the language of section 11.2(1), the first issue to consider is whether notice has been given to secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge. Paragraph 57 of the proposed order affords priority to the DIP charge, the administration charge, the Directors' and Officers' charge and the KERP charge with the following exception: "any validly perfected purchase money security interest in favour of a secured creditor or any statutory encumbrance existing on the date of this order in favour of any person which is a "secured creditor" as defined in the CCAA in respect of any of source deductions from wages, employer health tax, workers compensation, GST/QST, PST payables, vacation pay and banked overtime for employees, and amounts under the Wage Earners' Protection Program that are subject to a super priority claim under the BIA". This provision coupled with the notice that was provided satisfied me that secured creditors either were served or are unaffected by the DIP charge. This approach is both consistent with the legislation and practical.

33 Secondly, the Court must determine that the amount of the DIP is appropriate and required having regard to the debtors' cash-flow statement. The DIP charge is for up to \$100 million. Prior to entering into the CIT facility, the CMI Entities sought proposals from other third party lenders for a credit facility that would convert to a DIP facility should the CMI Entities be required to file for protection under the CCAA. The CIT facility was the best proposal submitted. In this case, it is contemplated that implementation of the plan will occur no later than April 15, 2010. The total amount of cash on hand is expected to be down to approximately \$10 million by late December, 2009 based on the cash flow forecast. The applicants state that this is an insufficient cushion for an enterprise of this magnitude. The cash-flow statements project the need for the liquidity provided by the DIP facility for the recapitalization transaction to be finalized. The facility is to accommodate additional liquidity requirements during the CCAA proceedings. It will enable the CMI Entities to operate as going concerns while pursuing the implementation and completion of a viable plan and will provide creditors with assurances of same. I also note that the proposed facility is simply a conversion of the pre-existing CIT facility and as such, it is expected that there would be no material prejudice to any of the creditors of the CMI Entities that arises from the granting of the DIP charge. I am persuaded that the amount is appropriate and required.

Thirdly, the DIP charge must not and does not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The only amount outstanding on the CIT facility is \$10.7 in outstanding letters of credit. These letters of credit are secured by existing security and it is proposed that that security rank ahead of the DIP charge.

Lastly, I must consider amongst others, the enumerated factors in paragraph 11.2(4) of the Act. I have already addressed some of them. The Management Directors of the applicants as that term is used in the materials filed will continue to manage

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the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. It would appear that management has the confidence of its major creditors. The CMI Entities have appointed a CRA and a Restructuring Officer to negotiate and implement the recapitalization transaction and the aforementioned directors will continue to manage the CMI Entities during the CCAA proceedings. The DIP facility will enhance the prospects of a completed restructuring. CIT has stated that it will not convert the CIT facility into a DIP facility if the DIP charge is not approved. In its report, the proposed Monitor observes that the ability to borrow funds from a court approved DIP facility secured by the DIP charge is crucial to retain the confidence of the CMI Entities' creditors, employees and suppliers and would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made. The proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP facility and charge.

36 For all of these reasons, I was prepared to approve the DIP facility and charge.

(d) Administration Charge

While an administration charge was customarily granted by courts to secure the fees and disbursements of the professional advisors who guided a debtor company through the CCAA process, as a result of the amendments to the CCAA, there is now statutory authority to grant such a charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA states:

(1) On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in respect of the fees and expenses of

(a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

38 I must therefore be convinced that (1) notice has been given to the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge;(2) the amount is appropriate; and (3) the charge should extend to all of the proposed beneficiaries.

As with the DIP charge, the issue relating to notice to affected secured creditors has been addressed appropriately by the applicants. The amount requested is up to \$15 million. The beneficiaries of the charge are: the Monitor and its counsel; counsel to the CMI Entities; the financial advisor to the Special Committee and its counsel; counsel to the Management Directors; the CRA; the financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Committee; and RBC Capital Markets and its counsel. The proposed Monitor supports the aforementioned charge and considers it to be required and reasonable in the circumstances in order to preserve the going concern operations of the CMI Entities. The applicants submit that the above-note professionals who have played a necessary and integral role in the restructuring activities to date are necessary to implement the recapitalization transaction.

40 Estimating quantum is an inexact exercise but I am prepared to accept the amount as being appropriate. There has obviously been extensive negotiation by stakeholders and the restructuring is of considerable magnitude and complexity. I was prepared to accept the submissions relating to the administration charge. I have not included any requirement that all of these professionals be required to have their accounts scrutinized and approved by the Court but they should not preclude this possibility.

(e) Critical Suppliers

41 The next issue to consider is the applicants' request for authorization to pay pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. In recognition that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to permit an insolvent corporation to remain in business, typically courts exercised their inherent jurisdiction to grant such authorization and a charge with respect to the provision of essential goods

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and services. In the recent amendments, Parliament codified the practice of permitting the payment of pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers and the provision of a charge. Specifically, section 11.4 provides:

(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring a person to be a critical supplier to the company if the court is satisfied that the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation.

(2) If the court declares a person to be a critical supplier, the court may make an order requiring the person to supply any goods or services specified by the court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or that the court considers appropriate.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2), the court shall, in the order, declare that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge in favour of the person declared to be a critical supplier, in an amount equal to the value of the goods or services supplied under the terms of the order.

(4) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

42 Under these provisions, the Court must be satisfied that there has been notice to creditors likely to be affected by the charge, the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company, and that the goods or services that are supplied are critical to the company's continued operation. While one might interpret section 11.4 (3) as requiring a charge any time a person is declared to be a critical supplier, in my view, this provision only applies when a court is compelling a person to supply. The charge then provides protection to the unwilling supplier.

43 In this case, no charge is requested and no additional notice is therefore required. Indeed, there is an issue as to whether in the absence of a request for a charge, section 11.4 is even applicable and the Court is left to rely on inherent jurisdiction. The section seems to be primarily directed to the conditions surrounding the granting of a charge to secure critical suppliers. That said, even if it is applicable, I am satisfied that the applicants have met the requirements. The CMI Entities seek authorization to make certain payments to third parties that provide goods and services integral to their business. These include television programming suppliers given the need for continuous and undisturbed flow of programming, newsprint suppliers given the dependency of the National Post on a continuous and uninterrupted supply of newsprint to enable it to publish and on newspaper distributors, and the American Express Corporate Card Program and Central Billed Accounts that are required for CMI Entity employees to perform their job functions. No payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. I accept that these suppliers are critical in nature. The CMI Entities also seek more general authorization allowing them to pay other suppliers if in the opinion of the CMI Entities, the supplier is critical. Again, no payment would be made without the consent of the Monitor. In addition, again no charge securing any payments is sought. This is not contrary to the language of section 11.4 (1) or to its purpose. The CMI Entities seek the ability to pay other suppliers if in their opinion the supplier is critical to their business and ongoing operations. The order requested is facilitative and practical in nature. The proposed Monitor supports the applicants' request and states that it will work to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized. The Monitor is of course an officer of the Court and is always able to seek direction from the Court if necessary. In addition, it will report on any such additional payments when it files its reports for Court approval. In the circumstances outlined, I am prepared to grant the relief requested in this regard.

(f) Directors' and Officers' Charge

The applicants also seek a directors' and officers' ("D &O") charge in the amount of \$20 million. The proposed charge would rank after the administration charge, the existing CIT security, and the DIP charge. It would rank pari passu with the KERP charge discussed subsequently in this endorsement but postponed in right of payment to the extent of the first \$85 million payable under the secured intercompany note.

45 Again, the recent amendments to the CCAA allow for such a charge. Section 11.51 provides that:

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(1) On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of the company is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company

(2) The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

(3) The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

(4) The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

47 The proposed Monitor reports that the amount of \$20 million was estimated taking into consideration the existing D&O insurance and the potential liabilities which may attach including certain employee related and tax related obligations. The amount was negotiated with the DIP lender and the Ad Hoc Committee. The order proposed speaks of indemnification relating to the failure of any of the CMI Entities, after the date of the order, to make certain payments. It also excludes gross negligence and wilful misconduct. The D&O insurance provides for \$30 million in coverage and \$10 million in excess coverage for a total of \$40 million. It will expire in a matter of weeks and Canwest Global has been unable to obtain additional or replacement coverage. I am advised that it also extends to others in the Canwest enterprise and not just to the CMI Entities. The directors and senior management are described as highly experienced, fully functional and qualified. The directors have indicated that they cannot continue in the restructuring effort unless the order includes the requested directors' charge.

The purpose of such a charge is to keep the directors and officers in place during the restructuring by providing them with protection against liabilities they could incur during the restructuring: *General Publishing Co., Re*¹⁰ Retaining the current directors and officers of the applicants would avoid destabilization and would assist in the restructuring. The proposed charge would enable the applicants to keep the experienced board of directors supported by experienced senior management. The proposed Monitor believes that the charge is required and is reasonable in the circumstances and also observes that it will not cover all of the directors' and officers' liabilities in the worst case scenario. In all of these circumstances, I approved the request.

(g) Key Employee Retention Plans

49 Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters of discretion. In this case, the CMI Entities have developed KERPs that are designed to facilitate and encourage the continued participation of certain of the CMI Entities' senior executives and other key employees who are required to guide the CMI Entities through a successful restructuring with a view to preserving enterprise value. There are 20 KERP participants all of whom are described by the applicants as being critical to the successful restructuring of the CMI Entities. Details of the KERPs are outlined in the materials and the proposed Monitor's report. A charge of \$5.9 million is requested. The three Management Directors are seasoned executives with extensive experience in the broadcasting and publishing industries. They have played critical roles in the restructuring initiatives taken to date. The applicants state that it is probable that they would consider other employment opportunities if the KERPs were not secured by a KERP charge. The other proposed participants are also described as being crucial to the restructuring and it would be extremely difficult to find replacements for them

50 Significantly in my view, the Monitor who has scrutinized the proposed KERPs and charge is supportive. Furthermore, they have been approved by the Board, the Special Committee, the Human Resources Committee of Canwest Global and the

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Ad Hoc Committee. The factors enumerated in *Grant Forest Products Inc.*, *Re*¹¹ have all been met and I am persuaded that the relief in this regard should be granted.

The applicants ask that the Confidential Supplement containing unredacted copies of the KERPs that reveal individually identifiable information and compensation information be sealed. Generally speaking, judges are most reluctant to grant sealing orders. An open court and public access are fundamental to our system of justice. Section 137(2) of the *Courts of Justice Act* provides authority to grant a sealing order and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada* (*Minister of Finance*) ¹² provides guidance on the appropriate legal principles to be applied. Firstly, the Court must be satisfied that the order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk. Secondly, the salutary effects of the order should outweigh its deleterious effects including the effects on the right to free expression which includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

52 In this case, the unredacted KERPs reveal individually identifiable information including compensation information. Protection of sensitive personal and compensation information the disclosure of which could cause harm to the individuals and to the CMI Entities is an important commercial interest that should be protected. The KERP participants have a reasonable expectation that their personal information would be kept confidential. As to the second branch of the test, the aggregate amount of the KERPs has been disclosed and the individual personal information adds nothing. It seems to me that this second branch of the test has been met. The relief requested is granted.

Annual Meeting

53 The CMI Entities seek an order postponing the annual general meeting of shareholders of Canwest Global. Pursuant to section 133 (1)(b) of the CBCA, a corporation is required to call an annual meeting by no later than February 28, 2010, being six months after the end of its preceding financial year which ended on August 31, 2009. Pursuant to section 133 (3), despite subsection (1), the corporation may apply to the court for an order extending the time for calling an annual meeting.

54 CCAA courts have commonly granted extensions of time for the calling of an annual general meeting. In this case, the CMI Entities including Canwest Global are devoting their time to stabilizing business and implementing a plan. Time and resources would be diverted if the time was not extended as requested and the preparation for and the holding of the annual meeting would likely impede the timely and desirable restructuring of the CMI Entities. Under section 106(6) of the CBCA, if directors of a corporation are not elected, the incumbent directors continue. Financial and other information will be available on the proposed Monitor's website. An extension is properly granted.

Other

55 The applicants request authorization to commence Chapter 15 proceedings in the U.S. Continued timely supply of U.S. network and other programming is necessary to preserve going concern value. Commencement of Chapter 15 proceedings to have the CCAA proceedings recognized as "foreign main proceedings" is a prerequisite to the conversion of the CIT facility into the DIP facility. Authorization is granted.

56 Canwest's various corporate and other entities share certain business services. They are seeking to continue to provide and receive inter-company services in the ordinary course during the CCAA proceedings. This is supported by the proposed Monitor and FTI will monitor and report to the Court on matters pertaining to the provision of inter-company services.

57 Section 23 of the amended CCAA now addresses certain duties and functions of the Monitor including the provision of notice of an Initial Order although the Court may order otherwise. Here the financial threshold for notice to creditors has been increased from \$1000 to \$5000 so as to reduce the burden and cost of such a process. The proceedings will be widely published in the media and the Initial Order is to be posted on the Monitor's website. Other meritorious adjustments were also made to the notice provisions. 2009 CarswellOnt 6184, [2009] O.J. No. 4286, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 853, 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72

58 This is a "pre-packaged" restructuring and as such, stakeholders have negotiated and agreed on the terms of the requested order. That said, not every stakeholder was before me. For this reason, interested parties are reminded that the order includes the usual come back provision. The return date of any motion to vary, rescind or affect the provisions relating to the CIT credit agreement or the CMI DIP must be no later than November 5, 2009.

59 I have obviously not addressed every provision in the order but have attempted to address some key provisions. In support of the requested relief, the applicants filed a factum and the proposed Monitor filed a report. These were most helpful. A factum is required under Rule 38.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Both a factum and a proposed Monitor's report should customarily be filed with a request for an Initial Order under the CCAA.

Conclusion

60 Weak economic conditions and a high debt load do not a happy couple make but clearly many of the stakeholders have been working hard to produce as desirable an outcome as possible in the circumstances. Hopefully the cooperation will persist. *Application granted.*

Footnotes

- 1 R.S.C. 1985, c. C. 36, as amended
- 2 R.S.C. 1985, c.C.44.
- 3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended.
- 4 (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); leave to appeal refused 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.).
- 5 (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 6 [2009] O.J. No. 349 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]).
- 7 (2006), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 187 (Alta. Q.B.).
- 8 (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont, Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).
- 9 (2004), 33 B.C.L.R. (4th) 155 (B.C. S.C.).
- 10 (2003), 39 C.B.R. (4th) 216 (Ont. S.C.J.).
- 11 [2009] O.J. No. 3344 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]). That said, given the nature of the relationship between a board of directors and senior management, it may not always be appropriate to give undue consideration to the principle of business judgment.

12 [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.).

End of Document

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TAB 11

2013 ONSC 2223 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

iMarketing Solutions Group Inc., Re

2013 CarswellOnt 4465, 2013 ONSC 2223, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 314

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

And In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of iMarketing Solutions Group Inc. and the Companies referred to in Schedule "A" (the "Applicants")

Newbould J.

Heard: April 12, 2012 Judgment: April 15, 2013 Docket: CV-13-10067-00CL

Counsel: Robert I. Thornton, Danny M. Nunes for Applicants Matthew P. Gottlieb for Duff & Phelps Canada Restructuring Inc. Virginie Gauthier, Daniel Pearlman for Shotgun Fund Limited Partnership III Clifton P. Prophet for Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Initial application --- Grant of stay --- General principles

Applicant insolvent corporation and number of its subsidiaries (applicants) were one of largest participants in telemarketing and fundraising industry in North America — Applicants were facing intense liquidity challenge such that they could not pay all liabilities as they became due — Liabilities included ongoing operating costs and legacy costs incurred as result of previous operational restructuring initiatives already undertaken — Without immediate stay of proceedings, applicants' businesses could not survive — Applicants brought application for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Application granted — Applicants had implemented initiatives to lower operating costs through process efficiencies and higher productivity — However, restructuring plan was taking longer than expected to implement, resulting in applicants' costs being higher than expected and savings being delayed — Initial order and stay under s. 11 of Act was made based on record and report from proposed monitor — Corollary orders were made.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Newbould J.:

Cinram International Inc., Re (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46, 2012 CarswellOnt 8413, 2012 ONSC 3767 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

iMarketing Solutions Group Inc., Re, 2013 ONSC 2223, 2013 CarswellOnt 4465

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Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24, 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275, 1993 CarswellOnt 183 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982 Chapter 15 — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally --- referred to

s. 11 -- considered

s. 11.2(4) [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] --- considered

s. 11.4 [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] — considered

s. 11.4(1) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - referred to

s. 11.4(2) [en. 1997, c. 12, s. 124] - referred to

APPLICATION by insolvent corporation and subsidiaries for protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act.

Newbould J.:

1 iMarketing Solutions Group Inc. ("IMSG") and a number of subsidiary corporations applied on April 12, 2002 for protection under the CCAA, at which time an Initial Order was granted containing several provisions. These are my reasons for the granting of the order.

2 Prior to December 3, 2012, IMSG was a publicly traded company listed on the TSX Venture Exchange. On that date, IMSG voluntarily delisted its common shares from the TSX-V and began listing its common shares on the Canadian National Stock Exchange.

3 IMSG is the direct or indirect parent company of twenty-two subsidiaries ("IMSG Group"). Seventeen of the subsidiaries along with IMSG comprise the Applicants in these proceedings.

The applicants are one of the largest participants in the telemarketing and fundraising industry in North America. The applicants provide direct marketing solutions for not-for-profit organizations, political organizations and professional associations. The IMSG Group's core businesses include: (i) tele-fundraising and outreach; (ii) data development; (iii) direct mail fundraising and outreach; (iv) data management; (v) publishing; (vi) social media; (vii) secure caging (an industry term for the process or act of collecting donations, processing donor mail and depositing contributions to customer accounts); and (viii) marketing list rentals (the renting of donor lists to third parties in exchange for a fee).

5 The IMSG Group's Canadian operations are located in the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec and New Brunswick. The IMSG Group's U.S. operations are located in the states of Wisconsin, Colorado, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Virginia, New Mexico and Florida. For the nine months ended September 30, 2012, the IMSG Group's Canadian operations accounted for approximately 57% of the applicants' gross margin while U.S. operations accounted for the remaining 43%. In 2013, the applicants' Canadian operations were expected to account for 53% of the total gross margin.

iMarketing Solutions Group Inc., Re, 2013 ONSC 2223, 2013 CarswellOnt 4465 2013 ONSC 2223, 2013 CarswellOnt 4465, 227 A.C.W.S. (3d) 314

6 As at April 5, 2013, the applicants employed approximately 1,143 employees (662 active employees and 481 on layoff) almost evenly divided between Canada and the U.S. The applicants' employees are not unionized and there are no pension plans in place.

7 The applicants have a \$2 million loan facility with CIBC made to The Responsive Marketing Group Inc. ("RMG"), which is one of the applicants. That loan has been fully advanced. It is secured against the assets of IRMG and guaranteed by other subsidiaries.

8 On October 12, 2012, IMSG obtained bridge loan financing in the amount of \$1.5 million. The bridge loan was provided by Shotgun Fund Limited Partnership III ("SF LP III") controlled by, among others, Michael Davis, a director and officer of IMSG. The purpose of the bridge loan was to address short-term liquidity issues and to improve IMSG's financial position. The net proceeds from the bridge loan were used for general working capital and operational restructuring purposes.

9 On December 4, 2012, IMSG completed a private placement offering of a secured convertible promissory note. The gross proceeds from the offering were \$3.5 million and the sole subscriber was SF LP III. The convertible note has a maturity date of December 4, 2015. IMSG granted SF LP III a security interest in all of its assets. The amount owing under the convertible promissory note is approximately \$3.8 million. The proceeds from the offering were used to repay the bridge loan and to fund the applicants' general working capital requirements.

10 As at April 5, 2013, the most significant liabilities of the applicants, other than their indebtedness to CIBC, approximately \$2.0 million, and SF LP III, approximately \$3.8 million, are as follows:

	(\$millions)
Unpaid Statutory Withholdings	\$0.2
Tax Authorities	\$1.2
Trade Creditors	\$4.3
Estimated Severance Obligations (as at April 5, 2013)	\$0.9
Estimated Future Obligations Relating to Abandoned Facilities	\$0.8
Rental Arrears	\$0.4
	\$7.8

Insolvency and Stay

11 The evidentiary record establishes that the IMSG Group is facing an intense liquidity challenge such that it cannot pay all liabilities as they become due, which liabilities include ongoing operating costs, as well as legacy costs incurred as a result of previous operational restructuring initiatives already undertaken. These initiatives were implemented with a view to returning the business of the IMSG Group to profitability.

12 The record also establishes that without an immediate stay of proceedings, the applicants' businesses cannot survive. The applicants are under increasing pressure from their creditors to pay outstanding accounts, including certain suppliers of goods and services that are critical to the ongoing operation of the applicants' businesses, and under constant threat from their landlords and critical suppliers who threaten to take enforcement actions to bar the applicants from their business premises and to discontinue the supply of goods and services necessary for the applicants to operate their businesses.

While the IMSG Group has historically been profitable, generating positive net income of approximately \$2.3 million and \$232,000 as recently as the fiscal years ending December 31, 2009 and 2010, over the most recent twenty-four month period it has generally incurred significant losses and, at present, the applicants lack sufficient liquidity to continue operating their businesses. For the three months ended September 30, 2012, the IMSG Group generated a loss of \$3.3 million and negative EBITDA from continuing operations of \$2.4 million. For the nine months ending September 30, 2012, the loss generated was \$4.7 million and the negative EBITDA from continuing operations was \$3.0 million. Although the IMSG Group has not finalized its audited financial statements for the year ending December 31, 2012, it expects to report continued material losses

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from ongoing operations as well as additional restructuring costs and losses from discontinued operations. For the first quarter of 2013, it expects that the IMSG Group will continue to show negative EBITDA and net losses, although the magnitude of such losses is expected to be materially lower than the quarterly results in 2012. It is expected that the IMSG Group will generate positive cash flow from ongoing operations shortly following the commencement of these proceedings.

14 Over the past two years, the applicants have taken steps to address the challenges facing them by implementing a number of initiatives to lower operating costs through process efficiencies and higher productivity. They commenced the implementation of a restructuring plan that was intended to transform their business and called for significant changes to the applicants' corporate structure, operations and management to bring these together under a single operating model. The applicants' restructuring plan has taken longer than expected to implement and anticipated operating results have not been achieved, resulting in the applicants' costs being higher than expected and savings being delayed.

I am satisfied from the record, including the report from the proposed Monitor, that an Initial Order and a stay under section 11 of the CCAA should be made. The applicants request that the stay apply as well to limited partnerships which form part of their business in light of the integrated nature of the business. Although the CCAA applies to corporations, there is authority that the stay may in appropriate circumstances be ordered to apply to limited partnership interests, particularly where the business interests of the applicant corporations are intertwined with the limited partnerships. See *Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re* (1993), 9 B.L.R. (2d) 275 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]). Such is the case with the applicants, and the stay requested is ordered.

It is to be noted that CIBC is subject to the stay. There is an issue, however, between the applicants and CIBC that needs to be addressed quickly and I understand that the parties are dealing with it. That has a do with whether the CIBC loan, once reduced by payments being made directly to CIBC by customers of one or more of the applicants, is to be increased to \$2 million. I understand that the applicants do not intend to compromise the rights of CIBC, including its security and collateral position, as result the proceedings and that the parties are working towards a mutually acceptable arrangement to the effect that intention. In the circumstances CIBC has reserved its rights concerning the Initial Order, which it has not opposed based upon this understanding.

DIP financing

17 The record indicates that the IMSG Group will require additional emergency funding in order to implement this restructuring. SF LP III has agreed to provide debtor in possession financing to the applicants up to the aggregate amount of \$1.0 million, subject to the applicants obtaining an Initial Order in this proceeding on the terms requested granting the DIP Lender a charge over all of the property, assets and undertaking of the applicants in priority to all creditors except CIBC. The cash flow forecasts for the period April 15, 2013 to August 2, 2013 indicate that in the absence of the DIP financing, the applicants have insufficient cash to continue to operate and operations will cease immediately. This is the view of both the applicants and the proposed Monitor.

18 After considering the factors set out in section 11.2 (4) of the CCAA, it appears that the DIP financing and charge appears reasonable and they are approved.

Administration Charge

19 The applicants propose an Administration Charge of \$300,000 to secure payment of the fees and expenses of the applicants' counsel, the Monitor and its counsel and the CRO and its counsel. The proposed Monitor is of the view that the proposed charge is reasonable. It appears to me relatively modest and is approved. This charge will rank after the CIBC security and before the other charges approved in the Initial Order, including the DIP charge.

Director's charge

20 The applicants also propose a Directors' Charge of \$1.3 million for any liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of these proceedings. The applicants estimate that the post-filing priority payables in respect of which the

4

directors would have personal liability are approximately \$1.3 million based on payroll, payroll remittances, vacation pay and sales taxes and determination or severance payments that may be owing. The proposed Monitor has reviewed the calculations and is of the view that the Directors' Charge is reasonable in relation to the quantum of the estimated potential liability. The Directors' Charge is approved.

Chief Restructuring Officer

The applicants propose that Mr. Upkar Arora CA, ICD.D, co-founder and Managing Director of Illumina, be appointed Chief Restructuring Officer. Illumina is an independent financial advisory firm that provides financial, operational and strategic advisory services to mid-sized businesses. IMSG retained Mr. Arora on September 24, 2012 as interim CFO upon the resignation of IMSG's previous CFO. It was expected that Mr. Arora's appointment would last for three months during which time he would, among other things, assist IMSG's board of directors in selecting a new CFO. Mr. Arora has remained in the position of interim CFO and, in that capacity, currently oversees the financial affairs of the applicants both in Canada and the U.S.

Mr. Arora has intimate knowledge of the Applicants' operations, financial status and efforts that have been undertaken by the applicants to restructure their business. The applicants believe that Mr. Arora's knowledge and experience will be an asset to them and will be of great assistance to the proposed Monitor in guiding the applicants through this restructuring process. A fee of \$75,000 per month has been agreed, plus a success fee on terms to be negotiated subject to court approval. The proposed Monitor believes that the monthly fee for Mr. Arora is reasonable and that absent his retention, professional fees would increase by at least the monthly fee payable to him. Mr. Arora is appointed as CRO and as an officer of the Court on the terms agreed between the applicants and Mr. Arora.

Cash management system

The IMSG Group operates an extensive centralized cash management system integrated among the various entities and centrally managed from IMSG's head office in Toronto. Cash is transferred daily, as needed, among some 120 bank accounts of the operating entities at multiple financial institutions its uses in Canada and the U.S. as well as customer accounts controlled by the IMSG Group. The applicants wish to continue this method of financing the various businesses on a daily basis. The proposed Monitor believes that it is necessary that this existing cash management system be continued as doing so would avoid (i) delays in accounts receivable collections and accounts payable payments until new bank and credit card accounts were established; (ii) a distraction of management's limited resources and (iii) payroll payment disruptions. It would also reduce administrative costs and expenses. The proposed Monitor points out that the cash flow projections do not consider the impact of cash flow delays and such delays would result in a need for increased funding which is not presently available.

The Initial Order will contain a provision that subject to the terms of the DIP facility, IMSG is authorized to make loans, advances or transfers of funds to any of the other IMSG Group entities in accordance with the cash management system and the DIP facility and the subsidiaries are authorized to repay funds previously advanced to them by IMSG from time to time in accordance with the cash management system and DIP facility. As well, there shall be an Inter-Company Charge on the property of IMSG Group.

Critical Suppliers and customers

The applicants have identified certain critical suppliers who provide goods and services critical to the applicants' ongoing operations. As well there are customers who to whom remittances were not made as required. The applicants have proposed in the Initial Order authority to make payments to these customers and critical suppliers for pre-filing indebtedness in consultation with the Monitor as it is believed that without making such payments their businesses cannot survive. The monitor believes the payments are appropriate and necessary for a number of reasons, including the fact that customers regularly engage on a percontract or per-service basis and would be expected to terminate or not renew their contracts if payment obligations to them were not honoured. The cash flow projections indicate that the applicants will have sufficient liquidity to make these payments over the next several weeks. The authorization to pay pre-filing amounts to critical suppliers is codified in section 11.4 of the CCAA. Pursuant to this section, the Court has the discretion to:

(a) declare a person to be a critical supplier, if it is satisfied the person is a supplier of goods or services to the company and the goods or services are critical to the company's continued operations (s. 11.4(1));

(b) make an order requiring the "critical supplier" to supply any goods or services specified by the Court to the company on any terms and conditions that are consistent with the supply relationship or the Court considers appropriate (s. 11.4(2)).

The rationale for the enactment of section 11.4 is explained in the Industry Canada Clause by Clause Briefing Book as follows:

Companies undergoing a restructuring must be able to continue to operate during the period. On the other hand, suppliers will attempt to restrict their exposure to credit risk by denying credit or refusing services to those debtor companies. To balance the conflicting interests, the court will be given the authority to designate certain key suppliers as "critical suppliers". The designation will mean that the supplier will be required to continue its business relationship with the debtor company but, in return, the critical supplier will be given security for payment.

28 The critical suppliers have been identified in the affidavit material of the applicants.

It is appropriate that the Initial Order contain a provision that the IMSG Group will be permitted to make such prefiling payments owing to customers and to suppliers as determined by the IMSG Group in consultation with the Monitor to be necessary to permit them to proceed with the restructuring.

Chapter 15 proceedings

30 IMSG Group intends to commence proceedings under Chapter 15 of the U.S. *Bankruptcy Code* pursuant to which they will seek to have these CCAA proceedings recognized as a foreign main proceeding and the Initial Order enforced in the US. IMSG will be named as the Foreign Representative in respect of the application. This would appear appropriate in light of the cross-border scope of the business, assets and operations of the applicants. The applicants are of the view that the center of main interests of the IMSG Group is in Ontario for a number of reasons set out in paragraph 21 of the affidavit of Mr. Langhorne. The proposed Monitor shares that view. They may well be correct, but it must be recognized that it is the function of the receiving court in the United States to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15. See *Cinram International Inc., Re* (2012), 91 C.B.R. (5th) 46 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), per Morawetz J.

31 The Initial Order signed on April 12, 2013 contains the provisions discussed in this endorsement.

Application granted.

End of Document

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TAB 12

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> 2009 CarswellOnt 4699 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

> > Grant Forest Products Inc., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4699, [2009] O.J. No. 3344, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 517, 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF GRANT FOREST PRODUCTS INC., GRANT ALBERTA INC., GRANT FOREST PRODUCTS SALES INC. and GRANT U.S. HOLDINGS GP (Applicants)

Newbould J.

Heard: August 6, 2009 Judgment: August 11, 2009 Docket: CV-09-8247-00CL

Counsel: A. Duncan Grace for GE Canada Leasing Services Company

Daniel R. Dowdall, Jane O. Dietrich for Grant Forest Products Inc., Grant Alberta Inc., Grant Forest Products Sales Inc., Grant U.S. Holdings GP

Sean Dunphy, Katherine Mah for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

Kevin McElcheran for Toronto-Dominion Bank

Stuart Brotman for Independent Directors

Subject: Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Arrangements -- Approval by court -- Miscellaneous

Applicant companies were leading manufacturer of oriented strand board — Parent company was G Inc — L was executive vice-president of G Inc — He owned no shares in G Inc — Employee retention plan ("ERP") agreement between G Inc. and L provided that if at any time before L turned 65 years of age, termination event occurred, and he was to be paid three times his then base salary — Agreement provided that obligation was to be secured by letter of credit and that if company made application under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, it would seek order creating charge on assets of company with priority satisfactory to L — In initial order, ERP agreement was approved and ERP charge on all of property of applicants as security for amounts that could be owing to L under ERP agreement was granted to L, ranking after administrative charge and investment offering advisory charge — Initial order was made without prejudice to G Co. to move to oppose ERP provisions — G Co. brought motion for order to delete ERP provisions in initial order on basis that provisions had effect of preferring interest of L over interest of other creditors, including G Co. — Motion dismissed — ERP agreement and charge contained in initial order were appropriate and were to be maintained — To require key employee to have already received offer of employment from someone else before ERP agreement could be justified would not be something that is necessary or desirable — ERP agreement and charge were approved by board of directors of G Inc., including approval by independent directors — Once could not assume without more that these people did not have experience in these matters or know what was reasonable — Three-year severance payment was not so large on face of it

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to be unreasonable or unfair to other stakeholders — Though ERP agreement did not provide that payment should not be made before restructuring was complete, that was clearly its present intent, which was sufficient.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Newbould J.:

MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re (2005), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 257, 2005 CarswellQue 3675, [2005] R.J.Q. 1558 (C.S. Que.) — distinguished

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1519 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - considered

Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — followed

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Beta Ltée/Beta Brands Ltd. (2007), 2007 CarswellOnt 5799, 36 C.B.R. (5th) 296 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Warehouse Drug Store Ltd., Re (2006), 24 C.B.R. (5th) 275, 2006 CarswellOnt 5128 (Ont. S.C.J.) -- considered

Statutes considered:

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

MOTION by creditor for order to delete employee retention plan provisions in initial order.

Newbould J.:

1 KERP is an acronym for key employee retention plan. In the Initial Order of June 25, 2009, a KERP agreement between Grant Forest Products Inc. and Mr. Peter Lynch was approved and a KERP charge on all of the property of the applicants as security for the amounts that could be owing to Mr. Lynch under the KERP agreement was granted to Mr. Lynch ranking after the Administration Charge and the Investment Offering Advisory Charge. The Initial Order was made without prejudice to the right of GE Canada Leasing Services Company ("GE Canada") to move to oppose the KERP provisions.

2 GE Canada has now moved for an order to delete the KERP provisions in the Initial Order. GE Canada takes the position that these KERP provisions have the effect of preferring the interest of Mr. Lynch over the interest of the other creditors, including GE Canada.

KERP Agreement and Charge

3 The applicant companies have been a leading manufacturer of oriented strand board and have interests in three mills in Canada and two mills in the United States. The parent company is Grant Forest Products Inc. Grant Forest was founded by Peter Grant Sr. in 1980 and is privately owned by the Grant family. Peter Grant Sr. is the CEO, his son, Peter Grant Jr., is the president, having worked in the business for approximately fourteen years. Peter Lynch is 58 years old. He practised corporate commercial law from 1976 to 1993 during which time he acted on occasion for members of the Grant family. In 1993 he joined the business and became executive vice-president of Grant Forest. Mr. Lynch owns no shares in the business.

4 The only KERP agreement made was between Grant Forest and Mr. Lynch. It provides that if at any time before Mr. Lynch turns 65 years of age a termination event occurs, he shall be paid three times his then base salary. A termination event

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is defined as the termination of his employment for any reason other than just cause or resignation, constructive dismissal, the sale of the business or a material part of the assets, or a change of control of the company. The agreement provided that the obligation was to be secured by a letter of credit and that if the company made an application under the CCAA it would seek an order creating a charge on the assets of the company with priority satisfactory to Mr. Lynch. That provision led to the KERP charge in the Initial Order.

Creditors of the Applicants

5 Grant Forest has total funded debt obligations of approximately \$550 million in two levels of primary secured debt. The first lien lenders, for whom TD Bank is the agent, are owed approximately \$400 million. The second lien lenders are owed approximately \$150 million.

6 Grant Forest has unsecured trade creditors of over \$4 million as well as other unsecured debt obligations. GE Canada is an unsecured creditor of Grant Forest pursuant to a master aircraft leasing agreement with respect to three aircraft which have now been returned to GE Canada. GE Canada expects that after the aircraft have been sold, it will have a deficiency claim of approximately U.S. \$6.5 million.

7 The largest unsecured creditor is a numbered company owned by the Grant family interests which is owed approximately \$50 million for debt financing provided to the business.

Analysis

8 Whether KERP provisions such as the ones in this case should be ordered in a CCAA proceeding is a matter of discretion. While there are a small number of cases under the CCAA dealing with this issue, it certainly cannot be said that there is any established body of case law settling the principles to be considered. In *Houlden & Morawetz Bankruptcy and Insolvency Analysis, West Law, 2009*, it is stated:

In some instances, the court supervising the CCAA proceeding will authorize a key employee retention plan or key employee incentive plan. Such plans are aimed at retaining employees that are important to the management or operations of the debtor company in order to keep their skills within the company at a time when they are likely to look for other employment because of the company's financial distress. (Underlining added)

9 In Canadian Insolvency in Canada by Kevin P. McElcheran (LexisNexis - Butterworths) at p. 231, it is stated:

KERPs and special director compensation arrangements are heavily negotiated and controversial arrangements. ... Because of the controversial nature of KERP arrangements, it is important that any proposed KERP be scrutinized carefully by the monitor with a view to insisting that <u>only true key employees are covered by the plan</u> and that the KERP will not do more harm than good by failing to include the truly key employees and failing to treat them fairly. (Underlining added)

10 I accept these statements as generally applicable. In my view it is quite clear on the basis of the record before me that the KERP agreement and charge contained in the Initial Order are appropriate and should be maintained. There are a number of reasons for this.

The Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge. Mr. Morrison has stated in the third report of the Monitor that as Mr. Lynch is a very seasoned executive, the Monitor would expect that he would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge, and that his doing so could only distract from the marketing process that is underway with respect to the assets of the applicants. The Monitor has expressed the view that Mr. Lynch continuing role as a senior executive is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process.

Mr. Hap Stephen, the Chairman and CEO of Stonecrest Capital Inc., appointed as the Chief Restructuring Advisor of the applicants in the Initial Order, pointed out in his affidavit that Mr. Lynch is the only senior officer of the applicants who is not a member of the Grant family and who works from Grant Forest's executive office in Toronto. He has sworn that the history, knowledge and stability that Mr. Lynch provides the applicants is crucial not only in dealing with potential investors

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during the restructuring to provide them with information regarding the applicants' operations, but also in making decisions regarding operations and management on a day-to-day basis during this period. He states that it would be extremely difficult at this stage of the restructuring to find a replacement to fulfill Mr. Lynch's current responsibilities and he has concern that if the KERP provisions in the Initial Order are removed, Mr. Lynch may begin to search for other professional opportunities given the uncertainty of his present position with the applicants. Mr. Stephen strongly supports the inclusion of the KERP provisions in the Initial Order.

It is contended on behalf of GE Canada that there is little evidence that Mr. Lynch has or will be foregoing other employment opportunities. Reliance is placed upon a statement of Leitch R.S.J. in *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Beta Ltée/ Beta Brands Ltd.* (2007), 36 C.B.R. (5th) 296 (Ont. S.C.J.). In that case Leitch J. refused to approve a KERP arrangement for a number of reasons, including the fact that there was no contract for the proposed payment and it had not been reviewed by the court appointed receiver who was applying to the court for directions. Leitch J. stated in distinguishing the case before her from *Warehouse Drug Store Ltd., Re*, [2006] O.J. No. 3416 (Ont. S.C.J.), that there was no suggestion that any of the key employees in the case before her had alternative employment opportunities that they chose to forego.

I do not read the decision of Leitch J, in *Textron* to state that there must be an alternative job that an employee chose to forego in order for a KERP arrangement to be approved. It was only a distinguishing fact in the case before her from the *Warehouse Drug Store* case. Moreover, I do not think that a court should be hamstrung by any such rule in a matter that is one of discretion depending upon the circumstances of each case. The statement in *Houlden Morawetz* to which I have earlier referred that a KERP plan is aimed at retaining important employees when they are likely to look for other employment indicates a much broader intent, i.e. for a key employee who is likely to look for other employment rather than a key employee who has been offered another job but turned it down. In *Nortel Networks Corp., Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 1188 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]), Morawetz J. approved a KERP agreement in circumstances in which there was a "potential" loss of management at the time who were sought after by competitors. To require a key employee to have already received an offer of employment from someone else before a KERP agreement could be justified would not in my view be something that is necessary or desirable.

15 In this case, the concern of the Monitor and of Mr. Stephen that Mr. Lynch may consider other employment opportunities if the KERP provisions are not kept in place is not an idle concern. On his cross-examination on July 28, 2009, Mr. Lynch disclosed that recently he was approached on an unsolicited basis to submit to an interview for a position of CEO of another company in a different sector. He declined to be interviewed for the position. He stated that the KERP provisions played a role in his decision which might well have been different if the KERP provisions did not exist. This evidence is not surprising and quite understandable for a person of Mr. Lynch's age in the uncertain circumstances that exist with the applicants' business.

It is also contended by GE Canada that Mr. Lynch shares responsibilities with Mr. Grant Jr., the implication being that Mr. Lynch is not indispensable. This contention is contrary to the views of the Monitor and Mr. Stephen and is not supported by any cogent evidence. It also does not take into account the different status of Mr. Lynch and Mr. Grant Jr. Mr. Lynch is not a shareholder. One can readily understand that a prospective bidder in the marketing process that is now underway might want to hear from an experienced executive of the company who is not a shareholder and thus not conflicted. Mr. Dunphy on behalf of the Monitor submitted that Mr. Lynch is the only senior executive independent of the shareholders and that it is the Monitor's view that an unconflicted non-family executive is critical to the marketing process. The KERP agreement providing Mr. Lynch with a substantial termination payment in the event that the business is sold can be viewed as adding to his independence insofar as his dealing with respective bidders are concerned.

17 It is also contended on behalf of GE Canada that there is no material before the court to establish that the quantum of the termination payment, three times Mr. Lynch's salary at the time he is terminated, is reasonable. I do not accept that. The KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors of Grant Forest, including approval by the independent directors. These independent directors included Mr. William Stinson, the former CEO of Canadian Pacific Limited and the lead director of Sun Life, Mr. Michael Harris, a former premier of Ontario, and Mr. Wallace, the president of a construction company and a director of Inco. The independent directors were advised by Mr. Levin, a very senior corporate counsel. One cannot assume without more that these people did not have experience in these matters or know what was reasonable.

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A three year severance payment is not so large on the face of it to be unreasonable, or in this case, unfair to the other stakeholders. The business acumen of the board of directors of Grant Forest, including the independent directors, is one that a court should not ignore unless there is good reason on the record to ignore it. This is particularly so in light of the support of the Monitor and Mr. Stephens for the KERP provisions. Their business judgment cannot be ignored.

19 The Monitor is, of course, an officer of the court. The Chief Restructuring Advisor is not but has been appointed in the Initial Order. Their views deserve great weight and I would be reluctant to second guess them. The following statement of Gallagan J.A., in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 4 O.R. (3d) I (Ont. C.A.), while made in the context of the approval by a court appointed receiver of the sale of a business, is instructive in my view in considering the views of a Monitor, including the Monitor in this case and the views of the Chief Restructuring Advisor:

When a court appoints a receiver to use its commercial expertise to sell an airline, it is inescapable that it intends to rely upon the receiver's expertise and not upon its own. Therefore, the court must place a great deal of confidence in the actions taken and in the opinions formed by the receiver. It should also assume that the receiver is acting properly unless the contrary is clearly shown. The second observation is that the court should be reluctant to second-guess, with the benefit of hindsight, the considered business decisions made by its receiver.

The first lien security holders owed approximately \$400 million also support the KERP agreement and charge for Mr. Lynch. They too take the position that it is important to have Mr. Lynch involved in the restructuring process. Not only did they support the KERP provisions in the Initial Order, they negotiated section 10(1) of the Initial Order that provides that the applicants could not without the prior written approval of their agent, TD Bank, and the Monitor, make any changes to the officers or senior management. That is, without the consent of the TD Bank as agent for the first lien creditors, Mr. Lynch could not be terminated unless the Initial Order were later amended by court order to permit that to occur.

21 With respect to the fairness of the KERP provisions for Mr. Lynch and whether they unduly interfere with the rights of the creditors of the applicants, it appears that the potential cost of the KERP agreement, if it in fact occurs, will be borne by the secured creditors who either consent to the provisions or do not oppose them. The first lien lenders owed approximately \$400 million are consenting and the second lien lenders owed approximately \$150 million have not taken any steps to oppose the KERP provisions. It appears from marketing information provided by the Monitor and Mr. Stephen to the Court on a confidential basis that the secured creditors will likely incur substantial shortfalls and that there likely will be no recovery for the unsecured creditors. Mr. Grace fairly acknowledged in argument that it is highly unlikely that there will be any recovery for the unsecured creditors. Even if that were not the case, and there was a reasonable prospect for some recovery by the unsecured creditors, the largest unsecured creditor, being the numbered company owned by the Grant family that is owed approximately \$50 million, supports the KERP provisions for Mr. Lynch.

In his work, *Canadian Insolvency in Canada, supra*, Mr. McElcheran states that because a KERP arrangement is intended to keep key personnel for the duration of the restructuring process, the compensation covered by the agreement should be deferred until after the restructuring or sale of the business has been completed, although he acknowledges that there may be stated "staged bonuses". While I agree that the logic of a KERP agreement leads to it reflecting these principles, I would be reluctant to hold that they are necessarily a code limiting the discretion of a CCAA court in making an order that is just and fair in the circumstances of the particular case.

In this case, the KERP agreement does not expressly provide that the payments are to await the completion of the restructuring. It proves that they are to be made within five days of termination of Mr. Lynch. There would be nothing on the face of the agreement to prevent Mr. Lynch being terminated before the restructuring was completed. However, it is clear that the company wants Mr. Lynch to stay through the restructuring. The intent is not to dismiss him before then. Mr. Dunphy submitted, which I accept, that the provision to pay the termination pay upon termination is to protect Mr. Lynch. Thus while the agreement does not provide that the payment should not be made before the restructuring is complete, that is clearly its present intent, which in my view is sufficient.

Grant Forest Products Inc., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4699

2009 CarswellOnt 4699, [2009] O.J. No. 3344, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 517...

I have been referred to the case of *MEI Computer Technology Group Inc., Re* (2005), 19 C.B.R. (5th) 257 (C.S. Que.), a decision of Gascon J. in the Quebec Superior Court. In that case, Gascon J. refused to approve a charge for an employee retention plan in a CCAA proceeding. In doing so, Justice Gascon concluded there were guidelines to be followed, which included statements that the remedy was extraordinary that should be used sparingly, that the debtor should normally establish that there was an urgent need for the creation of the charge and that there must be a reasonable prospect of a successful restructuring. I do not agree that such guidelines are necessarily appropriate for a KERP agreement. Why, for example, refuse a KERP agreement if there was no reasonable prospect of a successful restructuring? Justice Gascon accepted the submission of the debtor's counsel that the charge was the same as a charge for DIP financing, and took guidelines from DIP financing cases and commentary. I do not think that helpful. DIP financing and a KERP agreement are two different things. I decline to follow the case.


The motion by GE Canada to strike the KERP provisions from the Initial Order is denied. The applicants are entitled to their costs from GE Canada. If the quantum cannot be agreed, brief written submissions may be made.

Motion dismissed.

End of Document

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TAB 13



COURT FILE NUMBER

COURT

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JUDICIAL CENTRE

APPLICANTS

I hereby certify this to be a true copy of
the original Order
dated this 25^{+} day of $p = 20^{-13}$
for Clork of the Court

DOCUMENT

ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT

DATE ON WHICH ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED:

LOCATION WHERE ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED:

NAME OF JUSTICE WHO MADE THIS ORDER: COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA

CALGARY

1301-11352.

IN THE MATTER OF THE **COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT**, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

IN THE MATTER OF THE **BUSINESS CORPORATIONS ACT**, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9, as amended

AND IN THE MATTER OF LONE PINE RESOURCES CANADA LTD., LONE PINE RESOURCES (HOLDINGS) INC., LONE PINE RESOURCES INC., WISER OIL DELAWARE, LLC AND WISER DELAWARE LLC.

CCAA INITIAL ORDER

BENNETT JONES LLP

Barristers and Solicitors 4500 Bankers Hall East 855 – 2nd Street SW Calgary, Alberta T2P 4K7

Attention: Chris Simard Telephone No.: (403) 298-4485 Fax No.: 403-265-7219 Client File No.: 68261-10

September 25, 2013

Calgary

The Honourable Mme. Justice K.M. Eidsvik

UPON the application of Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd., Lone Pine Resources (Holdings) Inc., Lone Pine Resources Inc., Wiser Oil Delaware, LLC and Wiser Delaware, LLC (collectively the "Applicants"), AND UPON having read the Originating Application, the Affidavit of Tim Granger sworn September 25, 2013 (the "Granger Affidavit"); the consent of PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. to act as Monitor, the pre-filing report of PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., all filed; AND UPON noting that the secured creditors (including the Syndicate (as defined in the Granger Affidavit)) who are likely to be affected by the charges created herein do not oppose or alternatively consent to the charges created herein; AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicants, counsel for PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., counsel for the Syndicate, and counsel to the Initial Consenting Noteholders (as defined in the Granger Affidavit); IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED THAT:

SERVICE

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1. The time for service of the notice of application for this order is hereby abridged and deemed good and sufficient and this application is properly returnable today.

APPLICATION

2. The Applicants are companies to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

3. The Applicants shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

- 4. The Applicants shall:
 - (a) remain in possession and control of their current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "Property");

- (b) subject to further order of this Court, continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of their business (the "Business") and Property;
- (c) be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "Assistants") currently retained or employed by them, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as they deem reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order;
- (d) shall continue to have access to its cash accounts with the Syndicate, but shall have its operating facility capped and the Facility Commitment reduced to the amount outstanding at the date of this Order; and
- (e) be authorized to make inter-company transfers and advances to pay costs, expenses and amounts otherwise authorized herein.
- 5. To the extent permitted by law, the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses, incurred prior to or after this Order:
 - (a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, employee and pension benefits, vacation pay and expenses payable on or after the date of this Order, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements; and
 - (b) the reasonable fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicants in respect of these proceedings and to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel to the Initial Consenting Noteholders (Goodmans LLP and Stroock & Stroock & Lavan LLP), at their standard rates and charges. The payment of any reasonable fees and disbursements of counsel to the Initial Consenting Noteholders shall not, without the consent of the DIP Lender, exceed: (i) \$800,000, plus taxes, for pre-filing and post-filing amounts, up to the date of the sanction of a CCAA Plan by the Court; or (ii) in the event that this Court sanctions a CCAA Plan by December 31, 2013, \$800,000, plus taxes, for post-

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filing amounts from the date of this Initial Order to the date of implementation of a CCAA Plan.

- 6. The Engagement Letter entered into between RBC Dominion Securities Inc, a member company of RBC Capital Markets (the "Financial Advisor") and Lone Pine Resources Canada Inc. ("LPR Canada") and Lone Pine Resources Inc. ("LPRI") dated July 3, 2013 (the "RBC Engagement Letter") is hereby approved and LPR Canada and LPRI are authorized and directed to continue the engagement of the Financial Advisor as an Assistant thereunder and to comply with all of their obligations thereunder.
- 7. Except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, the Applicants shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicants in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after this Order, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:
 - (a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance), maintenance and security services;
 - (b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicants following the date of this Order; and
 - (c) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicants by those parties deemed by the Applicants (in consultation with the Monitor) to be Critical Suppliers whether supplied prior to or following the date of this Order. The Critical Suppliers are hereby granted a charge (the "Critical Suppliers' Charge") on the Property to secure all obligations owed to them as Critical Suppliers by the Applicants relating to the provision of goods and services on and after the date of this Order, to a maximum amount of \$1.5 million. The Critical Suppliers' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.
- 8. The Applicants shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:

- (a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in Right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of;
 - (i) employment insurance,
 - (ii) Canada Pension Plan, and
 - (iii) income taxes,

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but only where such statutory deemed trust amounts arise after the date of this Order, or are not required to be remitted until after the date of this Order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court;

- (b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "Sales Taxes") required to be remitted by the Applicants in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicants, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order; and
- (c) any amount payable to the Crown in Right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicants.
- 9. Until a real property lease is disclaimed or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicants may pay all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable as rent to the landlord under the lease) based on the terms of existing lease arrangements or as otherwise may be negotiated by the

Applicants from time to time for the period commencing from and including the date of this Order ("Rent"), but shall not pay any rent in arrears.

- 10. Except as specifically permitted in this Order, the Applicants are hereby directed, until further order of this Court:
 - (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicants to any of their creditors as of the date of this Order;
 - (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of their Property;
 - (c) not to grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business; and
 - (d) to pay monthly interest, but not principal, accruing due to the Syndicate and to pay the reasonable fees and disbursements of the Syndicate Advisor (as defined below) and counsel to the Syndicate.

RESTRUCTURING

- 11. The Applicants shall subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA and such covenants as may be contained in the Definitive Documents (as hereinafter defined in paragraph 36) or the Support Agreement dated September 25, 2013, entered into between the Applicants and the Initial Consenting Noteholders (the "Support Agreement"), have the right to:
 - (a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of their business or operations and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets not exceeding \$500,000 in any one transaction or \$2,000,000 in the aggregate (or in excess of these amounts, by order of this Court);
 - (b) terminate the employment of such of its employees or temporarily lay off such of their employees as they deem appropriate on such terms as may be agreed upon

between the Applicants and such employee, or failing such agreement, to deal with the consequences thereof in the Plan; and

(c) pursue all avenues of refinancing of their Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing,

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicants to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Business (the "Restructuring").

- 12. The Applicants shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the Applicants' intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal. If the landlord disputes the Applicants' entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the Applicants, or by further order of this Court upon application by the Applicants on at least two (2) days' notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If the Applicants disclaim or resiliate the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with section 32 of the CCAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in section 32(5) of the CCAA, and the disclaimer or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicants' claim to the fixtures in dispute.
- 13. If a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is delivered pursuant to section 32 of the CCAA, then:
 - (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Applicants and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice; and

(b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicants in respect of such lease or leased premises and such landlord shall be entitled to notify the Applicants of the basis on which it is taking possession and to gain possession of and re-lease such leased premises to any third party or parties on such terms as such landlord considers advisable, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

NO PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANTS OR THE PROPERTY

14. Until and including October 24, 2013, or such later date as this Court may order (the "Stay Period"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court (each, a "Proceeding") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicants or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further order of this Court.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

- 15. During the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "Persons" and each being a "Person"), whether judicial or extra-judicial, statutory or non-statutory against or in respect of the Applicants or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended and shall not be commenced, proceeded with or continued except with leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall:
 - (a) empower the Applicants to carry on any business which the Applicants are not lawfully entitled to carry on;

- (b) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by section 11.1 of the CCAA;
- (c) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest; or
- (d) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.
- 16. Nothing in this Order shall prevent any party from taking an action against the Applicants where such an action must be taken in order to comply with statutory time limitations in order to preserve their rights at law, provided that no further steps shall be taken by such party except in accordance with the other provisions of this Order, and notice in writing of such action be given to the Monitor at the first available opportunity. Nothing in this Order shall affect the rights or remedies under the CCAA of counterparties to "eligible financial contracts" as defined in the Regulations to the CCAA.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

17. During the Stay Period, no person shall accelerate, suspend, discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicants, except with the written consent of the Applicants and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

- 18. During the Stay Period, all persons having:
 - (a) statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services; or
 - (b) oral or written agreements or arrangements with the Applicants, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation, services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicants

are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with, suspending or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicants or exercising any other remedy provided under such

agreements or arrangements. The Applicants shall be entitled to the continued use of their current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the usual prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Applicants in accordance with the payment practices of the Applicants, or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicants and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court. Nothing in this Order has the effect of prohibiting a property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the date of this Order.

NO OBLIGATION TO ADVANCE MONEY OR EXTEND CREDIT

19. Except as provided in paragraph 4(d) of this Order, no creditor of the Applicants (including the Syndicate) shall be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicants.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

20. During the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA and paragraph 15 of this Order, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicants with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligations of the Applicants whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicants, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicants or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION AND CHARGE

21. The Applicants shall indemnify its directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors and or officers of the Applicants after the commencement of the within proceedings except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the obligation was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or willful misconduct.

- 22. The directors and officers of the Applicants shall be entitled to the benefit of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Directors' Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$1,000,000, as security for the indemnity provided in paragraph 21 of this Order. The Directors' Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 herein.
- 23. Notwithstanding any language in any applicable insurance policy to the contrary:
 - (a) no insurer shall be entitled to be subrogated to or claim the benefit of the Directors' Charge; and
 - (b) the Applicants' directors and officers shall only be entitled to the benefit of the Directors' Charge to the extent that they do not have coverage under any directors' and officers' insurance policy, or to the extent that such coverage is insufficient to pay amounts indemnified in accordance with paragraph 21 of this Order.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

- 24. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the Property, Business and financial affairs and the Applicants with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicants and its shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicants pursuant to this Order, and shall cooperate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.
- 25. The Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:
 - (a) monitor the Applicants' receipts and disbursements, Business and dealings with the Property;
 - (b) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, and such

other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein and immediately report to the Court if in the opinion of the Monitor there is a material adverse change in the financial circumstances of the Applicants;

- (c) assist the Applicants, to the extent required by the Applicants, in its dissemination to the DIP Lender and its counsel of financial and other information as agreed to between the Applicants and the DIP Lender which may be used in these proceedings, including reporting on a weekly basis;
- (d) advise the Applicants in its preparation of the Applicants' cash flow statements and reporting required by the DIP Lender and the Syndicate, which information shall be reviewed with the Monitor and delivered to the DIP Lender and the Syndicate and its counsel on a periodic basis, but not less than weekly, or as otherwise agreed to by the DIP Lender and the Syndicate;
- (e) advise the Applicants in their development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;
- (f) advise the Applicants, to the extent required by the Applicants, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;
- (g) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form and other financial documents of the Applicants to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicants' Property, Business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;
- (h) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order;
- (i) hold funds in trust or in escrow, to the extent required, to facilitate settlements between the Applicants and any other Person; and

- (j) perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.
- 26. The Applicants and the Monitor shall in a timely manner provide to Alvarez & Marsal Canada ULC (the "Syndicate Advisor") the information set out in paragraph 25 above. In addition, the terms of the Engagement Letter between the Syndicate's Counsel and the Syndicate Advisor (as consented to by LPRI and LPR Canada) dated August 9, 2013 are hereby approved (subject to the deletion of the existing paragraph 7 thereof and replacement with the following revised paragraph 7). LPRI and LPR Canada, with the assistance of the Monitor, are directed to continue performing their obligations thereunder:

7. <u>Confidentiality</u>

A&M shall keep as confidential all non-public information received from Norton, the Agent, the Senior Lenders or the Company in conjunction with this engagement, except: (i) confidential information obtained by A&M and delivered to Norton, the Agent or the Senior Lenders or their respective advisors in connection with this engagement; or (ii) as required by legal proceedings. A&M, Norton and the Agent acknowledge that Canadian and United States securities laws prohibit any person who has received from an issuer any material, non-public information from purchasing or selling securities of such issuer or from communicating such information to any other person under circumstances in which it is reasonably foreseeable that such person is likely to purchase or sell such securities. The Company specifically authorizes the Agent to divulge such information pursuant to any court proceeding commenced by or to which the Agent and/or Senior Lenders is a party in connection with the exercise of any of the Agent's or Senior Lenders' remedies against the Company including, without limitation, enforcing the security held by the Agent and the Senior Lenders from the Company.

27. The Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, or by inadvertence in relation to the due exercise of powers or performance of duties under this Order, be deemed to have taken or maintain possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof. Nothing in this Order shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation, enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal or waste or other contamination, provided however that this Order does not exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable environmental legislation.

- 28. The Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicants and the DIP Lender with information provided by the Applicants in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicants is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicants may agree.
- 29. In addition to the rights and protections afforded the Monitor under the CCAA or as an officer of this Court, the Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or willful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.
- 30. The Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and counsel to the Applicants shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, by the Applicants as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel for the Monitor and counsel for the Applicants on a regular basis.
- 31. The Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time.
- 32. The Monitor, counsel to the Monitor and the Applicants' counsel, as security for the professional fees and disbursements incurred both before and after the granting of this Order, shall be entitled to the benefits of and are hereby granted a charge (the

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"Administration Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$1,000,000, as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at the normal rates and charges of the Monitor and such counsel, both before and after the making of this order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.

33. The Financial Advisor and counsel to the Initial Consenting Noteholders shall be entitled to the benefits of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Subordinated Advisor Charge") on the Property, as security for their respective professional fees and disbursements incurred with respect of these proceedings (and, in the case of the Financial Advisor, in accordance with the RBC Engagement Letter). The Subordinated Advisor Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof. The Subordinated Advisor Charge shall also secure the amounts payable under the Backstop Agreement, as defined in the Granger Affidavit.

DIP FINANCING

- 34. The Applicants are hereby authorized and empowered to obtain and borrow under a credit facility from J.P. Morgan Securities L.L.C. on its own behalf and on behalf of a group of lenders (collectively the "DIP Lender") in order to finance the Applicants' working capital requirements and other general corporate purposes and capital expenditures (with any capital expenditure being in accordance with the Applicants' cash flow statements set out from time to time), provided that borrowings under such credit facility shall not exceed \$10,000,000.00 unless permitted by further order of this Court.
- Such credit facility shall be on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Term Sheet agreed between the Applicants and the DIP Lender dated as of September 20, 2013 (the "DIP Term Sheet"), as attached to the Granger Affidavit.
- 36. The Applicants are hereby authorized and empowered to execute and deliver such credit agreements, mortgages, charges, hypothecs and security documents, guarantees and other definitive documents (collectively, the "Definitive Documents"), as are contemplated by the DIP Term Sheet or as may be reasonably required by the DIP Lender pursuant to the terms thereof, and the Applicants are hereby authorized and directed to pay and perform

all of their indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to the DIP Lender under and pursuant to the DIP Term Sheet and the Definitive Documents as and when the same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

- 37. The DIP Lender shall be entitled to the benefits of and is hereby granted a charge (the "DIP Lender's Charge") on the Property to secure all obligations under the Definitive Documents incurred on or after the date of this Order which charge shall not exceed the aggregate amount advanced on or after the date of this Order under the Definitive Documents. The DIP Lender's Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.
- 38. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Order:

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- (a) the DIP Lender may take such steps from time to time as it may deem necessary or appropriate to file, register, record or perfect the DIP Lender's Charge or any of the Definitive Documents;
- (b) upon the occurrence of an event of default under the Definitive Documents or the DIP Lender's Charge, the DIP Lender shall be entitled immediately to cease making advances to the Applicants and, upon 5 days notice to the Applicants and the Monitor, may exercise any and all of its other rights and remedies against the Applicants or the Property under or pursuant to the DIP Term Sheet, Definitive Documents and the DIP Lender's Charge, including without limitation, set off and/or consolidate any amounts owing by the DIP Lender to the Applicants against the obligations of the Applicants to the DIP Lender under the DIP Term Sheet, the Definitive Documents or the DIP Lender's Charge, to make demand, accelerate payment and give other notices, or to apply to this Court for the appointment of a receiver, receiver and manager or interim receiver, or for a bankruptcy order against the Applicants; and

- (c) the foregoing rights and remedies of the DIP Lender shall be enforceable against any trustee in bankruptcy, interim receiver, receiver or receiver and manager of the Applicants or the Property.
- 39. The DIP Lender shall be treated as unaffected in any plan of arrangement or compromise filed by the Applicants under the CCAA, or any proposal filed by the Applicants under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* of Canada (the "BIA"), with respect to any advances made under the Definitive Documents.

KERP AND THE KERP CHARGE

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- 40. The Key Employee Retention Plan described in the Granger Affidavit including Exhibit "24" and the Confidential KERP Summary attached as Exhibit "25" to the Granger Affidavit (the "KERP") is hereby authorized and approved and the Applicants are authorized and directed to make the payments contemplated in the KERP.
- 41. The beneficiaries of the KERP are hereby granted a charge (the "KERP Charge") on the Property to secure all obligations under the KERP. The KERP Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 42 and 44 hereof.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF CHARGES

42. The priorities of the Directors' Charge, the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge, the KERP Charge and the Subordinated Advisor Charge, as among them, shall be as follows:

First - Administration Charge (to the maximum amount of \$1,000,000);

Second – DIP Lender's Charge;

Third – Directors' Charge (to the maximum amount of \$1,000,000); and

The following charges shall be subordinated to the security granted to the Syndicate (as defined in the Granger Affidavit):

Fourth – KERP Charge (to the maximum amount of \$2,499,272);

Fifth – Subordinated Advisor Charge (to the maximum of \$3,800,000 with respect to the fees and disbursements of the Financial Advisor pursuant to the RBC Engagement Letter); and

Sixth – Critical Suppliers' Charge, to a maximum of \$1.5 million.

- 43. The filing, registration or perfection of the Directors' Charge, the Administration Charge the DIP Lender's Charge, the KERP Charge, the Subordinated Advisor Charge or the Critical Suppliers' Charge (collectively, the "Charges") shall not be required, and the Charges shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Charges coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.
- 44. (i) Each of the Directors' Charge, the Administration Charge, the DIP Lender's Charge (all as constituted and defined herein) shall constitute a charge on the Property and such Charges shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "Encumbrances") in favour of any Person, and (ii) the KERP Charge, the Subordinated Advisor Charge and the Critical Suppliers' Charge shall constitute a charge on the Property and shall rank in priority to all Encumbrances in favour of any Person, other than the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge , the Directors' Charge and the security granted to the Syndicate.
- 45. Except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicants shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with, the Charges, unless the Applicants also obtain the prior written consent of the Monitor and the beneficiaries of the Charges, or further order of this Court.
- 46. The Charges shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Charges (collectively, the "Chargees") and/or the DIP Lender thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by:
 - (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made in this
 Order;

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- (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to BIA, or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications;
- (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA;
- (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or
- (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "Agreement") which binds the Applicants, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:
 - (i) neither the creation of the Charges nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of any documents in respect thereof, including the DIP Term Sheet or the Definitive Documents, shall create or be deemed to constitute a new breach by the Applicants of any Agreement to which it is a party;
 - (ii) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Charges, or the Applicants entering into the DIP Term Sheet, or execution, delivery or performance of the Definitive Documents; and
 - (iii) the payments made by the Applicants pursuant to this order, including the DIP Term Sheet or the Definitive Documents, and the granting of the Charges, do not and will not constitute preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

47. Payments under the Subordinated Advisor Charge to the Financial Advisor shall be made in accordance with the terms of the RBC Engagement Letter but not prior to the closing of any transaction contemplated in the RBC Engagement Letter.

ALLOCATION

48. Any interested Person may apply to this Court on notice to any other party likely to be affected, for an order to allocate the Charges amongst the various assets comprising the Property.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

- 49. The Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in the Calgary Herald and the Toronto Globe & Mail a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA; (ii) within five (5) days after the date of this Order (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicants of more than \$1,000 and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.
- 50. The Applicants and the Monitor shall be at liberty to serve this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery, facsimile transmission or e-mail to the Applicants' creditors or other interested Persons at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicants and that any such service or notice by courier, personal delivery, facsimile transmission or e-mail shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing. The Monitor may post a copy of any or all such materials on its website at http://www.pwc.com/car-lpr, which shall be established for informational purposes.

SEALING

51. The Confidential Affidavit of Tim Granger, sworn September 25, 2013 (including the unredacted RBC Engagement Letter (Exhibit "14" of the Granger Affidavit") and the Confidential KERP Summary (Exhibit "25" of the Granger Affidavit) shall be sealed on the Court file, notwithstanding Division 4 of Part 6 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*.

GENERAL

- 52. The Applicants or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.
- 53. The Applicants are hereby directed to report to this Honourable Court at the first stay extension application, to be scheduled on or before October 24, 2013 (the "First Extension Application"), as to the Applicants' progress in arranging for an asset-backed loan ("ABL") facility as part of the CCAA plan currently being contemplated by the Applicants. The Syndicate may, at the First Extension Application, in the absence of the Applicants achieving any of the milestones contained in the DIP Term Sheet, upon the occurrence of the termination of the Support Agreement (as defined in the Granger Affidavit), or at such other time as it deems advisable, seek any motion or relief in respect of the Applicants or their assets and Property.
- 54. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicants, the Business or the Property.
- 55. This Court hereby requests the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicants, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicants and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order to this Order, or to assist the Applicants and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

- 56. Each of the Applicants and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order and Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd. is authorized and empowered to act as the foreign representative of the Applicants in respect of the within proceedings for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.
- 57. Lone Pine Resources Canada Ltd. is hereby authorized, as the foreign representative of the Applicants and of the within proceedings, to apply for foreign recognition of these proceedings, as necessary, in any jurisdiction outside of Canada, including in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and to take such actions necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the recognition of these proceedings in any such jurisdiction.
- 58. Any interested party (including the Applicants and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days' notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.
- 59. This Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Mountain Time on the date of this Order.

K.M. Eidsvik"

TAB 14

	I hereby certify this to be a true copy of
	the original <u>Urder</u>
dated this 30 day of March 2013	
COURT FILE NUMBER:	1501 - Clerk's stamp? 3 1501 - 03351 for Clerk of the Court
COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA IN
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
	IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 36, as amended
	AND IN THE MATTER OF THE <i>BUSINESS</i> CORPORATIONS ACT, R.S.A. 2000, c. B-9
	AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF LARICINA ENERGY LTD., LARICINA GP HOLDING LTD., AND 1276158 ALBERTA INC.
APPLICANTS:	LARICINA ENERGY LTD., LARICINA GP HOLDING LTD., AND 1276158 ALBERTA INC.
DOCUMENT:	INITIAL ORDER
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	Osler, Hoskin & Harcourt LLP Suite 2500, 450-1st Street SW Calgary, Alberta T2P 5H1 Solicitors: A. Robert Anderson, Q.C./Aditya M. Badami Phone: 403.260.7004/7056 Fax: 403.260.7024 Email: randerson@osler.com/abadami@osler.com Matter: 1151294

Monday, March 30, 2015 DATE ON WHICH ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED:

NAME OF JUDGE WHO MADE THIS ORDER:

Justice S. J. LoVecchio Calgary Courts Centre

LOCATION OF HEARING:

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FIAT: Let the Clerk of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta file this Initial Order after the day the matter was heard.

Dated this March 30,2015 Ć.Q.B.A.

UPON the Originating Application (the "Laricina Application") of Laricina Energy Ltd., Laricina GP Holding Ltd., and 1276158 Alberta Inc. (collectively, the "Applicant"); AND **UPON** having read the Laricina Application, the Affidavit of Glen C. Schmidt and the Confidential Affidavit of Glen C. Schmidt in support of the Laricina Application, the Originating Application (the "CPPIB Credit Application") of CPPIB Credit Investments Inc. ("CPPIB Credit"), the Affidavit of Syed Mustafa Humayun and the Confidential Supplemental Affidavit of Syed Mustafa Humayun in support of the CPPIB Credit Application; AND UPON reading the consent of PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. to act as Monitor; AND UPON noting that the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the charge created herein have been provided notice of this application; AND UPON hearing counsel for the Applicant and for CPPIB Credit, the holder of all of the issued and outstanding 11.50% Senior Secured Notes (the "Notes") issued pursuant to an indenture (the "Indenture") dated March 20, 2014 and Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECLARED THAT:

SERVICE

1. The time for service of the notice of application for this order is hereby abridged and deemed good and sufficient and this application is properly returnable today.

APPLICATION

2. The Applicant is a company to which the CCAA applies.

PLAN OF ARRANGEMENT

3. The Applicant shall have the authority to file and may, subject to further order of this Court, file with this Court a plan of compromise or arrangement (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan").

POSSESSION OF PROPERTY AND OPERATIONS

- 4. The Applicant shall:
 - (a) remain in possession and control of its current and future assets, undertakings and properties of every nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situate including all proceeds thereof (the "Property");

- (b) subject to further order of this Court, continue to carry on business in a manner consistent with the preservation of its business (the "Business") and Property; and
- (c) be authorized and empowered to continue to retain and employ the employees, consultants, agents, experts, accountants, counsel and such other persons (collectively "Assistants") currently retained or employed by it, with liberty to retain such further Assistants as it deems reasonably necessary or desirable in the ordinary course of business or for the carrying out of the terms of this Order.
- 5. To the extent permitted by law, the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay the following expenses, incurred prior to or after this Order:
 - (a) all outstanding and future wages, salaries, employee and pension benefits, vacation pay and expenses payable on or after the date of this Order, in each case incurred in the ordinary course of business and consistent with existing compensation policies and arrangements; and
 - (b) the fees and disbursements of any Assistants retained or employed by the Applicant in respect of these proceedings, at their standard rates and charges.
- 6. Except as otherwise provided to the contrary herein, and consistent with the Cash Flow Forecast (as defined in paragraph 13), the Applicant shall be entitled but not required to pay all reasonable expenses incurred by the Applicant in carrying on the Business in the ordinary course after this Order, and in carrying out the provisions of this Order, which expenses shall include, without limitation:
 - (a) all expenses and capital expenditures reasonably necessary for the preservation of the Property or the Business including, without limitation, payments on account of insurance (including directors and officers insurance), maintenance and security services;
 - (b) payment for goods or services actually supplied to the Applicant following the date of this Order; and
 - (c) after consultation with CPPIB Credit, payment for certain goods and services supplied to the Applicant prior to the date of this Order by critical suppliers identified by the Applicant, as critical to the ongoing operation or preservation of

its Assets, and as set out in the Cash Flow Forecast and approved by the Monitor, to a maximum of \$2,000,000 in the aggregate.

Where the phrase "consultation with CPPIB Credit" or "consulting with CPPIB Credit" or any variation thereof is used in this Order, it shall not be construed as requiring assent, consent, or the approval of CPPIB Credit.

- 7. The Applicant shall remit, in accordance with legal requirements, or pay:
 - (a) any statutory deemed trust amounts in favour of the Crown in Right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any other taxation authority which are required to be deducted from employees' wages, including, without limitation, amounts in respect of:
 - (i) employment insurance,
 - (ii) Canada Pension Plan, and
 - (iv) income taxes,

but only where such statutory deemed trust amounts arise after the date of this Order, or are not required to be remitted until after the date of this Order, unless otherwise ordered by the Court;

- (b) all goods and services or other applicable sales taxes (collectively, "Sales Taxes") required to be remitted by the Applicant in connection with the sale of goods and services by the Applicant, but only where such Sales Taxes are accrued or collected after the date of this Order, or where such Sales Taxes were accrued or collected prior to the date of this Order but not required to be remitted until on or after the date of this Order; and
- (c) any amount payable to the Crown in Right of Canada or of any Province thereof or any political subdivision thereof or any other taxation authority in respect of municipal realty, municipal business or other taxes, assessments or levies of any nature or kind which are entitled at law to be paid in priority to claims of secured creditors and which are attributable to or in respect of the carrying on of the Business by the Applicant.

- 8. Until a real property lease is disclaimed or resiliated in accordance with the CCAA, the Applicant may pay all amounts constituting rent or payable as rent under real property leases (including, for greater certainty, common area maintenance charges, utilities and realty taxes and any other amounts payable as rent to the landlord under the lease) based on the terms of existing lease arrangements or as otherwise may be negotiated by the Applicant from time to time for the period commencing from and including the date of this Order ("Rent"), but shall not pay any rent in arrears.
- 9. Except as specifically permitted in this Order, the Applicant is hereby directed, until further order of this Court:
 - (a) to make no payments of principal, interest thereon or otherwise on account of amounts owing by the Applicant to any of its creditors as of the date of this Order;
 - (b) to grant no security interests, trust, liens, charges or encumbrances upon or in respect of any of its Property;
 - (c) not to grant credit or incur liabilities except in the ordinary course of the Business; and
 - (d) to make no payments of severance, termination, settlement or other similar amounts without prior consultation with CPPIB Credit and approval of the Monitor.
- 10. Notwithstanding paragraph 9 herein, the Applicant is authorized and directed to pay to CPPIB Credit interest and reasonable charges of CPPIB Credit's legal counsel and other consultants and advisors, arising both before and after the making of this Order, as and when the same become due and payable, in accordance with the Notes and the Note Indenture.
- 11. The Applicant shall, within two (2) business days of the date of this Order, make payment to CPPIB Credit of \$20,000,000 which CPPIB Credit shall apply in partial reduction of the principal indebtedness under the Note Obligations (as defined in the Indenture). For greater certainty, the foregoing sum shall not be applied to the Acceleration Payment Amount claimed in the Indenture trustee's Acceleration Notice and

Demand for Payment dated March 16, 2015. At the application to extend the initial Stay Period, the Applicant shall provide particulars of its calculation (which it shall not finalize until it has consulted with CPPIB Credit and with the Monitor), of cash available to partially repay the Note Obligations while still retaining sufficient cash-on-hand for the Applicant's forecasted funding needs (including an amount for contingencies), and shall seek authority and direction to pay such amount to CPPIB Credit.

RESTRUCTURING

- 12. The Applicant shall subject to such requirements as are imposed by the CCAA, and after consultation with CPPIB Credit and with the Monitor, have the right to:
 - (a) permanently or temporarily cease, downsize or shut down any of its business or operations and to dispose of redundant or non-material assets not exceeding \$500,000 in any one transaction or \$1,500,000 in the aggregate, provided that any sale that is either (i) in excess of the above thresholds, or (ii) in favour of a person related to the Applicant (within the meaning of section 36(5) of the CCAA), shall require authorization by this Court in accordance with section 36 of the CCAA;
 - (b) terminate the employment of such of its employees or temporarily lay off such of its employees as it deems appropriate on such terms as may be agreed upon between the Applicant and such employee, or failing such agreement, to deal with the consequences thereof in the Plan; and
 - (c) pursue all avenues of refinancing of its Business or Property, in whole or part, subject to prior approval of this Court being obtained before any material refinancing,

all of the foregoing to permit the Applicant to proceed with an orderly restructuring of the Business (the "Restructuring").

13. On or before April 7, 2015, the Applicant shall prepare, after consultation with CPPIB Credit and with the Monitor, a detailed cash flow forecast, in form and substance satisfactory to the Monitor (the "Cash Flow Forecast").

- 14. The Applicant shall provide each of the relevant landlords with notice of the Applicant's intention to remove any fixtures from any leased premises at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the intended removal. The relevant landlord shall be entitled to have a representative present in the leased premises to observe such removal. If the landlord disputes the Applicant's entitlement to remove any such fixture under the provisions of the lease, such fixture shall remain on the premises and shall be dealt with as agreed between any applicable secured creditors, such landlord and the Applicant, or by further order of this Court upon application by the Applicant on at least two (2) days' notice to such landlord and any such secured creditors. If the Applicant disclaims or resiliates the lease governing such leased premises in accordance with section 32 of the CAA, it shall not be required to pay Rent under such lease pending resolution of any such dispute (other than Rent payable for the notice period provided for in section 32(5) of the CCAA, and the disclaimer or resiliation of the lease shall be without prejudice to the Applicant's claim to the fixtures in dispute.
- 15. If a notice of disclaimer or resiliation is delivered pursuant to section 32 of the CCAA, then:
 - (a) during the notice period prior to the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the landlord may show the affected leased premises to prospective tenants during normal business hours, on giving the Applicant and the Monitor 24 hours' prior written notice; and
 - (b) at the effective time of the disclaimer or resiliation, the relevant landlord shall be entitled to take possession of any such leased premises without waiver of or prejudice to any claims or rights such landlord may have against the Applicant in respect of such lease or leased premises and such landlord shall be entitled to notify the Applicant of the basis on which it is taking possession and to gain possession of and re-lease such leased premises to any third party or parties on such terms as such landlord considers advisable, provided that nothing herein shall relieve such landlord of its obligation to mitigate any damages claimed in connection therewith.

- 16. Until and including April 24, 2015, or such later date as this Court may order (the "Stay Period"), no proceeding or enforcement process in any court (each, a "Proceeding") shall be commenced or continued against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, except with leave of this Court, and any and all Proceedings currently under way against or in respect of the Applicant or affecting the Business or the Property are hereby stayed and suspended pending further order of this Court. For greater certainty, during the Stay Period, the Applicant shall continue to grant access to CPPIB Credit in accordance with Section 4.20 of the Indenture and any demands by CPPIB Credit for such access (for itself or its designated financial advisor) shall not be deemed to be a Proceeding, as defined above.
- 17. During the initial Stay Period, the Applicant shall prepare its plan to raise capital to repay the balance of its indebtedness to CPPIB Credit (the "Capital Process"), but shall not finalize its intended Capital Process, without first consulting with CPPIB Credit and with the Monitor. The Applicant shall file an application to approve its Capital Process at the same time as it files any application to extend the initial Stay Period.

NO EXERCISE OF RIGHTS OR REMEDIES

- 18. During the Stay Period, all rights and remedies of any individual, firm, corporation, governmental body or agency, or any other entities (all of the foregoing, collectively being "Persons" and each being a "Person"), whether judicial or extra-judicial, statutory or non-statutory against or in respect of the Applicant or the Monitor, or affecting the Business or the Property, are hereby stayed and suspended and shall not be commenced, proceeded with or continued except with leave of this Court, provided that nothing in this Order shall:
 - (a) empower the Applicant to carry on any business which the Applicant is not lawfully entitled to carry on;
 - (b) affect such investigations, actions, suits or proceedings by a regulatory body as are permitted by section 11.1 of the CCAA;
 - (c) prevent the filing of any registration to preserve or perfect a security interest; or

- (d) prevent the registration of a claim for lien.
- 19. Nothing in this Order shall prevent any party from taking an action against the Applicant where such an action must be taken in order to comply with statutory time limitations in order to preserve their rights at law, provided that no further steps shall be taken by such party except in accordance with the other provisions of this Order, and notice in writing of such action be given to the Monitor at the first available opportunity.

NO INTERFERENCE WITH RIGHTS

20. During the Stay Period, no person shall accelerate, suspend, discontinue, fail to honour, alter, interfere with, repudiate, terminate or cease to perform any right, renewal right, contract, agreement, licence or permit in favour of or held by the Applicant, including, without limitation, any rights or remedies or provision that purports to effect or cause a cessation of operatorship, in any agreement, construction, ownership and operating agreement, joint venture agreement, including specifically the Joint Venture Agreement (the "OSUM JVA") dated June 1, 2006 with Oilsands Underground Mining Corp. and the 1990 CAPL Operating Procedure incorporated into the OSUM JVA, or any such similar agreements to which the Applicant is a party as a result of the occurrence of any default or non-performance by or the insolvency of the Applicant, the making or filing of these proceedings or any allegation, admission or evidence in these proceedings and under no circumstances shall the Applicant be replaced as operator pursuant to any such agreements, including the OSUM JVA, except with the written consent of the Applicant and the Monitor, or leave of this Court.

CONTINUATION OF SERVICES

- 21. During the Stay Period, all persons having:
 - (a) statutory or regulatory mandates for the supply of goods and/or services; or
 - (b) oral or written agreements or arrangements with the Applicant, including without limitation all computer software, communication and other data services, centralized banking services, payroll services, insurance, transportation, services, utility or other services to the Business or the Applicant

are hereby restrained until further Order of this Court from discontinuing, altering, interfering with, suspending or terminating the supply of such goods or services as may be required by the Applicant or exercising any other remedy provided under such agreements or arrangements. The Applicant shall be entitled to the continued use of its current premises, telephone numbers, facsimile numbers, internet addresses and domain names, provided in each case that the usual prices or charges for all such goods or services received after the date of this Order are paid by the Applicant in accordance with the payment practices of the Applicant, or such other practices as may be agreed upon by the supplier or service provider and each of the Applicant and the Monitor, or as may be ordered by this Court. Nothing in this Order has the effect of prohibiting a person from requiring immediate payment for goods, services, use of leased or licensed property or other valuable consideration provided on or after the date of this Order.

NO OBLIGATION TO ADVANCE MONEY OR EXTEND CREDIT

22. Notwithstanding anything else contained in this Order, no creditor of the Applicant shall be under any obligation on or after the date of this Order to advance or re-advance any monies or otherwise extend any credit to the Applicant.

PROCEEDINGS AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

23. During the Stay Period, and except as permitted by subsection 11.03(2) of the CCAA and paragraph 16 of this Order, no Proceeding may be commenced or continued against any of the former, current or future directors or officers of the Applicant with respect to any claim against the directors or officers that arose before the date hereof and that relates to any obligations of the Applicant whereby the directors or officers are alleged under any law to be liable in their capacity as directors or officers for the payment or performance of such obligations, until a compromise or arrangement in respect of the Applicant, if one is filed, is sanctioned by this Court or is refused by the creditors of the Applicant or this Court.

DIRECTORS' AND OFFICERS' INDEMNIFICATION

24. The Applicant shall indemnify its directors and officers against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as directors and or officers of the Applicant after the commencement

of the within proceedings except to the extent that, with respect to any officer or director, the obligation was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct.

APPOINTMENT OF MONITOR

- 25. PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc. is hereby appointed pursuant to the CCAA as the Monitor, an officer of this Court, to monitor the Property, Business and financial affairs and the Applicant with the powers and obligations set out in the CCAA or set forth herein and that the Applicant and its shareholders, officers, directors, and Assistants shall advise the Monitor of all material steps taken by the Applicant pursuant to this Order, and shall cooperate fully with the Monitor in the exercise of its powers and discharge of its obligations and provide the Monitor with the assistance that is necessary to enable the Monitor to adequately carry out the Monitor's functions.
- 26. The Monitor, in addition to its prescribed rights and obligations under the CCAA, is hereby directed and empowered to:
 - (a) monitor the Applicant's receipts and disbursements, Business and dealings with the Property;
 - (b) review the Applicant's expenditure reports on a weekly basis and report to CPPIB
 Credit, on a weekly basis, listing all variances against the Cash Flow Forecast and including an explanation of any material variances;
 - (c) report to this Court at such times and intervals as the Monitor may deem appropriate with respect to matters relating to the Property, the Business, and such other matters as may be relevant to the proceedings herein and immediately report to the Court if in the opinion of the Monitor there is a material adverse change in the financial circumstances of the Applicant;
 - (d) assist the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, in its dissemination of financial and other information which may be used in these proceedings;
 - (e) advise the Applicant in its preparation of the Applicant's cash flow statements;

- (f) advise the Applicant in its development of the Plan and any amendments to the Plan;
- (g) advise the Applicant, to the extent required by the Applicant, with the holding and administering of creditors' or shareholders' meetings for voting on the Plan;
- (h) have full and complete access to the Property, including the premises, books, records, data, including data in electronic form and other financial documents of the Applicant to the extent that is necessary to adequately assess the Applicant's Property, Business and financial affairs or to perform its duties arising under this Order;
- (i) be at liberty to engage independent legal counsel or such other persons as the Monitor deems necessary or advisable respecting the exercise of its powers and performance of its obligations under this Order;
- (j) hold funds in trust or in escrow, to the extent required, to facilitate settlements between the Applicant and any other Person;
- (k) respond to inquiries of CPPIB Credit (or its designated financial advisor) with respect to the CCAA proceedings with or without the presence or the consent of the Applicants, however copies of any written reports provided to CPPIB Credit by the Monitor shall be provided to the Applicant; and
- perform such other duties as are required by this Order or by this Court from time to time.
- 27. The Monitor shall not take possession of the Property and shall take no part whatsoever in the management or supervision of the management of the Business and shall not, by fulfilling its obligations hereunder, or by inadvertence in relation to the due exercise of powers or performance of duties under this Order, be deemed to have taken or maintain possession or control of the Business or Property, or any part thereof. Nothing in this Order shall require the Monitor to occupy or to take control, care, charge, possession or management of any of the Property that might be environmentally contaminated, or might cause or contribute to a spill, discharge, release or deposit of a substance contrary to any federal, provincial or other law respecting the protection, conservation,

enhancement, remediation or rehabilitation of the environment or relating to the disposal or waste or other contamination, provided however that this Order does not exempt the Monitor from any duty to report or make disclosure imposed by applicable environmental legislation.

- 28. The Monitor shall provide any creditor of the Applicant with information provided by the Applicant in response to reasonable requests for information made in writing by such creditor addressed to the Monitor. The Monitor shall not have any responsibility or liability with respect to the information disseminated by it pursuant to this paragraph. In the case of information that the Monitor has been advised by the Applicant is confidential, the Monitor shall not provide such information to creditors unless otherwise directed by this Court or on such terms as the Monitor and the Applicant may agree.
- 29. The Monitor shall incur no liability or obligation as a result of its appointment or the carrying out of the provisions of this Order, save and except for any gross negligence or wilful misconduct on its part. Nothing in this Order shall derogate from the protections afforded the Monitor by the CCAA or any applicable legislation.
- 30. The Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, independent counsel to the Applicant's Board of Directors, and counsel to the Applicant shall be paid their reasonable fees and disbursements, in each case at their standard rates and charges, by the Applicant as part of the costs of these proceedings. The Applicant is hereby authorized and directed to pay the accounts of the Monitor, counsel for the Monitor, and counsel for the Applicant on at least a monthly basis.
- 31. The Monitor and its legal counsel shall pass their accounts from time to time.
- 32. The Monitor, counsel to the Monitor, and the Applicant's counsel, as security for the professional fees and disbursements incurred both before and after the granting of this Order, shall be entitled to the benefits of and are hereby granted a charge (the "Administration Charge") on the Property, which charge shall not exceed an aggregate amount of \$750,000, as security for their professional fees and disbursements incurred at the normal rates and charges of the Monitor and such counsel, both before and after the

making of this order in respect of these proceedings. The Administration Charge shall have the priority set out in paragraphs 34 and 36 hereof.

INTERIM FINANCING

33. The Applicant has leave to apply hereafter for interim financing if it considers it advisable to do so, and is, but subject to the terms of the loan agreement, permitted to request advances under and utilize its \$15 million operating credit facility with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and is hereby authorized to pay and perform all of its indebtedness, interest, fees, liabilities and obligations to Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce under and pursuant to its loan agreement with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce as and when the same become due and are to be performed, notwithstanding any other provision of this Order.

VALIDITY AND PRIORITY OF ADMINISTRATION CHARGE

- 34. The Administration Charge shall have a first priority ranking (to the maximum amount of \$750,000).
- 35. The filing, registration or perfection of the Administration Charge shall not be required, and the Administration Charge shall be valid and enforceable for all purposes, including as against any right, title or interest filed, registered, recorded or perfected subsequent to the Administration Charge coming into existence, notwithstanding any such failure to file, register, record or perfect.
- 36. The Administration Charge shall constitute a charge on the Property and subject always to section 34(11) of the CCAA the Administration Charge shall rank in priority to all other security interests, trusts, liens, charges and encumbrances, claims of secured creditors, statutory or otherwise (collectively, "Encumbrances") in favour of any Person. Notwithstanding the above, the Administration Charge shall not rank in priority to the security held by Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.
- 37. Except as otherwise expressly provided for herein, or as may be approved by this Court, the Applicant shall not grant any Encumbrances over any Property that rank in priority to, or *pari passu* with either of the Administration Charge unless the Applicant also obtains

the prior written consent of the Monitor, the beneficiaries of the Administration Charge, and CPPIB Credit or further order of this Court.

- 38. The Administration Charge shall not be rendered invalid or unenforceable and the rights and remedies of the chargees entitled to the benefit of the Administration Charge (collectively, the "Chargees") thereunder shall not otherwise be limited or impaired in any way by:
 - (a) the pendency of these proceedings and the declarations of insolvency made in this Order;
 - (b) any application(s) for bankruptcy order(s) issued pursuant to the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (Canada) ("BIA"), or any bankruptcy order made pursuant to such applications;
 - (c) the filing of any assignments for the general benefit of creditors made pursuant to the BIA;
 - (d) the provisions of any federal or provincial statutes; or
 - (e) any negative covenants, prohibitions or other similar provisions with respect to borrowings, incurring debt or the creation of Encumbrances, contained in any existing loan documents, lease, sublease, offer to lease or other agreement (collectively, an "Agreement") which binds the Applicant, and notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any Agreement:
 - (i) neither the creation of the Administration Charge nor the execution, delivery, perfection, registration or performance of any documents in respect thereof shall create or be deemed to constitute a new breach by the Applicant of any Agreement to which it is a party;
 - (ii) none of the Chargees shall have any liability to any Person whatsoever as a result of any breach of any Agreement caused by or resulting from the creation of the Administration Charge; and
 - (iii) the payments made by the Applicant pursuant to this order, and the granting of the Administration Charge, do not and will not constitute

preferences, fraudulent conveyances, transfers at undervalue, oppressive conduct or other challengeable or voidable transactions under any applicable law.

ALLOCATION

39. Any interested Person may apply to this Court on notice to any other party likely to be affected, for an order to allocate the Administration Charge amongst the various assets comprising the Property.

KEY EMPLOYEE RETENTION PLAN

40. After consulting with CPPIB Credit and with the Monitor, the Applicant has leave to apply hereafter for the creation of a Key Employee Retention Plan for employees.

SERVICE AND NOTICE

- 41. The Monitor shall (i) without delay, publish in the Calgary Herald and the Globe and Mail a notice containing the information prescribed under the CCAA; (ii) within five (5) days after the date of this Order (A) make this Order publicly available in the manner prescribed under the CCAA, (B) send, in the prescribed manner, a notice to every known creditor who has a claim against the Applicant of more than \$1,000 and (C) prepare a list showing the names and addresses of those creditors and the estimated amounts of those claims, and make it publicly available in the prescribed manner, all in accordance with section 23(1)(a) of the CCAA and the regulations made thereunder.
- 42. The Applicant and the Monitor shall be at liberty to serve this Order, any other materials and orders in these proceedings, any notices or other correspondence, by forwarding true copies thereof by prepaid ordinary mail, courier, personal delivery, facsimile transmission or e-mail to the Applicant's creditors or other interested Persons at their respective addresses as last shown on the records of the Applicant and that any such service or notice by courier, personal delivery, facsimile transmission or e-mail shall be deemed to be received on the next business day following the date of forwarding thereof, or if sent by ordinary mail, on the third business day after mailing. The Monitor shall

establish and maintain a website in respect of these proceedings at <u>www.pwc.com/car-</u> laricing and shall post there as soon as practicable:

- (a) all materials prescribed by statue or regulation to be made publically available; and
- (b) all applications, reports, affidavits, orders or other materials filed in these proceedings by or behalf of the Monitor, or served upon it, except such materials as are confidential and the subject of a sealing order or pending application for a sealing order.

GENERAL

- 43. The Applicant or the Monitor may from time to time apply to this Court for advice and directions in the discharge of its powers and duties hereunder.
- 44. Notwithstanding Rule 6.11 of the *Alberta Rules of Court*, unless otherwise ordered by this Court, the Monitor will report to the Court from time to time, which reporting is not required to be in affidavit form and shall be considered by this Court as evidence.
- 45. Nothing in this Order shall prevent the Monitor from acting as an interim receiver, a receiver, a receiver and manager, or a trustee in bankruptcy of the Applicant, the Business or the Property.
- 46. This Court hereby requests the aid and recognition of any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body having jurisdiction in Canada or in the United States, to give effect to this Order and to assist the Applicant, the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order. All courts, tribunals, regulatory and administrative bodies are hereby respectfully requested to make such orders and to provide such assistance to the Applicant and to the Monitor, as an officer of this Court, as may be necessary or desirable to give effect to this Order, to grant representative status to the Monitor in any foreign proceeding, or to assist the Applicant and the Monitor and their respective agents in carrying out the terms of this Order.

- 47. Each of the Applicant and the Monitor be at liberty and is hereby authorized and empowered to apply to any court, tribunal, regulatory or administrative body, wherever located, for the recognition of this Order and for assistance in carrying out the terms of this Order and that the Monitor is authorized and empowered to act as a representative in respect of the within proceeding for the purpose of having these proceedings recognized in a jurisdiction outside Canada.
- 48. Any interested party (including the Applicant and the Monitor) may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than seven (7) days' notice to any other party or parties likely to be affected by the order sought or upon such other notice, if any, as this Court may order.
- 49. This Order and all of its provisions are effective as of 12:01 a.m. Mountain Standard Time on March 26, 2015.

Justice of the Court of Queen's Bench of Alberta

TAB 15

2009 CarswellOnt 1330 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 1330, [2009] O.J. No. 1044, 175 A.C.W.S. (3d) 965

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

And In the Matter of a plan of compromise or arrangement of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited, Nortel Networks Global Corporation, Nortel Networks International Corporation and Nortel Networks Technology Corporation (the "Applicants")

Application under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as amended

Morawetz J.

Heard: March 6, 2009 Judgment: March 12, 2009 Docket: 09-CL-7950, 09-CL-7951

Counsel: Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al
J. Pasquariello for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.
Jonathan Bell for Informal Group of Nortel Networks Noteholders
R. Moncur, M. Barrack for Flextronics
M. Starnino for Pension Benefits Guarantee Fund
Harvey Chaiton for IBM
D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.
Harvey Garman for U.K. Protection Fund, Nortel Networks UK Pension Trust Limited
Demtrios iokaris for Certain Former Salaried Employees of Nortel Networks
Alex MacFarlane for U.S. Unsecured Creditors' Committee

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act — Arrangements — Approval by court — "Fair and reasonable"

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (2002), 287 N.R. 203, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.) --- followed

2009 CarswellOnt 1330, [2009] O.J. No. 1044, 175 A.C.W.S. (3d) 965

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Generally — referred to

Morawetz J.:

1 This motion was heard on March 6, 2009 and the requested relief was granted, with brief reasons to follow.

At the outset of the Nortel proceedings on January 14, 2009, Mr. Tay, on behalf of Nortel Networks Corporation (the "Applicants or Nortel"), indicated that the Applicants would be seeking approval of a Key Employee Incentive Plan ("KEIP") and a Key Employee Retention Plan ("KERP"). Such approval was sought on this motion, together with a request to approve the Calgary Retention Plan (the "Calgary Retention Plan") providing for retention bonus payments promised to employees in connection with the closing of the Westwinds facility.

3 This motion was not opposed.

4 The record establishes that the commitment and retention of key employees will be essential to the execution of a restructuring of Nortel and the completion of a plan of arrangement.

5 The KEIP applies to certain executives of the Senior Leadership Team ("SLTs") and the Executive Leadership Team ("ELTs") and the KERP applies to certain other key employees.

6 The Monitor reports that these plans have been developed to incent those employees who are:

(i) absolutely key to the success of the restructuring; and

(ii) to remain with the Applicants and U.S. Debtors through to the completion of the Canadian and U.S. proceedings

7 In designing the plans, Nortel obtained independent advice from Mercer (U.S.) Inc. ("Mercer") which included benchmarking total direct compensation levels against industry standards in comparing other key employee incentive plans approved by the courts in recent comparable North American restructurings. In addition, the Monitor reports that Nortel's financial advisor, Lezard Fréres & Co., as well as the Monitor were consulted by Nortel throughout the development process with respect to the plans and have provided Nortel with appropriate input.

A total of 972 employees are eligible for the plans. This represents approximately 5% of Nortel's global workforce (excluding employees of the EMEA Filed Entities and the joint venturers). The KEIP covers 92 participants, of which, 29 are employed by the Applicants. The potential dollar value to be paid out under the KEIP is approximately \$23 million, of which \$6.8 million is allocated to the Canadian Applicants. With respect to the KERP, this plan covers 880 participants, of which 294 are employed by the Canadian Applicants. The total potential dollar value to be paid out under the KERP is approximately \$22 million, of which \$6.2 million is allocated to the Canadian Applicants.

9 The awards under both the KEIP and the KERP will vest based on the achievement of three milestones, namely, achievement of North American objectives; achievement of certain parameters that will result in a leaner and more focussed organization; and court-approved confirmation of a plan of restructuring.

10 The Unsecured Creditors' Committee ("UCC") in the Chapter 11 proceedings has indicated that it supports the plans, although such support with respect to the KEIP for the SLTs is conditional upon the delivery to the UCC of Nortel's 2009 financial projections.

2009 CarswellOnt 1330, [2009] O.J. No. 1044, 175 A.C.W.S. (3d) 965

11 Counsel to the Applicants advised that the U.S. Bankruptcy Court has approved the KEIP (except as it relates to the SLTs) and the KERP.

12 In order to maintain consistency between Canada and the U.S., the Applicants' motion to approve the KEIP excludes the SLTs. The Monitor reports that the Applicants have advised that they intend to request approval of the KEIP for the SLTs at a future date.

13 With respect to the Calgary Retention Plan, a decision was made in July 2008 to close the Westwinds facility and transfer R & D and global operations to other facilities over a period of 12 months. In July 2008, Nortel developed the Calgary Retention Plan that provided for retention payments to be made to those Westwinds facility employees who Nortel determined were critical to the successful shutdown of the facility. The Applicants have indicated that the maximum cost of the Calgary Retention Plan is estimated to be approximately \$727,000 to be paid to 45 employees at the time the employees have completed their portion of the project.

14 I am satisfied that the record establishes that the employees who are covered by the KEIP, the KERP and the Calgary Retention Plan are key to the operations of Nortel and are sought after by competitors, even given current market conditions.

15 The Monitor has reviewed the details of the Applicants proposed plans and Mercer's analysis and believes that the proposed plans provide reasonable compensation in the current situation.

16 Full details with respect to the plans are contained in the Confidential Report. I have reviewed this Report and agree with the submissions of both the Applicants and the Monitor that the Report contains sensitive commercial information that would be harmful to the Applicants if it were disclosed in the marketplace. In addition, the Confidential Report contains sensitive personal information relating to Nortel's employees, the disclosure of which, in my view, would be harmful.

17 The Applicants and the Monitor request that the Confidential Report be sealed, pending further order of the court. I am satisfied that the test for sealing the Confidential Report, as set out in *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522 (S.C.C.)has been satisfied and it is appropriate to grant the sealing order.

18 I have been satisfied that it is appropriate to approve the plans in question.

- 19 An order shall therefore issue approving:
 - (i) the KEIP except as it relates to the Applicants' employees whose are designated members of the SLT;
 - (ii) the KERP; and
 - (iii) the Calgary Retention Plan
- 20 An order shall issue sealing the Confidential Report pending further order of this court.

End of Document

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TAB 16

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO (COMMERCIAL LIST)

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INC., CINRAM INTERNATIONAL INCOME FUND, CII TRUST AND THE COMPANIES LISTED IN SCHEDULE "A", Applicants

BEFORE: MORAWETZ J.

COUNSEL: Robert J. Chadwick, Melaney Wagner and Caroline Descours, for the Applicants

Steven Golick, for Warner Electra-Atlantic Corp.

Steven Weisz, for Pre-Petition First Lien Agent, Pre-Petition Second Lien Agent and DIP Agent

Tracy Sandler, for Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation

David Byers, for the Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Inc.

HEARD & ENDORSED: JUNE 25, 2012

REASONS: JUNE 26, 2012

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Cinram International Inc. ("CII"), Cinram International Income Fund ("Cinram Fund"), CII Trust and the Companies listed in Schedule "A" (collectively, the "Applicants") brought this application seeking an initial order (the "Initial Order") pursuant to the *Companies' Creditors* Arrangement Act ("CCAA"). The Applicants also request that the court exercise its jurisdiction to extend a stay of proceedings and other benefits under the Initial Order to Cinram International Limited Partnership ("Cinram LP", collectively with the Applicants, the "CCAA Parties").

[2] Cinram Fund, together with its direct and indirect subsidiaries (collectively, "Cinram" or the "Cinram Group") is a replicator and distributor of CDs and DVDs. Cinram has a diversified operational footprint across North America and Europe that enables it to meet the replication and logistics demands of its customers.

[3] The evidentiary record establishes that Cinram has experienced significant declines in revenue and EBITDA, which, according to Cinram, are a result of the economic downturn in Cinram's primary markets of North America and Europe, which impacted consumers' discretionary spending and adversely affected the entire industry.

[4] Cinram advises that over the past several years it has continued to evaluate its strategic alternatives and rationalize its operating footprint in order to attempt to balance its ongoing operations and financial challenges with its existing debt levels. However, despite cost reductions and recapitalized initiatives and the implementation of a variety of restructuring alternatives, the Cinram Group has experienced a number of challenges that has led to it seeking protection under the CCAA.

- [5] Counsel to Cinram outlined the principal objectives of these CCAA proceedings as:
 - (i) to ensure the ongoing operations of the Cinram Group;
 - (ii) to ensure the CCAA Parties have the necessary availability of working capital funds to maximize the ongoing business of the Cinram Group for the benefit of its stakeholders; and
 - (iii) to complete the sale and transfer of substantially all of the Cinram Group's business as a going concern (the "Proposed Transaction").

[6] Cinram contemplates that these CCAA proceedings will be the primary court supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. Cinram has operations in the United States and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States. Cinram, however, takes the position that Canada is the nerve centre of the Cinram Group.

[7] The Applicants also seek authorization for Cinram International ULC ("Cinram ULC") to act as "foreign representative" in the within proceedings to seek a recognition order under Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code ("Chapter 15"). Cinram advises that the proceedings under Chapter 15 are intended to ensure that the CCAA Parties are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction to be undertaken pursuant to these CCAA proceedings.

[8] Counsel to the Applicants submits that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Cinram is one of the world's largest providers of pre-recorded multi-media products and related logistics services. It has facilities in North America and Europe, and it:

- (i) manufactures DVDs, blue ray disks and CDs, and provides distribution services for motion picture studios, music labels, video game publishers, computer software companies, telecommunication companies and retailers around the world;
- (ii) provides various digital media services through One K Studios, LLC; and
- (iii) provides retail inventory control and forecasting services through Cinram Retail Services LLC (collectively, the "Cinram Business").

[9] Cinram contemplates that the Proposed Transaction could allow it to restore itself as a market leader in the industry. Cinram takes the position that it requires CCAA protection to provide stability to its operations and to complete the Proposed Transaction.

[10] The Proposed Transaction has the support of the lenders forming the steering committee with respect to Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Steering Committee"), the members of which have been subject to confidentiality agreements and represent 40% of the loans under Cinram's First Lien Credit Facilities (the "Initial Consenting Lenders"). Cinram also anticipates further support of the Proposed Transaction from additional lenders under its credit facilities following the public announcement of the Proposed Transaction.

[11] Cinram Fund is the direct or indirect parent and sole shareholder of all of the subsidiaries in Cinram's corporate structure. A simplified corporate structure of the Cinram Group showing all of the CCAA Parties, including the designation of the CCAA Parties' business segments and certain non-filing entities, is set out in the Pre-Filing Report of FTI Consulting Inc. (the "Monitor") at paragraph 13. A copy is attached as Schedule "B".

[12] Cinram Fund, CII, Cinram International General Partner Inc. ("Cinram GP"), CII Trust, Cinram ULC and 1362806 Ontario Limited are the Canadian entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "Canadian Applicants"). Cinram Fund and CII Trust are both open-ended limited purpose trusts, established under the laws of Ontario, and each of the remaining Canadian Applicants is incorporated pursuant to Federal or Provincial legislation.

[13] Cinram (US) Holdings Inc. ("CUSH"), Cinram Inc., IHC Corporation ("IHC"), Cinram Manufacturing, LLC ("Cinram Manufacturing"), Cinram Distribution, LLC ("Cinram Distribution"), Cinram Wireless, LLC ("Cinram Wireless"), Cinram Retail Services, LLC ("Cinram Retail") and One K Studios, LLC ("One K") are the U.S. entities in the Cinram Group that are Applicants in these proceedings (collectively, the "U.S. Applicants"). Each of the U.S. Applicants is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, with the exception of One K, which is incorporated under the laws of California. On May 25, 2012, each of the U.S. Applicants opened a new Canadian-based bank account with J.P. Morgan.

[14] Cinram LP is not an Applicant in these proceedings. However, the Applicants seek to have a stay of proceedings and other relief under the CCAA extended to Cinram LP as it forms

part of Cinram's income trust structure with Cinram Fund, the ultimate parent of the Cinram Group.

[15] Cinram's European entities are not part of these proceedings and it is not intended that any insolvency proceedings will be commenced with respect to Cinram's European entities, except for Cinram Optical Discs SAC, which has commenced insolvency proceedings in France.

[16] The Cinram Group's principal source of long-term debt is the senior secured credit facilities provided under credit agreements known as the "First-Lien Credit Agreement" and the "Second-Lien Credit Agreement" (together with the First-Lien Credit Agreement, the "Credit Agreements").

[17] All of the CCAA Parties, with the exception of Cinram Fund, Cinram GP, CII Trust and Cinram LP (collectively, the "Fund Entities"), are borrowers and/or guarantors under the Credit Agreements. The obligations under the Credit Agreements are secured by substantially all of the assets of the Applicants and certain of their European subsidiaries.

[18] As at March 31, 2012, there was approximately \$233 million outstanding under the First-Lien Term Loan Facility; \$19 million outstanding under the First-Lien Revolving Credit Facilities; approximately \$12 million of letter of credit exposure under the First-Lien Credit Agreement; and approximately \$12 million outstanding under the Second-Lien Credit Agreement.

[19] Cinram advises that in light of the financial circumstances of the Cinram Group, it is not possible to obtain additional financing that could be used to repay the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

[20] Mr. John Bell, Chief Financial Officer of CII, stated in his affidavit that in connection with certain defaults under the Credit Agreements, a series of waivers was extended from December 2011 to June 30, 2012 and that upon expiry of the waivers, the lenders have the ability to demand immediate repayment of the outstanding amounts under the Credit Agreements and the borrowers and the other Applicants that are guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Mr. Bell further stated that there is no reasonable expectation that Cinram would be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012, fiscal 2013, and fiscal 2014. The cash flow forecast attached to his affidavit indicates that, without additional funding, the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

[21] The Applicants request a stay of proceedings. They take the position that in light of their financial circumstances, there could be a vast and significant erosion of value to the detriment of all stakeholders. In particular, the Applicants are concerned about the following risks, which, because of the integration of the Cinram business, also apply to the Applicants' subsidiaries, including Cinram LP:

- (a) the lenders demanding payment in full for money owing under the Credit Agreements;
- (b) potential termination of contracts by key suppliers; and
- (c) potential termination of contracts by customers.

[22] As indicated in the cash flow forecast, the Applicants do not have sufficient funds available to meet their immediate cash requirements as a result of their current liquidity challenges. Mr. Bell states in his affidavit that the Applicants require access to Debtor-In-Possession ("DIP") Financing in the amount of \$15 millions to continue operations while they implement their restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction. Cinram has negotiated a DIP Credit Agreement with the lenders forming the Steering Committee (the "DIP Lenders") through J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA as Administrative Agent (the "DIP Agent") whereby the DIP Lenders agree to provide the DIP Financing in the form of a term loan in the amount of \$15 million.

[23] The Applicants also indicate that during the course of the CCAA proceedings, the CCAA Parties intend to generally make payments to ensure their ongoing business operations for the benefit of their stakeholders, including obligations incurred prior to, on, or after the commencement of these proceedings relating to:

- (a) the active employment of employees in the ordinary course;
- (b) suppliers and service providers the CCAA Parties and the Monitor have determined to be critical to the continued operation of the Cinram business;
- (c) certain customer programs in place pursuant to existing contracts or arrangements with customers; and
- (d) inter-company payments among the CCAA Parties in respect of, among other things, shared services.

[24] Mr. Bell states that the ability to make these payments relating to critical suppliers and customer programs is subject to a consultation and approval process agreed to among the Monitor, the DIP Agent and the CCAA Parties.

[25] The Applicants also request an Administration Charge for the benefit of the Monitor and Moelis and Company, LLC ("Moelis"), an investment bank engaged to assist Cinram in a comprehensive and thorough review of its strategic alternatives.

[26] In addition, the directors (and in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, the Trustees, referred to collectively with the directors as the "Directors/Trustees") requested a Director's Charge to provide certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities. Mr. Bell states that in order to complete a successful restructuring, including the Proposed Transaction, the Applicants require the active and committed involvement of their

Directors/Trustees and officers. Further, Cinram's insurers have advised that if Cinram was to file for CCAA protection, and the insurers agreed to renew the existing D&O policies, there would be a significant increase in the premium for that insurance.

[27] Cinram has also developed a key employee retention program (the "KERP") with the principal purpose of providing an incentive for eligible employees, including eligible officers, to remain with the Cinram Group despite its financial difficulties. The KERP has been reviewed and approved by the Board of Trustees of the Cinram Fund. The KERP includes retention payments (the "KERP Retention Payments") to certain existing employees, including certain officers employed at Canadian and U.S. Entities, who are critical to the preservation of Cinram's enterprise value.

[28] Cinram also advises that on June 22, 2012, Cinram Fund, the borrowers under the Credit Agreements, and the Initial Consenting Lenders entered into a support agreement pursuant to which the Initial Consenting Lenders agreed to support the Proposed Transaction to be pursued through these CCAA proceedings (the "Support Agreement").

[29] Pursuant to the Support Agreement, lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement or Consent Agreement prior to July 10, 2012 (the "Consent Date") are entitled to receive consent consideration (the "Early Consent Consideration") equal to 4% of the principal amount of loans under the First-Lien Credit Agreement held by such consenting lenders as of the Consent Date, payable in cash from the net sale proceeds of the Proposed Transaction upon distribution of such proceeds in the CCAA proceedings.

[30] Mr. Bell states that it is contemplated that the CCAA proceedings will be the primary court-supervised restructuring of the CCAA Parties. He states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business in Canada, the United States and Europe that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally integrated in many significant respects. Mr. Bell further states that although Cinram has operations in the United States, and certain of the Applicants are incorporated under the laws of the United States, it is Ontario that is Cinram's home jurisdiction and the nerve centre of the CCAA Parties' management, business and operations.

[31] The CCAA Parties have advised that they will be seeking a recognition order under Chapter 15 to ensure that they are protected from creditor actions in the United States and to assist with the global implementation of the Proposed Transaction. Thus, the Applicants seek authorization in the Proposed Initial Order for:

Cinram ULC to seek recognition of these proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" and to seek such additional relief required in connection with the prosecution of any sale transaction, including the Proposed Transaction, as well as authorization for the Monitor, as a court-appointed officer, to assist the CCAA Parties with any matters relating to any of the CCAA Parties' subsidiaries and any foreign proceedings commenced in relation thereto. [32] Mr. Bell further states that the Monitor will be actively involved in assisting Cinram ULC as the foreign representative of the Applicants in the Chapter 15 proceedings and will assist in keeping this court informed of developments in the Chapter 15 proceedings.

[33] The facts relating to the CCAA Parties, the Cinram business, and the requested relief are fully set out in Mr. Bell's affidavit.

[34] Counsel to the Applicants filed a comprehensive factum in support of the requested relief in the Initial Order. Part III of the factum sets out the issues and the law.

[35] The relief requested in the form of the Initial Order is extensive. It goes beyond what this court usually considers on an initial hearing. However, in the circumstances of this case, I have been persuaded that the requested relief is appropriate.

[36] In making this determination, I have taken into account that the Applicants have spent a considerable period of time reviewing their alternatives and have done so in a consultative manner with their senior secured lenders. The senior secured lenders support this application, notwithstanding that it is clear that they will suffer a significant shortfall on their positions. It is also noted that the Early Consent Consideration will be available to lenders under the First-Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement prior to July 10, 2012. Thus, all of these lenders will have the opportunity to participate in this arrangement.

[37] As previously indicated, the Applicants' factum is comprehensive. The submissions on the law are extensive and cover all of the outstanding issues. It provides a fulsome review of the jurisprudence in the area, which for purposes of this application, I accept. For this reason, paragraphs 41-96 of the factum are attached as Schedule "C" for reference purposes.

[38] The Applicants have also requested that the confidential supplement – which contains the KERP summary listing the individual KERP Payments and certain DIP Schedules – be sealed. I am satisfied that the KERP summary contains individually identifiable information and compensation information, including sensitive salary information, about the individuals who are covered by the KERP and that the DIP schedules contain sensitive competitive information of the CCAA Parties which should also be treated as being confidential. Having considered the principals of *Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)*, (2002) 2 S.C.R. 522, I accept the Applicants' submission on this issue and grant the requested sealing order in respect of the confidential supplement.

[39] Finally, the Applicants have advised that they intend to proceed with a Chapter 15 application on June 26, 2012 before the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District of Delaware. I am given to understand that Cinram ULC, as proposed foreign representative, will be seeking recognition of the CCAA proceedings as "foreign main proceedings" on the basis that Ontario, Canada is the Centre of Main Interest or "COMI" of the CCAA Applicants.

[40] In his affidavit at paragraph 195, Mr. Bell states that the CCAA Parties are part of a consolidated business that is headquartered in Canada and operationally and functionally

integrated in many significant respects and that, as a result of the following factors, the Applicants submit the COMI of the CCAA Parties is Ontario, Canada:

- (a) the Cinram Group is managed on a consolidated basis out of the corporate headquarters in Toronto, Ontario, where corporate-level decision-making and corporate administrative functions are centralized;
- (b) key contracts, including, among others, major customer service agreements, are negotiated at the corporate level and created in Canada;
- (c) the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of CII, who are also directors, trustees and/or officers of other entities in the Cinram Group, are based in Canada;
- (d) meetings of the board of trustees and board of directors typically take place in Canada;
- (e) pricing decisions for entities in the Cinram Group are ultimately made by the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer in Toronto, Ontario;
- (f) cash management functions for Cinram's North American entities, including the administration of Cinram's accounts receivable and accounts payable, are managed from Cinram's head office in Toronto, Ontario;
- (g) although certain bookkeeping, invoicing and accounting functions are performed locally, corporate accounting, treasury, financial reporting, financial planning, tax planning and compliance, insurance procurement services and internal audits are managed at a consolidated level in Toronto, Ontario;
- (h) information technology, marketing, and real estate services are provided by CII at the head office in Toronto, Ontario;
- (i) with the exception of routine maintenance expenditures, all capital expenditure decisions affecting the Cinram Group are managed in Toronto, Ontario;
- (j) new business development initiatives are centralized and managed from Toronto, Ontario; and
- (k) research and development functions for the Cinram Group are corporate-level activities centralized at Toronto, Ontario, including the Cinram Group's corporate-level research and development budget and strategy.

[41] Counsel submits that the CCAA Parties are highly dependent upon the critical business functions performed on their behalf from Cinram's head office in Toronto and would not be able to function independently without significant disruptions to their operations.

[42] The above comments with respect to the COMI are provided for informational purposes only. This court clearly recognizes that it is the function of the receiving court – in this case, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware – to make the determination on the location of the COMI and to determine whether this CCAA proceeding is a "foreign main proceeding" for the purposes of Chapter 15.

[43] In the result, I am satisfied that the Applicants meet all of the qualifications established for relief under the CCAA and I have signed the Initial Order in the form submitted, which includes approvals of the Charges referenced in the Initial Order.

MORAWETZ J.

Date: June 26, 2012

SCHEDULE "A"

ADDITIONAL APPLICANTS

Cinram International General Partner Inc.

Cinram International ULC

1362806 Ontario Limited

Cinram (U.S.) Holdings Inc.

Cinram, Inc.

IHC Corporation

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Cinram Manufacturing LLC


Cinram Distribution LLC

Cinram Wireless LLC

Cinram Retail Services, LLC

One K Studios, LLC

SCHEDULE "B"



NULOUT

A. THE APPLICANTS ARE "DEBTOR COMPANIES" TO WHICH THE CCAA APPLIES

41. The CCAA applies in respect of a "debtor company" (including a foreign company having assets or doing business in Canada) or "affiliated debtor companies" where the total of claims against such company or companies exceeds \$5 million.

SCHEDULE "C"

CCAA, Section 3(1).

42. The Applicants are eligible for protection under the CCAA because each is a "debtor company" and the total of the claims against the Applicants exceeds \$5 million.

(1) The Applicants are Debtor Companies

43. The terms "company" and "debtor company" are defined in Section 2 of the CCAA as follows:

"company" means any company, corporation or legal person incorporated by or under an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of a province and any incorporated company having assets or doing business in Canada, wherever incorporated, and any income trust, but does not include banks, authorized foreign banks within the meaning of section 2 of the *Bank Act*, railway or telegraph companies, insurance companies and companies to which the *Trust and Loan Companies Act* applies.

"debtor company" means any company that:

(a) is bankrupt or insolvent;

(b) has committed an act of bankruptcy within the meaning of the *Bankruptcy* and *Insolvency Act* or is deemed insolvent within the meaning of the *Winding-Up* and *Restructuring Act*, whether or not proceedings in respect of the company have been taken under either of those Acts;

(c) has made an authorized assignment or against which a receiving order has been made under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*; or

(d) is in the course of being wound up under the *Winding-Up and Restructuring Act* because the company is insolvent.

CCAA, Section 2 ("company" and "debtor company").

44. The Applicants are debtor companies within the meaning of these definitions.

(2) The Applicants are "companies"

45. The Applicants are "companies" because:

- a. with respect to the Canadian Applicants, each is incorporated pursuant to federal or provincial legislation or, in the case of Cinram Fund and CII Trust, is an income trust; and
- b. with respect to the U.S. Applicants, each is an incorporated company with certain funds in bank accounts in Canada opened in May 2012 and therefore each is a company having assets or doing business in Canada.

Bell Affidavit at paras. 4, 80, 84, 86, 91, 94, 98, 102, 105, 108, 111, 114, 117, 120, 123, 212; Application Record, Tab 2.

46. The test for "having assets or doing business in Canada" is disjunctive, such that either "having assets" in Canada or "doing business in Canada" is sufficient to qualify an incorporated company as a "company" within the meaning of the CCAA.

47. Having only nominal assets in Canada, such as funds on deposit in a Canadian bank account, brings a foreign corporation within the definition of "company". In order to meet the threshold statutory requirements of the CCAA, an applicant need only be in technical compliance with the plain words of the CCAA.

Re Canwest Global Communications Corp. (2009), 59 C.B.R. (5th) 72 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 30 [*Canwest Global*]; Book of Authorities of the Applicants ("Book of Authorities"), Tab 1.

Re Global Light Telecommunications Ltd. (2004), 2 C.B.R. (5th) 210 (B.C.S.C.) at para. 17 [Global Light]; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

48. The Courts do not engage in a quantitative or qualitative analysis of the assets or the circumstances in which the assets were created. Accordingly, the use of "instant" transactions immediately preceding a CCAA application, such as the creation of "instant debts" or "instant assets" for the purposes of bringing an entity within the scope of the CCAA, has received judicial approval as a legitimate device to bring a debtor within technical requirements of the CCAA.

Global Light, supra at para. 17; Book of Authorities, Tab 2.

Re Cadillac Fairview Inc. (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 29 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paras. 5-6; Book of Authorities, Tab 3. Elan Corporation v. Comiskey (Trustee of) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 289 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 74, 83; Book of Authorities, Tab 4.

(3) The Applicants are insolvent

49. The Applicants are "debtor companies" as defined in the CCAA because they are companies (as set out above) and they are insolvent.

50. The insolvency of the debtor is assessed as of the time of filing the CCAA application. The CCAA does not define insolvency. Accordingly, in interpreting the meaning of "insolvent", courts have taken guidance from the definition of "insolvent person" in Section 2(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA"), which defines an "insolvent person" as a person (i) who is not bankrupt; and (ii) who resides, carries on business or has property in Canada; (iii) whose liabilities to creditors provable as claims under the BIA amount to one thousand dollars; and (iv) who is "insolvent" under one of the following tests:

- a. is for any reason unable to meet his obligations as they generally become due;
- b. has ceased paying his current obligations in the ordinary course of business as they generally become due; or
- c. the aggregate of his property is not, at a fair valuation, sufficient, or if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale under legal process, would not be sufficient to enable payment of all his obligations, due and accruing due.

BIA, Section 2 ("insolvent person").

Re Stelco Inc. (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.[Commercial List]); leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903; leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336, at para. 4 [*Stelco*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

51. These tests for insolvency are disjunctive. A company satisfying any one of these tests is considered insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA.

Stelco, supra at paras. 26 and 28; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

52. A company is also insolvent for the purposes of the CCAA if, at the time of filing, there is a reasonably foreseeable expectation that there is a looming liquidity condition or crisis that would result in the company being unable to pay its debts as they generally become due if a stay of proceedings and ancillary protection are not granted by the court.

Stelco, supra at para. 40; Book of Authorities, Tab 5.

53. The Applicants meet both the traditional test for insolvency under the BIA and the expanded test for insolvency based on a looming liquidity condition as a result of the following:

- a. The Applicants are unable to comply with certain financial covenants under the Credit Agreements and have entered into a series of waivers with their lenders from December 2011 to June 30, 2012.
- b. Were the Lenders to accelerate the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements, the Borrowers and the other Applicants that are Guarantors under the Credit Agreements would be unable to meet their debt obligations. Cinram Fund would be the ultimate parent of an insolvent business.
- d. The Applicants have been unable to repay or refinance the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements or find an out-of-court transaction for the sale of the Cinram Business with proceeds that equal or exceed the amounts owing under the Credit Agreements.

- e. Reduced revenues and EBITDA and increased borrowing costs have significantly impaired Cinram's ability to service its debt obligations. There is no reasonable expectation that Cinram will be able to service its debt load in the short to medium term given forecasted net revenues and EBITDA for the remainder of fiscal 2012 and for fiscal 2013 and 2014.
- f. The decline in revenues and EBITDA generated by the Cinram Business has caused the value of the Cinram Business to decline. As a result, the aggregate value of the Property, taken at fair value, is not sufficient to allow for payment of all of the Applicants' obligations due and accruing due.
- g. The Cash Flow Forecast indicates that without additional funding the Applicants will exhaust their available cash resources and will thus be unable to meet their obligations as they become due.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 23, 179-181, 183, 197-199; Application Record, Tab 2.

(4) The Applicants are affiliated companies with claims outstanding in excess of \$5 million

54. The Applicants are affiliated debtor companies with total claims exceeding 5 million dollars. Therefore, the CCAA applies to the Applicants in accordance with Section 3(1).

55. Affiliated companies are defined in Section 3(2) of the CCAA as follows:

- a. companies are affiliated companies if one of them is the subsidiary of the other or both are subsidiaries of the same company or each is controlled by the same person; and
- b. two companies are affiliated with the same company at the same time are deemed to be affiliated with each other.

CCAA, Section 3(2).

56. CII, CII Trust and all of the entities listed in Schedule "A" hereto are indirect, wholly owned subsidiaries of Cinram Fund; thus, the Applicants are "affiliated companies" for the purpose of the CCAA.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 3, 71; Application Record, Tab 2.

57. All of the CCAA Parties (except for the Fund Entities) are each a Borrower and/or Guarantor under the Credit Agreements. As at March 31, 2012 there was approximately \$252 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the First Lien Credit Agreement (plus approximately \$12 million in letter of credit exposure) and approximately \$12 million of aggregate principal amount outstanding under the Second Lien Credit Agreement. The total claims against the Applicants far exceed \$5 million.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 75; Application Record, Tab 2.

B. THE RELIEF IS AVAILABLE UNDER THE CCAA AND CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND POLICY OF THE CCAA

(1) The CCAA is Flexible, Remedial Legislation

58. The CCAA is remedial legislation, intended to facilitate compromises and arrangements between companies and their creditors as an alternative to bankruptcy. In particular during periods of financial hardship, debtors turn to the Court so that the Court may apply the CCAA in a flexible manner in order to accomplish the statute's goals. The Court should give the CCAA a broad and liberal interpretation so as to encourage and facilitate successful restructurings whenever possible.

Elan Corp. v. Comiskey, supra at paras. 22 and 56-60; Book of Authorities, Tab 4. *Re Lehndorff General Partners Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 at para. 5 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); Book of Authorities, Tab 6. *Re Chef Ready Foods Ltd; Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada* (1990), 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (B.C.C.A.) at pp. 4 and 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 7.

59. On numerous occasions, courts have held that Section 11 of the CCAA provides the courts with a broad and liberal power, which is at their disposal in order to achieve the overall

objective of the CCAA. Accordingly, an interpretation of the CCAA that facilitates restructurings accords with its purpose.

Re Sulphur Corporation of Canada Ltd. (2002), 35 C.B.R. (4th) 304 (Alta Q.B.) ("*Sulphur*") at para. 26; Book of Authorities, Tab 8.

60. Given the nature and purpose of the CCAA, this Honourable Court has the authority and jurisdiction to depart from the Model Order as is reasonable and necessary in order to achieve a successful restructuring.

(2) The Stay of Proceedings Against Non-Applicants is Appropriate

61. The relief sought in this application includes a stay of proceedings in favour of Cinram LP and the Applicants' direct and indirect subsidiaries that are also party to an agreement with an Applicant (whether as surety, guarantor or otherwise) (each, a "Subsidiary Counterparty"), including any contract or credit agreement. It is just and reasonable to grant the requested stay of proceedings because:

- a. the Cinram Business is integrated among the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties;
- b. if any proceedings were commenced against Cinram LP, or if any of the third parties to such agreements were to commence proceedings or exercise rights and remedies against the Subsidiary Counterparties, this would have a detrimental effect on the Applicants' ability to restructure and implement the Proposed Transaction and would lead to an erosion of value of the Cinram Business; and
- c. a stay of proceedings that extends to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties is necessary in order to maintain stability with respect to the Cinram Business and maintain value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 185-186; Application Record, Tab 2.

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62. The purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the *status quo* to enable a plan of compromise to be prepared, filed and considered by the creditors:

In the interim, a judge has great discretion under the CCAA to make order so as to effectively maintain the status quo in respect of an insolvent company while it attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for the proposed compromise or arrangement which will be to the benefit of both the company and its creditors.

Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re, supra at para. 5; Book of Authorities, Tab 6. Canwest Global, supra at para. 27; Book of Authorities, Tab 1. CCAA, Section 11.

63. The Court has broad inherent jurisdiction to impose stays of proceedings that supplement the statutory provisions of Section 11 of the CCAA, providing the Court with the power to grant a stay of proceedings where it is just and reasonable to do so, including with respect to non-applicant parties.

Lehndorff, supra at paras. 5 and 16; Book of Authorities, Tab 6. T. Eaton Co., Re (1997), 46 C.B.R. (3d) 293 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 6; Book of Authorities, Tab 9.

64. The Courts have found it just and reasonable to grant a stay of proceedings against third party non-applicants in a number of circumstances, including:

a. where it is important to the reorganization process;

- b. where the business operations of the Applicants and the third party non-applicants are intertwined and the third parties are not subject to the jurisdiction of the CCAA, such as partnerships that do not qualify as "companies" within the meaning of the CCAA;
- c. against non-applicant subsidiaries of a debtor company where such subsidiaries were guarantors under the note indentures issued by the debtor company; and

d. against non-applicant subsidiaries relating to any guarantee, contribution or indemnity obligation, liability or claim in respect of obligations and claims against the debtor companies.

Re Woodward's Ltd. (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 236 (B.C. S.C.) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 10.
Lehndorff, supra at para. 21; Book of Authorities, Tab 6.
Canwest Global, supra at paras. 28 and 29; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.
Re Sino-Forest Corp. 2012 ONSC 2063 (Commercial List) at paras. 5, 18, and 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 11.
Re MAAX Corp, Initial Order granted June 12, 2008, Montreal 500-11-033561-081, (Que. Sup. Ct. [Commercial Division]) at para. 7; Book of Authorities, Tab 12.

65. The Applicants submit the balance of convenience favours extending the relief in the proposed Initial Order to Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties. The business operations of the Applicants, Cinram LP and the Subsidiary Counterparties are intertwined and the stay of proceedings is necessary to maintain stability and value for the benefit of the Applicants' stakeholders, as well as allow an orderly, going-concern sale of the Cinram Business as an important component of its reorganization process.

(3) Entitlement to Make Pre-Filing Payments

66. To ensure the continued operation of the CCAA Parties' business and maximization of value in the interests of Cinram's stakeholders, the Applicants seek authorization (but not a requirement) for the CCAA Parties to make certain pre-filing payments, including: (a) payments to employees in respect of wages, benefits, and related amounts; (b) payments to suppliers and service providers critical to the ongoing operation of the business; (c) payments and the application of credits in connection with certain existing customer programs; and (d) intercompany payments among the Applicants related to intercompany loans and shared services. Payments will be made with the consent of the Monitor and, in certain circumstances, with the consent of the Agent.

67. There is ample authority supporting the Court's general jurisdiction to permit payment of pre-filing obligations to persons whose services are critical to the ongoing operations of the debtor companies. This jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by Section 11.4 of the CCAA, which became effective as part of the 2009 amendments to the CCAA and codified the Court's

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practice of declaring a person to be a critical supplier and granting a charge on the debtor's property in favour of such critical supplier. As noted by Pepall J. in *Re Canwest Global*, the recent amendments, including Section 11.4, do not detract from the inherently flexible nature of the CCAA or the Court's broad and inherent jurisdiction to make such orders that will facilitate the debtor's restructuring of its business as a going concern.

Canwest Global supra, at paras. 41 and 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1.

68. There are many cases since the 2009 amendments where the Courts have authorized the applicants to pay certain pre-filing amounts where the applicants were not seeking a charge in respect of critical suppliers. In granting this authority, the Courts considered a number of factors, including:

- a. whether the goods and services were integral to the business of the applicants;
- b. the applicants' dependency on the uninterrupted supply of the goods or services;
- c. the fact that no payments would be made without the consent of the Monitor;
- d. the Monitor's support and willingness to work with the applicants to ensure that payments to suppliers in respect of pre-filing liabilities are minimized;
- e. whether the applicants had sufficient inventory of the goods on hand to meet their needs; and
- f. the effect on the debtors' ongoing operations and ability to restructure if they were unable to make pre-filing payments to their critical suppliers.

Canwest Global supra, at para. 43; Book of Authorities, Tab 1. *Re Brainhunter Inc.*, [2009] O.J. No. 5207 (Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 21 [*Brainhunter*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 13. *Re Priszm Income Fund* (2012), 75 C.B.R. (5th) 213 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) at paras. 29-34; Book of Authorities, Tab 14.

69. The CCAA Parties rely on the efficient and expedited supply of products and services from their suppliers and service providers in order to ensure that their operations continue in an

efficient manner so that they can satisfy customer requirements. The CCAA Parties operate in a highly competitive environment where the timely provision of their products and services is essential in order for the company to remain a successful player in the industry and to ensure the continuance of the Cinram Business. The CCAA Parties require flexibility to ensure adequate and timely supply of required products and to attempt to obtain and negotiate credit terms with its suppliers and service providers. In order to accomplish this, the CCAA Parties require the ability to pay certain pre-filing amounts and post-filing payables to those suppliers they consider essential to the Cinram Business, as approved by the Monitor. The Monitor, in determining whether to approve pre-filing payments as critical to the ongoing business operations, will consider various factors, including the above factors derived from the caselaw.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 226, 228, 230; Application Record, Tab 2.

70. In addition, the CCAA Parties' continued compliance with their existing customer programs, as described in the Bell Affidavit, including the payment of certain pre-filing amounts owing under certain customer programs and the application of certain credits granted to customers pre-filing to post-filing receivables, is essential in order for the CCAA Parties to maintain their customer relationships as part of the CCAA Parties' going concern business.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 234; Application Record, Tab 2.

71. Further, due to the operational integration of the businesses of the CCAA Parties, as described above, there is a significant volume of financial transactions between and among the Applicants, including, among others, charges by an Applicant providing shared services to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of those services, and charges by a Applicant that manufactures and furnishes products to another Applicant of intercompany accounts due from the recipients of the provident of intercompany accounts due form the recipients of the products of the pr

Bell Affidavit, paras. 225; Application Record, Tab 2.

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72. Accordingly, the Applicants submit that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the CCAA Parties the authority to make the pre-filing payments described in the proposed Initial Order subject to the terms therein.

(4) The Charges Are Appropriate

73. The Applicants seek approval of certain Court-ordered charges over their assets relating to their DIP Financing (defined below), administrative costs, indemnification of their trustees, directors and officers, KERP and Support Agreement. The Lenders and the Administrative Agent under the Credit Agreements, the senior secured facilities that will be primed by the charges, have been provided with notice of the within Application. The proposed Initial Order does not purport to give the Court-ordered charges priority over any other validly perfected security interests.

(A) DIP Lenders' Charge

74. In the proposed Initial Order, the Applicants seek approval of the DIP Credit Agreement providing a debtor-in-possession term facility in the principal amount of \$15 million (the "DIP Financing"), to be secured by a charge over all of the assets and property of the Applicants that are Borrowers and/or Guarantors under the Credit Agreements (the "Charged Property") ranking ahead of all other charges except the Administration Charge.

75. Section 11.2 of the CCAA expressly provides the Court the statutory jurisdiction to grant a debtor-in-possession ("DIP") financing charge:

11.2(1) Interim financing - On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, a court may make an order declaring that all or part of the company's property is subject to a security or charge — in an amount that the court considers appropriate — in favour of a person specified in the order who agrees to lend to the company an amount approved by the court as being required by the company, having regard to its cash-flow statement. The security or charge may not secure an obligation that exists before the order is made.

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11.2(2) *Priority* – secured creditors – The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

Re Timminco Ltd. (2012), 211 A.C.W.S. (3d) 881(Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at para. 31; Book of Authorities, Tab 15. CCAA, Section 11.2(1) and (2).

76. Section 11.2 of the CCAA sets out the following factors to be considered by the Court in deciding whether to grant a DIP financing charge:

11.2(4) Factors to be considered - In deciding whether to make an order, the court is to consider, among other things,

(a) the period during which the company is expected to be subject to proceedings under this Act;

(b) how the company's business and financial affairs are to be managed during the proceedings;

(c) whether the company's management has the confidence of its major creditors;

(d) whether the loan would enhance the prospects of a viable compromise or arrangement being made in respect of the company;

(e) the nature and value of the company's property;

(f) whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced as a result of the security or charge; and

(g) the monitor's report referred to in paragraph 23(1)(b), if any.

CCAA, Section 11.2(4).

77. The above list of factors is not exhaustive, and it may be appropriate for the Court to consider additional factors in determining whether to grant a DIP financing charge. For example, in circumstances where funds to be borrowed pursuant to a DIP facility were not expected to be immediately necessary, but applicants' cash flow statements projected the need for additional liquidity, the Court in granting the requested DIP charge considered the fact that the applicants' ability to borrows funds that would be secured by a charge would help retain the confidence of their trade creditors, employees and suppliers.

Re Canwest Publishing Inc./Publications Canwest Inc. (2010), 63 C.B.R. (5th) 115 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 42-43 [*Canwest Publishing*]; Book of Authorities, Tab 16.

78. Courts in recent cross-border cases have exercised their broad power to grant charges to DIP lenders over the assets of foreign applicants. In many of these cases, the debtors have commenced recognition proceedings under Chapter 15.

Re Catalyst Paper Corporation, Initial Order granted on January 31, 2012, Court File No. S-120712 (B.C.S.C.) [Catalyst Paper]; Book of Authorities, Tab 17. Angiotech, supra, Initial Order granted on January 28, 2011, Court File No. S-110587; Book of Authorities, Tab 18 Re Fraser Papers Inc., Initial Order granted on June 18, 2009, Court File No. CV-09-8241-00CL; Book of Authorities, Tab 19.

79. As noted above, pursuant to Section 11.2(1) of the CCAA, a DIP financing charge may not secure an obligation that existed before the order was made. The requested DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations.

80. The following factors support the granting of the DIP Lenders' Charge, many of which incorporate the considerations enumerated in Section 11.2(4) listed above:

a. the Cash Flow Forecast indicates the Applicants will need additional liquidity afforded by the DIP Financing in order to continue operations through the duration of these proposed CCAA Proceedings;

- b. the Cinram Business is intended to continue to operate on a going concern basis during these CCAA Proceedings under the direction of the current management with the assistance of the Applicants' advisors and the Monitor;
- c. the DIP Financing is expected to provide the Applicants with sufficient liquidity to implement the Proposed Transaction through these CCAA Proceedings and implement certain operational restructuring initiatives, which will materially enhance the likelihood of a going concern outcome for the Cinram Business;
- d. the nature and the value of the Applicants' assets as set out in their consolidated financial statements can support the requested DIP Lenders' Charge;
- e. members of the Steering Committee under the First Lien Credit Agreement, who are senior secured creditors of the Applicants, have agreed to provide the DIP Financing;
- f. the proposed DIP Lenders have indicated that they will not provide the DIP Financing if the DIP Lenders' Charge is not approved;
- g. the DIP Lenders' Charge will not secure any pre-filing obligations;
- h. the senior secured lenders under the Credit Agreements affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and
- i. the proposed Monitor is supportive of the DIP Facility, including the DIP Lenders' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 199-202, 205-208; Application Record, Tab 2.

(B) Administration Charge

81. The Applicants seek a charge over the Charged Property in the amount of CAD\$3.5 million to secure the fees of the Monitor and its counsel, the Applicants' Canadian and U.S. counsel, the Applicants' Investment Banker, the Canadian and U.S. Counsel to the DIP Agent,

the DIP Lenders, the Administrative Agent and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements, and the financial advisor to the DIP Lenders and the Lenders under the Credit Agreements (the "Administration Charge"). This charge is to rank in priority to all of the other charges set out in the proposed Initial Order.

82. Prior to the 2009 amendments, administration charges were granted pursuant to the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Section 11.52 of the CCAA now expressly provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an administration charge:

11.52(1) Court may order security or charge to cover certain costs On notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge, the court may make an order declaring that all or part of the property of a debtor company is subject to a security or charge -- in an amount that the court considers appropriate - in respect of the fees and expenses of (a) the monitor, including the fees and expenses of any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the monitor in the performance of the monitor's duties;

(b) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by the company for the purpose of proceedings under this Act; and

(c) any financial, legal or other experts engaged by any other interested person if the court is satisfied that the security or charge is necessary for their effective participation in proceedings under this Act.

11.52(2) *Priority*

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditor of the company.

CCAA, Section 11.52(1) and (2).

82. Administration charges were granted pursuant to Section 11.52 in, among other cases, *Timminco, Canwest Global* and *Canwest Publishing*.

Canwest Global, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 1. Canwest Publishing, supra; Book of Authorities, Tab 16. Re Timminco Ltd., 2012 ONSC 106 (Commercial List) [Timminco]; Book of Authorities, Tab 20. 84. In *Canwest Publishing*, the Court noted Section 11.52 does not contain any specific criteria for a court to consider in granting an administration charge and provided a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in making such an assessment. These factors were also considered by the Court in *Timminco*. The list of factors to consider in approving an administration charge include:

- a. the size and complexity of the business being restructured;
- b. the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge;
- c. whether there is unwarranted duplication of roles;
- d. whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable;
- e. the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge; and
- f. the position of the Monitor.

Canwest Publishing supra, at para. 54; Book of Authorities, Tab 16. Timminco, supra, at paras. 26-29; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

85. The Applicants submit that the Administration Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Administration Charge, given:

- a. the proposed restructuring of the Cinram Business is large and complex, spanning several jurisdictions across North America and Europe, and will require the extensive involvement of professional advisors;
- b. the professionals that are to be beneficiaries of the Administration Charge have each played a critical role in the CCAA Parties' restructuring efforts to date and will continue to be pivotal to the CCAA Parties' ability to pursue a successful restructuring going forward, including the Investment Banker's involvement in the completion of the Proposed Transaction;

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- c. there is no unwarranted duplication of roles;
- d. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA Proceedings; and
- e. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Administration Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 188, 190; Application Record, Tab 2.

(C) Directors' Charge

86. The Applicants seek a Directors' Charge in an amount of CAD\$13 over the Charged Property to secure their respective indemnification obligations for liabilities imposed on the Applicants' trustees, directors and officers (the "Directors and Officers"). The Directors' Charge is to be subordinate to the Administration Charge and the DIP Lenders' Charge but in priority to the KERP Charge and the Consent Consideration Charge.

87. Section 11.51 of the CCAA affords the Court the jurisdiction to grant a charge relating to directors' and officers' indemnification on a priority basis:

11.51(1) Security or charge relating to director's indemnification On application by a debtor company and on notice to the secured creditors who are likely to be affected by the security or charge -in an amount that the court considers appropriate -- in favour of any director or officer of the company to indemnify the director or officer against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director or officer of the company after the commencement of proceedings under this Act.

11.51(2) *Priority*

The court may order that the security or charge rank in priority over the claim of any secured creditors of the company

11.51(3) *Restriction* -- indemnification insurance The court may not make the order if in its opinion the company could obtain adequate indemnification insurance for the director or officer at a reasonable cost.

11.51(4) *Negligence, misconduct or fault* The court shall make an order declaring that the security or charge does not apply in respect of a specific obligation or liability incurred by a director or officer if in its opinion the obligation or liability was incurred as a result of the director's or officer's gross negligence or wilful misconduct or, in Quebec, the director's or officer's gross or intentional fault.

CCAA, Section 11.51.

88. The Court has granted director and officer charges pursuant to Section 11.51 in a number of cases. In *Canwest Global*, the Court outlined the test for granting such a charge:

I have already addressed the issue of notice to affected secured creditors. I must also be satisfied with the amount and that the charge is for obligations and liabilities the directors and officers may incur after the commencement of proceedings. It is not to extend to coverage of wilful misconduct or gross negligence and no order should be granted if adequate insurance at a reasonable cost could be obtained.

Canwest Global, supra at paras 46-48; Book of Authorities, Tab 1. *Canwest Publishing, supra* at paras. 56-57; Book of Authorities, Tab 16. *Timminco, supra* at paras. 30-36; Book of Authorities, Tab 20.

89. The Applicants submit that the D&O Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the D&O Charge in the amount of CAD\$13 million, given:

- a. the Directors and Officers of the Applicants may be subject to potential liabilities in connection with these CCAA proceedings with respect to which the Directors and Officers have expressed their desire for certainty with respect to potential personal liability if they continue in their current capacities;
- b. renewal of coverage to protect the Directors and Officers is at a significantly increased cost due to the imminent commencement of these CCAA proceedings;
- c. the Directors' Charge would cover obligations and liabilities that the Directors and Officers, as applicable, may incur after the commencement of these CCAA Proceedings and is not intended to cover wilful misconduct or gross negligence;

- d. the Applicants require the continued support and involvement of their Directors and Officers who have been instrumental in the restructuring efforts of the CCAA Parties to date;
- e. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and

f. the Monitor is in support of the proposed Directors' Charge.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 249, 250, 254-257 ; Application Record, Tab 2.

(D) KERP Charge

90. The Applicants seek a KERP Charge in an amount of CAD\$3 million over the Charged Property to secure the KERP Retention Payments, KERP Transaction Payments and Aurora KERP Payments payable to certain key employees of the CCAA Parties crucial for the CCAA Parties' successful restructuring.

91. The CCAA is silent with respect to the granting of KERP charges. Approval of a KERP and a KERP charge are matters within the discretion of the Court. The Court in *Re Grant Forest Products Inc.* considered a number of factors in determining whether to grant a KERP and a KERP charge, including:

- a. whether the Monitor supports the KERP agreement and charge (to which great weight was attributed);
- b. whether the employees to which the KERP applies would consider other employment options if the KERP agreement were not secured by the KERP charge;
- c. whether the continued employment of the employees to which the KERP applies is important for the stability of the business and to enhance the effectiveness of the marketing process;

- d. the employees' history with and knowledge of the debtor;
- e. the difficulty in finding a replacement to fulfill the responsibilities of the employees to which the KERP applies;
- f. whether the KERP agreement and charge were approved by the board of directors, including the independent directors, as the business judgment of the board should not be ignored;
- g. whether the KERP agreement and charge are supported or consented to by secured creditors of the debtor; and
- h. whether the payments under the KERP are payable upon the completion of the restructuring process.

Re Grant Forest Products Inc. (2009), 57 C.B.R. (5th) 128 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J [Commercial List]) at para. 8-24 [Grant Forest]; Book of Authorities, Tab 21. Canwest Publishing supra, at paras 59; Book of Authorities, Tab 16. Canwest Global supra, at para. 49; Book of Authorities, Tab 1. Re Timminco Ltd. (2012), 95 C.C.P.B. 48 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J [Commercial List]) at paras. 72-75; Book of Authorities, Tab 22.

92. The purpose of a KERP arrangement is to retain key personnel for the duration of the debtor's restructuring process and it is logical for compensation under a KERP arrangement to be deferred until after the restructuring process has been completed, with "staged bonuses" being acceptable. KERP arrangements that do not defer retention payments to completion of the restructuring may also be just and fair in the circumstances.

Grant Forest, supra at para. 22-23; Book of Authorities, Tab 21.

93. The Applicants submit that the KERP Charge is warranted and necessary, and that it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the KERP Charge in the amount of CAD\$3 million, given:

a. the KERP was developed by Cinram with the principal purpose of providing an incentive to the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers, and the Aurora

Employees to remain with the Cinram Group while the company pursued its restructuring efforts;

- b. the Eligible Employees and the Eligible Officers are essential for a restructuring of the Cinram Group and the preservation of Cinram's value during the restructuring process;
- c. the Aurora Employees are essential for an orderly transition of Cinram Distribution's business operations from the Aurora facility to its Nashville facility;
- d. it would be detrimental to the restructuring process if Cinram were required to find replacements for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and/or the Aurora Employees during this critical period;
- e. the KERP, including the KERP Retention Payments, the KERP Transaction Payments and the Aurora KERP Payments payable thereunder, not only provides appropriate incentives for the Eligible Employees, the Eligible Officers and the Aurora Employees to remain in their current positions, but also ensures that they are properly compensated for their assistance in Cinram's restructuring process;
- f. the senior secured creditors affected by the charge have been provided with notice of these CCAA proceedings; and
- g. the KERP has been reviewed and approved by the board of trustees of Cinram Fund and is supported by the Monitor.

Bell Affidavit, paras. 236-239, 245-247; Application Record, Tab 2.

(E) Consent Consideration Charge

94. The Applicants request the Consent Consideration Charge over the Charged Property to secure the Early Consent Consideration. The Consent Consideration Charge is to be subordinate

in priority to the Administration Charge, the DIP Lenders' Charge, the Directors' Charge and the KERP Charge.

95. The Courts have permitted the opportunity to receive consideration for early consent to a restructuring transaction in the context of CCAA proceedings payable upon implementation of such restructuring transaction. In *Sino-Forest*, the Court ordered that any noteholder wishing to become a consenting noteholder under the support agreement and entitled to early consent consideration was required to execute a joinder agreement to the support agreement prior to the applicable consent deadline. Similarly, in these proceedings, lenders under the First Lien Credit Agreement who execute the Support Agreement (or a joinder thereto) and thereby agree to support the Proposed Transaction on or before July 10, 2012, are entitled to Early Consent Consideration earned on consummation of the Proposed Transaction to be paid from the net sale proceeds.

Sino-Forest, supra, Initial Order granted on March 30, 2012, Court File No. CV-12-9667-00CL at para. 15; Book of Authorities, Tab 23. Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

96. The Applicants submit it is appropriate in the present circumstances for this Honourable Court to exercise its jurisdiction and grant the Consent Consideration Charge, given:

- a. the Proposed Transaction will enable the Cinram Business to continue as a going concern and return to a market leader in the industry;
- b. Consenting Lenders are only entitled to the Early Consent Consideration if the Proposed Transaction is consummated; and
- c. the Early Consent Consideration is to be paid from the net sale proceeds upon distribution of same in these proceedings.

Bell Affidavit, para. 176; Application Record, Tab 2.

TAB 17

COURT FILE NO.: CV-09-7966-00CL DATE: 2009-01-27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

COMMERCIAL LIST

- RE: In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc. and others
- BEFORE: Pepall, J.
- COUNSEL: Sean F. Dunphy and Alexander D. Rose for the Applicants Robert J. Chadwick and Christopher G. Armstrong for the Proposed Monitor Susan Grundy for the DIP Lenders

ENDORSEMENT

[1] Smurfit-Stone Container Canada Inc. ("SSC Canada"), Stone Container Finance Company of Canada II, MBI Limited, 3083527 Nova Scotia Company, BC Shipper Supplies Ltd., Specialty Containers Inc., 639647 British Columbia Limited, 605681 N.B. Inc. Canada, and Francobec Company (the "Applicants") seek relief under the CCAA. They also request that the terms of the Initial CCAA order apply to two Canadian partnerships affiliated with the Applicants, namely Smurfit-MBI and SLP Finance General Partnership (the "CCAA Entities"). Each of these CCAA Entities has filed for Chapter 11 protection in the U.S. Deloitte and Touche Inc. has consented to act as Monitor in the CCAA proceedings.

[2] On January 26, 2009, Smurfit-Stone Container Corporation ("Smurfit-Stone") and certain of its affiliates including SSC Canada commenced Chapter 11 proceedings in the U.S. Smurfit-Stone is based in St. Louis, Missouri and in Chicago, Illinois. It is a leading North American producer of paperboard products, market pulp, corrugated containers and other

specialty packaging products. It is also one of the world's biggest recyclers of paper. It currently holds approximately 18% of the North American container board market. Its operations have been negatively affected by the global economic downturn, the decrease in consumer spending, the manufacturing exodus from North America, a rise in costs, and a general market shift away from paper-based packaging. It has numerous direct and indirect subsidiaries.

[3] SSC Canada and Smurfit-MBI, an Ontario limited partnership, are its principal Canadian operating entities. SSC Canada operates mills and plants producing liner board, corrugating medium and food board. Smurfit-MBI is a converting operation that produces corrugated containers using liner board from the mills. Its general partner is MBI Limited which carries on no business other than acting as Smurfit-MBI's general partner and has no assets other than its interest in Smurfit-MBI.

[4] 3083527 Nova Scotia Company is wholly-owned by SSC Canada. It does not carry on business except that it is one of the two Smurfit-MBI limited partners (the other being SSC Canada). BC Shipper Supplies Ltd. is no longer active. Specialty Containers Inc.'s assets were all sold in 2008. 639647 British Columbia Limited has no operations and holds the shares of BC Shippers Supplies Ltd. and Specialty Containers Inc.

[5] SLP Finance General Partnership is owned by two Delaware companies. It does not carry on operations but owns the shares of 605681 N. B. Inc. which was liquidated in 2005 and of Francobec Company, a Nova Scotia company which previously operated a hardwood chipping facility which is now inactive. It has US\$574 million in investment assets.

[6] Stone Container Finance Company of Canada II does not carry on business except that it issued notes, the proceeds of which were remitted to SSC Canada. It has assets of US\$62 million and liabilities of US\$207 million. Collectively all of these companies and partnerships are referred to as the CCAA Entities. [7] The CCAA Entities employ approximately 2,600 people across Canada many of whom are unionized.

[8] Smurfit-Stone operates as a North American company rather than as a collection of individual business units. The U.S. and Canadian operations are fully integrated. In this regard, they have a centralized cash management system. All high level management decisions are made by a U.S. management team and it will have responsibility for the restructuring plan for the CCAA entities.

[9] A secured credit facility covers both the Canadian and American operations. The amount outstanding on this pre-filing secured credit facility as of January 23, 2009 was approximately US\$1 billion of which approximately US\$367 million is attributable to SSC Canada. Security over all material Canadian assets had been provided as part of this facility.

[10] The debt of the CCAA Entities also includes Canadian notes of US\$200 million and trade creditor payables of US\$53.4 million. In addition, there is a Canadian accounts receivable securitization programme, the outstanding balance of which is US\$38 million as of January 23, 2009. There are six defined benefit registered pension plans in Canada for which there is an aggregate solvency deficiency of approximately \$132 million as at December 31, 2007.

[11] The Applicants are insolvent, have indebtedness in excess of \$5 million and qualify pursuant to the CCAA. The proposed outline for a plan includes continuing the process of selling and realizing value in respect of closed and discontinued operations and coordinating with the US entities to achieve a balance sheet restructuring.

[12] As a result of the Chapter 11 filing, the pre-filing secured credit facility is no longer available. In addition, the Chapter 11 filing constitutes an event of termination under the receivables agreement that governs the accounts receivable securitization programme. As such, absent some additional facility, the CCAA Entities would be required to repay amounts owing under the pre-filing credit agreement. In addition, they would no longer be able to

benefit from the accounts receivable securitization programme, would have no access to operating credits, would be unable to operate in the ordinary course, and would be unable to satisfy ongoing obligations.

[13] Under the DIP facility that is proposed, both SSC Canada and the U.S. company, Smurfit-Stone Container Enterprises, Inc. ("SSCUS") are borrowers; the total commitment is US\$750 million comprised of US\$315 million in revolving facilities available to both SSCUS and SSC Canada, a US\$400 million term loan available to SSCUS; and a US\$35 million term loan available to SSC Canada. The term loan facilities are being used to take out the accounts receivable securitization programme. The loans to SSCUS are guaranteed by SSCC and most of the U.S. debtors and by SSC Canada and the latter provides a charge over its assets for all advances made to SSCUS. There would be rights of subrogation. The loans to SSC Canada are guaranteed by SSCUS and most of its U.S. subsidiaries and secured by a charge over substantially all of the assets of Smurfit-Stone's U.S. entities. The borrowings of SSC Canada are guaranteed by the other CCAA entities.

[14] While some of the DIP lenders also participated in the pre-filing secured credit facility, the DIP financing involves new money and is not a refinancing. New lenders are also participating in the DIP facility. The lenders of the pre-filing secured credit facility are unopposed to the order sought.

[15] The DIP lenders are unwilling to extend the DIP facility to SSC Canada absent its guarantee of the obligations of SSCUS under the DIP facility. In addition, the business is fully integrated making it impracticable particularly in the current credit environment to secure alternate financing on a stand-alone basis. To continue operations, the DIP facility is required. Estimated cash on hand for the Canadian operating entities at January 23, 2009 was \$704,517 and the accounts payable balance is estimated to be in excess of US\$53 million.

[16] The amount borrowed is to be secured by a charge on the Applicants' property following an Administration charge of \$1 million and a Directors' charge of \$8.6 million. Until a final order has been granted by the U.S. court approving continued lending under the

DIP facility and until approved by this court, and prior to February 18, 2009, no more than \$100,000 million of the U.S. revolving commitment and \$15 million of the SSC Canada revolving commitment will be available for borrowing. During the initial 30-day stay period, the CCAA Entities anticipate they will require US\$50 million of which US\$31 million of the term loan is to be used to refinance the account receivables securitization programme. This will result in an increase in cash receipts.

The proposed Monitor filed a report. It described the extensive process undertaken to [17] obtain new debt financing. It further understands that Smurfit-Stone, having thoroughly canvassed the market, does not have any satisfactory alternative financing arrangements available. The proposed Monitor is of the view that the restructuring and continuation of Smurfit-Stone and the CCAA Entities as a going concern is the best option available given that a going concern restructuring would preserve the value of Smurfit-Stone and the CCAA Entities whereas a liquidation and wind-down would likely result in a substantial diminution in value that could ultimately reduce creditors' recoveries. Significantly, the liquidation and wind-down of the CCAA Entities could eliminate a significant number of jobs, many of which would be preserved if the CCAA Entities are able to continue as a going concern. The proposed Monitor has also been advised that the CCAA Entities have recently been "net debtors", relying on advances from SSCUS to fund working capital requirements. Based on the information available to it, it is supportive of the DIP facility including SSC Canada's guarantee. In this regard, however, it is unable to provide views of the value of the guarantee or the probability that it will be called upon. Smurfit-Stone has advised the Monitor that SSC Canada's guarantee of SSCUS' obligations is contingent and that the DIP facility was negotiated with a third-party lender on the basis that there would be full recovery of all loans advanced to SSCUS under the DIP facility from the U.S. assets of Smurfit-Stone.

[18] The successful restructuring of the CCAA Entities appears to be inextricably intertwined with the successful restructuring of the Smurfit-Stone enterprise in the Chapter 11 proceeding. In order to continue day-to-day operations and to facilitate the company's

- 6 -

restructuring, the U.S. debtors and the CCAA Entities require access to significant funding. Given all of these facts, I am prepared to grant the relief requested.

[19] As mentioned, the requested order extends the benefits of the protections provided by the order to Smurfit-MBI and SLP Finance General Partnership, both of which are partnerships but not Applicants. The operations of the partnerships are integral and closely interrelated with that of the Applicants and in my view the request is appropriate in the circumstances outlined. See also *Re: Lehndorff General Partner Ltd.* (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3rd) 24.

[20] As to the centralized cash management system, the proposed Monitor has reviewed it and will be able to adequately monitor the transfers of cash, including transfers within the system so that transactions applicable to SSC Canada and Smurfit-MBI can be ascertained, traced and properly recorded. The Monitor will review and monitor the system and report to the court from time to time. As of January 23, 2009, SSC Canada was estimated to have US\$121,000 and CDN\$185,000 in cash and Smurfit-MBI was estimated to have US\$97,000 and CDN\$414,000 in cash.

[21] The CCAA Entities seek to pay certain pre-filing amounts owed to critical suppliers. The proposed Monitor has been advised that SSC Canada's operations depend on a ready supply of key materials such as wood, chemicals, fuel and energy from third party suppliers and, in addition, SSC Canada's and Smurfit-MBI's operations are reliant on rail and trucking services, custom brokers and third party warehouses. I am satisfied that the request to pay these pre-filing amounts is appropriate.

[22] According to Smurfit-Stone, it is very difficult to separate the creditors of the U.S. debtors from the creditors of the CCAA Entities. Smurfit-Stone intends to engage Epiq Bankruptcy Solutions LLC to send notice of the Chapter 11 proceedings to all creditors owed more than \$1,000. The proposed Monitor has suggested that such notice include notice of the CCAA proceedings to the creditors of the CCAA Entities. I am in agreement with this proposed course of action but request that the Monitor report to the court when service has been effected.

which allows any interested party to apply to the court to vary or amend this order on not less 2009 CanLII 2493 (ON SC) There are obviously numerous other provisions in the order that I have not addressed specifically as I believe they are all self-evident. In all of the circumstances I am prepared to

Pepall, J.

DATE: January 27, 2009

than seven days' notice.

further recognition order.

[23]

[24]

grant the order requested. Counsel will re-attend on Wednesday at 10:00 a.m. to address a

I also note and rely upon the comeback provision found in paragraph 57 of the order

COURT FILE NO.: CV-09-7966-00CL **DATE: 2009-01-27**

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE **OR ARRANGEMENT OF SMURFIT-STONE** CONTAINER CANADA INC. AND OTHERS

ENDORSEMENT

PEPALL J.

Released: January 27, 2009

TAB 18

2012 ONSC 2063 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Sino-Forest Corp., Re

2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 2012 ONSC 2063, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

In the Matter of the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, as Amended

In the Matter of a Plan of Compromise or Arrangement of Sino-Forest Corporation, Applicant

Morawetz J.

Heard: March 30, 2012 Judgment: April 2, 2012 Docket: CV-12-9667-00CL

Counsel: Robert W. Staley, Kevin Zych, Derek J. Bell, Jonathan Bell, for Applicant
E.A. Sellers, for Sino Forest Corporation Board of Directors
Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam, for Proposed Monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc.
R. J. Chadwick, B. O'Neill, C. Descours, for Ad Hoc Noteholders
M. Starnino, for Counsel in the Ontario Class Action
P. Griffin, for Ernst & Young
Jim Grout, Hugh Craig, for Ontario Securities Commission
Scott Bomhof, for Credit Suisse, TD and the Underwriter Defendants in the Canadian Class Action

Subject: Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure; Corporate and Commercial

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act -- Miscellaneous

Application for initial order and sale process order under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Can.) — Applicant was publicly-listed major integrated forest plantation operator and forest production company with assets predominantly in PRC — Published report stated that applicant was near total fraud and Ponzi scheme — Investigations launched by securities commissions in both Ontario and Hong Kong — Applicant had not been able to release 2011 Q3 results — Applicant cautioned that its historic financial statements and related audit reports should not be relied upon — Application granted — Administration Charge and Director's Charge in requested amount appropriate and necessary — Continued participation of directors desirable.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by Morawetz J.:

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 45 B.L.R. (4th) 201, 2008 CarswellOnt 2652, 42 C.B.R. (5th) 90 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) --- referred to

2012 ONSC 2063, 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

Nortel Networks Corp., Re (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 48 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 2004 CarswellOnt 1211 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 2936 (Ont. C.A.) - referred to

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 338 N.R. 196 (notc), 2004 CarswellOnt 5200, 2004 CarswellOnt 5201 (S.C.C.) - referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 1982 Chapter 15 — referred to

Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. B.16 Generally — referred to

Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44 Generally — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 2(1) "debtor company" --- referred to

s. 11.51 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] -- considered

s. 11.52 [en. 2005, c. 47, s. 128] - considered

Morawetz J.:

Overview

1 The Applicant, Sino-Forest Corporation ("SFC"), moves for an Initial Order and Sale Process Order under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act* ("CCAA").

2 The factual basis for the application is set out in the affidavit of Mr. W. Judson Martin, sworn March 30, 2012. Additional detail has been provided in a pre-filing report provided by the proposed monitor, FTI Consulting Canada Inc. ("FTI").

3 Counsel to SFC advise that, after extensive arm's-length negotiations, SFC has entered into a Support Agreement with a substantial number of its Noteholders, which requires SFC to pursue a CCAA plan as well as a Sale Process.

4 Counsel to SFC advises that the restructuring transactions contemplated by this proceeding are intended to:

(a) separate Sino-Forest's business operations from the problems facing SFC outside the People's Republic of China ("PRC") by transferring the intermediate holding companies that own the "business" and SFC's inter-company claims against its subsidiaries to a newly formed company owned primarily by the Noteholders in compromise of their claims;

(b) effect a Sale Process to determine whether anyone will purchase SFC's business operations for an amount of consideration acceptable to SFC and its Noteholders, with potential excess being made available to Junior Constituents;

2012 ONSC 2063, 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

(c) create a structure that will enable litigation claims to be pursued for the benefit of SFC's stakeholders; and

(d) allow Junior Constituents some "upside" in the form of a profit participation if Sino-Forest's business operations acquired by the Noteholders are monetized at a profit within seven years from Plan implementation.

5 The relief sought by SFC in this application includes:

(i) a stay of proceedings against SFC, its current or former directors or officers, any of SFC's property, and in respect of certain of SFC's subsidiaries with respect to the note indentures issued by SFC;

(ii) the granting of a Directors' Charge and Administration Charge on certain of SFC's property;

(iii) the approval of the engagement letter of SFC's financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey;

(iv) the relieving of SFC of any obligation to call and hold an annual meeting of shareholders until further order of this court; and

(v) the approval of sales process procedures.

Facts

6 SFC was formed under the *Business Corporations Act (Ontario)*, R.S.O. 1990, c. B-16, and in 2002 filed articles of continuance under the *Canada Business Corporations Act*, R.S.C. 1985 c. C-44 ("CBCA").

7 Since 1995, SFC has been a publicly-listed company on the TSX. SFC's registered office is in Mississauga, Ontario, and its principal executive office is in Hong Kong.

8 A total of 137 entities make up the Sino-Forest Companies: 67 PRC incorporated entities (with 12 branch companies), 58 BVI incorporated entities, 7 Hong Kong incorporated entities, 2 Canadian entities and 3 entities incorporated in other jurisdictions.

9 SFC currently has three employees. Collectively, the Sino-Forest Companies employ a total of approximately 3,553 employees, with approximately 3,460 located in the PRC and approximately 90 located in Hong Kong.

10 Sino-Forest is a publicly-listed major integrated forest plantation operator and forest productions company, with assets predominantly in the PRC. Its principal businesses include the sale of standing timber and wood logs, the ownership and management of forest plantation trees, and the complementary manufacturing of downstream engineered-wood products.

11 Substantially all of Sino-Forest's sales are generated in the PRC.

12 On June 2, 2011, Muddy Waters LLC published a report (the "MW Report") which, according to submissions made by SFC, alleged, among other things, that SFC is a "near total fraud" and a "ponzi scheme".

13 On the same day that the MW Report was released, the board of directors of SFC appointed an independent committee to investigate the allegations set out in the MW Report.

14 In addition, investigations have been launched by the Ontario Securities Commission ("OSC"), the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commissions ("HKSFC") and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP").

15 On August 26, 2011, the OSC issued a cease trade order with respect to the securities of SFC and with respect to certain senior management personnel. With the consent of SFC, the cease trade order was extended by subsequent orders of the OSC.

2012 ONSC 2063, 2012 CarswellOnt 4117, 213 A.C.W.S. (3d) 831

16 SFC and certain of its officers, directors and employees, along with SFC's current and former auditors, technical consultants and various underwriters involved in prior equity and debt offerings, have been named as defendants in eight class action lawsuits in Canada. Additionally, a class action was commenced against SFC and other defendants in the State of New York.

17 The affidavit of Mr. Martin also points out that circumstances are such that SFC has not been able to release Q3 2011 results and these circumstances could also impact SFC's historical financial statements and its ability to obtain an audit for its 2011 fiscal year. On January 10, 2012, SFC cautioned that its historic financial statements and related audit reports should not be relied upon.

18 SFC has issued four series of notes (two senior notes and two convertible notes), with a combined principal amount of approximately \$1.8 billion, which remain outstanding and mature at various times between 2013 and 2017. The notes are supported by various guarantees from subsidiaries of SFC, and some are also supported by share pledges from certain of SFC's subsidiaries.

19 Mr. Martin has acknowledged that SFC's failure to file the Q3 results constitutes a default under the note indentures.

20 On January 12, 2012, SFC announced that holders of a majority in principal amount of SFC's senior notes due 2014 and its senior notes due 2017 agreed to waive the default arising from SFC's failure to release the Q3 results on a timely basis.

The waiver agreements expire on the earlier of April 30, 2012 and any earlier termination of the waiver agreements in accordance with their terms. In addition, should SFC fail to file its audited financial statements for its fiscal year ended December 31, 2011 by March 30, 2012, the indenture trustees would be in a position to accelerate and enforce the approximately \$1.8 billion in notes.

22 The audited financial statements for the fiscal year that ended on December 31, 2011 have not yet been filed.

23 Mr. Martin also deposes that, although the allegations in the MW Report have not been substantiated, the allegations have had a catastrophic negative impact on Sino-Forest's business activities and there has been a material decline in the market value of SFC's common shares and notes. Further, credit ratings were lowered and ultimately withdrawn.

Mr. Martin contends that the various investigations and class action lawsuits have required, and will continue to require, that significant resources be expended by directors, officers and employees of Sino-Forest. This has also affected Sino-Forest's ability to conduct its operations in the normal course of business and the business has effectively been frozen and ground to a halt. In addition, SFC has been unable to secure or renew certain existing onshore banking facilities and has been unable to obtain offshore letters of credit to facilitate its trading business. Further, relationships with the PRC government, local government, and suppliers have become strained, making it increasingly difficult to conduct any business operations.

As noted above, following arm's-length negotiations between SFC and the Ad Hoc Noteholders, the parties entered into a Support Agreement which provides that SFC will pursue a CCAA plan on the terms set out in the Support Agreement in order to implement the agreed upon restructuring transaction.

Application of the CCAA

26 SFC is a corporation continued under the CBCA and is a "company" as defined in the CCAA.

27 SFC also takes the position that it is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the CCAA. A "debtor company" includes a company that is insolvent.

The issued and outstanding convertible and senior notes of SFC total approximately \$1.8 billion. The waiver agreements with respect to SFC's defaults under the senior notes expire on April 30, 2012. Mr. Martin contends that, but for the Support Agreement, which requires SFC to pursue a CCAA plan, the indenture trustees under the notes would be entitled to accelerate and enforce the rights of the Noteholders as soon as April 30, 2012. As such, SFC contends that it is insolvent as it is "reasonably

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expected to run out of liquidity within a reasonable proximity of time" and would be unable to meet its obligations as they come due or continue as a going concern. See *Stelco Inc., Re*, [2004] O.J. No. 1257 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 26; leave to appeal to C.A. refused [2004] O.J. No. 1903 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 336 (S.C.C.); and *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.*, [2008] O.J. No. 1818 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 12 and 32.

29 For the purposes of this application, I accept that SFC is a "debtor company" within the meaning of the CCAA and is insolvent; and, as a CBCA company that is insolvent with debts in excess of \$5 million, SFC meets the statutory requirements for relief under the CCAA.

30 The required financial information, including cash-flow information, has been filed.

I am satisfied that it is appropriate to grant SFC relief under the CCAA and to provide for a stay of proceedings. FTI Consulting Canada, Inc., having filed its Consent to act, is appointed Monitor.

The Administration Charge

32 SFC has also requested an Administration Charge. Section 11.52 of the CCAA provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant an Administration Charge in respect of the fees and expenses of FTI and other professionals.

I am satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case, an Administration Charge in the requested amount is appropriate. In making this determination I have taken into account the complexity of the business, the proposed role of the beneficiaries of the charge, whether the quantum of the proposed charge appears to be fair and reasonable, the position of the secured creditors likely to be affected by the charge and the position of FTI.

34 In this case, FTI supports the Administration Charge. Further, it is noted that the Administration Charge does not seek a super priority charge ranking ahead of the secured creditors.

The Directors' Charge

35 SFC also requests a Directors' Charge. Section 11.51 of the CCAA provides the court with the jurisdiction to grant a charge in favour of any director to indemnify the director against obligations and liabilities that they may incur as a director of the company after commencement of the CCAA proceedings.

36 Having reviewed the record, I am satisfied that the Directors' Charge in the requested amount is appropriate and necessary. In making this determination, I have taken into account that the continued participation of directors is desirable and, in this particular case, absent the Directors' Charge, the directors have indicated they will not continue in their participation in the restructuring of SFC. I am also satisfied that the insurance policies currently in place contain exclusions and limitations of coverage which could leave SFC's directors without coverage in certain circumstances.

37 In addition, the Directors' Charge is intended to rank behind the Administration Charge. Further, FTI supports the Directors' Charge and the Directors' Charge does not seek a super priority charge ranking ahead of secured creditors.

38 Based on the above, I am satisfied that the Directors' Charge is fair and reasonable in the circumstances.

The Sale Process

39 SFC has also requested approval for the Sale Process.

The CCAA is to be given a broad and liberal interpretation to achieve its objectives and to facilitate the restructuring of an insolvent company. It has been held that a sale by a debtor, which preserves its businesses as a going concern, is consistent with these objectives, and the court has the jurisdiction to authorize such a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan. See *Nortel Networks Corp.*, *Re*, [2009] O.J. No. 3169 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras. 47-48.

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41 The following questions may be considered when determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan (See *Nortel Networks Corp., Re, supra* at para. 49):

- (i) Is the sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (ii) Will the sale benefit the "whole economic community"?
- (iii) Do any of the debtors' creditors have a bone fide reason to object to the sale of the business?
- (iv) Is there a better alternative?

42 Counsel submits that as a result of the uncertainty surrounding SFC, it is impossible to know what an interested third party might be willing to pay for the underlying business operations of SFC once they are separated from the problems facing SFC outside the PRC. Counsel further contends that it is only by running the Sale Process that SFC and the court can determine whether there is an interested party that would be willing to purchase SFC's business operations for an amount of consideration that is acceptable to SFC and its Noteholders while also making excess funds available to Junior Constituents.

43 Based on a review of the record, the comments of FTI, and the support levels being provided by the Ad Hoc Noteholders Committee, I am satisfied that the aforementioned factors, when considered in the circumstances of this case, justify the approval of the Sale Process at this point in time.

Ancillary Relief

44 I am also of the view that it is impractical for SFC to call and hold its annual general meeting at this time and, therefore, I am of the view that it is appropriate to grant an order relieving SFC of this obligation.

45 SFC seeks to have FTI authorized, as a formal representative of SFC, to apply for recognition of these proceedings, as necessary, in any jurisdiction outside of Canada, including as "foreign main proceedings" in the United States pursuant to Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Counsel contends that such an order is necessary to facilitate the restructuring as, among other things, SFC faces class action lawsuits in New York, the notes are governed by New York law, the indenture trustees are located in New York and certain of the SFC subsidiaries may face proceedings in foreign jurisdictions in respect of certain notes issued by SFC. In my view, this relief is appropriate and is granted.

- 46 SFC also requests an order approving:
 - (i) the Financial Advisor Agreement; and
 - (ii) Houlihan Lokey's retention by SFC under the terms of the agreement.

47 Both SFC and FTI believe that the quantum and nature of the remuneration provided for in the Financial Advisor Agreement is fair and reasonable and that an order approving the Financial Advisor Agreement is appropriate and essential to a successful restructuring of SFC. This request has the support of parties appearing today and, in my view, is appropriate in the circumstances and is therefore granted.

Disposition

48 Accordingly, the relief requested by SFC is granted and orders shall issue substantially in the form of the Initial Order and the Sale Process Order included the Application Record.

Miscellaneous

49 SFC has confirmed that it is bound by the Support Agreement and intends to comply with it.

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50 The come-back hearing is scheduled for Friday, April 13, 2012. The orders granted today contain a come-back clause. The orders were made on extremely short notice and for all practical purposes are to be treated as being made *ex parte*.

51 The scheduling of future hearings in this matter shall be coordinated through counsel to the Monitor and the Commercial List Office.

52 Finally, it would be helpful if counsel could also file materials on a USB key in addition to a paper record.

End of Document

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TAB 19

Nortel Networks Corp., Re, 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265...

> 2009 CarswellOnt 4467 Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

> > Nortel Networks Corp., Re

2009 CarswellOnt 4467, [2009] O.J. No. 3169, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 265, 55 C.B.R. (5th) 229

IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF A PLAN OF COMPROMISE OR ARRANGEMENT OF NORTEL NETWORKS CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS LIMITED, NORTEL NETWORKS GLOBAL CORPORATION, NORTEL NETWORKS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND NORTEL NETWORKS TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION (Applicants)

> APPLICATION UNDER THE COMPANIES' CREDITORS ARRANGEMENT ACT, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36, AS AMENDED

> > Morawetz J.

Heard: June 29, 2009 Written reasons: July 23, 2009 Docket: 09-CL-7950

Counsel: Derrick Tay, Jennifer Stam for Nortel Networks Corporation, et al

Lyndon Barnes, Adam Hirsh for Board of Directors of Nortel Networks Corporation, Nortel Networks Limited

J. Carfagnini, J. Pasquariello for Monitor, Ernst & Young Inc.

M. Starnino for Superintendent of Financial Services, Administrator of PBGF

S. Philpott for Former Employees

K. Zych for Noteholders

Pamela Huff, Craig Thorburn for MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III

L.P., Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P.

David Ward for UK Pension Protection Fund

Leanne Williams for Flextronics Inc.

Alex MacFarlane for Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors

Arthur O. Jacques, Tom McRae for Felske & Sylvain (de facto Continuing Employees' Committee)

Robin B. Schwill, Matthew P. Gottlieb for Nortel Networks UK Limited

A. Kauffman for Export Development Canada

D. Ullman for Verizon Communications Inc.

G. Benchetrit for IBM

Subject: Insolvency; Estates and Trusts

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal --- Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act --- Miscellaneous issues

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect

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to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Administration of estate --- Sale of assets --- Jurisdiction of court to approve sale

Telecommunication company entered protection under Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act ("Act") — Company decided to pursue "going concern" sales for various business units — Company entered into sale agreement with respect to assets in Code Division Multiple Access business and Long-Term Evolution Access assets — Company was pursuing sale of its other business units — Company brought motion for approval of bidding procedures and asset sale agreement — Motion granted — Court has jurisdiction to authorize sales process under Act in absence of formal plan of compromise or arrangement and creditor vote — Sale by company which preserved its business as going concern was consistent with objectives of Act — Unless sale was undertaken at this time, long-term viability of business would be in jeopardy.

Table of Authorities

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Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership (2009), 2009 BCCA 319, 2009 CarswellBC 1738 (B.C. C.A.) — followed

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 ONCA 587, 2008 CarswellOnt 4811, (sub nom. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re) 240 O.A.C. 245, (sub nom. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re) 296 D.L.R. (4th) 135, (sub nom. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp., Re) 92 O.R. (3d) 513, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 5432, 2008 CarswellOnt 5433 (S.C.C.) — referred to

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Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re (2007), 2007 CarswellAlta 1050, 2007 ABQB 504, 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1, 415 A.R. 196, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 68 (Alta. Q.B.) — referred to

Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re (1998), 1998 CarswellOnt 3346, 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299, 72 O.T.C. 99 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — considered

Caterpillar Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 2008 CarswellOnt 4046, 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp. (2008), 2008 BCCA 327, 2008 CarswellBC 1758, 83 B.C.L.R. (4th) 214, 296 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 434 W.A.C. 187, 258 B.C.A.C. 187, 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7, [2008] 10 W.W.R. 575 (B.C. C.A.) — distinguished

Consumers Packaging Inc., Re (2001), 150 O.A.C. 384, 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197, 2001 CarswellOnt 3482, 12 C.P.C. (5th) 208 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

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Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp. (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 76, 46 O.A.C. 321, 4 O.R. (3d) 1, 1991 CarswellOnt 205 (Ont. C.A.) — considered

Stelco Inc., Re (2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4084, 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) - referred to

Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 1240, 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.) - referred to

Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re (2008), 2008 CarswellMan 560, 2008 MBQB 297, 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. s. 363 — referred to

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 Generally — referred to

s. 11 — referred to

s. 11(4) — considered

MOTION by company for approval of bidding procedures for sale of business and asset sale agreement.

Morawetz J.:

Introduction

1 On June 29, 2009, I granted the motion of the Applicants and approved the bidding procedures (the "Bidding Procedures") described in the affidavit of Mr. Riedel sworn June 23, 2009 (the "Riedel Affidavit") and the Fourteenth Report of Ernst & Young, Inc., in its capacity as Monitor (the "Monitor") (the "Fourteenth Report"). The order was granted immediately after His Honour Judge Gross of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the "U.S. Court") approved the Bidding Procedures in the Chapter 11 proceedings.

I also approved the Asset Sale Agreement dated as of June 19, 2009 (the "Sale Agreement") among Nokia Siemens Networks B.V. ("Nokia Siemens Networks" or the "Purchaser"), as buyer, and Nortel Networks Corporation ("NNC"), Nortel Networks Limited ("NNL"), Nortel Networks, Inc. ("NNI") and certain of their affiliates, as vendors (collectively the "Sellers") in the form attached as Appendix "A" to the Fourteenth Report and I also approved and accepted the Sale Agreement for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

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3 An order was also granted sealing confidential Appendix "B" to the Fourteenth Report containing the schedules and exhibits to the Sale Agreement pending further order of this court.

4 The following are my reasons for granting these orders.

5 The hearing on June 29, 2009 (the "Joint Hearing") was conducted by way of video conference with a similar motion being heard by the U.S. Court. His Honor Judge Gross presided over the hearing in the U.S. Court. The Joint Hearing was conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Cross-Border Protocol, which had previously been approved by both the U.S. Court and this court.

6 The Sale Agreement relates to the Code Division Multiple Access ("CMDA") business Long-Term Evolution ("LTE") Access assets.

The Sale Agreement is not insignificant. The Monitor reports that revenues from CDMA comprised over 21% of Nortel's 2008 revenue. The CDMA business employs approximately 3,100 people (approximately 500 in Canada) and the LTE business employs approximately 1,000 people (approximately 500 in Canada). The purchase price under the Sale Agreement is \$650 million.

Background

8 The Applicants were granted CCAA protection on January 14, 2009. Insolvency proceedings have also been commenced in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel and France.

At the time the proceedings were commenced, Nortel's business operated through 143 subsidiaries, with approximately 30,000 employees globally. As of January 2009, Nortel employed approximately 6,000 people in Canada alone.

10 The stated purpose of Nortel's filing under the CCAA was to stabilize the Nortel business to maximize the chances of preserving all or a portion of the enterprise. The Monitor reported that a thorough strategic review of the company's assets and operations would have to be undertaken in consultation with various stakeholder groups.

11 In April 2009, the Monitor updated the court and noted that various restructuring alternatives were being considered.

12 On June 19, 2009, Nortel announced that it had entered into the Sale Agreement with respect to its assets in its CMDA business and LTE Access assets (collectively, the "Business") and that it was pursuing the sale of its other business units. Mr. Riedel in his affidavit states that Nortel has spent many months considering various restructuring alternatives before determining in its business judgment to pursue "going concern" sales for Nortel's various business units.

13 In deciding to pursue specific sales processes, Mr. Riedel also stated that Nortel's management considered:

(a) the impact of the filings on Nortel's various businesses, including deterioration in sales; and

(b) the best way to maximize the value of its operations, to preserve jobs and to continue businesses in Canada and the U.S.

- 14 Mr. Riedel notes that while the Business possesses significant value, Nortel was faced with the reality that:
 - (a) the Business operates in a highly competitive environment;
 - (b) full value cannot be realized by continuing to operate the Business through a restructuring; and
 - (c) in the absence of continued investment, the long-term viability of the Business would be put into jeopardy.

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15 Mr. Riedel concluded that the proposed process for the sale of the Business pursuant to an auction process provided the best way to preserve the Business as a going concern and to maximize value and preserve the jobs of Nortel employees.

16 In addition to the assets covered by the Sale Agreement, certain liabilities are to be assumed by the Purchaser. This issue is covered in a comprehensive manner at paragraph 34 of the Fourteenth Report. Certain liabilities to employees are included on this list. The assumption of these liabilities is consistent with the provisions of the Sale Agreement that requires the Purchaser to extend written offers of employment to at least 2,500 employees in the Business.

17 The Monitor also reports that given that certain of the U.S. Debtors are parties to the Sale Agreement and given the desire to maximize value for the benefit of stakeholders, Nortel determined and it has agreed with the Purchaser that the Sale Agreement is subject to higher or better offers being obtained pursuant to a sale process under s. 363 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and that the Sale Agreement shall serve as a "stalking horse" bid pursuant to that process.

18 The Bidding Procedures provide that all bids must be received by the Seller by no later than July 21, 2009 and that the Sellers will conduct an auction of the purchased assets on July 24, 2009. It is anticipated that Nortel will ultimately seek a final sales order from the U.S. Court on or about July 28, 2009 and an approval and vesting order from this court in respect of the Sale Agreement and purchased assets on or about July 30, 2009.

19 The Monitor recognizes the expeditious nature of the sale process but the Monitor has been advised that given the nature of the Business and the consolidation occurring in the global market, there are likely to be a limited number of parties interested in acquiring the Business.

The Monitor also reports that Nortel has consulted with, among others, the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the "UCC") and the bondholder group regarding the Bidding Procedures and is of the view that both are supportive of the timing of this sale process. (It is noted that the UCC did file a limited objection to the motion relating to certain aspects of the Bidding Procedures.)

21 Given the sale efforts made to date by Nortel, the Monitor supports the sale process outlined in the Fourteenth Report and more particularly described in the Bidding Procedures.

22 Objections to the motion were filed in the U.S. Court and this court by MatlinPatterson Global Advisors LLC, MatlinPatterson Global Opportunities Partners III L.P. and Matlin Patterson Opportunities Partners (Cayman) III L.P. (collectively, "MatlinPatterson") as well the UCC.

23 The objections were considered in the hearing before Judge Gross and, with certain limited exceptions, the objections were overruled.

Issues and Discussion

24 The threshold issue being raised on this motion by the Applicants is whether the CCAA affords this court the jurisdiction to approve a sales process in the absence of a formal plan of compromise or arrangement and a creditor vote. If the question is answered in the affirmative, the secondary issue is whether this sale should authorize the Applicants to sell the Business.

25 The Applicants submit that it is well established in the jurisprudence that this court has the jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve the sales process and that the requested order should be granted in these circumstances.

26 Counsel to the Applicants submitted a detailed factum which covered both issues.

27 Counsel to the Applicants submits that one of the purposes of the CCAA is to preserve the going concern value of debtors companies and that the court's jurisdiction extends to authorizing sale of the debtor's business, even in the absence of a plan or creditor vote.

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The CCAA is a flexible statute and it is particularly useful in complex insolvency cases in which the court is required to balance numerous constituents and a myriad of interests.

The CCAA has been described as "skeletal in nature". It has also been described as a "sketch, an outline, a supporting framework for the resolution of corporate insolvencies in the public interest". *ATB Financial v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Investments II Corp.* (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 163 (Ont. C.A.) at paras. 44, 61, leave to appeal refused [2008] S.C.C.A. No. 337 (S.C.C.). ("ATB Financial").

30 The jurisprudence has identified as sources of the court's discretionary jurisdiction, *inter alia*:

(a) the power of the court to impose terms and conditions on the granting of a stay under s. 11(4) of the CCAA;

(b) the specific provision of s. 11(4) of the CCAA which provides that the court may make an order "on such terms as it may impose"; and

(c) the inherent jurisdiction of the court to "fill in the gaps" of the CCAA in order to give effect to its objects. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re* (1998), 5 C.B.R. (4th) 299 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 43; *PSINET Ltd., Re* (2001), 28 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 5, *ATB Financial, supra*, at paras. 43-52.

31 However, counsel to the Applicants acknowledges that the discretionary authority of the court under s. 11 must be informed by the purpose of the CCAA.

Its exercise must be guided by the scheme and object of the Act and by the legal principles that govern corporate law issues. *Re Stelco Inc.* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 135 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 44.

In support of the court's jurisdiction to grant the order sought in this case, counsel to the Applicants submits that Nortel seeks to invoke the "overarching policy" of the CCAA, namely, to preserve the going concern. *Residential Warranty Co. of Canada Inc., Re* (2006), 21 C.B.R. (5th) 57 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 78.

33 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that CCAA courts have repeatedly noted that the purpose of the CCAA is to preserve the benefit of a going concern business for all stakeholders, or "the whole economic community":

The purpose of the CCAA is to facilitate arrangements that might avoid liquidation of the company and allow it to continue in business to the benefit of the whole economic community, including the shareholders, the creditors (both secured and unsecured) and the employees. *Citibank Canada v. Chase Manhattan Bank of Canada* (1991), 5 C.B.R. (3rd) 167 (Ont. Gen. Div.) at para. 29. *Re Consumers Packaging Inc.* (2001) 27 C.B.R. (4th) 197 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 5.

34 Counsel to the Applicants further submits that the CCAA should be given a broad and liberal interpretation to facilitate its underlying purpose, including the preservation of the going concern for the benefit of all stakeholders and further that it should not matter whether the business continues as a going concern under the debtor's stewardship or under new ownership, for as long as the business continues as a going concern, a primary goal of the CCAA will be met.

35 Counsel to the Applicants makes reference to a number of cases where courts in Ontario, in appropriate cases, have exercised their jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets, even in the absence of a plan of arrangement being tendered to stakeholders for a vote. In doing so, counsel to the Applicants submits that the courts have repeatedly recognized that they have jurisdiction under the CCAA to approve asset sales in the absence of a plan of arrangement, where such sale is in the best interests of stakeholders generally. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra, Re PSINet, supra, Consumers Packaging Inc., Re* [2001 CarswellOnt 3482 (Ont. C.A.)], *supra, Stelco Inc., Re* (2004), 6 C.B.R. (5th) 316 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at para. 1, *Tiger Brand Knitting Co., Re* (2005), 9 C.B.R. (5th) 315 (Ont. S.C.J.), *Caterpillar*

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Financial Services Ltd. v. Hard-Rock Paving Co. (2008), 45 C.B.R. (5th) 87 (Ont. S.C.J.) and Lehndorff General Partner Ltd., Re (1993), 17 C.B.R. (3d) 24 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

36 In *Re Consumers Packaging, supra*, the Court of Appeal for Ontario specifically held that a sale of a business as a going concern during a CCAA proceeding is consistent with the purposes of the CCAA:

The sale of Consumers' Canadian glass operations as a going concern pursuant to the Owens-Illinois bid allows the preservation of Consumers' business (albeit under new ownership), and is therefore consistent with the purposes of the CCAA.

...we cannot refrain from commenting that Farley J.'s decision to approve the Owens-Illinois bid is consistent with previous decisions in Ontario and elsewhere that have emphasized the broad remedial purpose of flexibility of the CCAA and have approved the sale and disposition of assets during CCAA proceedings prior to a formal plan being tendered. *Re Consumers Packaging, supra, at paras. 5, 9.*

37 Similarly, in *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, Blair J. (as he then was) expressly affirmed the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets in the course of a CCAA proceeding before a plan of arrangement had been approved by creditors. *Canadian Red Cross Society / Société Canadienne de la Croix-Rouge, Re, supra*, at paras. 43, 45.

38 Similarly, in *PSINet Limited*, *supra*, the court approved a going concern sale in a CCAA proceeding where no plan was presented to creditors and a substantial portion of the debtor's Canadian assets were to be sold. Farley J. noted as follows:

[If the sale was not approved,] there would be a liquidation scenario ensuing which would realize far less than this going concern sale (which appears to me to have involved a transparent process with appropriate exposure designed to maximize the proceeds), thus impacting upon the rest of the creditors, especially as to the unsecured, together with the material enlarging of the unsecured claims by the disruption claims of approximately 8,600 customers (who will be materially disadvantaged by an interrupted transition) plus the job losses for approximately 200 employees. *Re PSINet Limited, supra*, at para. 3.

39 In *Re Stelco Inc., supra*, in 2004, Farley J. again addressed the issue of the feasibility of selling the operations as a going concern:

I would observe that usually it is the creditor side which wishes to terminate CCAA proceedings and that when the creditors threaten to take action, there is a realization that a liquidation scenario will not only have a negative effect upon a CCAA applicant, but also upon its workforce. Hence, the CCAA may be employed to provide stability during a period of necessary financial and operational restructuring - and if a restructuring of the "old company" is not feasible, then there is the exploration of the feasibility of the sale of the operations/enterprise as a going concern (with continued employment) in whole or in part. *Re Stelco Inc, supra*, at para. 1.

40 I accept these submissions as being general statements of the law in Ontario. The value of equity in an insolvent debtor is dubious, at best, and, in my view, it follows that the determining factor should not be whether the business continues under the debtor's stewardship or under a structure that recognizes a new equity structure. An equally important factor to consider is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going concern.

41 Counsel to the Applicants also referred to decisions from the courts in Quebec, Manitoba and Alberta which have similarly recognized the court's jurisdiction to approve a sale of assets during the course of a CCAA proceeding. *Boutiques San Francisco Inc., Re* (2004), 7 C.B.R. (5th) 189 (C.S. Que.), *Winnipeg Motor Express Inc., Re* (2008), 49 C.B.R. (5th) 302 (Man. Q.B.) at paras. 41, 44, and *Calpine Canada Energy Ltd., Re* (2007), 35 C.B.R. (5th) 1 (Alta. Q.B.) at para. 75.

42 Counsel to the Applicants also directed the court's attention to a recent decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal which questioned whether the court should authorize the sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets where the debtor's plan

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"will simply propose that the net proceeds from the sale...be distributed to its creditors". In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay Investments Ltd. v. Fisgard Capital Corp.* (2008), 46 C.B.R. (5th) 7 (B.C. C.A.) ("*Cliffs Over Maple Bay*"), the court was faced with a debtor who had no active business but who nonetheless sought to stave off its secured creditor indefinitely. The case did not involve any type of sale transaction but the Court of Appeal questioned whether a court should authorize the sale under the CCAA without requiring the matter to be voted upon by creditors.

43 In addressing this matter, it appears to me that the British Columbia Court of Appeal focussed on whether the court should grant the requested relief and not on the question of whether a CCAA court has the jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.

I do not disagree with the decision in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. However, it involved a situation where the debtor had no active business and did not have the support of its stakeholders. That is not the case with these Applicants.

45 The *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* decision has recently been the subject of further comment by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in *Asset Engineering LP v. Forest & Marine Financial Ltd. Partnership*, 2009 BCCA 319 (B.C. C.A.).

46 At paragraphs 24 - 26 of the Forest and Marine decision, Newbury J.A. stated:

24. In *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*, the debtor company was a real estate developer whose one project had failed. The company had been dormant for some time. It applied for CCAA protection but described its proposal for restructuring in vague terms that amounted essentially to a plan to "secure sufficient funds" to complete the stalled project (Para. 34). This court, per Tysoe J.A., ruled that although the Act can apply to single-project companies, its purposes are unlikely to be engaged in such instances, since mortgage priorities are fully straight forward and there will be little incentive for senior secured creditors to compromise their interests (Para. 36). Further, the Court stated, the granting of a stay under s. 11 is "not a free standing remedy that the court may grant whenever an insolvent company wishes to undertake a "restructuring"...Rather, s. 11 is ancillary to the fundamental purpose of the CCAA, and a stay of proceedings freezing the rights of creditors should only be granted in furtherance of the CCAA's fundamental purpose". That purpose has been described in *Meridian Developments Inc. v. Toronto Dominion Bank* (1984) 11 D.L.R. (4 th) 576 (Alta. Q.B.):

The legislation is intended to have wide scope and allow a judge to make orders which will effectively maintain the status quo for a period while the insolvent company attempts to gain the approval of its creditors for a proposed arrangement which will enable the company to remain in operation for what is, hopefully, the future benefit of both the company and its creditors. [at 580]

25. The Court was not satisfied in *Cliffs Over Maple Bay* that the "restructuring" contemplated by the debtor would do anything other than distribute the net proceeds from the sale, winding up or liquidation of its business. The debtor had no intention of proposing a plan of arrangement, and its business would not continue following the execution of its proposal - thus it could not be said the purposes of the statute would be engaged...

26. In my view, however, the case at bar is quite different from *Cliffs Over Maple Bay*. Here, the main debtor, the Partnership, is at the centre of a complicated corporate group and carries on an active financing business that it hopes to save notwithstanding the current economic cycle. (The business itself which fills a "niche" in the market, has been carried on in one form or another since 1983.) The CCAA is appropriate for situations such as this where it is unknown whether the "restructuring" will ultimately take the form of a refinancing or will involve a reorganization of the corporate entity or entities and a true compromise of the rights of one or more parties. The "fundamental purpose" of the Act - to preserve the *status quo* while the debtor prepares a plan that will enable it to remain in business to the benefit of all concerned - will be furthered by granting a stay so that the <u>means</u> contemplated by the Act - a compromise or arrangement - can be developed, negotiated and voted on if necessary...

47 It seems to me that the foregoing views expressed in *Forest and Marine* are not inconsistent with the views previously expressed by the courts in Ontario. The CCAA is intended to be flexible and must be given a broad and liberal interpretation

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to achieve its objectives and a sale by the debtor which preserves its business as a going concern is, in my view, consistent with those objectives.

48 I therefore conclude that the court does have the jurisdiction to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan.

49 I now turn to a consideration of whether it is appropriate, in this case, to approve this sales process. Counsel to the Applicants submits that the court should consider the following factors in determining whether to authorize a sale under the CCAA in the absence of a plan:

- (a) is a sale transaction warranted at this time?
- (b) will the sale benefit the whole "economic community"?
- (c) do any of the debtors' creditors have a bona fide reason to object to a sale of the business?
- (d) is there a better viable alternative?

I accept this submission.

50 It is the position of the Applicants that Nortel's proposed sale of the Business should be approved as this decision is to the benefit of stakeholders and no creditor is prejudiced. Further, counsel submits that in the absence of a sale, the prospects for the Business are a loss of competitiveness, a loss of value and a loss of jobs.

51 Counsel to the Applicants summarized the facts in support of the argument that the Sale Transaction should be approved, namely:

(a) Nortel has been working diligently for many months on a plan to reorganize its business;

(b) in the exercise of its business judgment, Nortel has concluded that it cannot continue to operate the Business successfully within the CCAA framework;

(c) unless a sale is undertaken at this time, the long-term viability of the Business will be in jeopardy;

(d) the Sale Agreement continues the Business as a going concern, will save at least 2,500 jobs and constitutes the best and most valuable proposal for the Business;

(e) the auction process will serve to ensure Nortel receives the highest possible value for the Business;

(f) the sale of the Business at this time is in the best interests of Nortel and its stakeholders; and

(g) the value of the Business is likely to decline over time.

52 The objections of MatlinPatterson and the UCC have been considered. I am satisfied that the issues raised in these objections have been addressed in a satisfactory manner by the ruling of Judge Gross and no useful purpose would be served by adding additional comment.

53 Counsel to the Applicants also emphasize that Nortel will return to court to seek approval of the most favourable transaction to emerge from the auction process and will aim to satisfy the elements established by the court for approval as set out in *Royal Bank v. Soundair Corp.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 16.

Disposition

54 The Applicants are part of a complicated corporate group. They carry on an active international business. I have accepted that an important factor to consider in a CCAA process is whether the case can be made to continue the business as a going

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concern. I am satisfied having considered the factors referenced at [49], as well as the facts summarized at [51], that the Applicants have met this test. I am therefore satisfied that this motion should be granted.

55 Accordingly, I approve the Bidding Procedures as described in the Riedel Affidavit and the Fourteenth Report of the Monitor, which procedures have been approved by the U.S. Court.

I am also satisfied that the Sale Agreement should be approved and further that the Sale Agreement be approved and accepted for the purposes of conducting the "stalking horse" bidding process in accordance with the Bidding Procedures including, without limitation the Break-Up Fee and the Expense Reimbursement (as both terms are defined in the Sale Agreement).

57 Further, I have also been satisfied that Appendix B to the Fourteenth Report contains information which is commercially sensitive, the dissemination of which could be detrimental to the stakeholders and, accordingly, I order that this document be sealed, pending further order of the court.

In approving the Bidding Procedures, I have also taken into account that the auction will be conducted prior to the sale approval motion. This process is consistent with the practice of this court.

59 Finally, it is the expectation of this court that the Monitor will continue to review ongoing issues in respect of the Bidding Procedures. The Bidding Procedures permit the Applicants to waive certain components of qualified bids without the consent of the UCC, the bondholder group and the Monitor. However, it is the expectation of this court that, if this situation arises, the Applicants will provide advance notice to the Monitor of its intention to do so.

Motion granted.

End of Document

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TAB 20

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41,... 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823...

Most Negative Treatment: Distinguished

Most Recent Distinguished: Canada (Procureur général) c. Contrevenant No. 10 | 2015 CAF 155, 2015 FCA 155, 2015 CarswellNat 2920, 2015 CarswellNat 4847, 476 N.R. 142, 123 W.C.B. (2d) 413, 256 A.C.W.S. (3d) 759, [2015] A.C.F. No. 873 | (F.C.A., Jun 30, 2015)

2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41 Supreme Court of Canada

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance)

2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823, 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 522, [2002] S.C.J. No. 42, 113 A.C.W.S. (3d) 36, 18 C.P.R. (4th) 1, 20 C.P.C. (5th) 1, 211 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 223 F.T.R. 137 (note), 287 N.R. 203, 40 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, 44 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 161, 93 C.R.R. (2d) 219, J.E. 2002-803, REJB 2002-30902

Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, Appellant v. Sierra Club of Canada, Respondent and The Minister of Finance of Canada, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, the Minister of International Trade of Canada and the Attorney General of Canada, Respondents

McLachlin C.J.C., Gonthier, Iacobucci, Bastarache, Binnie, Arbour, LeBel JJ.

Heard: November 6, 2001 Judgment: April 26, 2002 Docket: 28020

Proceedings: reversing (2000), 2000 CarswellNat 970, (sub nom. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note), 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732 (Fed. C.A.); affirming (1999), 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1633 (Fed. T.D.)

Counsel: J. Brett Ledger and Peter Chapin, for appellant

Timothy J. Howard and Franklin S. Gertler, for respondent Sierra Club of Canada Graham Garton, Q.C., and J. Sanderson Graham, for respondents Minister of Finance of Canada, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Minister of International Trade of Canada, and Attorney General of Canada

Subject: Intellectual Property; Property; Civil Practice and Procedure; Evidence; Environmental

Related Abridgment Classifications

For all relevant Canadian Abridgment Classifications refer to highest level of case via History.

Headnote

Evidence --- Documentary evidence --- Privilege as to documents --- Miscellaneous documents

Confidentiality order was necessary in this case because disclosure of confidential documents would impose serious risk on important commercial interest of Crown corporation and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting of order — Confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on Crown corporation's right to fair trial and on freedom of expression — Deleterious effects of confidentiality order on open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal — Salutary effects of order outweighed deleterious effects — Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37, s. 5(1)(b) — Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106, R. 151, 312.

Practice --- Discovery --- Discovery of documents --- Privileged document --- Miscellaneous privileges

Sierra Club of Canada v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41,... 2002 SCC 41, 2002 CSC 41, 2002 CarswellNat 822, 2002 CarswellNat 823...

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Practice --- Discovery — Examination for discovery — Range of examination — Privilege — Miscellaneous privileges

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Preuve --- Preuve documentaire — Confidentialité en ce qui concerne les documents — Documents divers

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Communication des documents — Documents confidentiels — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentiels menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

Procédure --- Communication de la preuve — Interrogatoire préalable — Étendue de l'interrogatoire — Confidentialité — Divers types de confidentialité

Ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la divulgation des documents confidentials menacerait gravement l'intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'y avait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance — Ordonnance de confidentialité aurait des effets bénéfiques considérables sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression — Ordonnance de confidentialité n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression — Effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables — Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale, L.C. 1992, c. 37, art. 5(1)b) — Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106, r. 151, 312.

The federal government provided a Crown corporation with a \$1.5 billion loan for the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China. An environmental organization sought judicial review of that decision, maintaining that the authorization of financial assistance triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*. The Crown

corporation was an intervenor with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review. The Crown corporation filed an affidavit by a senior manager referring to and summarizing confidential documents. Before cross-examining the senior manager, the environmental organization applied for production of the documents. After receiving authorization from the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the Crown corporation sought to introduce the documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998* and requested a confidentiality order. The confidentiality order would make the documents available only to the parties and the court but would not restrict public access to the proceedings.

The trial judge refused to grant the order and ordered the Crown corporation to file the documents in their current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. The Crown corporation appealed under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998 and the environmental organization cross-appealed under R. 312. The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the cross-appeal. The confidentiality order would have been granted by the dissenting judge. The Crown corporation appealed.

Held: The appeal was allowed.

Publication bans and confidentiality orders, in the context of judicial proceedings, are similar. The analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles set out in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). A confidentiality order under R. 151 should be granted in only two circumstances, when an order is needed to prevent serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonable alternative measures will not prevent the risk, and when the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which includes public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

The alternatives to the confidentiality order suggested by the Trial Division and Court of Appeal were problematic. Expunging the documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution. Providing summaries was not a reasonable alternative measure to having the underlying documents available to the parties. The confidentiality order was necessary in that disclosure of the documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the Crown corporation, and there were no reasonable alternative measures to granting the order.

The confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the Crown corporation's right to a fair trial and on freedom of expression. The deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the open court principle and freedom of expression would be minimal. If the order was not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the Crown corporation was not required to mount a defence under the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, it was possible that the Crown corporation would suffer the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. The salutary effects of the order outweighed the deleterious effects.

Le gouvernement fédéral a fait un prêt de l'ordre de 1,5 milliards de dollar en rapport avec la construction et la vente par une société d'État de deux réacteurs nucléaires CANDU à la Chine. Un organisme environnemental a sollicité le contrôle judiciaire de cette décision, soutenant que cette autorisation d'aide financière avait déclenché l'application de l'art. 5(1)b) de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*. La société d'État était intervenante au débat et elle avait reçu les droits de partie dans la demande de contrôle judiciaire. Elle a déposé l'affidavit d'un cadre supérieur dans lequel ce dernier faisait référence à certains documents confidentiels et en faisait le résumé. L'organisme environnemental a demandé la production des documents avant de procéder au contre-interrogatoire du cadre supérieur. Après avoir obtenu l'autorisation des autorités chinoises de communiquer les documents à la condition qu'ils soient protégés par une ordonnance de confidentialité, la société d'État a cherché à les introduire en invoquant la r. 312 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale*, *1998*, et elle a aussi demandé une ordonnance de confidentialité. Selon les termes de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, les documents seraient uniquement mis à la disposition des parties et du tribunal, mais l'accès du public aux débats ne serait pas interdit.

Le juge de première instance a refusé l'ordonnance de confidentialité et a ordonné à la société d'État de déposer les documents sous leur forme actuelle ou sous une forme révisée, à son gré. La société d'État a interjeté appel en vertu de la r. 151 des *Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998*, et l'organisme environnemental a formé un appel incident en vertu de la r. 312. Les juges majoritaires de la Cour d'appel ont rejeté le pourvoi et le pourvoi incident. Le juge dissident aurait accordé l'ordonnance de confidentialité. La société d'État a interjeté appel.

Arrêt: Le pourvoi a été accueilli.

Il y a de grandes ressemblances entre l'ordonnance de non-publication et l'ordonnance de confidentialité dans le contexte des procédures judiciaires. L'analyse de l'exercice du pouvoir discrétionnaire sous le régime de la r. 151 devrait refléter les principes sous-jacents énoncés dans l'arrêt *Dagenais c. Société Radio-Canada*, [1994] 3 R.C.S. 835. Une ordonnance de confidentialité rendue en vertu de la r. 151 ne devrait l'être que lorsque: 1) une telle ordonnance est nécessaire pour écarter un risque sérieux pour un intérêt important, y compris un intérêt commercial, dans le cadre d'un litige, en l'absence d'autres solutions raisonnables pour écarter ce risque; et 2) les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance de confidentialité, y compris les effets sur les droits des justiciables civils à un procès équitable, l'emportent sur ses effets préjudiciables, y compris les effets sur le droit à la liberté d'expression, lequel droit comprend l'intérêt du public à l'accès aux débats judiciaires.

Les solutions proposées par la Division de première instance et par la Cour d'appel comportaient toutes deux des problèmes. Épurer les documents serait virtuellement impraticable et inefficace. Fournir des résumés des documents ne constituait pas une « autre option raisonnable » à la communication aux parties des documents de base. L'ordonnance de confidentialité était nécessaire parce que la communication des documents menacerait gravement un intérêt commercial important de la société d'État et parce qu'il n'existait aucune autre option raisonnable que celle d'accorder l'ordonnance.

L'ordonnance de confidentialité aurait d'importants effets bénéfiques sur le droit de la société d'État à un procès équitable et à la liberté d'expression. Elle n'aurait que des effets préjudiciables minimes sur le principe de la publicité des débats et sur la liberté d'expression. Advenant que l'ordonnance ne soit pas accordée et que, dans le cadre de la demande de contrôle judiciaire, la société d'État n'ait pas l'obligation de présenter une défense en vertu de la *Loi canadienne sur l'évaluation environnementale*, il se pouvait que la société d'État subisse un préjudice du fait d'avoir communiqué cette information confidentielle en violation de ses obligations, sans avoir pu profiter d'un avantage similaire à celui du droit du public à la liberté d'expression. Les effets bénéfiques de l'ordonnance l'emportaient sur ses effets préjudiciables.

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AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare), 2000 CarswellNat 356, 5 C.P.R. (4th) 149, 253 N.R. 284, [2000] 3 F.C. 360, 2000 CarswellNat 3254 (Fed. C.A.) — considered

Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), 2 C.R. (5th) 1, 110 C.C.C. (3d) 193, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480, 139 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 182 N.B.R. (2d) 81, 463 A.P.R. 81, 39 C.R.R. (2d) 189, 203 N.R. 169, 1996 CarswellNB 462, 1996 CarswellNB 463, 2 B.H.R.C. 210 (S.C.C.) — followed

Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., 34 C.R. (4th) 269, 20 O.R. (3d) 816 (note), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835, 120 D.L.R. (4th) 12, 175 N.R. 1, 94 C.C.C. (3d) 289, 76 O.A.C. 81, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 1, 1994 CarswellOnt 112, 1994 CarswellOnt 1168 (S.C.C.) — followed

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Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437, 82 F.T.R. 147, 1994 CarswellNat 537 (Fed. T.D.) - referred to

Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1998 CarswellOnt 380, 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.) — considered

Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général), 94 N.R. 167, (sub nom. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General)) [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, 58 D.L.R. (4th) 577, 24 Q.A.C. 2, 25 C.P.R. (3d) 417, 39 C.R.R. 193, 1989 CarswellQue 115F, 1989 CarswellQue 115 (S.C.C.) — followed

M. (A.) v. Ryan, 143 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 207 N.R. 81, 4 C.R. (5th) 220, 29 B.C.L.R. (3d) 133, [1997] 4 W.W.R. 1, 85 B.C.A.C. 81, 138 W.A.C. 81, 34 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, 42 C.R.R. (2d) 37, 8 C.P.C. (4th) 1, 1997 CarswellBC 99, 1997 CarswellBC 100 (S.C.C.) — considered

N. (F.), Re, 2000 SCC 35, 2000 CarswellNfld 213, 2000 CarswellNfld 214, 146 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 188 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 35 C.R. (5th) 1, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 191 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 577 A.P.R. 181 (S.C.C.) — considered

R. v. E. (O.N.), 2001 SCC 77, 2001 CarswellBC 2479, 2001 CarswellBC 2480, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 478, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 542, 47 C.R. (5th) 89, 279 N.R. 187, 97 B.C.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] 3 W.W.R. 205, 160 B.C.A.C. 161, 261 W.A.C. 161 (S.C.C.) — referred to

R. v. Keegstra, 1 C.R. (4th) 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, 77 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193, 117 N.R. 1, [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 114 A.R. 81, 61 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 3 C.R.R. (2d) 193, 1990 CarswellAlta 192, 1990 CarswellAlta 661 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76, 2001 CarswellMan 535, 2001 CarswellMan 536, 158 C.C.C. (3d) 449, 205 D.L.R. (4th) 512, 47 C.R. (5th) 63, 277 N.R. 160, [2002] 2 W.W.R. 409 (S.C.C.) — followed

R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200, 65 N.R. 87, 14 O.A.C. 335, 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 50 C.R. (3d) 1, 19 C.R.R. 308, 53 O.R. (2d) 719, 1986 CarswellOnt 95, 1986 CarswellOnt 1001 (S.C.C.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11

Generally --- referred to

s. 1 — referred to

s. 2(b) — referred to

s. 11(d) — referred to

Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, S.C. 1992, c. 37 Generally — considered

- s. 5(1)(b) referred to
- s. 8 --- referred to
- s. 54 referred to
- s. 54(2)(b) referred to

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 s. 486(1) — referred to

Rules considered:

Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106 R. 151 — considered

R. 312 — referred to

APPEAL from judgment reported at 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (Fed. C.A.), dismissing appeal from judgment reported at 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (Fed. T.D.), granting application in part.

POURVOI à l'encontre de l'arrêt publié à 2000 CarswellNat 970, 2000 CarswellNat 3271, [2000] F.C.J. No. 732, (sub nom. *Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. v. Sierra Club of Canada*) 187 D.L.R. (4th) 231, 256 N.R. 1, 24 Admin. L.R. (3d) 1, [2000] 4 F.C. 426, 182 F.T.R. 284 (note) (C.A. Féd.), qui a rejeté le pourvoi à l'encontre du jugement publié à 1999 CarswellNat 2187, [2000] 2 F.C. 400, 1999 CarswellNat 3038, 179 F.T.R. 283 (C.F. (1^{re} inst.)), qui avait accueilli en partie la demande.

The judgment of the court was delivered by *Iacobucci J*.:

I. Introduction

1 In our country, courts are the institutions generally chosen to resolve legal disputes as best they can through the application of legal principles to the facts of the case involved. One of the underlying principles of the judicial process is public openness, both in the proceedings of the dispute, and in the material that is relevant to its resolution. However, some material can be made the subject of a confidentiality order. This appeal raises the important issues of when, and under what circumstances, a confidentiality order should be granted.

2 For the following reasons, I would issue the confidentiality order sought and, accordingly, would allow the appeal.

II. Facts

3 The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. ("AECL"), is a Crown corporation that owns and markets CANDU nuclear technology, and is an intervener with the rights of a party in the application for judicial review by the respondent, the Sierra Club of Canada ("Sierra Club"). Sierra Club is an environmental organization seeking judicial review of the federal government's decision to provide financial assistance in the form of a \$1.5 billion guaranteed loan relating to the construction and sale of two CANDU nuclear reactors to China by the appellant. The reactors are currently under construction in China, where the appellant is the main contractor and project manager.

4 The respondent maintains that the authorization of financial assistance by the government triggered s. 5(1)(b) of the *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act*, S.C. 1992, c. 37 ("CEAA"), which requires that an environmental assessment be

undertaken before a federal authority grants financial assistance to a project. Failure to undertake such an assessment compels cancellation of the financial arrangements.

5 The appellant and the respondent Ministers argue that the CEAA does not apply to the loan transaction, and that if it does, the statutory defences available under ss. 8 and 54 apply. Section 8 describes the circumstances where Crown corporations are required to conduct environmental assessments. Section 54(2)(b) recognizes the validity of an environmental assessment carried out by a foreign authority provided that it is consistent with the provisions of the CEAA.

In the course of the application by Sierra Club to set aside the funding arrangements, the appellant filed an affidavit of Dr. Simon Pang, a senior manager of the appellant. In the affidavit, Dr. Pang referred to and summarized certain documents (the "Confidential Documents"). The Confidential Documents are also referred to in an affidavit prepared by Dr. Feng, one of AECL's experts. Prior to cross-examining Dr. Pang on his affidavit, Sierra Club made an application for the production of the Confidential Documents, arguing that it could not test Dr. Pang's evidence without access to the underlying documents. The appellant resisted production on various grounds, including the fact that the documents were the property of the Chinese authorities and that it did not have authority to disclose them. After receiving authorization by the Chinese authorities to disclose the documents on the condition that they be protected by a confidentiality order, the appellant sought to introduce the Confidential Documents under R. 312 of the *Federal Court Rules, 1998*, SOR/98-106, and requested a confidentiality order in respect of the documents.

7 Under the terms of the order requested, the Confidential Documents would only be made available to the parties and the court; however, there would be no restriction on public access to the proceedings. In essence, what is being sought is an order preventing the dissemination of the Confidential Documents to the public.

8 The Confidential Documents comprise two Environmental Impact Reports on Siting and Construction Design (the "EIRs"), a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (the "PSAR"), and the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang, which summarizes the contents of the EIRs and the PSAR. If admitted, the EIRs and the PSAR would be attached as exhibits to the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang. The EIRs were prepared by the Chinese authorities in the Chinese language, and the PSAR was prepared by the appellant with assistance from the Chinese participants in the project. The documents contain a mass of technical information and comprise thousands of pages. They describe the ongoing environmental assessment of the construction site by the Chinese authorities under Chinese law.

9 As noted, the appellant argues that it cannot introduce the Confidential Documents into evidence without a confidentiality order; otherwise, it would be in breach of its obligations to the Chinese authorities. The respondent's position is that its right to cross-examine Dr. Pang and Dr. Feng on their affidavits would be effectively rendered nugatory in the absence of the supporting documents to which the affidavits referred. Sierra Club proposes to take the position that the affidavits should therefore be afforded very little weight by the judge hearing the application for judicial review.

10 The Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, refused to grant the confidentiality order and the majority of the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. In his dissenting opinion, Robertson J.A. would have granted the confidentiality order.

III. Relevant Statutory Provisions

- 11 Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106
 - 151.(1) On motion, the Court may order that material to be filed shall be treated as confidential.

(2) Before making an order under subsection (1), the Court must be satisfied that the material should be treated as confidential, notwithstanding the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

IV. Judgments below

A. Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division, [2000] 2 F.C. 400

12 Pelletier J. first considered whether leave should be granted pursuant to R. 312 to introduce the supplementary affidavit of Dr. Pang to which the Confidential Documents were filed as exhibits. In his view, the underlying question was that of relevance, and he concluded that the documents were relevant to the issue of the appropriate remedy. Thus, in the absence of prejudice to the respondent, the affidavit should be permitted to be served and filed. He noted that the respondents would be prejudiced by delay, but since both parties had brought interlocutory motions which had contributed to the delay, the desirability of having the entire record before the court outweighed the prejudice arising from the delay associated with the introduction of the documents.

13 On the issue of confidentiality, Pelletier J. concluded that he must be satisfied that the need for confidentiality was greater than the public interest in open court proceedings, and observed that the argument for open proceedings in this case was significant given the public interest in Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology. As well, he noted that a confidentiality order was an exception to the rule of open access to the courts, and that such an order should be granted only where absolutely necessary.

Pelletier J. applied the same test as that used in patent litigation for the issue of a protective order, which is essentially a confidentiality order. The granting of such an order requires the appellant to show a subjective belief that the information is confidential and that its interests would be harmed by disclosure. In addition, if the order is challenged, then the person claiming the benefit of the order must demonstrate objectively that the order is required. This objective element requires the party to show that the information has been treated as confidential, and that it is reasonable to believe that its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could be harmed by the disclosure of the information.

15 Concluding that both the subjective part and both elements of the objective part of the test had been satisfied, he nevertheless stated: "However, I am also of the view that in public law cases, the objective test has, or should have, a third component which is whether the public interest in disclosure exceeds the risk of harm to a party arising from disclosure" (para. 23).

16 A very significant factor, in his view, was the fact that mandatory production of documents was not in issue here. The fact that the application involved a voluntary tendering of documents to advance the appellant's own cause as opposed to mandatory production weighed against granting the confidentiality order.

17 In weighing the public interest in disclosure against the risk of harm to AECL arising from disclosure, Pelletier J. noted that the documents the appellant wished to put before the court were prepared by others for other purposes, and recognized that the appellant was bound to protect the confidentiality of the information. At this stage, he again considered the issue of materiality. If the documents were shown to be very material to a critical issue, "the requirements of justice militate in favour of a confidentiality order. If the documents are marginally relevant, then the voluntary nature of the production argues against a confidentiality order" (para. 29). He then decided that the documents were material to a question of the appropriate remedy, a significant issue in the event that the appellant failed on the main issue.

18 Pelletier J. also considered the context of the case and held that since the issue of Canada's role as a vendor of nuclear technology was one of significant public interest, the burden of justifying a confidentiality order was very onerous. He found that AECL could expunge the sensitive material from the documents, or put the evidence before the court in some other form, and thus maintain its full right of defence while preserving the open access to court proceedings.

19 Pelletier J. observed that his order was being made without having perused the Confidential Documents because they had not been put before him. Although he noted the line of cases which holds that a judge ought not to deal with the issue of a confidentiality order without reviewing the documents themselves, in his view, given their voluminous nature and technical content as well as his lack of information as to what information was already in the public domain, he found that an examination of these documents would not have been useful.

20 Pelletier J. ordered that the appellant could file the documents in current form, or in an edited version if it chose to do so. He also granted leave to file material dealing with the Chinese regulatory process in general and as applied to this project, provided it did so within 60 days.

B. Federal Court of Appeal, [2000] 4 F.C. 426

(1) Evans J.A. (Sharlow J.A. concurring)

At the Federal Court of Appeal, AECL appealed the ruling under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998, and Sierra Club cross-appealed the ruling under R. 312.

With respect to R. 312, Evans J.A. held that the documents were clearly relevant to a defence under s. 54(2)(b), which the appellant proposed to raise if s. 5(1)(b) of the CEAA was held to apply, and were also potentially relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse a remedy even if the Ministers were in breach of the CEAA. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the benefit to the appellant and the court of being granted leave to file the documents outweighed any prejudice to the respondent owing to delay and thus concluded that the motions judge was correct in granting leave under R. 312.

On the issue of the confidentiality order, Evans J.A. considered R. 151, and all the factors that the motions judge had weighed, including the commercial sensitivity of the documents, the fact that the appellant had received them in confidence from the Chinese authorities, and the appellant's argument that without the documents it could not mount a full answer and defence to the application. These factors had to be weighed against the principle of open access to court documents. Evans J.A. agreed with Pelletier J. that the weight to be attached to the public interest in open proceedings varied with context and held that, where a case raises issues of public significance, the principle of openness of judicial process carries greater weight as a factor in the balancing process. Evans J.A. noted the public interest in the subject matter of the litigation, as well as the considerable media attention it had attracted.

In support of his conclusion that the weight assigned to the principle of openness may vary with context, Evans J.A. relied upon the decisions in *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)*, [2000] 3 F.C. 360 (Fed. C.A.), where the court took into consideration the relatively small public interest at stake, and *Ethyl Canada Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)* (1998), 17 C.P.C. (4th) 278 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at p. 283, where the court ordered disclosure after determining that the case was a significant constitutional case where it was important for the public to understand the issues at stake. Evans J.A. observed that openness and public participation in the assessment process are fundamental to the CEAA, and concluded that the motions judge could not be said to have given the principle of openness undue weight even though confidentiality was claimed for a relatively small number of highly technical documents.

Evans J.A. held that the motions judge had placed undue emphasis on the fact that the introduction of the documents was voluntary; however, it did not follow that his decision on the confidentiality order must therefore be set aside. Evans J.A. was of the view that this error did not affect the ultimate conclusion for three reasons. First, like the motions judge, he attached great weight to the principle of openness. Secondly, he held that the inclusion in the affidavits of a summary of the reports could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals, should the appellant choose not to put them in without a confidentiality order. Finally, if AECL submitted the documents in an expunged fashion, the claim for confidentiality would rest upon a relatively unimportant factor, i.e., the appellant's claim that it would suffer a loss of business if it breached its undertaking with the Chinese authorities.

Evans J.A. rejected the argument that the motions judge had erred in deciding the motion without reference to the actual documents, stating that it was not necessary for him to inspect them, given that summaries were available and that the documents were highly technical and incompletely translated. Thus, the appeal and cross-appeal were both dismissed.

(2) Robertson J.A. (dissenting)

27 Robertson J.A. disagreed with the majority for three reasons. First, in his view, the level of public interest in the case, the degree of media coverage, and the identities of the parties should not be taken into consideration in assessing an application for a confidentiality order. Instead, he held that it was the nature of the evidence for which the order is sought that must be examined.

In addition, he found that without a confidentiality order, the appellant had to choose between two unacceptable options: either suffering irreparable financial harm if the confidential information was introduced into evidence or being denied the right to a fair trial because it could not mount a full defence if the evidence was not introduced.

Finally, he stated that the analytical framework employed by the majority in reaching its decision was fundamentally flawed as it was based largely on the subjective views of the motions judge. He rejected the contextual approach to the question of whether a confidentiality order should issue, emphasizing the need for an objective framework to combat the perception that justice is a relative concept, and to promote consistency and certainty in the law.

30 To establish this more objective framework for regulating the issuance of confidentiality orders pertaining to commercial and scientific information, he turned to the legal rationale underlying the commitment to the principle of open justice, referring to *Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General)*, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 (S.C.C.). There, the Supreme Court of Canada held that open proceedings foster the search for the truth, and reflect the importance of public scrutiny of the courts.

Robertson J.A. stated that, although the principle of open justice is a reflection of the basic democratic value of accountability in the exercise of judicial power, in his view, the principle that justice itself must be secured is paramount. He concluded that justice as an overarching principle means that exceptions occasionally must be made to rules or principles.

32 He observed that, in the area of commercial law, when the information sought to be protected concerns "trade secrets," this information will not be disclosed during a trial if to do so would destroy the owner's proprietary rights and expose him or her to irreparable harm in the form of financial loss. Although the case before him did not involve a trade secret, he nevertheless held that the same treatment could be extended to commercial or scientific information which was acquired on a confidential basis and attached the following criteria as conditions precedent to the issuance of a confidentiality order (at para. 13):

(1) the information is of a confidential nature as opposed to facts which one would like to keep confidential; (2) the information for which confidentiality is sought is not already in the public domain; (3) on a balance of probabilities the party seeking the confidentiality order would suffer irreparable harm if the information were made public; (4) the information is relevant to the legal issues raised in the case; (5) correlatively, the information is "necessary" to the resolution of those issues; (6) the granting of a confidentiality order does not unduly prejudice the opposing party; and (7) the public interest in open court proceedings does not override the private interests of the party seeking the confidentiality order. The onus in establishing that criteria one to six are met is on the party seeking the confidentiality order. Under the seventh criterion, it is for the opposing party to show that a *prima facie* right to a protective order has been overtaken by the need to preserve the openness of the court proceedings. In addressing these criteria one must bear in mind two of the threads woven into the fabric of the principle of open justice: the search for truth and the preservation of the rule of law. As stated at the outset, I do not believe that the perceived degree of public importance of a case is a relevant consideration.

In applying these criteria to the circumstances of the case, Robertson J.A. concluded that the confidentiality order should be granted. In his view, the public interest in open court proceedings did not override the interests of AECL in maintaining the confidentiality of these highly technical documents.

34 Robertson J.A. also considered the public interest in the need to ensure that site-plans for nuclear installations were not, for example, posted on a web-site. He concluded that a confidentiality order would not undermine the two primary objectives underlying the principle of open justice: truth and the rule of law. As such, he would have allowed the appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal.

V. Issues

35

A. What is the proper analytical approach to be applied to the exercise of judicial discretion where a litigant seeks a confidentiality order under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998?

B. Should the confidentiality order be granted in this case?

VI. Analysis

A. The Analytical Approach to the Granting of a Confidentiality Order

(1) The General Framework: Herein the Dagenais Principles

The link between openness in judicial proceedings and freedom of expression has been firmly established by this Court. In *Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. New Brunswick (Attorney General)*, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 480 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter *New Brunswick*], at para. 23, La Forest J. expressed the relationship as follows:

The principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the rights guaranteed by s. 2(b). Openness permits public access to information about the courts, which in turn permits the public to discuss and put forward opinions and criticisms of court practices and proceedings. While the freedom to express ideas and opinions about the operation of the courts is clearly within the ambit of the freedom guaranteed by s. 2(b), so too is the right of members of the public to obtain information about the courts in the first place.

Under the order sought, public access and public scrutiny of the Confidential Documents would be restricted; this would clearly infringe the public's freedom of expression guarantee.

A discussion of the general approach to be taken in the exercise of judicial discretion to grant a confidentiality order should begin with the principles set out by this Court in *Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.). Although that case dealt with the common law jurisdiction of the court to order a publication ban in the criminal law context, there are strong similarities between publication bans and confidentiality orders in the context of judicial proceedings. In both cases a restriction on freedom of expression is sought in order to preserve or promote an interest engaged by those proceedings. As such, the fundamental question for a court to consider in an application for a publication ban or a confidentiality order is whether, in the circumstances, the right to freedom of expression should be compromised.

38 Although in each case freedom of expression will be engaged in a different context, the *Dagenais* framework utilizes overarching *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* principles in order to balance freedom of expression with other rights and interests, and thus can be adapted and applied to various circumstances. As a result, the analytical approach to the exercise of discretion under R. 151 should echo the underlying principles laid out in *Dagenais, supra*, although it must be tailored to the specific rights and interests engaged in this case.

39 *Dagenais, supra*, dealt with an application by four accused persons under the court's common law jurisdiction requesting an order prohibiting the broadcast of a television programme dealing with the physical and sexual abuse of young boys at religious institutions. The applicants argued that because the factual circumstances of the programme were very similar to the facts at issue in their trials, the ban was necessary to preserve the accuseds' right to a fair trial.

40 Lamer C.J. found that the common law discretion to order a publication ban must be exercised within the boundaries set by the principles of the *Charter*. Since publication bans necessarily curtail the freedom of expression of third parties, he adapted the pre-*Charter* common law rule such that it balanced the right to freedom of expression with the right to a fair trial of the accused in a way which reflected the substance of the test from *R. v. Oakes*, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.). At p. 878 of *Dagenais*, Lamer C.J. set out his reformulated test:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) Such a ban is *necessary* in order to prevent a real and substantial risk to the fairness of the trial, because reasonably available alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) The salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects to the free expression of those affected by the ban. [Emphasis in original.]

41 In *New Brunswick, supra*, this Court modified the *Dagenais* test in the context of the related issue of how the discretionary power under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code* to exclude the public from a trial should be exercised. That case dealt with an appeal from the trial judge's order excluding the public from the portion of a sentencing proceeding for sexual assault and sexual interference dealing with the specific acts committed by the accused on the basis that it would avoid "undue hardship" to both the victims and the accused.

42 La Forest J. found that s. 486(1) was a restriction on the s. 2(b) right to freedom of expression in that it provided a "discretionary bar on public and media access to the courts": *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 33; however, he found this infringement to be justified under s. 1 provided that the discretion was exercised in accordance with the *Charter*. Thus, the approach taken by La Forest J. at para. 69 to the exercise of discretion under s. 486(1) of the *Criminal Code*, closely mirrors the *Dagenais* common law test:

(a) the judge must consider the available options and consider whether there are any other reasonable and effective alternatives available;

(b) the judge must consider whether the order is limited as much as possible; and

(c) the judge must weigh the importance of the objectives of the particular order and its probable effects against the importance of openness and the particular expression that will be limited in order to ensure that the positive and negative effects of the order are proportionate.

In applying this test to the facts of the case, La Forest J. found that the evidence of the potential undue hardship consisted mainly in the Crown's submission that the evidence was of a "delicate nature" and that this was insufficient to override the infringement on freedom of expression.

This Court has recently revisited the granting of a publication ban under the court's common law jurisdiction in R. v. Mentuck, 2001 SCC 76 (S.C.C.), and its companion case R. v. E. (O.N.), 2001 SCC 77 (S.C.C.). In Mentuck, the Crown moved for a publication ban to protect the identity of undercover police officers and operational methods employed by the officers in their investigation of the accused. The accused opposed the motion as an infringement of his right to a fair and public hearing under s. 11(d) of the Charter. The order was also opposed by two intervening newspapers as an infringement of their right to freedom of expression.

44 The Court noted that, while *Dagenais* dealt with the balancing of freedom of expression on the one hand, and the right to a fair trial of the accused on the other, in the case before it, both the right of the accused to a fair and public hearing, and freedom of expression weighed in favour of denying the publication ban. These rights were balanced against interests relating to the proper administration of justice, in particular, protecting the safety of police officers and preserving the efficacy of undercover police operations.

45 In spite of this distinction, the Court noted that underlying the approach taken in both *Dagenais* and *New Brunswick* was the goal of ensuring that the judicial discretion to order publication bans is subject to no lower a standard of compliance with the *Charter* than legislative enactment. This goal is furthered by incorporating the essence of s. 1 of the *Charter* and the *Oakes* test into the publication ban test. Since this same goal applied in the case before it, the Court adopted a similar approach to that taken in *Dagenais*, but broadened the *Dagenais* test (which dealt specifically with the right of an accused to a fair trial) such that it could guide the exercise of judicial discretion where a publication ban is requested in order to preserve *any* important aspect of the proper administration of justice. At para. 32, the Court reformulated the test as follows:

A publication ban should only be ordered when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the publication ban outweigh the deleterious effects on the rights and interests of the parties and the public, including the effects on the right to free expression, the right of the accused to a fair and public trial, and the efficacy of the administration of justice.

46 The Court emphasized that under the first branch of the test, three important elements were subsumed under the "necessity" branch. First, the risk in question must be a serious risk well-grounded in the evidence. Second, the phrase "proper administration of justice" must be carefully interpreted so as not to allow the concealment of an excessive amount of information. Third, the test requires the judge ordering the ban to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives are available, but also to restrict the ban as far as possible without sacrificing the prevention of the risk.

47 At para. 31, the Court also made the important observation that the proper administration of justice will not necessarily involve *Charter* rights, and that the ability to invoke the *Charter* is not a necessary condition for a publication ban to be granted:

The [common law publication ban] rule can accommodate orders that must occasionally be made in the interests of the administration of justice, which encompass more than fair trial rights. As the test is intended to "reflect . . . the substance of the Oakes test", we cannot require that Charter rights be the only legitimate objective of such orders any more than we require that government action or legislation in violation of the Charter be justified exclusively by the pursuit of another Charter right. [Emphasis added.]

The Court also anticipated that, in appropriate circumstances, the *Dagenais* framework could be expanded even further in order to address requests for publication bans where interests other than the administration of justice were involved.

Mentuck is illustrative of the flexibility of the *Dagenais* approach. Since its basic purpose is to ensure that the judicial discretion to deny public access to the courts is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles, in my view, the *Dagenais* model can and should be adapted to the situation in the case at bar where the central issue is whether judicial discretion should be exercised so as to exclude confidential information from a public proceeding. As in *Dagenais, New Brunswick* and *Mentuck*, granting the confidentiality order will have a negative effect on the *Charter* right to freedom of expression, as well as the principle of open and accessible court proceedings, and, as in those cases, courts must ensure that the discretion to grant the order is exercised in accordance with *Charter* principles. However, in order to adapt the test to the context of this case, it is first necessary to determine the particular rights and interests engaged by this application.

(2) The Rights and Interests of the Parties

49 The immediate purpose for AECL's confidentiality request relates to its commercial interests. The information in question is the property of the Chinese authorities. If the appellant were to disclose the Confidential Documents, it would be in breach of its contractual obligations and suffer a risk of harm to its competitive position. This is clear from the findings of fact of the motions judge that AECL was bound by its commercial interests and its customer's property rights not to disclose the information (para. 27), and that such disclosure could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23).

Aside from this direct commercial interest, if the confidentiality order is denied, then in order to protect its commercial interests, the appellant will have to withhold the documents. This raises the important matter of the litigation context in which the order is sought. As both the motions judge and the Federal Court of Appeal found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to defences available under the CEAA, the inability to present this information hinders the appellant's capacity to make full answer and defence or, expressed more generally, the appellant's right, as a civil litigant, to present its case. In that sense, preventing the appellant from disclosing these documents on a confidential basis infringes its right to a fair trial. Although in the context of a civil proceeding this does not engage a *Charter* right, the right to a fair trial generally can be viewed as a fundamental principle of justice: M. (A.) v. Ryan, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157 (S.C.C.), at para. 84, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. (dissenting, but not on that point). Although this fair trial right is directly relevant to the appellant, there

is also a general public interest in protecting the right to a fair trial. Indeed, as a general proposition, all disputes in the courts should be decided under a fair trial standard. The legitimacy of the judicial process alone demands as much. Similarly, courts have an interest in having all relevant evidence before them in order to ensure that justice is done.

51 Thus, the interests which would be promoted by a confidentiality order are the preservation of commercial and contractual relations, as well as the right of civil litigants to a fair trial. Related to the latter are the public and judicial interests in seeking the truth and achieving a just result in civil proceedings.

52 In opposition to the confidentiality order lies the fundamental principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This principle is inextricably tied to freedom of expression enshrined in s. 2(b) of the *Charter: New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 23. The importance of public and media access to the courts cannot be understated, as this access is the method by which the judicial process is scrutinized and criticized. Because it is essential to the administration of justice that justice is done and is *seen* to be done, such public scrutiny is fundamental. The open court principle has been described as "the very soul of justice," guaranteeing that justice is administered in a non-arbitrary manner: *New Brunswick, supra*, at para. 22.

(3) Adapting the Dagenais Test to the Rights and Interests of the Parties

Applying the rights and interests engaged in this case to the analytical framework of *Dagenais* and subsequent cases discussed above, the test for whether a confidentiality order ought to be granted in a case such as this one should be framed as follows:

A confidentiality order under R. 151 should only be granted when:

(a) such an order is necessary in order to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, including a commercial interest, in the context of litigation because reasonably alternative measures will not prevent the risk; and

(b) the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right of civil litigants to a fair trial, outweigh its deleterious effects, including the effects on the right to free expression, which in this context includes the public interest in open and accessible court proceedings.

As in *Mentuck*, *supra*, I would add that three important elements are subsumed under the first branch of this test. First, the risk in question must be real and substantial, in that the risk is well-grounded in the evidence and poses a serious threat to the commercial interest in question.

In addition, the phrase "important commercial interest" is in need of some clarification. In order to qualify as an "important commercial interest," the interest in question cannot merely be specific to the party requesting the order; the interest must be one which can be expressed in terms of a public interest in confidentiality. For example, a private company could not argue simply that the existence of a particular contract should not be made public because to do so would cause the company to lose business, thus harming its commercial interests. However, if, as in this case, exposure of information would cause a breach of a confidentiality agreement, then the commercial interest affected can be characterized more broadly as the general commercial interest of preserving confidential information. Simply put, if there is no general principle at stake, there can be no "important commercial interest" for the purposes of this test. Or, in the words of Binnie J. in *Re N. (F.)*, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 880, 2000 SCC 35 (S.C.C.), at para. 10, the open court rule only yields" where the *public* interest in confidentiality outweighs the public interest in openness" (emphasis added).

In addition to the above requirement, courts must be cautious in determining what constitutes an "important commercial interest." It must be remembered that a confidentiality order involves an infringement on freedom of expression. Although the balancing of the commercial interest with freedom of expression takes place under the second branch of the test, courts must be alive to the fundamental importance of the open court rule. See generally Muldoon J. in *Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd.* (1994), 56 C.P.R. (3d) 437 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 439.

57 Finally, the phrase "reasonably alternative measures" requires the judge to consider not only whether reasonable alternatives to a confidentiality order are available, but also to restrict the order as much as is reasonably possible while preserving the commercial interest in question.

B. Application of the Test to this Appeal

(1) Necessity

At this stage, it must be determined whether disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and whether there are reasonable alternatives, either to the order itself or to its terms.

59 The commercial interest at stake here relates to the objective of preserving contractual obligations of confidentiality. The appellant argues that it will suffer irreparable harm to its commercial interests if the confidential documents are disclosed. In my view, the preservation of confidential information constitutes a sufficiently important commercial interest to pass the first branch of the test as long as certain criteria relating to the information are met.

60 Pelletier J. noted that the order sought in this case was similar in nature to an application for a protective order which arises in the context of patent litigation. Such an order requires the applicant to demonstrate that the information in question has been treated at all relevant times as confidential and that on a balance of probabilities its proprietary, commercial and scientific interests could reasonably be harmed by the disclosure of the information: *AB Hassle v. Canada (Minister of National Health & Welfare)* (1998), 83 C.P.R. (3d) 428 (Fed. T.D.), at p. 434. To this I would add the requirement proposed by Robertson J.A. that the information in question must be of a "confidential nature" in that it has been" accumulated with a reasonable expectation of it being kept confidential" (para. 14) as opposed to "facts which a litigant would like to keep confidential by having the courtroom doors closed" (para. 14).

61 Pelletier J. found as a fact that the *AB Hassle* test had been satisfied in that the information had clearly been treated as confidential both by the appellant and by the Chinese authorities, and that, on a balance of probabilities, disclosure of the information could harm the appellant's commercial interests (para. 23). As well, Robertson J.A. found that the information in question was clearly of a confidential nature as it was commercial information, consistently treated and regarded as confidential, that would be of interest to AECL's competitors (para. 16). Thus, the order is sought to prevent a serious risk to an important commercial interest.

The first branch of the test also requires the consideration of alternative measures to the confidentiality order, as well as an examination of the scope of the order to ensure that it is not overly broad. Both courts below found that the information contained in the Confidential Documents was relevant to potential defences available to the appellant under the CEAA and this finding was not appealed at this Court. Further, I agree with the Court of Appeal's assertion (para. 99) that, given the importance of the documents to the right to make full answer and defence, the appellant is, practically speaking, compelled to produce the documents. Given that the information is necessary to the appellant's case, it remains only to determine whether there are reasonably alternative means by which the necessary information can be adduced without disclosing the confidential information.

Two alternatives to the confidentiality order were put forward by the courts below. The motions judge suggested that the Confidential Documents could be expunded of their commercially sensitive contents, and edited versions of the documents could be filed. As well, the majority of the Court of Appeal, in addition to accepting the possibility of expundement, was of the opinion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits could go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals. If either of these options is a reasonable alternative to submitting the Confidential Documents under a confidentiality order, then the order is not necessary, and the application does not pass the first branch of the test.

There are two possible options with respect to expungement, and, in my view, there are problems with both of these. The first option would be for AECL to expunge the confidential information without disclosing the expunged material to the

parties and the court. However, in this situation the filed material would still differ from the material used by the affiants. It must not be forgotten that this motion arose as a result of Sierra Club's position that the summaries contained in the affidavits should be accorded little or no weight without the presence of the underlying documents. Even if the relevant information and the confidential information were mutually exclusive, which would allow for the disclosure of all the information relied on in the affidavits, this relevancy determination could not be tested on cross-examination because the expunged material would not be available. Thus, even in the best case scenario, where only irrelevant information needed to be expunged, the parties would be put in essentially the same position as that which initially generated this appeal in the sense that at least some of the material relied on to prepare the affidavits in question would not be available to Sierra Club.

Further, I agree with Robertson J.A. that this best case scenario, where the relevant and the confidential information do not overlap, is an untested assumption (para. 28). Although the documents themselves were not put before the courts on this motion, given that they comprise thousands of pages of detailed information, this assumption is at best optimistic. The expungement alternative would be further complicated by the fact that the Chinese authorities require prior approval for any request by AECL to disclose information.

The second option is that the expunged material be made available to the Court and the parties under a more narrowly drawn confidentiality order. Although this option would allow for slightly broader public access than the current confidentiality request, in my view, this minor restriction to the current confidentiality request is not a viable alternative given the difficulties associated with expungement in these circumstances. The test asks whether there are *reasonably* alternative measures; it does not require the adoption of the absolutely least restrictive option. With respect, in my view, expungement of the Confidential Documents would be a virtually unworkable and ineffective solution that is not reasonable in the circumstances.

A second alternative to a confidentiality order was Evans J.A.'s suggestion that the summaries of the Confidential Documents included in the affidavits" may well go a long way to compensate for the absence of the originals" (para. 103). However, he appeared to take this fact into account merely as a factor to be considered when balancing the various interests at stake. I would agree that at this threshold stage to rely on the summaries alone, in light of the intention of Sierra Club to argue that they should be accorded little or no weight, does not appear to be a "reasonably alternative measure" to having the underlying documents available to the parties.

With the above considerations in mind, I find the confidentiality order necessary in that disclosure of the Confidential Documents would impose a serious risk on an important commercial interest of the appellant, and that there are no reasonably alternative measures to granting the order.

(2) The Proportionality Stage

As stated above, at this stage, the salutary effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, must be weighed against the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order, including the effects on the right to free expression, which, in turn, is connected to the principle of open and accessible court proceedings. This balancing will ultimately determine whether the confidentiality order ought to be granted.

(a) Salutary Effects of the Confidentiality Order

As discussed above, the primary interest that would be promoted by the confidentiality order is the public interest in the right of a civil litigant to present its case or, more generally, the fair trial right. Because the fair trial right is being invoked in this case in order to protect commercial, not liberty, interests of the appellant, the right to a fair trial in this context is not a *Charter* right; however, a fair trial for all litigants has been recognized as a fundamental principle of justice: *Ryan, supra,* at para. 84. It bears repeating that there are circumstances where, in the absence of an affected *Charter* right, the proper administration of justice calls for a confidentiality order: *Mentuck, supra,* at para. 31. In this case, the salutary effects that such an order would have on the administration of justice relate to the ability of the appellant to present its case, as encompassed by the broader fair trial right.

The Confidential Documents have been found to be relevant to defences that will be available to the appellant in the event that the CEAA is found to apply to the impugned transaction and, as discussed above, the appellant cannot disclose the documents without putting its commercial interests at serious risk of harm. As such, there is a very real risk that, without the confidentiality order, the ability of the appellant to mount a successful defence will be seriously curtailed. I conclude, therefore, that the confidentiality order would have significant salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial.

Aside from the salutary effects on the fair trial interest, the confidentiality order would also have a beneficial impact on other important rights and interests. First, as I discuss in more detail below, the confidentiality order would allow all parties and the court access to the Confidential Documents, and permit cross-examination based on their contents. By facilitating access to relevant documents in a judicial proceeding, the order sought would assist in the search for truth, a core value underlying freedom of expression.

73 Second, I agree with the observation of Robertson J.A. that, as the Confidential Documents contain detailed technical information pertaining to the construction and design of a nuclear installation, it may be in keeping with the public interest to prevent this information from entering the public domain (para. 44). Although the exact contents of the documents remain a mystery, it is apparent that they contain technical details of a nuclear installation, and there may well be a substantial public security interest in maintaining the confidentiality of such information.

(b) Deleterious Effects of the Confidentiality Order

Granting the confidentiality order would have a negative effect on the open court principle, as the public would be denied access to the contents of the Confidential Documents. As stated above, the principle of open courts is inextricably tied to the s. 2(b) *Charter* right to freedom of expression, and public scrutiny of the courts is a fundamental aspect of the administration of justice: *New Brunswick, supra*, at paras. 22-23. Although as a *general* principle, the importance of open courts cannot be overstated, it is necessary to examine, in the context of this case, the *particular* deleterious effects on freedom of expression that the confidentiality order would have.

Underlying freedom of expression are the core values of (1) seeking the truth and the common good, (2) promoting selffulfilment of individuals by allowing them to develop thoughts and ideas as they see fit, and (3) ensuring that participation in the political process is open to all persons: *Irwin Toy Ltd. c. Québec (Procureur général)*, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 (S.C.C.), at p. 976, *R. v. Keegstra*, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.), *per* Dickson C.J., at pp. 762-764. *Charter* jurisprudence has established that the closer the speech in question lies to these core values, the harder it will be to justify a s. 2(b) infringement of that speech under s. 1 of the *Charter: Keegstra*, *supra*, at pp. 760-761. Since the main goal in this case is to exercise judicial discretion in a way which conforms to *Charter* principles, a discussion of the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on freedom of expression should include an assessment of the effects such an order would have on the three core values. The more detrimental the order would be to these values, the more difficult it will be to justify the confidentiality order. Similarly, minor effects of the order on the core values will make the confidentiality order easier to justify.

Seeking the truth is not only at the core of freedom of expression, but it has also been recognized as a fundamental purpose behind the open court rule, as the open examination of witnesses promotes an effective evidentiary process: *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, *per* Wilson J., at pp. 1357-1358. Clearly, the confidentiality order, by denying public and media access to documents relied on in the proceedings, would impede the search for truth to some extent. Although the order would not exclude the public from the courtroom, the public and the media would be denied access to documents relevant to the evidentiary process.

⁷⁷ However, as mentioned above, to some extent the search for truth may actually be *promoted* by the confidentiality order. This motion arises as a result of Sierra Club's argument that it must have access to the Confidential Documents in order to test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence. If the order is denied, then the most likely scenario is that the appellant will not submit the documents, with the unfortunate result that evidence which may be relevant to the proceedings will not be available to Sierra Club or the court. As a result, Sierra Club will not be able to fully test the accuracy of Dr. Pang's evidence on cross-examination.

In addition, the court will not have the benefit of this cross-examination or documentary evidence, and will be required to draw conclusions based on an incomplete evidentiary record. This would clearly impede the search for truth in this case.

As well, it is important to remember that the confidentiality order would restrict access to a relatively small number of highly technical documents. The nature of these documents is such that the general public would be unlikely to understand their contents, and thus they would contribute little to the public interest in the search for truth in this case. However, in the hands of the parties and their respective experts, the documents may be of great assistance in probing the truth of the Chinese environmental assessment process, which would, in turn, assist the court in reaching accurate factual conclusions. Given the nature of the documents, in my view, the important value of the search for truth which underlies both freedom of expression and open justice would be promoted to a greater extent by submitting the Confidential Documents under the order sought than it would by denying the order, and thereby preventing the parties and the court from relying on the documents in the course of the litigation.

79 In addition, under the terms of the order sought, the only restrictions on these documents relate to their public distribution. The Confidential Documents would be available to the court and the parties, and public access to the proceedings would not be impeded. As such, the order represents a fairly minimal intrusion into the open court rule, and thus would not have significant deleterious effects on this principle.

80 The second core value underlying freedom of speech, namely, the promotion of individual self-fulfilment by allowing open development of thoughts and ideas, focuses on individual expression, and thus does not closely relate to the open court principle which involves institutional expression. Although the confidentiality order would restrict individual access to certain information which may be of interest to that individual, I find that this value would not be significantly affected by the confidentiality order.

The third core value, open participation in the political process, figures prominently in this appeal, as open justice is a fundamental aspect of a democratic society. This connection was pointed out by Cory J. in *Edmonton Journal*, *supra*, at p. 1339:

It can be seen that freedom of expression is of fundamental importance to a democratic society. It is also essential to a democracy and crucial to the rule of law that the courts are seen to function openly. The press must be free to comment upon court proceedings to ensure that the courts are, in fact, seen by all to operate openly in the penetrating light of public scrutiny.

Although there is no doubt as to the importance of open judicial proceedings to a democratic society, there was disagreement in the courts below as to whether the weight to be assigned to the open court principle should vary depending on the nature of the proceeding.

82 On this issue, Robertson J.A. was of the view that the nature of the case and the level of media interest were irrelevant considerations. On the other hand, Evans J.A. held that the motions judge was correct in taking into account that this judicial review application was one of significant public and media interest. In my view, although the public nature of the case may be a factor which strengthens the importance of open justice in a particular case, the level of media interest should not be taken into account as an independent consideration.

Since cases involving public institutions will generally relate more closely to the core value of public participation in the political process, the public nature of a proceeding should be taken into consideration when assessing the merits of a confidentiality order. It is important to note that this core value will *always* be engaged where the open court principle is engaged owing to the importance of open justice to a democratic society. However, where the political process is also engaged by the *substance* of the proceedings, the connection between open proceedings and public participation in the political process will increase. As such, I agree with Evans J.A. in the court below, where he stated, at para. 87:

While all litigation is important to the parties, and there is a public interest in ensuring the fair and appropriate adjudication of all litigation that comes before the courts, some cases raise issues that transcend the immediate interests of the parties and the general public interest in the due administration of justice, and have a much wider public interest significance.

This motion relates to an application for judicial review of a decision by the government to fund a nuclear energy project. Such an application is clearly of a public nature, as it relates to the distribution of public funds in relation to an issue of demonstrated public interest. Moreover, as pointed out by Evans J.A., openness and public participation are of fundamental importance under the CEAA. Indeed, by their very nature, environmental matters carry significant public import, and openness in judicial proceedings involving environmental issues will generally attract a high degree of protection. In this regard, I agree with Evans J.A. that the public interest is engaged here more than it would be if this were an action between private parties relating to purely private interests.

However, with respect, to the extent that Evans J.A. relied on media interest as an indicium of public interest, this was an error. In my view, it is important to distinguish *public* interest from *media* interest, and I agree with Robertson J.A. that media exposure cannot be viewed as an impartial measure of public interest. It is the public *nature* of the proceedings which increases the need for openness, and this public nature is not necessarily reflected by the media desire to probe the facts of the case. I reiterate the caution given by Dickson C.J. in *Keegstra*, *supra*, at p. 760, where he stated that, while the speech in question must be examined in light of its relation to the core values," we must guard carefully against judging expression according to its popularity."

Although the public interest in open access to the judicial review application *as a whole* is substantial, in my view, it is also important to bear in mind the nature and scope of the information for which the order is sought in assigning weight to the public interest. With respect, the motions judge erred in failing to consider the narrow scope of the order when he considered the public interest in disclosure, and consequently attached excessive weight to this factor. In this connection, I respectfully disagree with the following conclusion of Evans J.A., at para. 97:

Thus, having considered the nature of this litigation, and having assessed the extent of public interest in the openness of the proceedings in the case before him, the Motions Judge cannot be said in all the circumstances to have given this factor undue weight, even though confidentiality is claimed for only three documents among the small mountain of paper filed in this case, and their content is likely to be beyond the comprehension of all but those equipped with the necessary technical expertise.

Open justice is a fundamentally important principle, particularly when the substance of the proceedings is public in nature. However, this does not detract from the duty to attach weight to this principle in accordance with the specific limitations on openness that the confidentiality order would have. As Wilson J. observed in *Edmonton Journal, supra*, at pp. 1353-1354:

One thing seems clear and that is that one should not balance one value at large and the conflicting value in its context. To do so could well be to pre-judge the issue by placing more weight on the value developed at large than is appropriate in the context of the case.

In my view, it is important that, although there is significant public interest in these proceedings, open access to the judicial review application would be only slightly impeded by the order sought. The narrow scope of the order coupled with the highly technical nature of the Confidential Documents significantly temper the deleterious effects the confidentiality order would have on the public interest in open courts.

In addressing the effects that the confidentiality order would have on freedom of expression, it should also be borne in mind that the appellant may not have to raise defences under the CEAA, in which case the Confidential Documents would be irrelevant to the proceedings, with the result that freedom of expression would be unaffected by the order. However, since the necessity of the Confidential Documents will not be determined for some time, in the absence of a confidentiality order, the appellant would be left with the choice of either submitting the documents in breach of its obligations or withholding the documents in the hopes that either it will not have to present a defence under the CEAA or that it will be able to mount a successful defence in the absence of these relevant documents. If it chooses the former option, and the defences under the CEAA are later found not to apply, then the appellant will have suffered the prejudice of having its confidential and sensitive

information released into the public domain with no corresponding benefit to the public. Although this scenario is far from certain, the possibility of such an occurrence also weighs in favour of granting the order sought.

In coming to this conclusion, I note that if the appellant is not required to invoke the relevant defences under the CEAA, it is also true that the appellant's fair trial right will not be impeded, even if the confidentiality order is not granted. However, I do not take this into account as a factor which weighs in favour of denying the order because, if the order is granted and the Confidential Documents are not required, there will be no deleterious effects on *either* the public interest in freedom of expression *or* the appellant's commercial interests or fair trial right. This neutral result is in contrast with the scenario discussed above where the order is denied and the possibility arises that the appellant's commercial interests will be prejudiced with no corresponding public benefit. As a result, the fact that the Confidential Documents may not be required is a factor which weighs in favour of granting the confidentiality order.

90 In summary, the core freedom of expression values of seeking the truth and promoting an open political process are most closely linked to the principle of open courts, and most affected by an order restricting that openness. However, in the context of this case, the confidentiality order would only marginally impede, and in some respects would even promote, the pursuit of these values. As such, the order would not have significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression.

VII. Conclusion

In balancing the various rights and interests engaged, I note that the confidentiality order would have substantial salutary effects on the appellant's right to a fair trial, and freedom of expression. On the other hand, the deleterious effects of the confidentiality order on the principle of open courts and freedom of expression would be minimal. In addition, if the order is not granted and in the course of the judicial review application the appellant is not required to mount a defence under the CEAA, there is a possibility that the appellant will have suffered the harm of having disclosed confidential information in breach of its obligations with no corresponding benefit to the right of the public to freedom of expression. As a result, I find that the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects, and the order should be granted.

Consequently, I would allow the appeal with costs throughout, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, and grant the confidentiality order on the terms requested by the appellant under R. 151 of the *Federal Court Rules*, 1998. *Appeal allowed*.

Pourvoi accueilli.

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